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Abstract 
For four days in August 2011 there were widespread public disturbances in 66 
locations across the country. Known as the ‘2011 English Riots’, they were 
estimated to have involved 15,000 participants, cost half a billion pounds and were 
associated with five deaths (Bridges 2012). The Prime Minister described them as 
‘criminality, pure and simple’ (Cameron 2011). Consequently, there was no major 
official inquiry. An academic literature emerged, but this was theoretically driven 
and London-centric.  
The lack of an empirical evidence-base provided the rationale for this study. The 
aims were to understand why the riots occurred in some places outside London, 
but not others; to explore the role of police and partners in preventing and 
containing unrest; and, recognising that policing rarely takes place in a vacuum, to 
identify other contextual factors undermining and promoting social order at local 
levels. 
The case study method was selected for its ability to capture context. Cases 
included a riot affected city and an ‘at risk’ city, which were characteristically 
similar, to support a compare and contrast approach. Neighbourhood 'sub-cases' 
were used as a methodological tool to access community-level variables. The study 
drew on quantitative and qualitative data, but was primarily based on 45 
interviews with police and partners involved in the public order response or 
working with affected communities. 
The study found that inequality, exclusion and poor treatment of communities 
provided motivation for rioting.  However, the activities of police and partners 
were able to prevent and contain unrest. The involvement of neighbourhood 
police officers and practitioners in the main public order response offered greater 
chance of success, due to their local knowledge and rapport, but was dependent 
on pre-existing partnerships and the mind-set of police commanders. Informal 
social controls, underpinned by community attachment, played an important role 
in inhibiting violence, especially where supported by formal controls.  
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Introduction 
Background 
On Saturday, 6 August 2011 in Tottenham, North London, a community protest 
over the police killing of a young Black man, Mark Duggan, escalated into violent 
disturbances. This marked the beginning of what became known as ‘the 2011 
English Riots’, which occurred over four days and across 66 locations in England 
and Wales. Some commentators reported them as the most widespread 
disturbances in recent history (Bridges 2012; Clarke 2012; Lea & Hallsworth 2012). 
They involved an estimated 15,000 people, cost approximately half a billion 
pounds and were associated with five deaths (Bridges 2012).  
The immediate political and media response focused on ‘mindless thugs’. Prime 
Minister David Cameron claimed: 'this was not political protest or a riot about 
protest, about politics. It was common or garden thieving, robbing and looting. 
And we don't need an inquiry to tell us that' (Hansard HC Deb. 2001, col.1051). 
Thus, despite the scale of unrest, there was no major public investigation 
equivalent to the Scarman inquiry (1981) into the Brixton riots. Reports by the 
Riots Communities and Victims Panel (2012) and the Home Affairs Select 
Committee (2011a) were light-touch by comparison. 
An academic literature emerged to provide a critical contrast to the mainstream 
media construction of events, but this was theoretically driven and less grounded 
in an empirical evidence base. A dominant explanation drew on theories of 
consumerism to argue that a culture of individualism, envy and intense social 
competition, produced by late-capitalism and neoliberalism, had undermined any 
possibility of protest (Treadwell et al. 2012; Bauman 2012; Moxon 2011; Žižek 
2011). This overlapped with Cameron’s view, albeit for different reasons, that 
rioters’ motives were primarily criminal. Beyond the micro-politics in Tottenham, 
people participated because they felt unable to let an historic opportunity to grab 
something for free pass them by. However, consumerism could not explain why 
riots did not occur everywhere. 
Outside London, events were widely described as 'copycat riots’, fuelled by media 
reporting and social networking, people were drawn into rioting by either 
‘emotional contagion’ (Baker, 2012) or calculated opportunism as participants 
were seen ‘getting away with it’ (Morrell, Scott, McNeish, & Webster, 2011, p. 36). 
This closely aligns with 'mob psychology', whereby individuals lose their sense of 
self and personal responsibility and unquestioningly follow the predominant ideas 
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and emotions of the crowd (Le Bon 1895); and by implication, context – local, 
national, or global – was irrelevant. 
The main empirical work that was produced in the aftermath of the disturbances 
was the Reading the Riots study, conducted by the London School of Economics 
and the Guardian newspaper. However, this was London-centric and focused 
largely on rioters’ self-reported motivations, which may have been blind to the 
wider events and structural forces affecting individuals’ choices. There was some 
reflection on events is specific localities (Jeffery & Jackson 2012; Clifton 2012a; 
Clifton 2012b; Spalek et al. 2012), but without the depth of detail to understand 
how risk and protective factors interacted; and with little consideration of how 
policing partners can plan for unrest should there be a similar threat again. 
Aims and Objectives 
The lack of an evidence-based understanding about why the 2011 Riots occurred 
in some towns and cities outside London, but not others, provided the rationale 
for this study. The fieldwork was conducted in 2014-15, providing time since the 
riots for reflection. Based on the documented role of the police in previous riots, a 
key objective was to look at this again. However, in this study the scope was 
widened to explore the role of other agencies in preventing and containing unrest, 
given their remit in policing and protecting communities since the Crime and 
Disorder Act 1998. It was also important because after pointing the finger of blame 
firmly at rioters, the government began criticise the police for the extent of the 
disorders, claiming they did not act quickly enough and were initially too timid.  
Recognising that policing rarely takes place in a vacuum, the study additionally 
sought to explore the relevance of key contextual factors, including those 
previously associated with urban unrest. The literature on contemporary riots in 
England, France and the United States made reference to deprivation, social 
exclusion, crime, previous unrest, dysfunctional community, police-community 
relations and austerity. However, the primary research was not restricted to these. 
The methodology involved both deductive and inductive inquiry to ensure any 
distinct local factors in the case studies were not overlooked. Context is critical and 
what works in one locality many not work in another. 
Thus, the over-arching aim of the study was to understand the aetiology of the 
2011 English Riots outside London. The objectives were: 
1. to understand why riots occurred in some locales, but not others, 
highlighting the role of both risk and protective factors; 
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2. to explore the role of police and partners in preventing and containing 
unrest, as the actors primarily responsible for community safety and public 
order maintenance; and 
3. to identify key contextual factors undermining and promoting order at local 
levels, which might limit the capability of policing partners to prevent and 
contain imminent unrest. 
Methods 
A case study approach was selected for its ability to investigate phenomena and 
context together. Two case studies were selected including a riot-affected city, 
Nottingham, and an ‘at risk’ city, Sheffield. These two cities were selected because 
they were characteristically similar and this supported a compare and contrast 
model. Nottingham and Sheffield were also selected because they were far away 
from London and non-contiguous with other riot-affected areas. Neighbourhood 
'sub-cases' were used as a methodological tool to access data on community-level 
variables. These were identified in a similar way to the main case studies, to 
include riot-affected neighbourhoods in Nottingham and at risk neighbourhoods in 
Sheffield. It was a mixed methods study, involving analysis of social statistics, 
documentary material and 45 qualitative interviews across the two case studies. 
The semi-structured interviews were conducted with police officers and managers 
and practitioners in partner agencies, including community-based providers, who 
were either involved in the public order response or worked with local people in 
the study neighbourhoods. 
Why understanding unrest is important 
Urban unrest is costly both financially and socially. In some cases, urban unrest 
also incurs human costs, when lives are lost, as they were in 2011. Although riots 
have occurred with alarming regularity in England (Solomos 2011), the level of 
social disruption leads to serious questions being asked about the state of the 
nation and our system of law and order (Newburn 2012a). The police come in for 
particular scrutiny. Scarman's inquiry was critical of community policing. This time, 
public order policing was probed (Home Affairs Committee 2011a). The police also 
suffer financially, in terms of mounting a public order response and footing the bill 
for reparations because under the Riot Damages Act (1886) the police are liable for 
the cost of loss or damage to people’s homes and businesses. 
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Urban unrest can also have longer-term implications for the police. Hohl et al. 
(2013) found that a quarter of Londoners had substantially lower confidence in 
police competence and capability after the 2011 Riots, especially in parts of the 
city hardest hit, which tended to be multi-ethnic deprived neighbourhoods where 
confidence in the police has been historically low.  Low confidence erodes public 
support for the police and can undermine citizen cooperation with the police and 
even nurture hate, which might be what was being expressed in 2011 
(Waddington 2012b; Bradford & Jackson 2011). And, if riots further undermine 
confidence, this may lead to a vicious cycle that is difficult to break and which may 
explain why urban unrest tends to recur in the same places. 
Additional financial costs, not factored into the figure above, include those linked 
to the sentencing of individuals convicted of riot-related offences. The 2011 
English Riots may be remembered for their 'success' in punishing participants. The 
police use of CCTV increased the number identified and the judiciary uplifted the 
sentences of those appearing in court, even abandoning the sentencing guidelines 
that should have acted as a restraint on the judiciary's punitive impulses 
(Ashworth 2012; Roberts 2012). The severity of sentencing attracted some 
concern, however, there was an additional 'uplift' at every step of the criminal 
justice process (Lightowlers & Quirk 2014), which has barely been acknowledged, 
despite the implications for any society considering itself to be fair and just. 
The importance of this study resides in its potential to understand how urban 
unrest can be prevented and contained to limit these costs, both to the public 
purse and to individuals and communities directly affected, linked to stigmatising 
narratives about riots. The literature makes important reference to riots as a form 
of collective action against perceived injustices (Grover 2011; Benyon & Solomos 
1987; Tilly 1978). The rationale for this study was not to incapacitate protest, but 
to understand whether non-riot affected areas had found less harmful ways to 
make themselves heard. 
Structure of the thesis 
The first chapter reviews the literature on the 2011 English Riots, summarising 
what was known about these events before the study. The first section considers 
explanations for them by a range of commentators, including politicians, the 
mainstream press and academics. This exercise helped to identify gaps in 
understanding and informed the development the study aims and approach. The 
second part of the chapter reflects on previous unrest in contemporary England, 
France and the United States, to see how unique the 2011 Riots were. It concludes 
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they were continuous in being sparked by the death of a BME individual at the 
hands of the police and occurring in areas of high deprivation, typically affected by 
unrest before. They were remarkably widespread for English riots, but not 
compared to the 2005 French Riots (see Body-Gendrot 2016). Looting was 
unusually prominent or, at least, unusually seized upon by the media. Moreover, 
the media and political commentators revealed an exceptional level of 
condemnation, using the conceptual and perceptual framework of the underclass 
through which social inequalities are conceived as consequences of 'bad individual 
choices', an absence of moral judgement, poor parenting, hereditary deficiencies 
and/or welfare dependency (Tyler 2013; Young 2016).  
The second chapter reviews relevant literature on policing, as a central focus of 
the research. The chapter sketches out key developments and issues relating to 
community policing, which has been implicated in previous unrest - and by the 
Reading the Riots study this time - whereby officers have caused community 
grievance due either to over-policing or under-policing. The chapter looks at how 
police powers have been expanded and constrained by legislation and how 
changing governance structures have affected police accountability because both 
have the ability to limit repressive policing. Organisational changes are also 
discussed, especially in the context of how the extended policing family, including 
the introduction of Police Community Support Officer (PCSO) role, provides the 
potential to improve police-community relations through increased visibility and 
positive contacts. Public order policing is considered in a later section of this 
chapter, as a distinct police activity. However, links are made with community 
policing in terms of procedural justice theory. The chapter concludes that the 
public perception of fair and just treatment is important in all interactions with the 
police and provides the capacity to prevent a tense situation escalating into violent 
disorder. 
Theories and empirical evidence reviewed in the first two chapters informed the 
methodological framework, which is described in the third chapter. It outlines the 
logic of the research design and decisions taken about the methods and tools used 
for data collection and analysis. It provides a critical introduction to the case study 
approach and how the cases and subcases were selected, based on their socio-
demographic profiles, to support a compare and contrast model of analysis. The 
chapter reflects on the contentious nature of ‘riots’ as a subject-matter for 
empirical research, which, combined with a focus on small geographical areas, 
presented particular challenges for the research design, the research experience 
and potentially the impact of the findings.  Methodological challenges included the 
unwillingness of people to participate in the research; pressures for them to re-
- 6 - 
write history in particular ways; and risks to the anonymity of individuals and 
neighbourhoods involved in the research, with the potential for reputational and 
wider social harms. 
The fourth chapter constitutes the first of four empirical chapters. It is divided into 
two main sections, which detail the nature of people and place in the case studies 
and the disorder events occurring there in August 2011.  This is not merely scene-
setting for the more substantive findings chapters; the physical, social and 
situational context is explored as an essential part of the study design, being 
hypothesised as part of the explanation for different disorder outcomes in 
different places. By combining data from documentary sources and the qualitative 
interviews, the chapter describes how the disorder in Nottingham began on 
Monday 8 August and lasted for two nights. It seems that although Nottingham 
gained less media attention than some other riot affected locales, the number of 
incidents and scale of the attacks on police property were more significant.  Police 
struggled to keep up with a threat that was described as highly 'mobile' and 'fluid'. 
Unsurprisingly, there is less material on Sheffield in this chapter because large-
scale disorder did not occur, but the perceived threat from disorder and the 
manifestation of 'pre-disorder' is detailed as background to the local response. 
Chapter Five describes the public order responses in the two cases studies. The 
public order response is not merely the activities of the police, but rather the 
collective actions all agencies and individuals purposely engaged in trying to avert 
or contain urban unrest. This chapter draws on interview and documentary data to 
establish the sequence and nature of activities taking place in each city. 
Acknowledging competing and half-remembered accounts, this chapter makes a 
best attempt to describe what happened and how some events may have been 
causally linked. The chapter is thematically structured according to key elements of 
the public order responses that seemed to promote differential outcomes in the 
two cities, including timeliness of the response, partnership working, how 
information was shared within and between agencies and with the public, the style 
of policing and choice of tactics.  
Chapter Six takes a step back from the public order response to examine the 
nature of policing partnerships in the years and decades preceding the riots. The 
chapter begins by looking at relationships between policing agencies and 
communities in the two case studies. It considers how police operations and 
particular tactics such as stop and search had antagonised communities, 
constituting the tinder for unrest, but how mechanisms of accountability were able 
to mitigate risk in Sheffield. Poverty and ethnicity are shown to correlate with 
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unrest due to the way that the police and wider society perceive and interact with 
people who are poor and Black. Research suggests that Black men are more likely 
than Whites to be labelled as gang-involved and this tends to result in more 
repressive policing (Williams 2015).  The second part of the chapter looks at inter-
agency relationships in the two case studies and identifies factors that promoted 
positive relations and joint-working in the two case studies. Co-location, 
partnership structures and facilitation roles were found to be beneficial, while 
funding allocation processes had the potential both to support and undermine 
partnerships. Pre-established relationships positively determined the capability 
and willingness of agencies to work together when unrest seemed imminent.  
Chapter Seven focuses on community context. Dysfunctional community has 
previously been associated with urban unrest, either linked to community tensions 
within neighbourhoods, in the case of disturbances in the North East of England in 
the early 1990s (Campbell 1993); or between neighbourhoods, in the case of the 
2001 disturbances in the mill towns of Bradford, Oldham and Burnley (Cantle 
2001).  This chapter describes the different social groups residing in the case 
studies and the extent to which they got on together at the neighbourhood and 
city level. The chapter refers to sociological concepts such as social capital and 
social cohesion to understand these relationships. The chapter then considers 
whether inter-group tensions, at any level, increased the risk of disorder in the two 
cities. The chapter examines the hypothesis that a collective sense of belonging 
can promote shared norms and values, which are the basis of informal social 
control. Thus, social cohesiveness at the neighbourhood level is likely to be 
protective by promoting collective efficacy across the whole locality. However, the 
findings suggest that informal controls may not be able to prevent young men, 
who are marginalised from education and employment, from collective violence 
beyond the boundary of the neighbourhood. This chapter underlines the 
importance of social equality and strong communities, which must be supported, 
rather than oppressed, by formal policing. 
Chapter Eight, as the conclusion, draws together the various themes emerging out 
of the study and how they inter-relate. It considers the extent to which the study 
findings support and build upon existing theory and makes tentative 
recommendations for preventing and containing unrest in the future. Given the 
timing of the research, a view is taken about how recent austerity measures may 
affect the risk of riots and the capacity to respond in the two case studies.  
Findings suggest that some of what worked in 2011 may not work again as a 
consequence of changes to youth provision and community policing. The thesis 
concludes that the combined activities of police, partners and communities when 
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unrest seems imminent can inhibit unrest. The involvement of local police and 
practitioners in the main public order response is critical, but this seems 
dependent on relationships established over time. Structural and community 
factors are possibly the most difficult to address, but the most important. They can 
prevent the risk of unrest by providing individuals and groups, especially young 
men, with a sense of belonging and of having 'something to lose' by rioting. 
Attachment to community provides the basis of informal social controls, which 
offer the best chance of preventing and containing urban unrest, especially where 
these are supported by formal controls. 
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Chapter 1 – The 2011 English Riots and Other Contemporary 
Disturbances 
1.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the literature on what have come to be known as the '2011 
English Riots' to help understand the nature of these events and why they 
occurred. It reflects on the main political and popular narrative and how this 
compares with other explanations to establish the level of consensus and 
disagreement between different commentators. The purpose of this exercise was 
to establish any gaps in understanding to help inform the development of the 
study aims and objectives. In particular, the exercise sought to understand why the 
riots spread from their original starting point in Tottenham, where the triggers 
were better understood, to towns and cities far beyond and non-contiguous with 
London. The chapter looks at accounts of previous riots in contemporary Britain, 
France and the U.S. to understand how the 2011 English Riots were continuous or 
unique by comparison and to inform the theoretical framework for this study. 
The Chapter begins by outlining key events associated with the 2011 English Riots, 
followed by a descriptive section on previous British riots across three decades, 
including the 1980s, 1990s and the 2000s. Explanations for riots across this time 
period are considered under thematic headings as a way of summarising dominant 
theories, including that riots are primarily the consequence of criminal motives; 
political motives; material and social inequalities; styles of policing that either 
antagonise communities or leave them feeling unprotected; and community 
issues, for example, linked to inter-ethnic or gender relations. Overseas riots are 
considered in a separate section to consider similarities and differences between 
British disorders and U.S. and French disorders, respectively. The conclusion draws 
together key factors across time and space, spotlighting anger at the police as the 
thread running through all contemporary riots. Inter-ethnic conflict also emerges 
as a key factor, but is more prevalent in the U.S. than either Britain or France. 
Relative poverty, promoting a sense of social injustice, is identified as an important 
contextual factor at both societal and local levels. Finally, the chapter reflects on 
these findings in the context of the current study to highlight where there are any 
gaps in understanding and to focus the field of inquiry.   
1.2 The 2011 English Riots 
For four days in August 2011 there were widespread public disturbances in 66 
locations across England and Wales. Generally referred to as '2011 English Riots', 
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they involved an estimated 15,000 people, cost approximately half a billion pounds 
and were associated with five deaths (Bridges 2012). In exploring the nature of 
these events it seems important to establish definitional terms.  The legal 
definition of a riot in the UK is:  
Where 12 or more persons who are present together use or threaten 
unlawful violence for a common purpose and the conduct of them (taken 
together) is such as would cause a person of reasonable firmness present at 
the scene to fear for his personal safety (Public Order Act 1986, Ch. 64) 
Although events in August 2011 were collectively identified as riots, commentators 
in some riot-affected locales were reluctant to accept this definition. For example, 
Assistant Chief Constable Broadbent for Nottinghamshire Police told the Home 
Affairs Select Committee (2011c) that Nottingham did not have riots. Instead he 
described local events, less seriously, as ‘violent disorders’, on the basis that 'at no 
point could we substantiate that there were 12 or more people together for a 
common purpose with intent to commit the act of rioting' (Ev.70). However, it is 
worth noting potential motives for avoiding the 'riot' classification, including the 
desire to limit reputational harm. Police forces are noted to have well-resourced 
communications offices to ensure that ‘brand’ image and message are accurately 
and/or positively represented (Greer & McLaughlin 2010). Police forces also have a 
financial incentive, because under the Riot (Damages) Act 1886 they are liable for 
the cost of loss or damage to people’s homes and businesses; but not if violent 
disorders have occurred. 
Another term used to describe events in 2011 (e.g. One Nottingham 2011) and in 
previous decades is 'disturbances', for example, in referring to the '2001 
disturbances' and this term can sometimes be used interchangeably with riot. 
However, Power and Tunstall (1997, p.viii) have distinguished the two by referring 
to a disturbance as being ‘an interruption of the peace, an uproar of an outbreak 
of public agitation’ compared to a riot, which is a term commonly used to describe 
‘a gathering of several people which is so disorderly that police intervention is 
necessary to restore order’. Some commentators additionally refer to the political 
dimension of the term 'riot’. They suggest it is not merely descriptive or legalistic, 
but rather the term riot suggests criminal motives.  On these grounds, Tester 
(2012) prefers to use the more neutral word ‘events’. This chapter and the thesis 
beyond use the terms assigned to events in the general discourse, noting where 
any specific distinction has been made. 
Many authors (Bridges 2012; Clarke 2012; Lea & Hallsworth 2012) report the 2011 
English Riots as the most widespread public disturbances in British history, 
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reaching areas previously untouched by such events before. Others think that 
commentators simply lost a sense of perspective. Durodié (2012) suggests that 
while the August 2011 disturbances may have been the most costly (depending on 
how such episodes are accounted for), others have matched them in terms of 
levels of participation and violence, including the inner-city riots of the early 
eighties (in particular 1981 and 1985); pitched battles between the British police 
and striking miners in the mid-80s; and protests against the Poll tax at the 
beginning of the nineties. Lea and Hallsworth (2012) claim the August 2011 riots 
were 'more serious than any that have gone before' because unlike previous riots, 
which have had a specific target or grievance, these were characterised by a more 
'diffuse and generalised rage' (p.31). 
The 2011 Riots began on 6 August, two days after a 29-year old man, Mark 
Duggan, was shot dead by police near Tottenham Hale station in North London. 
Duggan had been under surveillance linked to Operation Trident, an anti-gun crime 
operation being run by the MPS. The shooting occurred on 4 August as officers 
stopped a mini cab in which Duggan was travelling, and attempted to arrest him. 
The day after the shooting the press reported that a spokesperson for the 
Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) had said that Duggan had been 
killed in a shoot-out with the police; and during this shoot-out a police officer was 
hit by a bullet that lodged in his radio and Duggan had been killed by return fire 
(Moore-Bridger et al. 2011). A conflicting story was reported a day later, claiming 
that an eye witness had seen Duggan being pulled from the mini-cab and held 
down by police before being shot (London Evening Standard 2011). Duggan was 
variously reported as a drug dealer and/or a ‘well-known gangster’, which were 
claims that his family and local community denied on the basis that he had no 
criminal record. What exactly happened is still not entirely clear, despite an IPCC 
investigation (2015). However, it is evident that a catalogue of errors by both the 
Metropolitan Police and the IPCC contributed to the disorder in Tottenham, which 
proliferated across a further 21 London boroughs and eventually reached other 
towns and cities across England, including Birmingham, Bristol, Liverpool, 
Nottingham, Manchester, Salford and Wolverhampton. Some minor incidents 
were also reported in Wales (Cardiff). 
Without any direct communication from the MPS or the IPCC confirming or 
denying the ‘exchange of fire’ or ‘assassination’ stories, Duggan's family and the 
wider community began to suspect police mishandling. The MPS review notes that 
'...The issue of inaccuracy in the media story concerning an exchange of fire 
between officers and Mark Duggan should have been positively rebutted 
immediately' (Metropolitan Police Service 2012). It followed that on 6 August, a 
- 12 - 
peaceful protest march beginning at Broadwater Farm and finishing at Tottenham 
police station was held by friends and relatives, demanding 'justice' for Mark's 
family. They stayed outside the police station waiting for a senior police officer to 
speak to them, but none came. Much later, 'a younger and more aggressive crowd' 
congregated  outside the station, and this is when the violence is thought to have 
broken out (Bridges 2012).  Anger and frustration intensified when a young woman 
was pushed to ground and repeatedly hit by a police officer. Many agree that this 
event, rather than the death of Mark Duggan, was what 'sparked' the disturbances 
(Reicher & Stott 2011). At this stage a police car was set on fire, prompting some 
of the crowd to leave, but attracted others, curious to see what was happening 
(Morrell et al. 2011). There was an escalation in arson and destruction. Shop 
windows were smashed to provide access to missiles to throw at the police, rather 
than to loot, which increasingly became a feature of later disturbances in both in 
Tottenham and elsewhere (ibid). 
1.3 Previous Riots in England and Wales 
England has been described as the most riotous country in Europe based on the 
startling frequency of urban unrest throughout the post-war period  (Campbell 
1993). This section looks at major outbreaks throughout the 1980s, 1990s and 
2000s. It provides a temporal and selective overview of key events, including 
triggers, how they developed and how they ended.  Social disorder linked primarily 
to football violence, industrial or political disputes - such as the miners' strike in 
the mid-1980s, the Poll Tax riots in the 1990s - have been excluded from the 
analysis. Marx (1970) refers to these as ‘instrumental riots’,  in which a generalized 
belief is present and which tend to involve a dissident group against the 
government or other authority or have a focused institutional context such as a 
factory or school. The chapter focuses on two other types of riots, including 
‘communal riots’ (Janowitz 1969), in which a generalised belief may be present but 
this not instrumental in resolving a group's problems. Communal riots are likely to 
have a more diffuse character, often involving violence between groups divided by 
religion, ethnicity, ideology, race, or region. The third type are referred to as 
'issueless' or unprincipled riots, in which a generalised protest belief is absent or 
unclear. Marx (1970) sees these as developing out of two kinds of circumstances: 
(1) in the face of a pronounced weakening of the agents of social control, or (2) as 
expressive out- bursts, occasionally alongside victory celebrations or ritualized 
festivals. Marx notes that just because a generalised belief is not present, does not 
mean that issueless riots are mainly for fun or profit. Instead, it means that they 
need to be studied in more detail to gain an understanding of what motivated 
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rioters and what their consequences might be. The 2011 English Riots seem to fit 
best with the third type. 
1.3.1 The 1980s 
Benyon and Solomos (1988) remark on the relative tranquillity of the post-war 
years up until the major outbreaks of disorder in the 1980s. They claim that 
Margaret Thatcher's administration failed in one of its principal functions, to 
maintain public order. Major riots commanded the headlines in 1980, 1981 and 
1985, starting with events in the St. Paul's district of Bristol in April 1980. This was 
widely reported as Black violence against the police following a raid on an illegal 
Black drinking club. However, the Café was frequented by both Blacks and Whites 
and when anger tipped over following a drugs raid, which found no drugs, they 
attacked the police together (Campbell 1993). Political commentators regarded 
the disorder as a one-off aberration in social behaviour and the Home Secretary 
resisted calls for a public enquiry (Benyon & Solomos 1988). A year later, however, 
this diagnosis was challenged when serious disorder took place in Brixton, London, 
over the weekend of 10-12 April 1981, resulting in many injuries and widespread 
damage. It was triggered by a series of incidents beginning on Friday 10 April, 
when a police officer apprehended a Black youth, Michael Bailey, who was on his 
way to hospital with a stab wound. This led to violent skirmishes between some 40 
officers and 100 Black youths; as well as looting and destruction in the  commercial 
centre (Waddington 1992). 
Further unrest erupted in July of the same year, affecting many parts of the 
country, including Southall (London), Toxteth (Liverpool), Moss Side (Manchester), 
Handsworth (Birmingham), Chapeltown (Leeds), Sheffield, Nottingham, Hull, 
Slough, Bradford, Leicester, Derby, High Wycombe, and Cirencester. These were 
downplayed as 'copycat' riots (Scarman 1981), but many had their own specific 
triggers. For example, the Toxteth riot was traceable to the chase and arrest of a 
young Black motorcyclist by a routine traffic patrol. Arrest data shows that rioters 
came from a wide cross-section of the community, including a high proportion of 
Whites, women and older people (Cooper 1985).  The night’s disturbances were 
terminated by police use of tear gas – the first such occurrence in mainland Britain. 
The Moss Side riot is thought to have started after a group of Black men were 
taunted by a group of White men for not having the courage to 'rise up' like the 
people in Brixton and Toxteth (D. Thompson 2011). This triggered two days of 
disorder, including the damage and looting of many shops and businesses and an 
attack, by hundreds of rioters, on Moss Side police station. Rioters were mainly 
Black, but there was also a large minority of Whites. 
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The riots in Handsworth and Southall were associated with local concerns about 
neo-fascists. The flashpoint in Handsworth was an attack on a locally known police 
superintendent who was trying to dispel rumours of an impending National Front 
march amongst a tense crowd of concerned residents (Southgate 1982). Within an 
hour, the police and fire stations were attacked, and looting and widespread 
damage to property ensued. Fearful shopkeepers from the South Asian community 
had already begun boarding up their premises. Half the rioters were White, a third 
Black and a fifth of South Asian ethnic origin. Violence erupted in Southall when 
hundreds of neo-fascist skinheads travelled into the area for a concert at a local 
pub (Unsworth 1982). They were reported to have racially insulted the wife of an 
South Asian grocer, smashed shop windows, and wrote National Front slogans 
around the area (Robb 2006). Around 400 South Asians congregated to wait for 
the skinheads outside the tavern (Miner Kingman Daily 1981), but their violence 
turned against the police, who they perceived to be protecting the skinheads. Of 
all the 1981 disorders, this is the only one described as a 'race riot', due to the 
inter-racial conflict (Benyon & Solomos 1988).  
Police chiefs suggested that what the press had described as ‘riots’ in the early 
1980s were for them ‘routine disturbances’ (Frith 1981). They represented ‘a 
temporary cluster of upsurges punctuating a chronic reality of tension and 
aggression in the inner city’ (Unsworth 1982). Further instances of unrest, usually 
involving police-community conflict, in places like Liverpool and London, continued 
on a reduced scale between 1982 and 1984 (Benyon & Solomos 1987). The 
Metropolitan Police Commissioner reported that during 1984 'there were many 
mini-riots which had the potential to escalate to Brixton 1981 proportions' but for 
some reason didn't, adding that 'London nowadays is a very volatile city (cited in 
Benyon & Solomos 1988, p.404). Hence, unrest during this period was under-
reported by the media.  
In 1985 large scale unrest erupted again, linked to the shooting of a Black woman, 
Dorothy 'Cherry' Groce, when armed police entered her home looking for her son. 
A plastic bullet damaged her spine, causing permanent paralysis. The police station 
was later attacked and Black and White people took part in burning and looting 
causing costly damage and the death of a freelance photographer. Two days later, 
another riot occurred in Toxteth, precipitated when four Black men were refused 
bail at Liverpool Magistrates' Court (Benyon & Solomos 1987). This provoked a 
demonstration outside the police station, which was subsequently attacked, along 
with police cars, and officers themselves. Rioting also occurred in Peckham, 
London, the same night, although the reasons are not clear (ibid).  
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The disturbance in the Handsworth Lozells Road area of Birmingham was sparked 
on the 9 September 1985 when a Black youth became involved in an altercation 
with a police officer over a parking ticket. Three hours later some 45 buildings 
were set alight and two South Asian men died as a result. Earlier disturbances had 
gone unreported by the media, but provided the immediate context of 
deteriorating relations with the police. Disturbances occurred in other parts of the 
West Midlands, regarded as 'copycat' (Benyon & Solomos 1987). A disturbance 
also occurred in the St. Paul's district of Bristol. The most serious disturbance in 
1985 occurred on the Broadwater Farm Estate in Tottenham, following the death 
of Cynthia Jarrett during a police raid at her home. The violence against the police 
was ferocious, and resulted in the death of PC Blakelock (Loney 1986). The rioting 
tailed off as news of his death spread. 
However, tensions and lower level disorder continued on the Broadwater Estate 
into 1986, when there were also other disturbances in Notting Hill, the St. Paul's 
district of Bristol and Plymouth. In St. Paul’s, attacks on police led to more than 
100 arrests. These were seen as a reaction to police operations in the area, in 
which a large number of houses had been raided in connection with drugs and 
drinking offences. In Plymouth, participants were White youths, who set up 
burning barricades and caused damage to local properties (Benyon & Solomos 
1987). The 1986 disturbances were under-reported by the media, perhaps 
demonstrating an 'undercurrent of boredom and resignation' to urban unrest by 
this point  (Benyon & Solomos 1987, p.10). 
1.3.2 The 1990s 
Between 1991 and 1995, 28 violent disturbances were recorded (Power & Tunstall 
1997). These received much less attention from sociologists, perhaps because with 
one exception they were in largely 'White' areas and, consequently, lacked the 
social drama of the ethnic riots in the 1980s (Bagguley & Hussain 2008). 
Disturbances in the early 1990s were widely distributed across 13 locations in 
England and Wales, in places such as Cardiff, Oxford, Coventry and Newcastle 
(Power & Tunstall 1997). They were all outside London and 12 of the 13 were on 
run down council estates, which were heavily stigmatised. The disturbances were 
described as ‘street battles’ between young people and police (Waddington, 
Jobard, et al. 2009), whose actions in all cases were the immediate trigger (Power 
& Tunstall 1997); for example, in responding to car crimes such as ‘hotting’ (stunt 
driving on the streets) or ‘joyriding’ (Campbell 1993; Power & Tunstall 1997). Most 
of the damage was done to the community. The Meadowell riot, in Northumbria, 
saw hundreds of young men, burning buildings and raiding and razing shops, which 
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left local people with no access to essential provisions for some time (Campbell 
1993). 
Riots in 1994 and 1995 were characterised by racist policing. A disturbance in May 
1994 in Darnall, Sheffield, followed an argument between White and South Asian 
residents over the use a local park. Violence was triggered when police arrived in 
defence of the White residents and were openly racist towards the South Asians 
(Wiles 1995). Arrests were entirely South Asian. The riot in Manningham, similarly 
followed an altercation with the police when four South Asian youths were 
arrested while playing football in the street. The youths were accused by the 
officers of swearing at them. A key point of antagonism was that the police made 
no differentiation between curious onlookers, people trying to calm things down 
and trouble makers (D. Waddington 2007). A rumour then spread that the police 
'attack' on a baby had resulted in hospitalisation or even death, leading to 
community protests outside the police station. This led to more arrests, which 
were reported as the 'clinching factor in uniting young and old in openly 
expressing anger against the police' (Bradford Commission Report, cited in 
Waddington 2007). 
1.3.3 The 2000s 
Disturbances took place during the summer of 2001 in several towns and cities in 
the north of England, including Bradford, Burnley, Oldham, Leeds and Stoke-on-
Trent. Most of these were characterised by inter-ethnic conflict and a perceived 
lack of police protection. The Oldham events in June 2001 followed an attack on 
two South Asian brothers by a White youth. South Asian homes and businesses 
were subsequently attacked. Police arrived on the scene, arresting many of the 
White offenders, but, in the meantime, an angry South Asian crowd had formed in 
response to rumours that the police were unwilling or unable to prevent the White 
attacks and this is when serious disorder erupted. A month later, there was a 
similar disturbance in Burnley, preceded by confrontations between Whites and 
South Asians over drugs. The police report acknowledges that an injured South 
Asian taxi driver was simply in the wrong place at the wrong time and it was not a 
racially motivated attack (D. Waddington 2007). However, rumours that the man 
had died and the men responsible had been released without charge, promoted 
tensions. The police helped avoid violent clashes between Whites and South 
Asians, who instead turned their attention to property damage in each other's' 
areas of residence. 
There were two disturbances in Bradford in 2001. The first was smaller and less 
serious than the one taking place over the weekend of 7-8 July. This was described 
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as the worst civil disturbance on mainland Britain for twenty years (Bagguley & 
Hussain 2008) and was classified as a riot (McGhee 2003). It started after an anti-
racist demonstration against a proposed National Front rally, which had already 
been banned by the Home Office. The context to this was the cancellation by the 
police of the closing day festivities of the month-long Bradford festival, an annual 
event designed to promote unity and understanding among the city’s diverse 
ethnic community (Waddington 2010). It is not entirely clear from the accounts, 
but some suggest the riots were triggered by racially abusive comments and an 
attack on a young South Asian man by neo-fascists (Bagguley & Hussain 2008), 
while others suggest that it may have been the stabbing of a White youth by South 
Asians, causing South Asian youths to ‘stream’ back to the city centre and 
‘mayhem’ to ensue (Bujra & Pearce 2009).  
The riots in the Lozells area of Birmingham in 2005 were different by involving 
conflict between two BME communities. African-Caribbean and South Asian 
residents were in conflict with each other linked to rumours of a young Black girl 
being gang-raped by a group of South Asian men in a local beauty parlour (King 
2009). Police reported that disorder erupted during a public meeting arranged in a 
local church and attended by 300-400 people, mainly from the Black community, 
but some key members of the South Asian community were also present. One 
account suggests that Asian youths gathered outside the building shouting abuse, 
while another claims that Black youths armed and wearing masks emerged from 
the church and side streets and headed towards the local mosque. Two days of 
rioting followed, involving petrol bombs, machetes and firearms. 
1.4 Explanations for Riots 
The previous two sections were descriptive in style, outlining key events 
associated with the 2011 English Riots and other major outbreaks of urban unrest 
in the three preceding decades - in the 1980s, the 1990s and the 2000s. The 
current section now turns to the various explanations for these riots. The purpose 
is to understand what may have changed or remained the same over time, in 
relation to the manifestation and aetiology of urban unrest and how this has been 
captured in popular and academic discourses. The various explanations are 
organised thematically below, followed by some over-arching conclusions about 
British riots at the end of the section.  
1.4.1 Contagion and the mediated crowd 
In 2011, events beyond Tottenham were described in the press and by politicians 
as 'copycat' riots. Politically, this was perhaps intended to disassociate the unrest 
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with any other kind of explanation that might signal widespread social problems. 
The 'copy-cat' assertion harks back to nineteenth century views of the 'criminal 
crowd'. Le Bon ([1895] 2002) describes how the criminal crowd amasses as 
individuals in spatial proximity experience heightened emotions and are 
transformed into a type of collective mind. Individuals lose their conscious 
personality and rational faculties - linked to the perception that the crowd confers 
anonymity, unaccountability, and cumulative sense of invincibility - and are 
predisposed to act criminally. Twentieth century crowd theory later rejected the 
notion of the 'criminal crowd', instead focusing on the social conditions that cause 
individuals to engage in 'collective behaviour' (McCarthy 1991). Crowds were still 
thought to amass in spatial proximity, but not pathologically, instead through 
shared feelings of frustration about social conditions such as inequality, 
discrimination and deprivation (Miller & Dollard 1941). 
Not all locations affected by the 2011 Riots were contiguous and participants did 
not all share the same geographical space. Baker (2012), however, argues that 
crowd theory can still be used to help understand what happened through the 
notion of the 'mediated crowd', whereby emotional contagion is facilitated 
through social networking, which not only accentuates the speed and scope of 
crowd membership, but creates 'novel temporal and spatial contexts for mediated 
crowd membership that operate simultaneous to shared interactions in 
geographic public space' (Baker 2012, p.46). This theory receives some support 
from empirical findings, which show that social media was used by Tottenham 
residents in the immediate aftermath of Duggan's death. Their messages were 
concerned with the circumstances surrounding the death and evidenced mistrust 
in the Police and the IPCC (Ball & Brown 2011). Arguably, had the perception of 
police mishandling developed though other forms of communication, over a longer 
period and when emotions were less intense, perhaps the protest outside the 
police station, and ultimately the riots, would not have taken place. 
Although Facebook and Twitter were used, it was the Blackberry Messenger (BBM) 
network that played the more substantive role in the 2011 Riots (Ball & Brown 
2011). BBM became the rioters' communication method of choice because 
Blackberry handsets are owned by many young people, due to them being an 
affordable smartphone and because they provide a free instant messaging service 
between Blackberry users. The security of the BBM network was a key advantage. 
Unlike Facebook and Twitter, messages sent by BBM are private to recipients and 
encrypted during transmission, a fact which many rioters were aware. This level of 
security was designed into the phone to meet the needs of its original target 
group, which was business users, rather than teenagers. It is unlikely that action 
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could ever be taken to monitor BBM messages, owing to legal protections that all 
BBM users are entitled to.  
Press and television coverage of the disturbances were also reported to have 
played a role in the contagion. 'It was the visibility of the chaos in Tottenham that 
led to its spread to Birmingham and elsewhere' (Spalek et al. 2012, p.14). 
Interviews with young people revealed that the experience of watching events 
unfold on real time television, showing 'people getting away with it' and the police 
'responding in a low key fashion', was a 'nudge' factor for involvement (Morrell et 
al. 2011, p.36). There is evidence as well for the protective role of mainstream and 
social media. Young people described the deterrent effect of watching 'scary' 
television coverage, and some social media messages provided information on 
locations to keep away from to avoid involvement (ibid). Social media was 
proactively used by some communities as a tool to discourage rioting in their area. 
In Sheffield, for example, police, other local organisations and young people used 
social media to call for calm and dispel myths and rumours. An information sharing 
campaign between these same partners also meant that provocative posts 
appearing in the social media could quickly be removed (ibid). 
Lord Scarman's inquiry (1981) into the Brixton disorders of 1981 similarly gave 
credence to the role of ‘media contagion’, blaming coverage of the Brixton 
disorder in April 1981 for generating riots elsewhere as the summer wore on. Mary 
Whitehouse led a campaign against the media for its coverage of the riots, 
managing to secure statements from editors of both the BBC and ITN news, 
admitting their broadcasts had probably had some copycat effect (Murdock 1984). 
However, this contrasts with the views of police and rioters, who suggested that 
rioting was not encouraged by the ‘advertising’ effect of television coverage 
(Tumbler 1982). This was evidenced by the speed in which some of the incidents 
flared up, which suggested that young people were not sitting indoors, but were 
already out on the streets, bored and resentful and waiting to for trouble (p.46). 
1.4.2 Criminality 
Each government presiding over major social unrest has looked to explanations of 
law and order. One of the first politicians to publicly respond to the 2011 Riots was 
local MP David Lammy. Standing before cameras on Tottenham High Road the day 
after the disturbances began, he described participants as ‘mindless, mindless 
people’ (cited in Bridges 2012 p.4). This gave the lead to other political leaders, 
who put the events down to ‘criminality, pure and simple’ (Prime Minister David 
Cameron), ‘needless and opportunist theft and violence’ (Deputy Prime Minister 
Nick Clegg) and the product of ‘a feral underclass’ (Justice Secretary Kenneth Clark) 
- 20 - 
(all cited in Bridges 2012 p.4).  Tester (2012) argues that the criminalisation of 
participants was 'commonsensically valid' because the media had immediately 
referred to the disturbances as 'riots' rather than using more neutral terminology. 
Clarke's reference to a 'feral underclass' suggests that participants were subhuman 
and beyond society (Waterton & Sesay 2012). The implication was that they 
needed no understanding, but simply to be controlled and dealt with (Newburn 
2012b). Politicians also used the 'sick' analogy. The Prime Minister, David 
Cameron, responded to the disturbances by saying ‘there are pockets of our 
society that are not just broken but frankly sick' (cited in Durkin 2012 p.50). This 
set the unhealthy 'them' against the healthy 'us' (Durkin 2012). 
In its initial response, the Government promoted the idea of criminal motives by 
pointing to gangs as key contributors. Cameron described gangs as 'territorial, 
hierarchical and incredibly violent, they are mostly composed of young boys, 
mainly from dysfunctional homes' (cited in Newburn, Taylor and Ferguson 2011). A 
less emotive and broader definition set out in an influential report by the Centre 
for Social Justice  (2009) suggests that youth gangs have a number of 
characteristics, including durability, being identifiable to others, associated with a 
particular territory, being engaged in crime and violence, and often in conflict with 
other gangs. It is unclear to what extent this definition informed estimates of gang 
involvement in the 2011 Riots. The Metropolitan Police Service mysteriously 
claimed that it had defined gang membership through 'some intelligence analysis' 
about suspects (Newburn, Taylor, et al. 2011). Data on those brought before the 
courts for riot-related offences classified 13 per cent as gang members (cited in 
Newburn, Topping, et al., 2011). While some regard this as an overestimation 
(Newburn, Topping, et al. 2011), others (Harding 2012) suggest it might be an 
underestimation because gang members are more experienced in avoiding 
detection. Moreover, it is suggested that that the orchestrated activity of gang 
members should raise concern because it is likely to have 'brought new entrants 
into the gravitational pull of the gang' and the gang truce may have generated new 
opportunities for partnership working across rival gangs. Consequently, the 2011 
Riots may mark an 'evolutionary step' in the development of UK street gangs 
(p.23). 
Many other commentators, however, dispute the role of gangs. One expert points 
out the practical fact that riots detract from the main activity of most gangs, which 
is selling drugs (cited in Wain, 2012). Moreover, gangs are famously protective of 
their territory or ‘hoods’ (Durodié 2012), which does not sit well with accounts of 
rioters 'trashing' their own neighbourhoods. This is evidenced by reports of gang 
members protecting an area in East London, known as Poplar, when it was 
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perceived that the disturbances might spread that way (Morrell et al. 2011). The 
majority of those who took part in the 2011 Riots, from London to Liverpool and 
Manchester to Birmingham, denied that gangs had caused or exacerbated the 
unrest (Newburn, Topping, et al. 2011). Although it is accepted that gang members 
were involved, and in some cases may have played an important role, there is little 
indication that they orchestrated what happened. Rather, it seems that individuals 
stepped out of their gang roles and for the duration of the disturbances and 
worked together in shared endeavour, fighting side by side against the police 
(Briggs, 2012). 
Previous riots in the 1980s and 2001 were similarly explained as criminality. David 
Blunkett referred to the 2001 disturbances in England's northern mill towns as 
‘sheer mindless violence – people behaving in a totally anti-social and thuggish 
fashion’(cited in Allen 2003, p.23). Norman Tebbbit ascribed riots in the 1980s to 
‘wickedness’. This caused a correspondent to The Guardian to point out that if this 
were so, the stock of human wickedness must have risen alarmingly since the 
election of Mr Tebbit’s Conservative Party to government (Benyon & Solomos 
1987). Speaking specifically about the Toxteth riots in 1981, political 
commentators claimed they were ‘hooliganism on a grand scale’  (Liverpool Liberal 
Leader, Sir Trevor Jones cited in Cooper 1985, p.61). Yet, the demographic data on 
those arrested for involvement in these riots evidenced participation from a wide 
cross-section of people, including a large proportion who did not normally have 
contact with the police (Cooper 1985). This supported an alternative view that the 
Toxteth riots were ‘powered by forces enough to promote law-abiding citizens into 
breaking the law’ (Unsworth 1982, p.65). Reports of mindless violence also ignored 
events that demonstrated considerable control and selectivity by rioters. For 
example, during the St Paul's Riot in Bristol in 1980, rioters were observed 
directing traffic (Reicher 1984) and defending shops where children slept (Gilroy 
1987). 
Instead of gangs, explanations of these earlier riots referred to the role of 
'agitators', who had set out to cause social disorder on a grand scale. A number of 
senior police officers claimed the riots in 1981 were planned either by drug dealers 
or political extremists (Benyon & Solomos 1987; Murdock 1984) and these 
agitators helped explain the spread of the disturbances across cities as far apart as 
Sheffield and Southampton. Fingers were pointed at groups on the far left and the 
far right. In particular, a socialist group called the Militant Tendency was 
implicated. This provided a reason to debate the potential threat of ‘entryism’ to 
Parliament (Crick 1986). Entryism was a strategy used by the Militant Tendency to 
gain political influence by its members joining (i.e. ‘entering’) the Labour Party. 
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Despite there being little evidence for the 'outside agitator' theory, and the fact 
that other accounts stressed the local residence of most riot participants 
(Waddington 1992; Gilroy 1987; Reicher 1984), the Labour Party National 
Executive Committee decided to expel many leading Militant supporters, prohibit 
sales of the Militant newspaper at party meetings and prevent the Militant 
tendency from using all party facilities (Crick 1986). By 1986, forty expulsions had 
taken place. 
Identifying criminality as the main cause of riots can be a way of avoiding 
explanations. It puts the blame firmly on individuals and takes the actions of the 
government, the police and other authorities firmly out of the equation. When 
David Cameron claimed 'this was not political protest or a riot about protest, about 
politics. It was common or garden thieving, robbing and looting. And we don't 
need an inquiry to tell us that' (Hansard HC Deb. 2001, col.1051), he dismissed the 
need for a major public investigation equivalent to the Scarman inquiry into the 
1981 Brixton riots. Reports by the Riots Communities and Victims Panel (2012) and 
the Home Affairs Select Committee (2011a) have been narrowly focused and their 
findings fairly low key (Newburn, Lewis & Metcalf 2011). The main response to the 
2011 Riots was the tracking down, arrest and conviction of offenders, which 
continued much longer than in previous riots and resulted in far more arrests. 
Futhermore, those brought before the the Magistrates' and Crown Courts, faced 
harsh sentencing (Heap & Smithson 2012), which attracted criticism for being 
disproportionate (Howard League for Penal Reform 2011). Some believe this was 
to prepare for a decade of worsening social deprivation and concomittatly 
increasing disorder, sending a clear message that this would not be tolerated (Lea 
& Hallsworth 2012, p.31). 
However, in addition to the public response to riots there is often a 'quiet 
response', under the public radar so as not to signal that a problem is being 
addressed. After the 'Tesco riots' in Bristol in April 2011, additional effort was put 
into improving the area and addressing local concerns, such as those about crime 
and anti-social behaviour and this was reported to have played a role in preventing 
rioting later in the year. Multi-agency partnerships involving residents had 
provided opportunities for people to voice their frustrations and improvements to 
the area meant that people could see things were getting done (Clifton 2012b). In 
the aftermath of the 2011 Riots, the Government announced funding totalling £8 
million to be spend in riot-affected cities (May 2011). Although this was 
communicated as a way of tackling a 'gang, guns and knives problem', agencies 
receiving funding were likely to have some flexibility in interpreting this aim 
locally. A more punitive response, also to address gangs, has been the national 
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roll-out of gang injunctions, or 'gangbos'. Heap and Smithson (2012) observe that 
this policy marks a shift back towards conduct regulation associated with the 
previous government, and runs counter to the Home Secretary's earlier 
statements about a commitment to localism and reducing 'top down' Whitehall 
driven national initiatives.  
1.4.3 The Role of Looting 
There was a heavy focus on looting in the media reporting of the 2011 Riots (e.g. 
BBC 2011b; Williams 2011; Greenslade 2011), leading to the label the 'consumer 
riots'. Around 2,500 shops and businesses were looted, which was estimated by 
insurance claims to have cost the London economy alone in the region of three 
hundred million pounds (Topping & Bawdon 2011). A single looter reported 
stealing goods worth £7,000 (Treadwell et al. 2012). Looting during riots is not 
unusual, 'but crowds moving from shopping centre to shopping centre? Actively 
trying to avoid a confrontation with police, trying to get in and out of JD Sports 
before the 'feds' arrive? That bit is new' (Williams 2011). Some observers reported 
that people were trying things on amidst the looting, suggesting an atmosphere of 
shopping (Williams 2011), rather than reckless 'snatch and grab'. Primarily, people 
were targeting luxury goods, including designer clothing, plasma televisions, 
phones  and jewellery, but there were also some reports of people looting 
essential items such as rice, pasta and babies nappies (Topping & Bawdon 2011).  
As discussed above, looting was viewed by some as evidence that rioters were 
common criminals. Overlapping, but providing some contrast with this view, 
another dominant approach drew on theories of consumerism to argue that the 
manifestation of looting in the 2011 was a product of overwhelming consumerism. 
Beyond the 'initial micro-political protest' against police misconduct in Tottenham, 
people participated because they saw it as an unprecedented opportunity to grab 
something for free (Treadwell et al. 2012, p.1). Tester (2012) argues that '[t]he 
events were not an uprising on the part of the urban dispossessed deliberately and 
consciously breaking into the spheres of neoliberal success in order to destroy it'. 
Police were only attacked because they got in the way of the shopping experience, 
or more analytically, because they are the 'symbolic gatekeepers keeping urban 
youth out of the glittering world of electronic goods, fashion and chemical oblivion 
into which they seek to roam' (ibid p.5). The ubiquity of the consumerist 
motivation was revealed by the fact, after selling the looted goods, rioters 
returned with the proceeds to the very stores they had targeted to buy legitimate 
goods (Treadwell et al. 2012). Thus, 'rather than signalling any breakdown of 
society of pathology on the part of the rioters, the events of 2011 represented 
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conformity to the underlying values of consumer culture, and showed how far the 
diktats of that culture have been internalised by the participants' (Moxon 2011, 
p.1). 
Despite the obvious economic marginalisation of the rioters, their behaviour 
showed how well they were incorporated into the competitive individualist culture 
that had evolved under neoliberalism (Treadwell et al. 2012). An ethnographic 
study in Birmingham (Treadwell et al. 2012) was able to capture the views of 
rioters directly. At the outset of interviews, some claimed their involvement was 
about exacting revenge upon the police for the death of Mark Duggan, but when 
challenged on this in the context of how much they had looted, the importance of 
this motive receded. Some were not even sure what had happened in London; 
whether Duggan had been shot or stabbed. Additionally, they did not begrudge 
the super-rich their success and nor were they outraged by recent economic 
failures. These aspects of life 'simply confirm what they already know: the world is 
a lonely place in which only the self can be relied upon, and the only way to relieve 
forms of subjective torture and lack is to join the exploiter class and enrich the self 
as quickly as possible' (p.11). However, other observations of rioting in 
Birmingham told a different story (Davies 2012, p.16), suggesting that rioters' 'only 
aim was to goad the police, challenging them vocally, attempting to provoke the 
police to charge', at which point they would run through side streets to escape, 
before returning to repeat the exercise till late into the night. Either this was an 
attempt to draw police away from shops for the purpose of looting or there were 
other factors at play, at least for some groups. 
Those who claimed the 2011 Riots were devoid of politics and protest, blamed a 
'weak and ineffectual left', which had failed to reinvent and reinvigorate itself in 
the face of a deep economic crisis (Younge 2011). In previous eras, the 
marginalised would have found collective support 'in the broad left's various, yet 
closely allied and symbolically efficient' political groups, but in the 'post-political 
present' there was nothing at hand to provide a means of grasping the reality of 
common stresses and dissatisfactions (Treadwell et al. 2012, pp.2–3). Unable to 
either succeed as individuals, linked to relative poverty and social injustice, or 
articulate and address their situation as a collective, due to a weakened left, 
destined only to fail while the mass media incessantly promotes 'the magical 
success of consumer capitalism's winners', 'these young people had nowhere to 
take their anger and resentment but the shops' (ibid p.2). These were the acts of 
'defective and disqualified consumers' (Bridges 2012; Clarke 2012; Lea & 
Hallsworth 2012). Others concede that the disturbances were political on some 
level. Rioters were saying  'you call on use to consume while simultaneously 
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depriving us of the means to do it properly - so here we are doing it the only way 
we can!' (Žižek 2011, p.3). Lea and Hallsworth (2012) regard this generalised rage, 
without a vision of an alternative, as a reason the 2011 Riots should be viewed 
more seriously than any before. Thus, if nothing else is to come of the riots, 
Bridges (2012, p.11) hopes they serve as  ‘a wake-up call for those on the Left to 
once again address the grievances and concerns of the disenfranchised and the 
disinherited’. 
The consumerist thesis is built around the scale and nature of reported looting, but 
with little critique of this information. Based on The Guardian (2011b) database of 
riot incidents (collated from a range of media sources including news reports, 
blogs and twitter) it has been possible to categorisation of them – according to 
whether reported incidents were primarily about looting, criminal damage, conflict 
(with the police), or general disorder. This is a crude analysis, but, nonetheless 
provides some indication that looting may not have been as prevalent as some 
accounts suggest. The data indicates that two-thirds of riot incidents had little or 
nothing to do with looting (Figure 1.1), and, in some local authority areas, looting 
accounted for less than a tenth of what occurred (Figure 1.2). These findings 
undermine the explanatory power of personal greed and perhaps offer some 
support for claims that many rioters were more intent on ‘sticking it to the police’. 
There is also the fact that, in Nottingham, five police stations were attacked 
(Clifton 2011), which does not fit easily with the consumerist thesis. 
 
Figure 1.1: 2011 Riot events by type 
 
Data source: The Guardian (2011b) 
General disorder 
7% (16) 
Conflict 12% 
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Looting 33% (80) 
Damage 48% 
(115) 
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Figure 1.2: 2011 Riot events by type and district 
 
Data source: The Guardian (2011) 
 
Consideration might be given to what else looting might represent, if not merely 
criminal acquisition. Ginty (2004) suggests ‘looting’ is a negative label used by the 
powerful, but conflates a wide range of activities that differ greatly in terms of 
organisation, scale and the object of looting. To counter the indiscriminate use of 
the term, Ginty proposes a four-fold typology, which establishes that in addition to 
economic motives, looting can be symbolic, strategic, or selective. Symbolic looting 
includes the taking of goods as trophies, fitting with some accounts that looting in 
2011 was used as a means to acquire street reputation, especially by gang 
members, and this took primacy over material value (Harding 2012). Looting can 
also send a message about changing power relations, demonstrating a lack of 
consent for existing authority. This aligns with Angel’s (2012) view that riots are 
inherently political events because they both provoke and are a product of what 
Habermas (1975) describes as a ‘legitimation crisis' the state, linked to the state's 
attempts to maintain profitability in a capitalist-based economy. This is supported 
by survey data which show that perceived 'looting' of state resources by those at 
the top draws a significant minority of people toward a moral stance that makes 
them potentially available for participation in acts of mass illegality (Birch & Allen 
2012). Thus, 'what some have unhelpfully labelled a 'feral underclass' is simply the 
mirror image of the now 'feral elite' (Neal Lawson, cited in Bauman 2012 p.12). 
People interviewed for the Reading the Riots study also referred to anger at the 
financial sector as a motivation for their participation (Newburn, Lewis, Addley, et 
al. 2011).  
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Collins (2008) has previously referred to the strategic role of looting, which can act 
as a 'mass recruiter and momentum sustainer’, without which the riot would come 
to an end once the police chose to withdraw. From a Durkeimian perspective, 
looting is a 'symbolic expression of membership' (McDonald, 2012).  Solidarity and 
integration was suggested by the way in which the 2011 rioters worked together 
(Tester 2012). Participants stood in the way of cameras, presumably to avoid 
fellow looters being identified (McDonald 2012). Looters taking goods from other 
looters was reported, but this was rare, and violence was generally targeted at 
non-participants. Selective looting, often a feature of communal rioting, is where 
properties or whole areas are looted in a manner suggesting target discrimination. 
For example, in the 1992 Los Angeles riot, property damage for Koreans was high 
(Min, 1996 p.90) because it was targeted by African Americans due to inter-ethnic 
tensions.  Similarly, rioters' targeting of designer clothing and electrical stores in 
2011 may not have been economically motivated.  An alternative explanation, 
voiced by looters themselves, is that these stores were targeted because they 
were perceived to be the most exploitative and responsible for putting local shops 
out of business (Briggs 2012b).  
Ginty (2004) has identified four variables that must come together for looting to 
occur:  
1. availability of potential looters 
2. availability of lootable goods 
3. absence of restraint 
4. permissible socio-cultural environment 
These factors focus on the circumstances in which looting takes place, over the 
characteristics or motivations of offenders, which is how the ‘routine activity 
approach’ seeks to explain crime (see Cohen and Felson, 1979). The second 
variable spotlights the importance of place, suggesting that looting is more likely to 
occur where lootable goods are more easily available, such as commercial areas; 
and may explain the greater prevalence of looting in some places compared to 
others. Quantitative research in the U.S. has shown that where there has been no 
pre-arrangement or planned event, people tend to gather at symbolic locations, 
such as a well-known public building or major road intersection (Haddock and 
Polsby, 1994). Arguably, a shopping centre is a ‘symbolic location’ for young 
people living in contemporary urban Britain. Shopping centres are where young 
people meet to ‘hang out’ with their friends. Hence, it is understandable that 
young people living in Birmingham should head to the Bull Ring, where disorder 
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occurred in 2011. The manifestation of looting here is perhaps unsurprising given 
the proximity of lootable goods, but it does not confirm that participants gathered 
with prior intention to loot. 
A number of commentators (Bauman 2012; P A J Waddington 2012a; Morrell et al. 
2011; Stenson 2012) have also referred to the fun factor of looting and rioting 
more generally. Some of the scenes from the 2011 Riots have been described as 
carnivalesque (P A J Waddington 2012a). Of the participants who have since been 
interviewed, a proportion offered no motivation for their involvement other than 
'the buzz of doing things they couldn't or wouldn't normally do such as smashing 
things and being chased by the police' (Morrell et al. 2011, p.27). The inconvenient 
truth is that disorder and rioting are fun (Rock 1981). The motivation of having 
'something exciting to do' is likely linked to the everyday boredom experienced by 
some groups of young people with little else to do, due to high youth 
unemployment and a lack of quality youth provision. In other instances, the same 
motive was reported by young people otherwise engaged in work or education, 
with events being described in terms of a wild party, or as one young person put it 
'like a rave' (Morrell et al. 2011). However, the fun factor has also been linked by 
some commentators to consumerism. They argue that, as capitalism advances and 
capitalists realise the limits to what can physically be accumulated, they  turn to 
the provision of ephemeral services in consumption, including entertainment 
experiences, such as visits to the museum, theatre, cinema, gyms, and even 
shopping itself (Harvey 1989). Consequently, we have now become a society of 
'sensation gatherers' (Bauman 1997). Moxon (2011) suggests that 'the nihilistic 
moment begins to bear some resemblance to the acquisitive moment' and this can 
help explain some of the thrill experienced by the 2011 rioters. Those involved in 
looting were able to acquire consumer goods, conferring identity and status (as 
demanded by consumer culture), with the added excitement linked to the illicit 
nature of this acquisition; 'this was a theme park with no entrance fee' (ibid). 
As well as the sheer fun associated with the experience of rioting, was the 
euphoric feeling of seizing power (Stenson 2012; Briggs 2012b). This may not have 
been a motivation for getting involved in the first instance, but perhaps for 
sustaining involvement. Young people reported how good it felt to have deprived 
the police of their usual power. One young woman interviewed for the Reading the 
Riots study said 'people was just passing fags from the counters... You know what? 
For once it felt like you had so much power' (cited in Lewis 2011). Others spoke 
triumphantly about having the police 'under manners for once' (ibid). The social 
disorder had empowered some people to take on other forms of authority besides 
the police, even beyond the period of the riots. A dimension that has been 
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relatively neglected in accounts of the riots is the issue of how far urban unrest is 
liked to exclusion from political institutions (Solomos 2011). Research in the U.S. 
has highlighted a strong relationship between collective violence and exclusion 
from politics and positions of power. This was implicit in the views of people in 
riot-affected communities. For example, they claimed that local young people had 
participated in the riots because 'they just want to be heard...This is the only way 
some people have to communicate' (cited in Addley 2011). This highlights the need 
to consider the most recent outbreaks in the context of political power relations 
because little has been documented about the political cultures and local 
leadership in towns and cities  where the riots took place (Solomos 2011). 
1.4.4 Deprivation and social exclusion 
Almost all academics writing about the 2011 Riots refer to socio-economic factors 
as critical context. Occurring not long after the global financial crisis of 2008-09, 
considered to be the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s, 
commentators refer to the role of unemployment and austerity measures, which 
had been a consequence. Milburn (2012) argues that the 'hysterical campaign' 
demonising participants, reinforced by the ‘endless looping footage of shops set 
alight’, was launched by political and media elites to avoid the unrest becoming 
linked to 'the context of crisis and austerity from which they emerged' (p.402). 
Empirical evidence supports this hypothesis, demonstrating that previous social 
unrest has been invariably linked to recession (Ponticelli & Voth 2009; Gurr 1970). 
However, in the majority of cases the unrest was not a reaction to the felt effects 
of governmental austerity, but rather to the anticipation of them (Ponticelli & Voth 
2009). This is fitting for the 2011 Riots, which occurred at a time when the full 
weight of proposed spending cuts had not yet hit. Ted Gurr’s seminal book Why 
Men Rebel (1970) suggests that social unrest is most likely to occur during an 
economic downturn following a sustained period of growth, because this produces 
a pronounced discrepancy between expectations and reality, when people have 
come to expect prosperity as a matter of routine. Thus, it is relative rather than 
absolute poverty that drives discontent. 
Taylor-Gooby (2013) argues that 'it is not so much the fact of cut-backs in social 
spending as the groups affected and the detail of the restructuring of the welfare 
state' that affects social order (p.12). Many scholars have argued that state welfare 
contributes to legitimacy, which is the extent to which citizens accept the authority 
of the government, and is central to the orderly operation of democracies (Weber 
1964). Marxism identifies 'two basic and often mutually contradictory functions' 
for state welfare in capitalist societies: accumulation and legitimation (O’Connor 
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1973, p.9). Welfare provision helps to expand capital by ensuring a healthy, skilled, 
adequately housed workforce; and indirectly supports capital by addressing 
workforce needs not met by the market and by helping to secure acceptance of 
the existing social order as fair. Based on a longitudinal quantitative study covering 
26 countries, Taylor-Gooby (2013) concludes that welfare cuts that hit the poorest 
groups hardest, and welfare restructuring that promotes a greater role for the 
private sector and a smaller role for the public sector, are most likely to undermine 
legitimacy, and in doing so are the most likely to promote social unrest. The Liberal 
Democrat / Conservative coalition government set out to achieve cut-backs by 
doing both these things. Findings in relation to the increased work-centredness of 
welfare reforms are more equivocal, and the Coalition policies in this particular 
area may not undermine legitimacy and social order except where vulnerable 
groups are denied adequate benefits at a time of high unemployment. 
In 2011, those most affected by the recession and government retrenchment were 
young people, perhaps explaining why the majority of convicted rioters were aged 
under 20. Youth employment had reached record levels and, linked to public 
spending cuts, youth provision had reduced, leaving young people in disturbance-
affected areas with less to do than in previous years. The Government's removal of 
a £110 million in grant to the City of Manchester had led to services such as the 
Manchester Youth Service being axed (Wain & Joyce 2012). Haringey had cut its 
children and young people's services by 62 per cent (Higgs 2011). Eight of 13 youth 
clubs had closed down, closing with them the opportunity of positive activity away 
from the streets and away from gang culture (McVeigh 2011). When young people 
have nothing more to lose, it is unsurprising that the social norms restraining 
people – such as fear of a criminal record, community exclusion and time in jail - 
become less of a deterrent (Waterton & Sesay 2012). Rioters interviewed as part 
of the Reading the Riots study, invariably talked about a pervasive sense of 
injustice, with younger interviewees particularly likely to mention lack of 
opportunities, the cuts, and the ending of the Educational Maintenance Allowance 
(EMA) (Newburn, Lewis, Addley, et al. 2011). 
Lord Scarman (1981) reported that a significant cause of the disorder for the riots 
in the 1980s was unemployment and social disadvantage. Social statistics provided 
evidence of dramatically high unemployment in all riot-affected areas. In early 
1981, unemployment in the Brixton area was 13 per cent, rising to 25 per cent for 
ethnic minorities, and 55 per cent for Black males under 19 years (ibid). A study in 
the Birmingham area asked people why the riots happened, and 43 per cent of the 
sample identified unemployment as a major cause; the next two most popular 
choices were 'copying other areas' (23%) and boredom (22%) (Benyon 1984). 
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Thatcher, however, never conceded the role of employment. She referred to the 
involvement of school-age children in the disturbances as evidence that ‘it has 
nothing whatever to do with the dole queue' (cited in Unsworth 1982, p.78). 
Thatcher blamed parents for the criminal behaviour of their children and 
suggested that this be dealt with in the form of parental fines. Conversely, others 
argued that the involvement of children was more likely due to their awareness of 
the prospect of unemployment or and the experience of their parents 
worklessness (Unsworth 1982). 
Accounts of disturbances in the 1990s and the 2000s similarly referred to poverty, 
relative deprivation, social isolation and high levels of youth unemployment. 
Bradford, Burnley and Oldham, areas affected by large-scale disorders in 2001, had 
been built on the textile industry, but capitalism’s preference for the cheapest 
labour had decimated their local economies as soon as it became possible to 
source labour more easily abroad (D. Waddington 2007). Thus, these once low-
paid local economies were transformed into severely impoverished communities, 
which were among the 20 most deprived areas in the UK. Consequently, in these 
areas… 
...events did not come out of nowhere. They were the result of tensions that 
have been brewing for years and whose sources are not mysterious. The 
first is poverty. As in every other recent British riot, the trouble erupted in a 
place of desperate economic hardship. Youth unemployment in Oldham is 
40%. That does not justify the behaviour of those young men … but it helps 
explain their anger, frustration and the sense they had nothing to lose. (The 
Guardian 2001) 
Power and Tunstall (1997) suggest that the locations affected by the of 1991-92 
disturbances were characterised by ‘a dangerous combination of large numbers of 
out-of-work young males with no status or stake in society, living in low-income, 
work-poor households, … suffering from a high social stigma’ (p.ix). These socio-
economic conditions had contributed to a crisis of masculinity, which was the 
backdrop to the disturbances (Campbell 1993). Unemployment on some of the 
housing estates where violence occurred was three times as high as the local 
authority average and more than twice as high as other areas comprising social 
housing (Power & Tunstall 1997). This had undermined the ability of men on these 
estates to constitute themselves as men via legal routes and they were forced to 
express their masculinity instead through crime. For example, joyriding, which 
played a role in a number of the disturbances of the early 1990s, can be viewed as 
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‘hyper-masculinity’, which was detrimental not only to men's relationship with law 
and order, but also women and their communities (Campbell 1993). 
By the spring of 1990, joyriding performances in Blackbird Leys had become 
ritualised, but for more than a year, the police did not respond. According to one 
driver, known as ‘The Don’, the police ‘let it mature nicely… they were taking no 
notice’ (cited p.256-7). Eventually the drivers’ taunts and public pressure produced 
a police presence, which intensified excitement and by 1991 the displays were 
being designed not only for the drivers’ fans, but for the police as well. Joyriders 
used radio scanners to keep one step ahead of the police and because their 
behaviour was about being in control, they were keen to demonstrate their ability 
both to draw the police and not get caught. After the riots, senior police officers 
acknowledged the problem had been ‘a macho status-seeking thing’, but ‘gender 
palpably was not addressed as a problem' (p.267). Instead, officers at the time had 
argued that parents needed to take ownership of the problem. This contradicted 
Home Office research (Webb & Laycock 1992), which showed that it was peer 
culture and economics that kept offenders in car crime. Few joyriders would have 
been affected by parental influence. 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s 'problem families' and poor parenting were being 
blamed for a range for societal ills. Charles Murray’s ruminations on the British 
underclass, published in the Sunday Times in 1989, referred to the ‘failure to work’ 
to explain high unemployment. Murray also focused on the undermining effect of 
illegitimacy. He claimed that ‘communities need families. Communities need 
fathers’ (cited in Campbell 1993, p.309). Murray’s prejudice was such that he 
never referred to the strength of mothers coping without men, who presumably 
were being evicted or allowed to abscond (by women) (Campbell 1993). 
Contrasting with this view, ‘neither manners nor mothers’ were to blame for the 
disturbances in the early 1990s, but rather the different ways in which men and 
women on 'Britain’s forgotten estates' dealt with the challenges of poverty and 
unemployment. While women had babies, made and organised and created 
community politics, men, deprived of work and wages – their one guarantee of 
power and privilege – spun into an identity crisis. This was not because they were 
starved of male role models, as suggested by Murray, but because they were 
saturated with them. The political system ‘did not know how to support the 
women and it did not know how to challenge the men’, and it is this ‘crisis of 
empathy’ that made the politicians ultimately culpable for the disorder and 
violence that took place (p.253). 
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In summary, the context of deprivation makes urban unrest more likely, especially 
when it falls unevenly. The worst-affected groups may feel abandoned by those 
who have the power to do something about it. However, deprivation is not the 
whole story. Some communities may have the strength to resist the damaging 
effects of poverty and unemployment. Other communities, though, may require 
support from the state and other local agencies and it is perhaps their second 
abandonment that is most dangerous. 
1.4.5 Over-Policing 
A number of accounts of the 2011 Riots refer to the role of the police. In some 
cases, poor experiences of community policing was seen as the longer-term 
context to disorder. Those interviewed for the Reading the Riots study claimed 
their participation in the disturbances was to seek retribution for police abuse of 
power in their communities (Prasad 2011). The Riots Communities and Victims 
Panel (2012) also highlighted frustration with the police as a causal factor. There 
was a prevalent view among rioters that ‘the police is the biggest gang out there’ 
and the shooting of Mark Duggan confirmed this (Prasad 2011). Rioters raised 
particular concerns about stop and search. Of those brought before the courts for 
riot-related offences, 78 per cent of males and 43 per of females had been 
stopped and searched in the previous 12 months (Topping et al. 2011). It was not 
just the quantity of stop and searches that was an issue, but the manner in which 
they were carried out. Being treated unfairly and without respect had generated 
grievance and anger (Reicher & Stott 2011). In Salford, antagonistic community 
policing was also a predisposing factor. This was associated with local strategies to 
'cleanse' areas that had been gentrified under the guise of 'regeneration' (Jeffery & 
Jackson 2012, p.20). 
Anger at the police linked to repressive tactics and styles of policing were similarly 
identified as in relation to previous riots. In the months preceding the unrest, the 
'Swamp 81' operation accounted for more than 1,000 stop and searches and 100 
arrests through the heavy use of the 'sus law' (Bunyan 1985), which allowed police 
to arrest members of the public for merely acting suspiciously. The operation 
aimed to ‘flood’ the Lambeth area with police to detect and arrest burglars and 
robbers, but only apprehended a small number of people on minor offences (Lea & 
Young 1982). 'The 'Swamp 81' operation served as 'a tailor-made example of how 
to antagonise the greatest possible number of people while at the same time 
achieving the minimum efficiency' (ibid, p.11).  Those commenting on the Moss 
Side (Hytner 1981)and Toxteth Riots (Cooper 1985) also  referred to a ‘deep seated 
hostility' against the police. This was felt primarily by young people, who were 
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personally affected by stop and search, but police relations with the wider adult 
community were affected because in many cases they were the friends and 
relatives of young people. Loney (1986) has described the Broadwater Farm riot in 
1985 as entirely a response to the police, which explains why officers were the 
‘virtual exclusive target for the rioters’ and there was little looting or damage to 
property (p.82). Bernie Grant, the Leader of the Labour-controlled Haringey 
Council, remarked in the aftermath of the Broadwater Farm riot that ‘the youths 
around here believe the police were to blame for what happened on Sunday and 
what they got was a bloody good hiding’ (cited in BBC 2000). 
Mervyn Jones and Winkler (1982) comment on the irony of reactive and coercive 
styles of policing in the 1980s, given the emphasis and open commitment by senior 
officers to 'bobbies on the beat' as the backbone of the police service. They 
explained as a discrepancy between police policy and practice, associated with 
how community policing was resourced and perceived by officers.  These authors 
concluded that beat policing was both undermanned and undervalued. In 
particular, perverse incentives were undermining community relations. The 
informal route to promotion was gained through an impressive record of summons 
reports and arrest, which distracted attention away peace-keeping, community 
relations and other key elements of balanced beat policing.  Thus, street patrol 
was often used as a punishment and officers who displayed dedication to the beat 
patrolling were viewed with deep suspicion within the organisation. 
1.4.6 Under-Policing 
Poor police-community relations were seen to have a role in the disturbances of 
the 1990s and the 2000s, but largely due to under-policing rather than coercive 
policing. In the years preceding the widespread disturbances in 1991-2, police had 
retreated from disadvantaged housing estates on the periphery of urban districts 
because crime was rife and they were considered too difficult to deal with 
(Campbell 1993). In the year before the riot, Meadowell in Northumbria had the 
highest crime rate in the country and ‘it was not unusual to have a ram-raid a 
night’ (Chief Inspector Waddington, cited in Campbell 1993, p.52). When the police 
suddenly began to increase their efforts, fortuitously averting a ram-raid 
operation, the criminal fraternity, which had been given space to develop 
militaristic networks and systems, fought back. Individual officers were targeted. 
They were followed home, and their houses and cars were attacked. The death of 
the two young drivers in a police pursuit was but the final ‘call to arms’. The riot 
was but ‘an explosion at the climax of an ongoing process of loss of control over 
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certain individuals and groups by established authority’ (Power & Tunstall 1997, 
p.16). 
The disturbances of the early 1990s have been described as an example par 
excellence of ‘too little policing followed by too much policing’ (Campbell 1993, 
p.45). The withdrawal of policing from these housing estates not only conceded 
ground to criminal fraternities, but left other residents, unsupported and 
unprotected, and less willing to share information with the police, when they later 
needed it. Campbell (1993) has described how groups of diligent women in these 
besieged estates across the country were working hard to ‘create community’, 
organising informal networks to sustain social integrity and make life liveable 
(p.50). But, rather than supporting them, the police and the local authority, 
abandoned these women to deal with men’s dangerousness on their own. The 
women's Meadowell Action Group tried to intervene against ‘neighbourhood 
terrorism’ by offering young people the use of their building, but the boys and 
young men refused to share space. Consequently, they began to regularly attack 
the building, stealing everything stored there, and to regularly harass the women. 
The police, nor any other agency stopped them and ‘that was why, despite the 
scale and stamina of community politics in Meadowell, it could not become 
hegemonic. That was why there was nothing to stop the riot’ (p.245). A lack of 
resistance to the young men’s misbehaviour, or punishment, ‘gave them 
permission to riot, and then represent the riot as the community’s dissent’ (p.244). 
The situation was similar on the Scotswood estate, in Newcastle, where the 
criminal fraternity felt so unthreatened by the police that they positioned a sign 
outside their regular pub, announcing their intention to riot and their targets, 
which were local women activists, regarded as ‘grassers’ for reporting burglaries 
and their efforts in the community. Paradoxically, these women were scapegoated 
for the loss of respectability on their estates, despite doing exactly what Prime 
Minister, John Major, later asked them to do when he called for ‘the public to have 
a crusade against crime’ (cited in Campbell 1993, p.113). During this period, racist 
attacks had become a matter of public record, but attacks on women were largely 
ignored by the police and other public agencies. When the neighbouring Elswick 
estate was threatened with disorder, not long before, the Racial Equality Council 
mobilised the police to protect the symbolic sites of its South Asian residents. This 
proactive strategy was successful in preventing disorder. However, the lesson was 
not transferred to Scotswood. When the disorder erupted, the police stayed away 
long enough for the rioters to attack and destroy the post office, a symbolic place 
for local women. It was where they collected their benefits to support their 
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families; where they sent letters and bought birthday cards; and was also the 
community’s main ‘conduit to the big wide world’ (p.86).  
Under-policing can also account for the aggression of ethnic minorities towards 
the police in a number of disturbances across the three earlier decades. The 
disturbances in Southall in 1981, Sheffield in 1994 and the disturbances of the 
northern mill towns in 2001 all began with some form of inter-ethnic conflict 
between South Asians and Whites. Conflict developed as a defensive response by 
South Asian men to racist threats against their communities. The police were not 
providing adequate protection, and, in some cases even ignoring requests for 
protection, so the South Asian community, traditionally seen as ‘passive’ became 
‘aggressive’ actors against racism (Goodey 2001).  South Asian violence has tended 
to shift towards the police when they are perceived to be siding with or protecting 
White racists. Referring to the disturbances of the 1980s, Unsworth (1982) 
suggests that South Asian and Black communities had different grounds for 
allegations of police racism. The principal complaint of the Black community was 
police harassment and abuse on the streets through the use of local powers of 
stop and search and the ‘sus’ offence. For South Asians, police racism manifested 
in their resistance to accept or investigate racial motivation behind violence 
against them. 
Events in the run up to the Oldham disturbances in 2001 demonstrate how under-
policing can contribute to unrest. The 2001 football season coincided with rising 
racial tensions in Oldham, which some football hooligans were looking to exploit. 
These tensions were linked to recent media coverage of an attack by South Asian 
youths on a White war veteran; the announcement by the leader of the BNP that 
he was going to stand for the Oldham West constituency in the forthcoming 
general election; and the announcement of a National Front March through the 
town (Bagguley & Hussain 2008). Expecting trouble after the football match 
between Stoke City and Oldham Athletic, the South Asian community asked the 
police to re-direct fans from their area. Police ignored this request for help (ibid). 
Consequently, South Asian men gathered to defend their own community, and this 
led to a large-scale confrontation with racist fans. The police managed to drive 
back the Whites and then attempted to disperse the South Asians, but it appeared 
that the police were taking the hooligans’ side. Eventually, the South Asian men 
had to be dispersed using truncheons and dogs. The main disturbances, taking 
place a few weeks later, characterised by extensive South Asian violence against 
the police, were undoubtedly affected by these events. 
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1.4.7 Public Order Policing 
In addition to the context of poor-police relations, police public order tactics are 
also viewed as problematic in relation to the 2011 Riots (Wain & Joyce 2012). A 
perception that the police could not contain the scale of the rioting is thought to 
have been a key trigger for the spread of disorder; because people felt they 'would 
be able to loot and damage without being challenged by the police' (Riots 
Communities and Victims Panel 2011). Durodié (2012) additionally spotlights 
organisational issues. He argues that the 2011 Riots were only able to take place 
on the scale they did because the police were a weak and disorganised institution 
following a period of transformation. This meant the police were currently more 
concerned with risk management and health and safety issues than robust 
policing. Consequently, this encouraged 'mindless teenagers, who numbered never 
more than a few hundred in any one instance, to come and have a go' (p.5). The 
Reading the Riots research provided some evidence for this theory, suggesting that 
young people participating in the disorders felt powerful over the police and this 
spurred them on. One reason put forward for why the disturbances came to end 
was fear due to the swell in officer numbers on the street, giving the impression 
that the police had decided to take firm action (Taylor et al. 2011). 
The increase in police numbers, however, was only possible through the use of 
mutual aid, which involved the loan of officers from one force to another. 
Otherwise, the Metropolitan Police Service felt unprepared for the scale of the 
unrest (Newburn & Prasad 2012). Officers dealing with the violence first-hand 
across localities reported being untrained, overwhelmed and afraid (ibid). 
Nevertheless, many officers believed they averted unrest on a larger scale, which 
meant it only lasted four days instead of several months. Yet, there are 
commentators who believe the MPS might have dealt with things better. Angel 
(2012) suggests that a crisis of leadership and consequent confusion at senior 
levels of the MPS contributed to two critical errors, which were instrumental in 
transforming a peaceful community protest outside Tottenham police station into 
a riot. These errors include an inability to locate a senior police officer to answer 
the protester's questions; and the decision, if any decision was made, to 'back off' 
when social disorder first erupted. At the time of the riots, police morale was at a 
low ebb due to job insecurity and recent controversies, such as the phone hacking 
scandal and the Tomlinson case, in which heavy-handed police tactic during the 
G20 protests had led to the death of Ian Tomlinson (e.g. HMIC 2009a).  These 
things may be responsible for undermining the resolve of officers on duty in 
Tottenham and, consequently, the impression soon spread that the police were 
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either unwilling or unable to intervene, and this may have contributed to the 
spread of the unrest (Angel 2012). 
A report by the HMIC (2011) has since proposed that a new framework for 
resolving public disorder should include the rules of engagement for weaponry 
such as water cannons, CS gas, and plastic bullets. This echoes the response of 
Thatcher's government, following the riots in the eighties. The Home Affairs 
Committee, however, concluded that these would have been an inappropriate as 
well as a dangerous response to events in 2011 (Home Affairs Committee 2011b). 
It is argued that however well-equipped the police force, society would be 
impossible to regulate without its consent (Jackson et al., 2012; Klein, 2012). 
People are more likely to obey the law and cooperate with the police where there 
is moral alignment between the people, the law and enforcement agencies 
(Jackson et al., 2012; Tyler & Fagan, 2006). In the words of one chief constable 
following the 1981 disturbances, the way forward for policing disaffected 
communities is 'to talk hearts and minds, not CS gas and plastic bullets' (Alderson 
1981, cited in Wain and Joyce 2012 p.133). 
'Provocative' policing during the Bradford disturbances using tactics of 'contain 
and disperse’ (also known as 'kettling') were reported to have escalated disorder 
(Burja & Pearce 2011). Conversely, during 2011 some areas were reported to have 
avoided disorder specifically because the police avoided heavy-handed 
approaches. In Bristol, the police had gained experience during the 'Tesco riots' 
earlier the same year, and were 'very firm but very even-handed'. Police called on 
people to 'calm down' and this was reported to have a relaxing effect on an 
otherwise tense crowd (Clifton 2012b). In Chapeltown, an area of Leeds that had 
previously experienced riots, major unrest was  averted by the decision of West 
Yorkshire police to allow community workers to conduct urgent outreach work to 
dissuade potential rioters (Clifton 2012a). The founder of the Chapeltown young 
people's club, much respected by young people in the area, recalls: 
They were going to input the full force of West Yorkshire police on 
Chapeltown that night. ... But me and Lutel asked them whether we could 
have one hour to go down and quell the situation. An officer made a very 
brave decision to hold back the police: on our wishes, she gave us the 
chance to go into Chapeltown and speak to these young people. (cited in 
Clifton, 2012b) 
Consequently, although there were some isolated outbreaks of violence in 
Chapeltown, due to the commitment of community workers and the willingness of 
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the police to listen and defer to local knowledge and expertise, the situation was 
contained. 
Durodié (2012) claims that what was exposed by the 2011 Riots was a crisis of 
authority across society, and authorities needed to work out how to inspire their 
citizens to be part of and engage with their own society. Empirical evidence from 
the Reading the Riots research supports this, reporting that a major brake on the 
disturbances was the ‘call for peace’ from the father of one of the men killed in 
Birmingham, as opposed to heavy-handed police tactics. Several rioters 
commented how the father's public speech made them feel sad and remorseful, 
and this directly informed their decision to exit from the disturbances (Taylor et al. 
2011). Parental pressure and concerns about bringing shame on their families 
were also found to be key factors inhibiting young people’s involvement in the 
2011 riots (Morrell et al. 2011; Taylor et al. 2011). Thus, demonstrating that even 
the most challenged communities have the ability to self-regulate; and perhaps 
suggesting a role for policing partners as 'facilitators… rather than creators' of 
social order (Innes & Roberts 2008). 
1.4.8 Race and Ethnicity 
The typical participant in the 2011 English Riots was young, male, Black and 
unemployed, based on individuals appearing in court charged with riot offences 
(Ministry of Justice 2012). Over half belonged to a Black or Minority Ethnic (BME) 
group (59%), although Whites represented the largest single ethnic group (41%), 
followed closely by Blacks (39%). This clearly shows an over-representation of BME 
citizens and especially Black citizens and confirmed for some commentators that 
these were 'race riots'. However, academics (Lea & Hallsworth, 2012; Murji & Neal, 
2011; Muir & Adegoke, 2012) later downplayed the role of race. Murji and Neal 
(2011) suggest they were less straightforwardly about race because of the high 
involvement of young White men and because they occurred in unracialised or 
only selectively racialised geographies (such as Gloucester, Enfield, Ealing). 
Although there was the fact that Far Right groups turned up to complicate the 
situation in Liverpool, Eltham and Enfield, declaring intentions to protect their 
areas from 'Blacks'. There were also some skirmishes between Black and South 
Asian residents in Birmingham, but otherwise inter-ethnic conflict was rare (Muir 
& Adegoke, 2012). It is argued that the over-representation of BME groups was 
less to do with race itself, but rather due to a range of other factors, such as 
deprivation, class, and geography, which tend to correlate with ethnicity in Britain 
(ibid). It is these other factors that underpinned people's sense of exclusion and 
made them more likely to riot (Wain & Joyce 2012; Lagrange 2012). 
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Race is 'an overriding theme that runs like a thread through most of the riots in 
post-war Britain' (Newburn, Lewis & Metcalf 2011). In the 1950s, social disorders 
in Nottingham and Notting Hill were described as 'race riots' linked to a history of 
conflict between Whites and recently arrived Blacks. In more recent times, the 
closest parallel to these were the 2001 disturbances, where there was significant 
conflict between White and local Asian youths. By contrast, the major disturbances 
of the early 1980s - in London, Birmingham, Leeds, Manchester and Liverpool - 
coalesced around conflict with the police, but some commentators argued that 
race was still at the heart of the grievances (ibid). It was widely reported that 
rioters in the 1980s were mainly Blacks, but others (Keith 1993) have pointed out 
that of those arrested for riot-related offences in London in 1981, the largest single 
group (a third) was White; and in Toxteth, as many as 60 per cent were White  
(based on The Guardian estimates, cited in Unsworth 1982, p.69). Blacks and 
Whites fought side by side against the police because their experiences were 
increasingly shared (Bunyan 1981). The involvement of Whites was explained by 
the dislocation of traditional working-class communities in the course of industrial 
decline and the powerlessness and relative material and cultural impoverishment 
they have since endured (Unsworth 1982). Black youth had experienced years of 
police harassment and now the young (and not so young) poor White were 
suffering from the same aggressive policing; thus, adding a class dimension 
(Bunyan 1981). A youth worker reflected this in his comments:  
I can understand, as a black man who grew up with racism, how a lot of 
White working-class people feel today...These Politicians have no interest in 
the White man in Salford or the black man in Brixton. (cited in Newburn, 
Lewis & Metcalf 2011) 
There was a 'conspicuous absence' of South Asians in the 2011 disturbances. 
Lagrange (2012) suggests this was because the propensity to riot is linked to the 
prospects of an entire group. Apart from a few exceptional cases, young men of 
South Asian origin were more frequently targets than perpetrators of violence in 
2011, typically as they defended their shops. Lagrange claims that South Asian 
shops were not looted by random. Rather they were targeted due to a politics of 
envy, which was directed at a group that had managed to acquire property and 
build businesses within a wider community that had nothing. Pakistani and 
Bangladeshi immigrants also had slightly better school achievement and 
employment rates compared to African-Caribbean and native British young 
people. In this respect, South Asians had better prospects in 2011 and, 
consequently, less of a reason to create disorder. This predicament demonstrates 
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how inter-ethnic conflict can manifest, which is both detrimental to community 
cohesion and, by consequence, social order. 
Accepting the importance of socio-economic explanations, it cannot be overlooked 
that some Black participants, interviewed for the Reading the Riots research, felt 
unfairly treated because of the colour of their skin (Muir & Adegoke 2011). There 
is also the remarkable similarity between the shooting of Duggan and the role this 
played in providing a spark for the riots and the events leading to the Broadwater 
Farm riots in 1985, which took place in protest at the death of Cynthia Jarratt. In 
trying to understand why the riots happened, it is natural to look for 
commonalities, 'but it would be wrong to leave to one side the role that ... race 
and ethnicity played in some localities' (Solomos 2011, p.2). The initial unrest in 
Tottenham highlighted how the actions of the police, and rumours about their 
actions, can provide the spark for collective violence. It also spotlighted again the 
role of policing in racially and ethnically diverse communities. Although Scarman's 
inquiry (1981) denied institutional racism following the 1980s riots, it did 
recommend a more racially diverse and racially sensitive police force (Newburn 
2011). Official accounts of the 2001 disturbances in Bradford, Oldham and Burnley, 
similarly noted issues raised by policing in communities divided along lines of class, 
faith and culture in the context of deprivation, segregation and social exclusion 
(Cantle 2001; Burnley Task Force 2001; Oldham Independent Review 2001). These 
reports, too, identified a need for more minority ethnic police officers and a need 
to improve police-community relations. 
1.4.9 Dysfunctional Community 
Dysfunctional community has often been invoked as a response to urban unrest. 
Like law and order explanations, it puts the problem with the rioters and ignores 
structural reasons that might, at least, be important context. Dysfunctional 
community buys into the notion that there is a majority culture that is functional. 
In response to the 2011 English Riots, commentators referred to the erosion of 
community life across Britain, which had divided people within their own 
neighbourhoods. Hence, where Cantle (2001) indicated 'too much community' in 
relation to the 2001 disturbances, the response to the 2011 disturbances was 'not 
enough community' (Murji & Neal 2011). Young people seen trashing their own 
neighbourhoods (Briggs 2012a), looting and destroying local businesses and 
terrifying older residents were castigated for disrupting the norms and 
expectations of community. This can be contrasted with the relief expressed at the 
prevailing communitarianism of the ‘saviours of community’ who defended local 
space and cleared up the mess (Wallace 2012).  Such a response reveals 'the moral 
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(as well as penal and economic) power which is brought to bear on the urban 
poor’. 'Communities' have been repositioned within the context of urban 
regeneration 'as sites of order, participation and renewal', in which 'disorder is 
locally managed and welfare is locally produced'. It was this notion of community 
that informed the ‘official’ response to the disturbances, and is perhaps what the 
rioters succeeded in momentarily challenging (ibid). 
Durodié (2012) notes that the government had spent considerable resources over 
recent years wanting to be seen to be ‘building resilience’ among ordinary people, 
particularly in the aftermath of recent acts of terrorism. Yet, when a community 
truly comes together, spontaneously, and at its own initiative to confront a shared 
problem – as the disturbances might be interpreted – the authorities are 
immediately concerned. In fact, what they really want ‘is not resilience, but 
compliance’. Durodié blames the erosion of community life on 'an expansive and 
overarching state that does not allow its citizens to develop and maintain informal 
relations at their own initiative, but would rather constantly formalise these 
through constant codes and procedures' (p.7). In Birmingham, people did not riot 
on their own doorsteps. Some wonder whether this  indicates any kind of respect 
for local residential spaces (Bhattacharyya et al. 2012) or merely the pull towards 
the usually inaccessible space of consumerism (discussed further below). Violence 
directed at local shopkeepers might reflect inter-communal tensions. However, 
this kind of violence was rare and did not generate a dynamic or resonance 
(McDonald 2012).  
Tester (2012) asserts that the events of 2011 must be seen within the context of 
‘interregnum’, which in the Gramscian sense means that 'the great masses have 
become detached from their traditional ideologies, and no longer believe what 
they used to believe previously. ... The... old is dying and the new cannot be born; 
in their interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear' (Gramsci 1971, 
p.276). The current interregnum is due to the breakdown of the 'social imaginary', 
a term reflecting how people imagine their social existence, including expectations 
about how they and others should interact with each other and the values that 
underpin these expectations (Taylor 2007). Bauman (2012) similarly comments 
that 'the world as we knew it, or thought we knew it, is going out of joint. ... The 
old certainties have disappeared' (p.14). From this perspective, the 2011 English 
Riots were characterised by looting because consumer goods ‘are tangible - they 
appear to offer something certain in the circumstances of interregnum when 
everything else has been invalidated' (Tester 2012, p.9). 
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Official accounts have always blamed certain groups, who simply do not know how 
to behave. In 2011, as in the early 1990s, the group was poor young people, who 
had not been parented well enough. Consequently, the government presiding over 
the 2011 Riots decided that parents would now to be punished alongside their 
children using the 'riot clause' enacted through the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime 
and Policing Act 2014. This new piece of legislation extended the powers of 
possession to social housing landlords, suggesting courts may order possession 
where 'the tenants or an adult residing in the dwelling-house has been convicted 
of an indictable offence which took place during, and at the scene of, a riot in the 
UK'. This has not yet been used, but, nonetheless, remains a symbol of state 
violence (Moxon 2011) and punishment on a class basis (Young 2016). Other times, 
certain ethnic groups have been identified as the cause of community dysfunction. 
In the 1980s, Black people were the ‘enemy within’, substituted by South Asian 
men in the official response to the 2001 disturbances (Bagguley & Hussain 2008). 
Diagnosing racial residential segregation leading to dysfunctional community as a 
major cause of the 2001 disturbances paved the way for the government’s 
‘community cohesion’ agenda, which shifted away from multiculturalism and 
towards assimilation (ibid). Alternatively, Young (2007) argues that the 
disturbances in 2001, as in the 1980s, were due ‘not to discontent because of lack 
of assimilation but rather discontent because of the degree of assimilation’.  In 
both cases these riots involved second generation immigrants, who had 
incorporated notions of citizenship and, thus, were acutely aware of their political 
and economic exclusion from wider society, and that bad policing was an 
additional violation of their citizenship. 
An emphasis on cultural dysfunction ‘lays the blame clearly at the feet of the 
rioters and the community pathologies that have generated them’ (Alexander 
2004, p.529), ignoring issues of racial disadvantage and White extremism, which 
some suggest were important for understanding the 2001 disturbances.  The 
history of the northern mill towns have been interwoven with colonialism and 
racist housing policies, which provided the conditions of poverty and segregation, 
giving rise to inter-ethnic animosity (Kundnani et al. 2001; Amin 2003). Migrant 
labour was brought over from Pakistan and Bangladesh in the 1960s and 1970s to 
work the undesirable night shifts in the northern cotton mills. Initially, ‘the textile 
industry was the common thread binding the White and South Asian working class 
into a single social fabric. But with its collapse, each community was forced to turn 
inwards on to itself' (Kundnani et al. 2001, p.106). Competition for scarce local 
opportunities fuelled resentment between the two communities, especially as 
stories grew of Whites getting better jobs and houses and of South Asians 
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receiving preferential welfare support (Amin 2003). Segregation in housing led to 
segregation in education, and meant that a generation of Whites and South Asians 
was now growing up with little contact or understanding of each other, except that 
provided by the media (Kundnani et al. 2001). 
Additional context for the 2001 disturbances was the shift in perceptions of British 
South Asians. The ‘Honeyford Affair’ caused cultural issues to be debated and 
defended by a variety of groups when a head teacher in Bradford wrote an article 
for a national audience problematizing Muslim pupils’ inclusion in education 
(Bolognani 2012). The focus shifted more firmly from culture to religion, when a 
group of Bradford Muslims burned copies of The Satanic Verses and forced 
retailers to take the book off their shelves (Herbert 2003). It has been argued that 
the ‘Rushdie Affair’ marked the emergence of a Muslim identity separate from the 
South Asian cultural heritage (Bolognani 2009), and the beginnings of 
Islamophobia in the media and popular discourse (Runneymede Trust 1997). In 
1995, there were then the protests against prostitution on Lumb Lane, which 
demonstrated the ability of Bradford Muslims to fend for themselves without the 
support of other groups previously associated with the Honeyford Affair (Macey 
1999). Soon after, the 1995 Bradford riot occurred, considered another key turning 
point for the demonization of British South Asians, who by now represented the 
public face of Islam in Britain (Goodey 2001). Bradford had made the transition 
from ‘a touch of exoticism in the grim North’ to the home of Muslim aggressors 
(Goodey 2001, p.626) 
These historical events cannot be divorced from the neo-fascist mobilisations and 
the mundane, persistent racism affecting the lives of many South Asian people 
living in Bradford, Oldham and Burnley  (Bagguley & Hussain 2008). The popular 
image of the 2001 rioters is one of ‘delinquent Asian-Muslim youths’, but it has 
been argued that at least some of them were motivated by resistance to racist 
mobilisations by neo-fascist groups and the failure of the police to provide 
protection from this threat (Kundnani et al. 2001, p.105). Some of the riot-affected 
areas had previously been popularised as no-go areas through the media coverage 
of racist attacks, especially on White people, and alarming references to South 
Asian gangs (Vasagar et al. 2001). There had been much less coverage of the plight 
of the South Asians living in these areas. The rally organised by the British National 
Party (BNP) and the National Front (NF) in Oldham on the 26 May, seen as 
contributing to the 2001 disturbance, was in fact the third such demonstration 
involving White racists that year (Kalra & Rhodes 2009). As the Labour party 
neglected its core White working class base, the BNP and the NF saw the 
opportunity to mobilise this group under the theme of 'rights for Whites' (Bagguley 
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& Hussain 2008). The disturbances in Oldham, as in the other northern mill towns, 
must be seen within a context of repeated incursions instigation by neo-fascists 
(Vasagar et al. 2001). 
Recognising the role of White extremism in precipitating the 2001 disturbances, 
Bagguley and Hussain (2008) were drawn into re-evaluating accounts of earlier 
riots. With the benefit of hindsight, they see that often the riots of 1981 and 1985 
were a response to neo-fascist mobilisations, and can be seen as part of the same 
'wave' of action starting in the late 1970s. They suggest that the St. Pauls’ and 
Brixton riots were indeed responses to police action, but others were not. They 
argue that, as with the 2001 disturbances, some of the riots in the eighties 
represented, more than anything, class disunity and inter-ethnic conflict, albeit 
'mediated' through the police. The one disturbance in the 1990s that has always 
been associated with inter-ethnic conflict, the Southall disturbance in 1981, was 
never really investigated by the authorities. Instead, the skinheads were 
scapegoated by politicians, stereotyping them all as fascists and setting them out 
as the new folk devil (Unsworth 1982). This focus on the ‘skinhead invasion’ 
enabled the Southall incident to be slotted into the history of moral panics about 
youth and immorality, deflecting attention from underlying conditions that may 
have bred the racial violence. 
Although the disturbances of the early 1990s took place in predominantly White 
areas, inter-ethnic conflict did play out in some of the events.  In Meadowell, 
Northumbria, first-hand accounts of the disturbances show that rioters made 
collective decisions to target South Asian shops. The attacks on South Asian stores 
were also the most malicious, risking the lives of South Asian families living above 
them (Campbell 1993). The riot started as a crusade against the police, but ‘when 
the police refused to make themselves available for an attack, then low-flying 
endemic racism made the South Asians – who lived there – available to drive a 
mission that was drifting’ (p.88). Regarding the disturbances in Ely, Cardiff, the 
police and the people involved denied any ‘racist undertones’, but he incidents 
preceding them suggest otherwise. The trouble started with a dispute over a trade 
covenant between two shopkeepers: a Pakistani grocer, Abdul Waheed, whose 
business was doing well, and the newsagents, Mr and Mrs Agius, whose business 
was not.  The policing of the unrest transformed it into a ‘gladiatorial contest’ 
between the men and the police, but the starting point was the racist response to 
a successful Pakistani business man in a predominantly White community. 
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1.5 Urban unrest elsewhere in the world 
This section looks at urban unrest in the USA and France across the same three 
decades explored for Britain. These countries have been chosen because they are 
most similar to Britain. The main disturbances are identified and key events are 
briefly described and explained based on the available literature. The aim is to 
explore whether the frequency and nature of unrest in Britain is mirrored 
elsewhere and to what extent it is caused by the same factors. The USA and France 
are covered in separate sub-sections below. Reflections on how these compare 
with British disorders is then returned to in the concluding sections. 
1.5.1 U.S. Riots 
It is argued that the historical pattern of rioting in both Britain and the USA can be 
explained by the migratory movements of ethnic minorities, leading to two distinct 
phases of urban unrest the two countries (Waddington 1992). In their respective 
histories there has been an earlier period of what Janowitz (1969) has called 
'communal riots', involving inter-racial clashes between Whites and ethnic 
minorities and a subsequent period of 'commodity riots', involving confrontations 
between ethnic minorities and the agents of social control, such as the police. A 
more recent period of rioting from the 1980s to the present sees rioting of both 
types, including some hybrid riots. Horowitz (1983) suggests that this re-
emergence of inter-ethnic conflict may signify a new pattern of tensions linked to 
the large-scale immigration experienced by the USA since 1965. He also warns us, 
based on comparative evidence, that an accumulation of grievances against more 
than one competitor ethnic group may produce especially strong hostility. 
The U.S. 'ghetto riots' of the 1960s have been likened to the British riots of the 
1980s because in both cases they were typically precipitated by police actions and 
involved Black people (Waddington 1992; Benyon & Solomos 1987; Field & 
Southgate 1982; Horowitz 1983).  It is argued that they occurred not in locales 
where discrimination and deprivation were at their worst, but where hope for 
amelioration was at its highest. They reflected aspirations of the marginalised 
Black population to be included in society and politics. There was another period 
of commodity riots between 1980 and 1989 in and around Miami. During this 
period, each major outbreak of violence was triggered by the fatal shooting of a 
Black person either by a White or Hispanic police officer. Similarly, the Cincinnati 
Riots, occurring over four days in 2001, were triggered when a Black American was 
shot dead by a White officer during a police chase. As described in relation to the 
Salford disturbances (Jeffery & Jackson 2012), the 2011 English Riots, the context 
to the Cincinnati Riots was poor police-community relations linked to gentrification 
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(Waddington 2009). Following these riots a ‘collaborative arrangement’ was 
developed. This comprised a community group to help reform police operations 
and policies and an independent citizen-complaint panel. The measures were 
thought to be instrumental in avoiding unrest in 2003, following the death of 
another Black man, who was beaten by White police officers (ibid). 
Communal riots in the U.S. have tended to be more violent than commodity riots 
(Horowitz 1983). Although the Miami Riot of 1980 was sparked by the acquittal of 
four White police officers accused of killing a Black motorist, the response 
manifested as inter-ethnic violence, resulting in the brutal killings of both Cubans 
and Whites (ibid). The violence was preceded by an extraordinary growth in the 
Cuban population and surveys conducted before the riots suggested high levels of 
anti-Cuban resentment on the part of Blacks, linked to perceptions of economic 
competition and ‘opportunities usurped by newcomers’ (Horowitz 1983). There 
were other communal riots in the Crown Heights area of Brooklyn, New York, in 
1991. The confrontation this time was between Blacks and Hasidic Jews and the 
perception of unequal treatment by the police. The incident was foregrounded by 
a long history of tension between Hasidic and Black communities, primarily over 
the allocation of housing and over-stretched emergency services. Resentment 
among Blacks had also been stoked by the head of the African American 
department at New York's City College, accusing Jews and the Mafia of devising 'a 
system of destruction of Black people' (cited in Waddington 1992, p.72). 
The 1992 Los Angeles riots, also known as the Rodney King riots, have been 
described as the worst riot in modern American history (Gale 1996). They have 
also been described as something of a hybrid, containing elements of both 
communal and commodity rioting.  Violence erupted when four police officers 
were acquitted of beating a Black man, Rodney King, by an overwhelming White 
jury. The rioting spread from Los Angeles up the Pacific coast in Seattle and to 
other parts of the country, including Newark, Detroit, New York, Washington, 
Chicago, and Philadelphia. Incidentally these were all places affected by rioting in 
the 1960s. In 1992, Blacks and Hispanics were united because Hispanics had their 
own grievances against the Los Angeles Police Department and felt the same racial 
and economic conditions that Blacks felt (Alvarez 2012). The riot brought a greater 
sense of understanding between the two groups and signalled 'the start of a new 
coming together in community' (ibid). Approximately half all the damage was to 
Korean American property (Min 1996, p.90). Tensions between Koreans and 
African Americans had been simmering for some time. These were largely due to 
cultural differences and the socio-economic success of Korean Americans relative 
to Blacks (Kim 2011). The media had stoked further resentment by presenting 
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provocative images of gun-wielding Korean merchants, fending off mostly Black 
and Hispanic inner-city residents plundering their stores (ibid). 
1.5.2 French Riots 
This section draws on accounts of the 2005 French Riots, which have been 
compared with the 2011 English Riots (Body-Gendrot 2012 e.g. Newburn 2016; 
Waddington & King 2009). Before the 2005 riots there was no academic tradition 
in France devoted to theoretically explaining periods of urban unrest (Jobard 
2009a). hence, this section draws on sparse and retrospective accounts to identify 
the key characteristics of these earlier French riots and to examine why they 
occurred and, finally to compare and contrast them with British riots, specifically 
the 2011 English Riots. The discussion below is structured temporally, looking at 
major French riots in each decade from the 1980s to the 2000s. 
The 'Minguettes Hot Summer' disturbances of 1981 were seen as the beginning of 
the Banlieues crisis in France (Jobard 2009a). They involved residents in the 
Minguettes housing estate, in the Banlieue-town of Vénissieux on the outskirts of 
Lyon.  Banlieue is a French term from the middle ages literally meaning' banned 
location', but is now widely used to designate an urbanised area on the outskirts of 
a large town (Waddington, Jobard, et al. 2009). The Minguettes were erected in 
the mid-1960s to house immigrant workers recruited from the former French 
colonies in northern-Saharan Africa. The disturbances occurred during the school 
summer holidays and mainly consisted of car crime and related disorder on the 
Minguettes estate itself. Young people stole high performance cars from Lyon and 
brought them back to the estate for car chases, sometimes with the police, and to 
set them on fire. By the end of the summer, around 250 cars had been destroyed. 
There are obvious similarities between these disturbances and and the English 
disturbances on predominantly White working class estates in the early 1990s 
(ibid). 
The 1990s came to be known as the 'riots decade'  due to the frequency of 
disorder (Jobard 2009a). In the first half of the decade, disturbances occurred at a 
rate of 10-15 each year (Lagrange 2006).  Although immigration was on the 
decline, the immigrant population was changing due to the arrival of a darker-
skinned group from sub-Saharan Africa and racial attacks and police brutality rose 
concordantly, which in turn sparked riots (Schneider 2008).  A long list of 
disturbances has been directly attributed to the deaths of young immigrants at the 
hands of the police, who never faced charges (ibid). However, Lagrange (2006) 
identifies two distinct periods between 1990s to 2004. Whereas, those in the 
earlier period (1992-96) were linked to policing and can be defined as ‘commodity 
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riots’ (Janowitz 1976). Those between 1997 and 2004, were more akin to 
communal riots. This shift this was due to worsening employment and living 
conditions that resulted in the radicalisation of inter-neighbourhood 
confrontations and a rise of neighbourhood-related identities. Neighbourhoods 
were demarcated with names like 'La cité des 4000' (City of 4,000) to represent the 
number of apartments in the local tower blocks (Bonelli 2005). Segregating poor 
migrants in the Banlieues had produced identities that emanated 'from turf rather 
than ethnicity' (Body-Gendrot 2007, p.423) and it was economic segregation, more 
than unemployment, that played the greater role in producing this unrest 
(Lagrange 2012, p.32). 
A large episode of social unrest took place in autumn 2005, and a smaller one in 
2007. Lagrange (2009) regards the rioting in 2005 as exceptional even for France 
'where protests are a living tradition' (p.107). Other contemporary riots had lasted 
two or three days (Jobard 2009b). By contrast, the events of 2005 spanned 20 days 
and affected 300 localities (Body-Gendrot 2012). The damage to property was 
spectacular, including no fewer than 10,000 torched cars and 250 public buildings 
destroyed (Jobard 2009b) and costing between 200 and 250 million euros (Body-
Gendrot 2012). Where the riots of the 1980s and the 1990s occurred in towns 
mainly populated by northern-Saharan immigrants (of Algerian and Moroccan 
heritage), the 2005 riot locations aligned with settlements of newer sub-Saharan 
migrants (Jobard 2009b).  This meant that they could not be accounted for by a 
culture of protest, passed down from previous generations (Jobard 2009b; 
Lagrange 2009), meaning  other explanations had to be found. 
It was observed that the majority of the 2005 riot locations (85%) were in sensitive 
urban zones (ZUS), which had been identified as focal points for urban renewal 
since the 1990s (Lagrange 2006). A study by the National Council of Cities 
emphasised how the most violent events were actually in areas where investment 
had been the greatest (cited in Epstein 2009). This was due to the destabilising 
effect of these programmes (Lagrange 2006). Families living in damaged buildings 
scheduled for demolition or temporarily re-housed in hotels found it difficult to 
prevent their children going out in the evenings during the riots. Epstein (2009) 
points out that rioting also occurred in areas where demolition operations had not 
yet begun. Thus, it was not so much the roll out of the programme that 
contributed to unrest, but the way the renewal programme was perceived. 
Inadequate information regarding the nature and implementation of the 
programme, against the backdrop of a right-wing discourse in local and national 
politics (see Murray 2006), fed suspicions that ‘the urban renewal programme was 
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aimed less at improving the living environment of the residents than at ensuring 
their expulsion from the area’ (Epstein 2009, p.132).  
The actions of the police in sparking the 2005 French riots are well documented 
(Schneider 2008; Waddington, King, et al. 2009). They followed an incident 
involving three migrant boys, who were approached by police officers wanting to 
check their identity papers on the way home from playing football. The boys fled 
and took refuge in an electricity substation, where one sustained major burns and 
the other two were electrocuted. It is believed that ‘a simple call to the electric 
power company would have saved the children’s lives, but instead the police 
abandoned them to almost certain death’ (Schneider 2008, p.135). Within two 
hours, rumours of the incident had provoked a violent response, involving around 
100 local youths and the burning of 23 vehicles (Brown 2007). At the outset the 
rioting remained focused in towns close to where the incident occurred, but began 
to spread across large parts of the country after a tear gas grenade was thrown by 
police into a mosque and the Interior Minister, Nicholas Sarkozy, refused to admit 
the police had committed any wrong (Jobard 2008). 
Although migrant youths in the Banlieues were frustrated by poverty and high 
unemployment, ‘neither underclass culture nor despair led young people to burn 
cars and public buildings for three weeks on end’ (Schneider 2008, p.138). Rather it 
was police brutality, ‘which is more likely in highly unequal societies and in those 
where particular racial, ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities are excluded 
from full participation’ (ibid).  The events of 2005 were foregrounded by 
deteriorating relations between immigrant communities and the state following 
the 2002 election, which put Sarkozy in charge of the police. Sarkozy was seen to 
have played a role in the riots by calling for aggressive enforcement against quality 
of life crimes, which disproportionately affected resident in the Banlieues; by 
extending police powers to check identity papers; and by disbanding community 
police. Complaints of police abuse rose dramatically as a result (Schneider 2008). 
Murray (2006) suggests that just as police stop and search practices had outraged 
Britain's Black communities in the 1980s, repetitive identity checks had alienating 
and antagonised France's ethnic minority youths.  
Jobard (2009b) suggests that police management of the disturbances was 
responsible for the extent and spread of the violence once it had erupted. By 
focusing on containment instead of a more arrest-oriented mode of policing, 
rioters were left ‘free’ to continue their activities and there was no inducement for 
them to stop. This strategy can be linked to Sarkozy’s concern to avoid political 
fall-out of the type that contributed to the defeat of Chirac’s government, when 
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the police in 1986 beat a young man to death during a student demonstration. The 
2005 riots gradually subsided only when Sarkozy developed the confidence to 
sanction a more confrontational role for the police. Jobard suggests the strategy of 
containment also explains the extent of the destruction in rioters’ own 
neighbourhoods. This was extensively cited by the authorities as nihilism and 
vandalism, but empirical evidence suggests that targets were collectively discussed 
and selected by rioters on the basis of local politics. For example, a car depot was 
burnt because its owner was rumoured to be racist and a school because its 
principal had recently expelled a student, perceived to be unjust by local people 
(Kokoreff 2006). 
In comparing contemporary urban unrest in France and Britain, it seems there are 
many similarities. Both countries primarily experienced commodity riots in the 
1980s and communal riots in the mid-late 1990s and early 2000s. The 1981 riots in 
France and the British disturbances in the early 1990s had striking parallels, linked 
to the thrill-seeking behaviour of unemployed young men on peripheral housing 
estates, who used joy riding as a way to relieve their boredom and antagonise the 
police. Both countries experienced a higher frequency of disorder in the 1990s 
compared to other decades. However, in France these were associated with 
aggressive policing of migrant communities rather than under-policing of poor 
White communities. The spread of the 2011 English Riots attracted a great deal of 
domestic commentary, but these were not on the same scale as the 2005 French 
Riots, which reached 300 localities compared to 66. Moreover, in England, the 
riots lasted 4 days compared to 20 in France; although it was reported that no 
single locality experienced disorder for more than four nights (Centre d’analyse 
stratégique 2006). In almost all cases in both countries, the rioting occurred in 
areas of high deprivation. A key difference with the 2011 English Riots was the 
level of looting, which might be explained by their occurrence in city centres 
compared with mainly residential localities in France (Newburn 2016). 
1.6 Conclusion 
Some issues cut across time and space in relation to urban unrest. Material and 
social deprivation are always key contextual factors. Unfair treatment by the police 
is usually the trigger and the longer-term context, either due to over-policing or 
under-policing of communities. In all three countries, aggressive policing tends to 
be the complaint of BME communities, invariably linked to racism within the police 
expressed through the use of aggressive operations and street-based practices; 
such as stop and search in Britain and identity checks in France. The death of 
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ethnic minorities at the hands of the police has been responsible for some of the 
most violent disturbances. Britain is unusual due to the relatively high level of 
rioting by White people. Their participation, often under-reported, adds a class 
dimension, which was more pronounced in the 2011 English Riots than ever 
before. Spatial patterning in the U.S. and France means BME groups are more 
segregated than in England and this may help explain why White and Black people 
are less likely to riot together in these countries.  
Inter-ethnic conflict has been linked to migratory patterns in combination with 
poverty, unemployment and social injustice and appears more prevalent in the 
USA than either Britain or France. Even when U.S. riots have been triggered by the 
police, they have often resulted in inter-ethnic conflict, typically between Blacks 
and a newer migrant group. This is  linked to the perceptions of Black people of 
economic competition and ‘opportunities usurped by newcomers’ (Horowitz 
1983). In Britain, inter-ethnic conflict was most obvious in the 2001 riots, which 
were a response of South Asian communities to neo-fascist mobilisations in the 
north of England. White resentment of ethnic minorities in traditionally White 
working class areas had grown in response to increasing poverty and 
unemployment and campaigning of neo-fascist groups under the banner of ‘rights 
for Whites’. However, the popular narrative in the aftermath of the 2001 
disturbances identified the ‘self-segregation’ of South Asians as the main problem, 
prompting the ‘community cohesion’ agenda aimed at helping migrant groups to 
integrate themselves, rather than a societal response aimed addressing material 
and social deprivation. 
Reflecting on the 2011 English Riots, despite some localised incidents, there was 
little evidence that these were communal riots. Policing was the immediate trigger 
and backdrop to events in London. Some commentators also suggest it was a key 
contextual factor in other localities, where people may have viewed the treatment 
of Mark Duggan and his community as symbolic of their own experience. 
Conversely, there was some indication that police were able to prevent unrest, 
especially where they worked in partnership with other agencies. However, much 
of the literature on the 2011 English Riots is not empirically grounded and where it 
is, this is mainly focused on the London experience. This provides a rationale for 
further research outside London, both in riot affected locales to examine 
predisposing factors and non-riot affected locales to better understand protective 
factors. 
As with previous British riots, dysfunctional communities, poor parenting and 
criminal youth have featured heavily in media and political explanations of the 
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2011 English Riots; but perhaps more than ever before. Conversely, brief reference 
has been made to the role of parents in inhibiting young people’s involvement 
(Morrell et al. 2011; Taylor et al. 2011) and perhaps the protective role of 
community needs to be explored further. The role of youth workers in averting 
violence in Leeds was also suggested (Clifton 2012a), as well as the deleterious 
consequences of cuts to youth provision. Given that rioters are most often young 
people, youth services were also worth exploring further, as a local contextual 
factor. This analysis of the literature has helped to identify a range of factors that 
might help explain ‘why’ and ‘where’ riots occurred in 2011. Given the prominent 
role of policing in almost every riot, the next chapter will look at the literature on 
issues affecting policing and police-community relations. The Chapter after this will 
show how the research design for the empirical part of the study was informed by 
the literature findings.   
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Chapter 2 – Policing literature  
2.1 Introduction 
Policing has been spotlighted as playing a prominent role in most contemporary 
riots in Britain, France and the USA. Often there has been a specific event involving 
an officer that has ‘sparked’ unrest. Typically, as with the 2011 English Riots, this 
has event has resulted in the death of a BME individual. However, the tinder for 
the unrest has sometimes been inter-ethnic tensions, but more usually and often 
in combination, the longer-term context has been poor police-community relations 
too. Conversely, there was some evidence that non-riot affected locales in 2011 
were protected by the actions, or inactions, of police and partners. There were 
also reports that unrest was avoided in Cincinnati in the early 2000s because 
certain measures were put in place to promote joint problem-solving between the 
police and local people and to deal with complaints against the police 
independently, thus making the police more accountable to the public. Hence, the 
themes of community policing and public accountability will be explored here with 
the wider context of police and legislative reform. The aim of this chapter is to 
provide a theoretical framework to inform the empirical part of the study, which 
intends to look at the role of police and partners in preventing and containing 
unrest, and perhaps promoting it, during the 2011 English Riots.   
The chapter begins by introducing key policing terms and definitions to clarify how 
they are used and understood within the thesis, leading onto a brief overview of 
how the police were introduced and developed in England and Wales. From here 
there is some attempt to chart key developments for the police and policing. The 
chapter is structured thematically, with consideration given to the temporal 
sequencing of events where this is possible. Key themes include how police 
powers have been expanded and constrained by legislation and governance 
structures; police accountability, particularly when officers are accused of misusing 
their powers; and how the role of the police has changed to accommodate new 
forms of policing, new policing partners and new personnel. Cross-cutting all these 
themes is how police work, particularly discretionary practice in situations of low 
visibility, can be checked to ensure it does not discriminate. This is because styles 
of policing characterised by procedural fairness are most likely to gain support for 
the police and compliance with the law. Public order policing is considered 
separately at the end, partly because this is seen as a distinct activity by the police. 
However, discussion will illustrate that police discretion and fair treatment are as 
important for crowd management as they are to community policing. 
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2.2 Police and the task of policing 
The distinction between police, police-work and policing is an important one for 
facilitating understanding about the police role as it has evolved and currently 
exists in England and Wales. It is also important for understanding the relationship 
of the police to other public authorities, both generally and in the context of urban 
unrest. In Anglo-American societies, the term ‘police’ refers to ‘a specialised body 
of people given primary formal responsibility for legitimate force to safeguard 
security’ (Reiner 2010, pp.4–8). ‘Policing’, narrowly defined, refers only to the 
activities performed by the police, but there is also a broader definition, which is 
used to signify social regulation, recognising the term’s etymological link with 
politics and governance (Rowe 2013). To avoid policing becoming a catch-all for 
every institution and activity contributing to social regulation, which might include 
schools and schooling, Reiner (2010) practically suggests narrowing it down to ‘the 
creation of systems of surveillance coupled with the threat of sanctions for 
discovered deviance’ (p5). Thus, what the police do is policing, but other 
institutions, groups and roles also contribute to this activity. 
The history of the police in England and Wales began with the establishment of the 
Metropolitan Police in 1829 by the Home Secretary Sir Robert Peel (Rowe 2013, 
p.24). This ‘new police’ replaced constables, watchmen and amateur justices and 
constituted part of a move to a more centralised social order (Reiner 2010, p.53). 
The police’s primary instruction was the ‘prevention of crime’ (Emsley 1991). In 
the face of massive resistance, the first officers were dressed in a non-military 
style, carried minimal weaponry, and were instructed to be civil and obliging to 
people of every position and respectful to private property at all times (McLaughlin 
2007, p.3). Yet, public animosity and even conflict endured and it wasn’t until the 
1950s that the police started to gain widespread acceptance, and to even be 
regarded as a symbol of national pride (Loader & Mulcahy 2003). This acceptance 
was achieved in three ways (McLaughlin 2007): Firstly, political patronage and 
judicial protection meant that allegations of police malpractice went un-
investigated or were explained away; secondly, the police learnt to negotiate 
‘unspoken’ contracts with certain social groups to avoid conflict and get them on 
side; and, thirdly, representations of the police in popular culture normalised its 
presence and fictional characters such as PC George Dixon nurtured the image of 
the ‘beloved British bobby’.   
Of these three explanations, the second alludes most strongly to the crux of 
policing, which is the ability of officers to use discretion to deal with incidents in a 
variety of other ‘peacekeeping’ ways even if an offence may have been committed. 
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Discretion is both a practical response to the limited capacity of the criminal justice 
system (Reiner 2010, p.19) and a logical outcome of legal rules that require 
interpretation in unpredictable situations (Newburn & Reiner 2012). For example, 
most offences require mens rea (a ‘guilty mind’), which can be difficult to assess 
and therefore leaves officers with ample scope for discretion. However, while it 
may be the consensually wise way to deal with some issues, discretion also raises 
the prospect of discrimination and malpractice (Reiner 2010, p.19). The Scarman 
inquiry (1981) into the 1981 Brixton riots acknowledged this dual nature of police 
discretion. The report influentially argued that maintaining order should take 
priority over law enforcement and in this way discretion was the better part of 
police valour (Newburn & Reiner 2012). On the other hand, the report identified 
disproportionate and indiscriminate use of stop-and-search, and by implication the 
use of police discretion, as the main cause of the riots by provoking community 
anger and hostility. 
2.3 Procedural justice 
Stop and search is a tactic used by the police to gain access to evidence on the 
person about a crime they have committed or are about to commit. It is a tactic 
that relies heavily on police discretion. In the run up the Brixton riots stop and 
search was heavily used as part of ‘Operation Swamp 81’ in an attempt to tackle 
high levels of street crime. Scarman (1981) found that of the 943 individuals 
stopped, over half were Black and most were aged under 21. Only 118 were 
arrested, and of the 75 charges just 21 were for the target offences theft, robbery 
and burglary. Most charges were for threatening behaviour, assault and 
obstruction, of which many, Scarman concluded, were likely to have resulted from 
police over-zealousness. Operations such as Swamp 81 were the product of a 
wider set of developments affecting styles of policing from the 1960s including the 
introduction of the Unit Beat System, which was a new reactive ‘fire brigade’ 
approach, intended simultaneously to improve efficiency and police-community 
relations (Holdaway 1983; Kinsey et al. 1986). Instead, by removing officers from 
the streets and transferring them into panda cars, it did the opposite. While the 
technology of fast cars and sirens gave officers the ability to speed from one 
incident to the next, it reduced opportunity for face-to-face contact beyond 
conflictual arrest situations, leaving a relationship which had little space for 
consent (Crawford 1997, p.46).  
Scarman’s observation that many of the charges resulting from Operation Swamp 
were probably linked to how people were treated the police raises interesting 
- 57 - 
questions about the circumstances under which people will abide by the law. 
Research has found that perceptions of fair treatment, also referred to as 
procedural justice, are a key determinant of people’s lawful behaviour (Tyler 1990; 
Jackson & Bradford 2010). This is because fair treatment communicates to people 
that the police are ‘on the same side’ and this moral connection makes people 
more likely to trust the police. Trust is a future-oriented concept, defined as a 
‘positive feeling of expectation regarding another’s future actions’ (Barbalet 2009, 
p.375) and is a powerful predictor of compliance and legitimacy. People comply 
not because they fear punishment (instrumental compliance), but because the 
police are seen as a legitimate authority. Because a trusting public are more 
cooperative, this can also make police work easier (Tyler 1990). Procedural justice 
is just one driver of legitimacy. Others include the perceived lawfulness of police 
behaviours and the absence of corruption (Beetham 1991); distributive fairness, or 
how fairly police resources are distributed; and the quality of outcomes or 
perceived competence of the police (Bottoms & Tankebe 2012). Researchers vary 
in the emphasis they place on these drivers (Hough 2013), but ultimately 
acceptance of police authority is linked to perceptions that the police are fair and 
act in the interests of the public.  
The first serious riot in Brixton was triggered by two young policemen whose 
conduct, though not unlawful, lacked ‘discretion and judgement’ and failed ‘to 
strike the balance between enforcing the law and keeping the peace’ (sec.3.79). 
Scarman’s (1981) conclusion on this point provoked criticism from both the left 
and right of politics. Endorsing the use of discretion in the interests of 
peacekeeping was perceived by critics on the right, and reported in the Daily Mail, 
as ‘telling the police to turn a blind eye to black crime’ and as a ‘call for positive 
discrimination’ (Kettle & Hodges 1982). For critics on the left, Scarman’s 
recommendations failed to ‘grasp the nettle’ in relation to key areas of policing 
impacting on the use of discretion, including the application of police powers, the 
investigation of complaints against the police, and police accountability (see Howe 
1988; Bridges 1982; Cain & Sadigh 1982). Scarman’s nod to police accountability 
was ‘statutory liaison committees’ as a means ‘of enabling the community to be 
heard not only in the development of policing but in the planning of many, 
although not all, operation against crime’ (sec.5.56). However, others felt that 
continued frustration and anger were inevitable unless more drastic measures 
were taken to bring the police under democratic control (Bowling & Phillips 2002). 
To prevent racial discrimination, Scarman recommended recruiting more ethnic 
minorities, changes to officer training, and making the display of racially prejudiced 
behaviour a dismissible offence. However, these did not fully take account of 
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mechanisms structuring police discretionary bias. Research on ‘cop culture’ (Loftus 
2009; Skolnick 1966) suggests that police suspiciousness alongside a commitment 
to ‘real’ police work, in the form of catching criminals, makes officers prone to 
operate with prejudiced stereotypes of potential ‘villains’ and ‘troublemakers’; and 
these stereotypes are influenced by dominant views within the police 
organisation, including elements of sexism, racism (Loftus 2009) and dominant 
views within society, especially about groups who threaten the tranquillity of 
public space, including the young, male, disproportionately Black, economically 
marginal, street population (Newburn & Reiner 2012, p.813). The finding that 
dominant views within society can serve to promote discriminatory policing is an 
important one, which will be returned to later in the chapter with reference to 
democratic and community-led policing. 
2.4 PACE and rationalising police powers 
Since Scarman’s report there have been various attempts to rationalise police 
powers and discretionary practices, with the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 
(PACE) being the most significant of these. Ahead of the Brixton riots, Prime 
Minister James Callaghan had already announced the creation of the Royal 
Commission on Criminal Procedure (RCCP). This was in response to other police 
scandals, including miscarriages of justice such as the Confait case (e.g. Fisher 
1977), which were recognised to be undermining legitimacy (Smith 2007, p.279). 
According to its terms of reference the RCCP was to have regard ‘both to the 
interests of the community in bringing offenders to justice and to the rights and 
liberties of persons suspected or accused of crime’ (cited in Reiner 2010, p.212). 
The RCCP went on to inform the PACE, which eventually came into force in January 
1986. PACE offered a comprehensive set of measures aimed at bringing pre-trial 
criminal processes within the control of the law (Smith 2007, p.281), and has been 
regarded as ‘the single most significant landmark in the modern development of 
police powers’ (Reiner 2010, p.212). Although some provisions were amended by 
the 2012 Protection of Freedoms Act, PACE continues to provide the framework of 
accountability from which police powers are derived today (Rowe 2013; Hough 
2007b).   
The PACE Act and its accompanying Codes of Practice set out detailed procedures 
for regulating police practice, including stop-and-search, search and seizure, 
detention and questioning of suspects, identification parades, and recording of 
interviews. Failure to comply with these procedures was a disciplinary offence. The 
legislation attempted to address a key problem for police accountability, posed by 
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the low visibility of most routine police work, by requiring the use of recording 
equipment and detailed written records of interactions with suspects. To enhance 
police accountability more generally, PACE imposed obligations on police 
authorities to consult with local communities, and established the Police 
Complaints Authority (PCA). How well PACE achieved its aspiration of balancing 
power and safeguards, however, has been much debated. Some critics argue that 
it merely rationalised and codified powers the police already possessed (in statute 
and common law) (Reiner 2010, p.213). Others suggest that PACE gave the police a 
whole range of new powers. A mid-ground was that the constraints on police 
powers set out in PACE were largely cosmetic and that police rule-avoidance 
quickly resurfaced (McConville et al. 1991). 
Responding to specific concerns about stop-and-search, PACE required that 
‘reasonable suspicion’ become a legal justification and that written records be 
produced for all searches carried out. These constraints assume that legal rules act 
as ‘direct and explicit instructions’ to the police (Smith 1986, p.87). However, while 
legal rules are important in setting out broad parameters, police decisions to stop 
and search can spring from sources, such as organisational imperatives to get a 
‘result’ (p.92). Recording the use of stop and search has also been problematic, 
due to partial recording and because written accounts can be (re-) constructed 
after the event. Research has found that officers stop a suspect ‘instinctively and 
then think about how… [to] satisfy a disinterested third party’ after the event 
(McConville et al. 1991 extract from field notes); but even then reasons are often 
vague (Bland et al. 2000). Since 1996 there has been an additional requirement to 
record the ethnicity of people stopped and additional pressure to record all PACE 
stop-and-searches following the Macpherson Report (on the murder of Stephen 
Lawrence). Yet, despite these pressures, levels of recording remain low. This leaves 
one positive outcome of recording requirements, which is that they make officers 
‘think twice’ before acting and remind them of the limits of their powers (Bland et 
al. 2000; Foster et al. 2005). 
Critiques of PACE raise important concerns about the extent to which police 
practice can be regulated by legislation, particularly when so many aspects of 
police-work routinely occur in situations of low-visibility. There is also the 
possibility that provisions intended to constrain police powers served to expand 
them. For example, it can be argued that a power to stop-and-question without 
‘reasonable suspicion’ was implicit in PACE’s conferral of stop and search powers, 
interpreted from the wording of PACE part 1, which suggests that while a stop for 
the purpose of a search must be justified by reasonable suspicion, an officer ‘need 
not conduct a search if it appears to him subsequently – (i) that no search is 
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required; or (ii) that a search is impracticable’ because suspicion was dispelled by 
questioning’. It might be inferred from this that a person can be stopped to assess 
grounds for suspicion. After the Macpherson enquiry the relevant Code of Practice 
was amended, formally introducing this power to stop and account to ensure 
these were recorded. However, recording requirements were later dropped on the 
recommendation of Sir Flannagan, the former chief constable of the RUC, to cut 
‘unnecessary bureaucracy’ (see Reiner 2010, p.220). In sum, attempts to regulate a 
discretionary police practice culminated in de facto recognition of a power never 
actually granted by legislation or case law; and, therefore, has never clearly been 
debated (ibid). 
2.5 Expanding police powers 
In addition to PACE, other pieces of legislation have affected police powers. These 
are mentioned here due their role in widening the scope for police discretion. The 
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (CJPOA) permitted adverse inferences 
to be drawn from the silence of the accused (against recommendation of the 
RCCP) (ibid) and introduced an exceptional new stop and search power frequently 
used in the context of public order policing. Section 60 of the CJPOA provides the 
power to stop and search any person in a specific locality without reasonable 
suspicion if an inspector or higher ranking officer reasonably believes the locality 
to be at risk of serious violence (or persons carrying offensive weapons).  Section 
60 was intended to prevent violent offences at sporting and other large-scale 
events, specifically football matches, but has been used in response to a far wider 
range of situations ‘including lower level incidents that could not be dealt with by 
other means’ (Quinton et al. 2000, p.50). Official data shows that the number of 
section 60 stop-and-searches has been increasing steadily (Hand & Dodd 2009), 
despite relatively low effectiveness in producing arrests (Miller et al. 2000). 
The Crime and disorder Act 1998 provided new powers to chief officers to apply 
for Anti-Social Behaviour Orders (ASBOs) and child curfew orders for a range of 
new (and spurious) offences. The Act was part of New Labour’s re-civilisational 
discourse, informed by New York’s ‘zero tolerance’ approaches (McLaughlin 2007). 
The Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 introduced spot penalties, Penalty Notices 
for Disorder (PNDs), for certain listed offences; and the scope of these gradually 
widened from minor drink-related disorder to thefts under £200 and vandalism 
under £500 (Reiner 2010, p.221). PNDs, increasingly accounting for clear-ups 
(Young 2008), were viewed as a welcome tool by the police for meeting ever 
demanding performance targets (Reiner 2010). Legislation affecting the treatment 
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of suspects includes the Criminal Justice Act 2003, which increased detention for 
up to 36 hours for arrestable offences, and the Serious Organised Crime and Police 
Act 2005 (SOCA), which provided power of arrest for all offences (not just 
arrestable offence or those satisfying the PACE criteria). Some House of Lord 
judgements have also been instrumental in increasing police powers without 
specific safeguards. Austin and another vs. Commissioner of the Metropolis (2009) 
found that police surrounding and holding large crowds (‘kettling’) did not infringe 
the human right to liberty where there was a threat of violence of damage to 
property (cited in HMIC 2009a), freeing the way for the police to utilise mass 
containment as a formal aspect of their tactical planning for public order events. 
2.6 Complaints systems 
One major development in terms of a check on police powers and police 
accountability to public was the creation of the Police Complaints Authority (PCA), 
which became operational from April 1985. The Police Act 1964 had codified the 
legal right of citizens to make complaints against the police, but until the 
introduction of the PCA this was primarily an in-house ‘police investigating police’ 
model (McLaughlin 2007, p.175). The PCA was introduced by PACE but can be 
linked back to Scarman’s (1981) recommendation that a degree of external 
involvement in the handling of police complaints was necessary to ensure police 
accountability at the organisational and officer level. The PCA was to be an 
important tool for improving police-community relations. In practice, however, 
public confidence and complainant satisfaction remained low long after its 
introduction (Maguire & Corbett 1991). One explanation for this is that the system 
was premised on the principle that the police themselves would determine 
whether a complaint warranted investigation and even then only the most serious 
cases would be supervised by outsiders. But while the public were concerned 
about the PCA’s lack of power and independence, police officers denounced it for 
being too powerful. 
Calls for a fully autonomous complaints body were finally answered by the Police 
Reform Act 2002, which introduced the Independent Police Complaints 
Commission (IPCC). However, the IPCC was never set up to deal with all complaints 
against the police. Most complaints continued to be dealt with by the police using 
a ‘local resolution’ process, with the IPCC being given a ‘call in’ power to 
investigate or to supervise an investigation by the police only when necessary 
(McLaughlin 2007, p.178). Consequently, the benefits of a completely independent 
complaints system have not been as dramatic as many hoped. Increasing numbers 
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of complaints may indicate greater public confidence in the IPCC, or alternatively 
be explained by better recording of complaints and an expansion in types of police 
staff that can  be complained against (Reiner 2010, p.226). Clear-up rates of 
complaints remain low, most likely due to the perennial problem for police 
accountability, which is the ‘low visibility’ of operational situations that give rise to 
many complaints. Hence, irrespective of who conducts the investigation, there is 
often little independent evidence to prove or disprove a complaint, which is likely 
to leave complainants with a sense of grievance. 
An example of how a lack of evidence can undermine confidence in a complaints 
system is provided by the IPCC’s investigation into the police shooting of Mark 
Duggan. The 500-page report, released three-and-a-half years after the event, 
appeared to be a rehash of the police’s initial version of events, concluding that 
there was not enough evidence to challenge the testimony of the investigated 
officer (Stafford 2015). Unsurprisingly, the IPCC’s account was dismissed by 
Duggan’s family as a ‘whitewash’ and they were not the only ones to feel that the 
investigation lacked rigour. Justice Keith Cutler, who presided over the inquest, 
expressed his own concerns, claiming that he had been ‘left with an impression of 
some uncertainty about precisely what was being investigated, on whose behalf, 
for what purpose, and by what means’ (cited in Stafford 2015). The IPCC (2015) 
conceded that a lack of video/audio material made it difficult to know with 
absolute certainty what had happened, recommending that national policing 
bodies develop proposals for recording communications during covert operations, 
and fitting audio/visual recording devices in covert armed response vehicles, to 
improve police accountability for the future. 
2.7 Governance structures 
In addition to legislation and complaints procedures, police governance offers a 
structural mechanism for managing the police and making them more accountable 
to the public. This includes internal governance, which relates to how the 
institution manages the conduct of its own officers, and external governance, 
relating to how the police are managed by independent institutions, groups, and 
individuals. Despite significant reforms from the mid-1990s onwards, the Police 
Act 1964 remains the formal basis of current police governance (Jones 2008).  The 
Police Act was an attempt to rationalise and consolidate national and local 
influences, which hitherto differed between rural and urban areas. For the 41 
provincial police forces outside London the Act established the ‘tripartite 
structure’ of governance, which divided responsibility for policing policy between 
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the Home Office, chief constables, and local police authorities. The Metropolitan 
Police remained accountable to the Home Secretary alone, and the City of London 
to the Common Council of the City of London and the Home Secretary. 
Critiques of the tripartite structure have focused on the balance between central 
and local control. Critics on the left have called for greater local control via a 
stronger role for police authorities. They argue that the Act provided the Home 
Secretary with an array of powers that established in statute the increasing 
dominance of central government within the framework of police governance 
(Jones 2008). Police forces were placed under the ‘direction and control’ of their 
chief constables, with the mode of accountability to external bodies being 
‘explanatory and co-operative’ (Marshall 1978).  Chief constables were not legally 
obliged to take account of any criticism from the police authority (Reiner 1995). In 
theory police authorities could dismiss their chief constable, but subject to Home 
Office veto (Reiner 2010). The imbalance of power was especially apparent in the 
1984-5 miner’s strike when Labour-dominated authorities, unhappy with the 
repressive policing of pickets, tried to intervene. With a level of control over police 
finances at least (via the precept on Council Tax), South Yorkshire Police Authority 
attempted to restrict its chief constable’s spending on mounted police and the 
dogs section. This was immediately thwarted by the Home Secretary, who warned 
that the authority might be acting in contravention of the Police Act 1964 (Reiner 
2010). Some believe that the role of the police in suppressing the miner’s 
industrial action not only damaged the moral status of the police (Waddington 
1991), but made it easy to conclude that the police were a partisan vanguard of an 
authoritarian government (P. Waddington 2007). 
Developments after the miners’ strike continued the trajectory of centralisation. 
Police authorities were reshaped by the Police and Magistrates’ Counts Act 1994, 
significantly reducing their size and requiring them to include more ‘independent’ 
members with business experience (Smith 2007, p.288). Police authorities were 
downgraded to mere ‘purchasers’ of police services, albeit with additional powers 
to decide how police budgets were spent (ibid). Yet, a court case involving the 
Northumbria Police Authority  found that even in spending matters local police 
authorities had no real power to challenge a chief constable who had secured 
Home Office support (Reiner 1991). For example, if chief constables were 
prevented by their authority from purchasing CS gas or plastic bullets, they could 
obtain them instead from a central store if Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of 
Constabulary (HMIC) felt it necessary. The HMIC is just one of a number of  
organisations, including the Audit Commission, the Association of Chief Police 
Officers (ACPO), and the National Improvement Agency (NPIA), used by central 
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government to gain better control of policing (Reiner 2010, pp.235–7) through a 
series of ‘New Public Management’ (NPM) reforms, returned to later. 
2.8 Democratic policing 
Proposals for strengthening the role of police authorities have stemmed from a 
belief in the value and importance of local democracy (Jones et al. 1996). Yet, 
there were others who doubted that bringing the police under closer control by 
elected representatives would guarantee ‘democratic policing’. The reason being 
that the tripartite system incorporated and disguised a more fundamental power 
imbalance because it failed to ensure representation of the weak, unorganised, or 
minority groups (Scraton 1982; Jefferson & Grimshaw 1984). Thus, closer control 
by elected representatives might simply result in more repressive policing of 
minority groups in the interests of the ‘respectable’ majority. This gets to the heart 
of debates about democratic policing, both as a concept and practice. The Greek 
translation of democracy is ‘rule of (or by) the people’. Yet the appropriate role of 
‘the people’ in a democratic system has long been debated, for example, whether 
citizens should participate in developing ideas or simply choose between the ideas 
of ‘expert and accountable’ elites (Schumpeter 1961; Sartori 1962); participate not 
as a means to an end, but as an end in itself (Mill 1910); or be prevented from 
participating, because the ‘masses’ are inherently incompetent and a threat to 
political stability (Le Bon 1895). Similar debates are implicated in discussions about 
the role of the police in a democracy and the democratic governance of the police. 
Drawing on the notion of democracy in political theory, Jones and colleagues 
(1996) advance seven criteria that can be applied to policing. In order of priority 
the seven criteria, which can be used to judge the quality of police governance in a 
democracy, include: equity, delivery of service, responsiveness, distribution of 
power, information, redress, and participation. The authors are pessimistic about 
the possibility of achieving equity in a vastly unequal society (p.191), but suggest 
service ought to be provided to citizens in general on the basis of needs. They 
argue that the ‘principle of effective service flows from the principle of equity’ and 
information plays a crucial in measuring and monitoring performance. Manning 
(2010, p.10) suggests that these ‘managerial criteria’ ignore the needs and 
demands of the public. Yet, the authors’ qualification of responsiveness 
demonstrates some understanding of how these might be dealt with. They argue 
that attempts to widen participation can be difficult because political activity has 
for some time been confined to a small elite and often only the most salient issues 
stimulate public concern. This predicament requires systems that are flexible 
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enough to allow effective participation when police legitimacy is called into 
question and requires a range of participatory and consultation techniques to 
ensure the police are responsive to a ‘representative’ body; even if, ultimately, the 
views of the public are weighed against the general principle of equity.  
It is argued that non-democratic policing presents a risk not only to the victims of 
repressive unchecked policing, but to society as a whole. This relates to the 
symbolic role of the police in a democracy (see Loader 2006; Loader & Walker 
2007; Loader & Mulcahy 2003). The police are the most visible and dramatic facet 
of policing and, because policing operates as a mediator of collective identity, how 
officers interact with the public has the ability to make people feel either attached 
or unattached to the political community. In line with procedural justice theory, 
repressive or procedurally unjust policing sends authoritative signals about societal 
conflicts, cleavages and hierarchies, fostering insecurity among members of 
disadvantaged groups. These feelings of insecurity are not necessarily derived 
from material threat, but from a lack of tacit trust in the institutional 
arrangements that are put in place for their security. This is because the feeling of 
security inheres not in relative immunity from threat, i.e. ‘am I safe?’, but rather in 
the capacity to feel at ease with threats posed by the everyday environment. This 
axiomatic security helps individuals to ‘go on’ in those settings without routine 
concern for how safe they are. Consequently, the police role is best seen as 
‘backstop’ to other forms of social control; producing and maintaining security and 
getting and keeping democracy by being constrained, rights-regarding agencies of 
minimal interference and last resort (Kinsey et al. 1986, chap.9; Loader 2006). 
2.9 New Public Management 
In the 1990s New Public Management (NPM) became the principal way that 
central government governed the police. These originated from the Conservatives 
‘value for money’ agenda in 1979, later continued and extended by New Labour 
(Senior et al. 2007). A major step in the development of NPM was the Police and 
Magistrates’ Courts Act 1994, which gave the Home Secretary new powers to set 
national policing objectives supported by measurable targets (Hough 2007b). 
Police authorities continued to have a duty to draw up local policing strategies, but 
these had to ‘have regard’ to the Home Secretary’s National Policing Plan (Reiner 
2010, p.236). This new regime of performance management, preventing any local 
variation in policing, was consolidated by the establishment of the Police 
Standards Unit (PSU) (in 2002) to monitor police forces against their targets; the 
development of the Policing Performance Assessment Framework (PPAF); and the 
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creation of the National Policing Improvement Agency (by the Police and Justice 
Act 2006) (see Neyroud 2007; Reiner 2010). NPM reforms additionally involved 
budgetary cuts, increasing the choice of service provision and the more general 
application of private sector management methods to public services. 
It is difficult to disagree with the basic principle that organisations should identify 
priorities and focus their energies on these. However, it is possible that systematic 
focused action against these types of priorities may be worse that unfocused or 
badly implemented action against well-specified priorities (Hough 2007a). So, 
while NPM techniques are not inherently bad, they have been criticised for a 
narrow focus on crime fighting to the detriment of police-community relations and 
community disorder. This narrow focus on crime fighting contributed to a decline 
in public ratings of the police and an emerging ‘reassurance gap’, which is the 
divergence between public perceptions of crime compared crime as measured by 
statistics (ibid). From 1995 police recorded crime and the British Crime Survey 
(BCS) showed a reversal in the historic trend of rising crime, while at the same time 
the public were becoming more anxious about risk of victimisation (Dodd et al. 
2004). Informed by the Signal Crimes Perspective (SCP) (Innes et al. 2002), senior 
officers, argued that reductions in crime had been achieved at the expense of a 
retreat from less serious more visible forms of disorder, termed ‘signal disorders’, 
which actually had a greater impact on public perceptions than  ‘volume crimes’ 
such as burglary or car thefts being prioritised by government. Although declines in 
public satisfaction were likely linked to other factors as well, it is noted that the 
steepest decline occurred over a five-year period from the mid-1990s – at precisely 
the time when NPM reforms were most acute (Hough 2007a, p.73). 
The conclusion to be drawn from this critique of the government’s NPM regime is 
that performance management has potential to influence police practice, which in 
turn has the potential to affect how the public sees the police and feels about 
crime and security.  Thus, as a valuable mechanism for leverage and change within 
the police, some commentators have mainly been concerned about the emphasis 
of the NPM modernisation agenda on efficiency, effectiveness and consumer 
satisfaction, without due regard for how institutions such as the police require the 
support of the public to build legitimacy (see Horton & Smith 1988; Kelling 1999; 
Neyroud & Beckley 2001). Conceptualised differently performance management 
might be used to foster police practice that consolidates and supports their 
authority. While policing needs to be outcome focused, the complexity of the 
policing environment also needs to be recognised. So instead of narrow targets 
that see the police as directly responsible for levels of crime, a better approach 
would be to monitor policing practice against professional and ethical standards. 
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This would focus the efforts of managers on ensuring that officers maintain these 
professional standards. The relationship between establishing professional and 
ethical standards and the legitimation of police authority is self-evident (Hough 
2007a). 
2.10 Ambient Policing 
Instead of calling for a switch from crime fighting targets to professional policing 
standards as a solution to the reassurance gap, ACPO’s solution was ‘Reassurance 
Policing’, which gained government support for a pilot in 2002. Reassurance 
Policing had much in common with community policing, advocated by Chief 
Constable John Alderson, as a way of reversing the alienation of communities from 
the process of policing, which had occurred as a result of the ‘fire brigade’ model 
of policing (Crawford 1997; Kinsey et al. 1986); and was later recommended by 
Lord Scarman (1981) as a way of repairing police-community relations in Brixton 
after the riots. There were attempts at community policing in the 1980s and 1990s, 
but these were regarded largely as failures (O’Neill 2015). Following a positive 
evaluation of the Reassurance Policing pilot by the Home Office (Tuffin et al. 2006), 
the programme was reshaped into the Neighbourhood Policing Programme and 
launched nationally in April 2005.  Neighbourhood Policing was premised on the 
ideal that democratic policing is delivered most effectively through responsive 
policing teams operating and accountable at the local level (Jones 2008). As such, 
the approach represented a ‘bifurcation’ of the police reform agenda, 
characterised by the disempowerment of the police in some areas, as authority 
over decision making was increasingly centralised, but empowerment in others, as 
officers in the community were afforded greater discretion and authority (Savage 
2007).  
The Neighbourhood Policing Programme placed an emphasis on establishing a 
visible police presence, responsiveness to public concerns, co-produced solutions, 
and styles of policing that engender public trust and confidence. This approach 
was thought better suited to today’s higher and more demanding customer 
expectations (Innes 2004). Yet, a key challenge was the low rate of public 
participation, attributed to poor public awareness or understanding of the 
programme; frustration with time consuming and tedious processes; cynicism that 
input would have any impact on police decision-making; and inadequate methods 
of community engagement compounded by individual and community level 
characteristics (Myhill et al. 2003; Bullock & Sindall 2014).  For example, being 
‘time-poor’, low educational attainment, weak English language skills, and 
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disabilities or health problems an all make participation difficult (Audit 
Commission 1999). Being fearful of crime can also affect participation by 
undermining trust in the community and preventing engagement with the police 
due to fears that this would lead to reprisals (Lloyd & Foster 2009). These barriers 
to participation demonstrate how neighbourhood policing can add to, rather than 
alleviate, social inequality. Poorer and Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) groups are 
especially under-represented, highlighting the importance of the police doing what 
is equitable rather than what is demanded by the vocal majority. 
In addition to the non-democratic implications of policing based on partial or 
prejudiced views, there are other more pragmatic consequences of demand-led 
policing. Pressures from the middle classes risk distributing policing resources in 
inverse relation to crime risks (Hope et al. 2001). Setting the expectation of 
demand-led policing also raises the possibility of dissatisfaction when demands are 
not met and may result in the creation of a vicious, self-propelling cycle whereby 
popular demands, and the supply of police numbers in a bid to meet them, are 
both endlessly ratcheted up, with financial implications (Loader 2006). This 
presents a non-street-based situation whereby the use of police discretion has the 
potential to antagonise communities; whether to respond, when to respond and 
how to respond (Crawford 2007b). Yet, policing is often described as a ‘public 
good’, suggesting that equity in distribution, provision and service should be a 
policing ideal (Loader & Walker 2005).   For these reasons, uncritically seeking to 
satisfy public demands seems both undesirable and unrealistic. Public demands 
might better be brought within institutional arrangements that subject them, and 
their supporting narratives and resource claims, to the scrutiny of democratic 
dialogue (Crawford 2007b). 
In light of the earlier discussion on democratic policing, a broader criticism of 
Neighbourhood Policing and other forms of ‘ambient policing’ is that they 
fundamentally misconstrue the contribution that policing makes to citizen security 
(Loader 2006). The contribution of democratic policing to citizen security is said to 
be ‘deep but narrow’: ‘narrow’ insofar that it does not require police actors to be 
supplied in ever-greater numbers, nor in a highly visible way; and ‘deep’ insofar as 
‘it can and does provide individuals with a powerful token of their membership of 
a political community’, making them feel both safe and secure (Loader 2006, 
p.214). Conversely, ambient policing, is criticised for being ‘shallow but wide’: 
‘shallow’ because it focuses on material security, claiming to be able to protect 
persons, property, and neighbourhoods from the threat of crime and disorder; and 
‘wide’ because, conceived as such, the police contribution relies upon a strategy of 
greater numbers and visibility, and making officers pivotal to community building 
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and cohesion. In this way, security becomes the prevailing discourse for 
understanding social problems, which in fact makes people feel less secure; and 
paradoxically a policing strategy intended to reassure the public does quite the 
opposite. 
2.11 Multi-agency policing 
One explanation for why Neighbourhood Policing has not succeeded in reassuring 
the public and is because the programme was really a manipulation of 
appearances used to foster organisational legitimacy, secure scarce public 
resources, and help the police compete within a widening market (Crawford 
2007b). Neighbourhood Policing gave centre stage to the police at a time when the 
Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (CDA) had made it a legal requirement for the police 
to form multi-agency Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships (CDRPs) (now 
known as Community Safety Partnerships) with local authorities, which in practice 
could involve a range of local public agencies, as well as private and voluntary 
sector organisations (Crawford 1998). The message from government 
underpinning the CDA was that tackling crime and its causes should no longer be 
the sole responsibility of the police (Morgan 1991).  This resulted in a patchwork of 
agencies becoming involved in the provision of security, euphemistically referred 
to as the ‘extended policing family’ (Newburn 2007). Neighbourhood Policing, on 
the other hand, offered the illusion that the police – alone – can make a difference 
(Crawford 2007b).  
This said, Neighbourhood Policing became the primary setting for multi-agency 
working. The programme’s focus placed on problem-solving in communities has 
commonly found the police working with a range of agencies, including housing 
agencies, schools, children’s service departments and youth services, in order to 
reduce issues of crime and anti-social behaviour, and especially the underlying 
causes of these problems (McCarthy & O’Neill 2014). However, literature on the 
early years of multi-agency working reported how the police struggled to 
relinquish their authority and control, leading to hostility and inter-agency conflicts 
(Pearson et al. 1992; Sampson et al. 1988). The police were especially hostile 
towards welfare agencies, such as social workers, suspected of wanting to 
undermine their crime-control efforts. This is in keeping with understandings of 
police culture with regard to the police being distrustful of ‘outsiders’ and 
‘challengers’ (Reiner 2010; Holdaway 1983). Police tried to retain control by 
hijacking partnerships for their own ends (i.e. crime control rather than ‘safety’) 
and dominating meetings, quickly losing patience with other agencies whose 
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internal processes were not immediately responsive (Edwards 2002). Where 
conflict was  ‘defined away, avoided, or circumvented’, this was equally damaging 
because it led to decisions being made outside of formal meetings in ways that 
were exclusive and divisive and resulting in the interests of some agencies being 
ignored (Crawford & Jones 1995) . 
Since the early years there have been a number of changes relating to the 
increased complexity of policing that have improved the attitude of the police 
towards partnership working (McCarthy & O’Neill 2014).  Given the core value 
base of pragmatism as a key part of police culture (Reiner 2010) , it is perhaps 
unsurprising that increased support within the police for partnership working has 
relied heavily on fellow officers celebrating their experience in ways that 
emphasise the practical benefits (McCarthy & O’Neill 2014). These benefits are 
primarily outcome-based as officers have realised the limits of their own expertise 
to deal with certain social problems and the cost-savings accrued through shared 
endeavours. However, multi-agency policing does not necessarily mean better 
outcomes for the policed. It is argued that the increased number of agencies 
engaged in crime prevention has resulted in ‘net-widening’, whereby the social 
control apparatus of the state is extended so that increased numbers of people, 
especially police property, become ensnared in the criminal justice system (Clarke 
1996). Even if this was no state-led objective, ‘the inter-connectedness of a multi-
agency approach to crime prevention and control’ presents a threat to ‘due 
process’ and the rights of the putative offender (Crawford 1997, p.497). Moreover, 
‘corporatist’ multi-agency arrangements pose a threat to justice and democracy 
via their focus on pragmatism and efficiency at the expense of ‘normative 
regulation’ (p.511). 
Yet, there are reasons to be ‘cautiously optimistic’ (Henry 2007). The CDA‘s role in 
promoting ‘plural policing’ (Newburn 2002) acknowledged that other agencies may 
have a different ‘purchase on a given crime problem’ (Young 1991). It also 
provided for the fact that other agencies may be better placed for community 
engagement. Moreover, the ‘vague and open-texture’ of community safety 
(Crawford 1994) offers the opportunity for creative ideological appropriation by 
local progressive alliances and networks, which may be able to challenge 
regressive local and centralist tendencies of law and order (Hughes 1998). On the 
other hand, it is argued that the proliferation of private security, as a consequence 
of plurality, represents a radical rupture in which one system of policing is being 
replaced by another (Bayley & Shearing 1996).  The widening ‘choice’ of security 
hardware (e.g. CCTV) and personnel also emphasises the role of citizens as self-
calculating, risk-monitoring consumers (Loader 2000). In this sense, 
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‘accountability’ denotes the responsibility of citizens to take care of their own 
crime and/or the responsiveness of private security providers to their paying 
customers. This commodification of security is also likely to compound extant 
inequalities by reallocating policing services in favour of those who can more 
readily afford them (ibid). 
2.12 Organisational change 
The emphasis within the Neighbourhood Policing Programme on establishing a 
visible police came with an important twist (Blair 2002). A significant number of 
street-based responsibilities were passed to Police Community Support Officers 
(PCSOs), an auxiliary tier without full constabulary powers. Far from embracing this 
new addition to the team, however, there was a great deal of confusion within the 
organisation about what PCSOs were actually meant to do (O’Neill 2015). Training 
for PCSOs was brief and patchy and there was no central message to supervisors 
about how PCSOs should fit into existing arrangements. This may have been 
responsible for some of the initial hostility towards PCSOs (Cooper et al. 2006), 
along with concerns that PCSOs constituted ‘policing on the cheap’ (Newburn 
2007). Over the longer term, however, officers who went onto to work with PCSOs 
developed strong support for their ability to gather information; to develop 
relationships with local people, by virtue of having ‘time to talk’; and to free up 
officers’ time to work on other things (O’Neill 2015). There are currently concerns 
about the impact of austerity on Neighbourhood Policing, which is being eroded by 
a widening of responsibilities for neighbourhood officers due to the loss of police 
personnel in other areas (e.g. response) (HMIC 2014). Under these conditions it is 
suggested that PCSOs can provide a continued link between the police and 
communities (O’Neill 2015); although this assumes that the role of PCSOs will not 
be widened too. 
Leaving aside the pros and cons of high visibility policing, critiques of PCSOs relate 
to how well the role is utilised within the police. For example, although PCSOs can 
generate valuable community intelligence and local information, this is often 
poorly used; in part because information must be integrated into systems of 
intelligence and data analysis, which are invariably not in place (Crawford 2007b). 
Information generated by PCSOs also competes with other forms of intelligence. 
Crime hotspots, which are painstakingly mapped by the police to determine where 
resources should be targeted, are not the same as fear hotspots, which may offer a 
better indicator of where PCSOs should be deployed (ibid). Most importantly 
PCSOs provide an opportunity to reconfigure police-community relations via face-
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to-face interactions which help rebuild police legitimacy. Yet, along with other 
uniformed officers, PCSOs have been increasingly used to deal with low level 
incivilities. Hence, if PCSOs remain the primary vehicle for delivering 
Neighbourhood Policing, there is a need to address unresolved concerns about 
their own legitimacy, as well as their capacity to generate trust and confidence in 
the police. 
2.13 Public order policing 
Although most policing is in some way related to the maintenance of public order, 
public order policing is regarded as a distinct activity requiring specialist training. 
All officers are trained to level 3, which is basic public order training. Levels 2 and 1 
(Territorial Support Group Level) require ongoing training and officers are provided 
with protective clothing and equipment. In part, this specialist approach is due to 
the assumption that crowds are prone to a particular set of behaviours that pose a 
threat to social order (Reicher et al. 2007). Historically, and still largely today, 
public order policing is based on the notion that crowds are inherently irrational 
and uniformly dangerous. This is based on Le Bon’s (1895) ‘mob psychology’, 
which suggests that individuals within a crowd lose their sense of individual self 
and personal responsibility and unquestioningly follow the predominant ideas and 
emotions, which are limited by the moral and cognitive abilities of the least 
capable members. 
Public order policing is especially important to public perceptions of the police due 
the high profile of public order events, which include large-scale sports events, 
public celebrations and planned protests, as well as spontaneous disorder and 
riots. These types of events usually attract attention from the media, which means 
that public order policing gets widely reported. More recently, the development of 
affordable handheld recording devices, such as smartphones, has also increased 
reporting of public order events by individual citizens, for example via social 
media. In this sense, media can play a positive role in holding the police 
accountable for their actions by providing evidence that might be used to support 
complaints. For example, media reporting, including video footage, was used to 
support complaints about excessive use of force against protesters and non-
protesters during the anti-capitalist demonstration at the G20 summit in 2009 
(Campbell 2009; Rosie & Gorringe 2009). 
The handling of G20 protest by the Metropolitan Police was initially deemed a 
success because there were no major riots and only minor damage (HMIC 2009a). 
However, a few days later this changed and the force became the focus of 
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negative media headlines, nationally and internationally, not least because of the 
death of Ian Tomlinson, a newspaper vendor, who died after being struck by an 
officer. The Guardian (Lewis & Fernando 2009) published video which showed 
Tomlinson walking away from officers with his hands in his pockets.  An officer 
strikes him behind the knees with his baton, and then violently shoves Tomlinson 
in the back sending him sprawling. None of the surrounding officers assist him to 
his feet or reprimand their colleague. Outside of the police complaints system, the 
courts offer an alternative means of redress. However, a paradox of the justice 
system provided two contradictory verdicts. An inquest jury determined unlawful 
killing by a police officer, while a criminal trial found the officer ‘not guilty’ of 
manslaughter. 
Media headlines about the G20 protest also focused on the kettling of protesters, 
a tactic used to surround and control crowds. The Times carried a highly critical 
account by one of its own journalists, who had endured ‘7 hours of detention 
without food or water’ within the kettle (Whipple 2009). The Guardian reported 
that parents with children and passers-by were told they could not leave and given 
no further information and, once set up, police cordons were squeezed to move 
the kettles and protesters who refused to move were battered by officers (Laville 
& Campbell 2009). It was also reported how the containment, achieved with the 
use of mounted police and dogs, ramped up tensions and fuelled bloody 
confrontations (Campbell 2009). This approach was likely to have been influenced 
by media predictions of riots in the run up to the protest, not least because, as 
Gorringe and Rosie (2008).remind us ‘cops read papers too’. Research has found 
that when police anticipate violence they focus on ‘controlling’ the crowd using 
tactics of arrest, dispersal and containment (Earl & Soule 2006).  
The controversy over the G20 protest led to a formal inquiry by the Her Majesty's 
Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) (2009a), which focused on the policing 
strategy, the behaviour of  individual officers, and a more general review of public 
order policing tactics. This led to the Adapting to Protest report, which praised the 
collective achievement of the Metropolitan Police, but was critical of various 
aspects of the G20 operation. In particular, it reinforced the requirement of 
officers to wear identity numbers; the need for advance communication with 
protesters and those caught up in ‘kettles’; and stressed the need to facilitate 
‘peaceful protest through the planning process and execution of the operation’ 
(p.47). Critiques drew attention to the fact that many of the report’s 
recommendations had been made before and ignored; and that the terminology of 
‘peaceful protesters’ gave officers the discretion to determine who was ‘peaceful’; 
and if the police have preconceived ideas that protesters do not have peaceful 
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intentions, the report simply paves the way for ‘business-as-usual’ (Rosie & 
Gorringe 2009). 
The elaborated social identity model (ESIM) (e.g. Drury & Reicher 2000) explains 
how police perceptions of a crowd as being inherently and uniformly violent can 
itself lead to violence. Homogenous treatment of the crowd creates a common 
experience, promoting group identification and group behaviour. Once unified, an 
action against one member of the group is perceived as an action against the 
whole group; and collective conflict becomes a likely outcome where the police-
civilian encounter gives rise to a shared sense of police illegitimacy. This played out 
in practice at a student demonstration against student loans in the late 1980s, 
referred to as the ‘Battle of Westminster’ (e.g. Reicher 1996). Most students 
started with a sense of themselves as respectable subjects exercising the 
democratic right to protest, and hence distanced themselves from radicals calling 
for confrontational action. The police, however, saw the student body as a 
dangerous threat and acted in order to impede its progress towards the Houses of 
Parliament. This action was seen as illegitimate by the students as a whole and 
united them in opposition to the police. This unity also empowered them to 
actively confront the police cordon, leading to conflict.  
2.13.1 Negotiated management 
Reflecting the growing understanding of ESIM principles, the policing of public 
order events in Western Europe (and Northern America) has moved away from 
overt force and towards a ‘negotiated management’ approach (Gorringe & Rosie 
2008). This so-called ‘soft-hat’ approach emphasises cooperation and 
communication between police and protesters to de-escalate sensitive situations 
and reduce the likelihood of violence. A key intervening variable is ‘police 
knowledge’ (Della Porta & Fillieule 2004), which helps to carefully stage-manage 
events. It is expected that some disruption to public life will be tolerated. 
Negotiated management has developed through a capacity referred to as ‘liaison 
based public order policing’ (Gorringe et al. 2011; 2012).  This was initially  
developed in Stockholm where a unit of ‘dialogue police’ was created as part of a 
wider set of public order police reforms, following the major riots in Gothenburg in 
2001 (Holgersson & Knutsson 2001). Similar units of Police (or Protest) Liaison 
Officers (PLOs) have more recently been introduced to the UK. PLOs were referred 
to in the Adapting to Protest report, but without clarification of how to use them. 
The detail of the role was ‘pinned down’ by consultants working for South 
Yorkshire Police, who first used them to police protesters gathered at the Liberal 
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Democrat party conference in Sheffield in 2011 (Gorringe et al. 2012). This model 
has since been used as a template for other forces. 
The theory is that PLOs add a low-level problem-solving capability to a public order 
policing operation (e.g. Stott et al. 2013). Situated within the crowd they are able 
to mediate emergent tension. They achieve this by wearing a uniform distinct 
(light blue tabard with ‘Liaison Officer’ written on it), to distinguish their role from 
other officers. They adopt a ‘non-repressive’ approach before, during and after 
crowd events to establish relationships of trust with protesters. In turn, these 
relationships, and the contextualised knowledge that flows from them, helps to 
improve police decision-making, often correcting inaccurate assumptions about 
emerging risks, and mitigating police tendency to use force to arrest disperse or 
contain entire crowds. In the context of perceived police legitimacy, fans begin to 
‘self-police’. Despite police scepticism, self-policing was evidenced at the Liberal 
Democrat conference. A delegate, Patrick Streeter, made his way into the crowd 
provoking an angry response, and prompted a Police Liaison Team (PLT) to make 
its way through to protesters. Against the natural inclination of the public order 
commander to pull Streeter from the crowd, the assessment of the PLT was ‘not to 
do anything’. Subsequently volatile elements of the crowd were calmed by more 
moderate protesters. This outcome was interpreted by the police to be a direct 
outcome of the PLTs relationship with the crowd and its understanding of how 
police actions might impact a situation (Gorringe et al. 2012). 
An evaluation of liaison based approaches (Stott et al. 2013) found evidence for 
the success of PLTs. Some protest groups now communicate with the police on a 
regular basis, demonstrating an improvement in relationships; there has been a 
dramatic decline in disorder, damage, and arrests at protest events; and a rapid 
decrease in the use of Police Support Units (PSUs), providing  a significant financial 
saving, as a PSU constitutes 27 police officers (1 inspector, 3 sergeants, 18 
constables, 3 drivers, and 2 operational medics), issued with full Personal 
Protective Equipment (PPE), and public order trained at least twice per year. Based 
on its perceived success, the liaison tactic has been adopted by around 75 per cent 
of all UK forces, including the Metropolitan Police. Some forces now consider it a 
primary tactic for their operational response to protest, and a proportion are 
testing an extension of the approach into the policing of football. However, PLTs 
and the negotiated management approach more generally have been criticised, on 
the basis that they represent a subtle and disingenuous way of containing or 
repressing political dissent, while at the same time ensuring public sympathy and 
legitimacy (Gillham et al. 2012; Gilham & Noakes 2007). Peter Waddington’s two-
year participant observation study of public order policing in the Metropolitan 
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Police (cited in Gorringe et al. 2011) supports this view. It is reported how senior 
police were able to secure their objectives of having protesters march peacefully 
along the police’s preferred route thus minimising disruption and inconvenience to 
ongoing city life through the guileful deployment of spurious friendship, advice, 
guidance and extension of favours in pre-event negotiation with organisers. 
Some protest organisations and civil liberties groups have been specifically 
concerned about the PLT tactic. Sussex Police were heavily criticised over the way 
they used PLTs ahead of a demonstration held in Brighton by UK Uncut, the 
campaign against tax avoidance (e.g. Parkinson & Evans 2012). Senior officers 
claimed PLTs had attempted to build bridges by engaging with protesters in 
‘honest, two-way dialogue’. By contrast, protesters complained of harassment by 
officers who had visited their homes primarily to gather intelligence. Netpol 
(2012), the network for police monitoring, highlight that both Sussex and 
Metropolitan Police forces had recruited PLOs with a background in intelligence or 
counter-terrorism. Hence, while intelligence can be used to inform a peaceful 
policing operation, the suspicion was that the police’s real aim was to collect 
personal data relating to protesters, whether or not they had ever been arrested 
or convicted of a criminal offence; and this is a human rights issue.  Arguably some 
of the concern about PLTs is a hangover from another police intelligence role 
previously discredited by protest groups, the Forward Intelligence Officer (FIO) 
(Stott et al. 2013). Forward Intelligence Officers were developed for use in 
protests, following the perceived success of Football Intelligence Officers (or 
‘spotters’), who identified fans likely to become involved in criminality. The 
Forward Intelligence Officer role had been heavily criticised by protest groups for 
violating rights of privacy and for criminalising peaceful protesters. So, while the 
theoretical value of the PLT tactic is strong, its success depends on how it is 
implemented and the ability of the police to create transparent operational and 
structural divisions between PLTs and criminal intelligence resources (ibid). 
The College of Policing, now the professional body for policing, has become the 
official source of guidance for police practice, referred to as Authorised 
Professional Practice (APP). Since the launch of the College of Policing website in 
October 2013, all earlier guidance has been decommissioned, including ACPO 
guidance on public order policing, such as the Manual of Guidance on Keeping the 
Peace (ACPO 2010b) and Guidance on Policing Football (ACPO 2010a). These 
earlier documents and the current Public APP seem to be underpinned by 
principles of ESIM, with their emphasis on a ‘presumption in favour of peaceful 
assembly’, proportionality, and the use of ‘engagement and dialogue whenever 
possible’. However, another important factor influencing police practice is the 
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training given to officers. A study of public order training (Hoggett & Stott 2010) 
found that although guidance may advocate negotiated management, taught 
tactics still tend to revolve around arrest, containment and dispersal. This meant 
that officers were ill-equipped to deal with approaches emphasising dialogue and 
facilitation. How officers are trained is often less transparent than practice 
guidance. For example, the ACPO manual of public order training (ACPO 2004) has 
been a ‘restricted’ document, only made available to members of the public via a 
Freedom of Information request. 
2.13.2 Paramilitary policing 
Running alongside and perhaps counter to these developments towards 
negotiated management as a way of responding to public order situations there 
has been a growing use of riot control hardware. The preparedness of the police to  
respond began to be expanded and refined during the 1970s, in part due to panic 
by the establishment following a miners' dispute in 1972, which resulted in the 
Saltley coke depot being closed after a six-day struggle (Reiner 2010, p.85). The 
Metropolitan Police had already developed a paramilitary role to help deal with 
public order and terrorism in the 1960s, but it was only after 1974 that all forces 
formed Police Support Units (PSUs). These special units were referred to as 'third 
forces', albeit located within the organisation rather than a separate force along 
the lines of the French Compagnies Républicaines de Sécurité (SRS). Shields were 
first used at Lewisham and Nottingham Hill in 1977, replacing the traditional 
protection of dustbin lids (ibid); and what has been termed the 'militarisation of 
policing' continued apace following the urban disorders of the early-1980s. It was 
during these riots that CS gas was first used on mainland Britain in a riot context. 
High speed driving of police vehicles to disperse the crowds was also used. 
Unsurprisingly, this resulted in unprecedented numbers of both police and civilians 
injured in the 1980s riots. This did not deter Thatcher's government from agreeing 
tougher tactics, equipment and legal powers for police to deal with rioters; 
specifically, the use of water cannon, CS gas, and plastic bullets if Chief Constables 
wanted them. These developments displaced Dixon of Dock Green for Darth Vader 
at least in public order policing (ibid, p.87). 
Following the 2011 English Riots, there were immediate calls for harsh and 
exceptional remedies, including equipping police with water cannon and rubber 
bullets and even bringing armed forces onto the streets (Tyler 2013). The 
government also announced a huge expansion in riot training for police and 
proposed an expansion of police powers to impose a curfew in a riot situation with 
the possibility of extending that curfew in order to ‘keep the public off the streets 
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in a given location, for a given period of time’ (Fekete 2013). Liberty (2012, p.9) 
condemned this idea, claiming that it aligned the UK with the military dictatorships 
we ‘have been rightly quick to condemn during the uprisings in the Middle East 
and North Africa’.  Boris Johnson, as Mayor of London, bought three water cannon 
for the Metropolitan Police force, at a cost of more than £200,000  plus an 
additional £5,000 per month for storing them  (Snowdon 2016). The purchase 
went ahead despite Peter Fahy, as the Chief Constable of Greater Manchester 
Police, telling the Home Affairs Select Committee (2011b) that using water cannon 
and baton rounds would have been 'very, very difficult' in the sort of 'fluid...fast 
moving situation' that his officers faced during the 2011 disturbances. Theresa 
May, as Home Secretary announced in July 2015 that she would not be giving 
permission for police to use the cannon for riot control, citing safety fears as a 
major factor. 
Ideas about police weaponry sit alongside more general debates about 
‘paramilitary policing’, which some commentators argue entails an inevitable 
amplification of disorder (Jefferson 1990). This is because preparing for the 'worse 
case' scenario contains the germ of a self-fulfilling prophecy. Conversely, 
paramilitary policing is thought to promote a peaceful resolution because 
militarised organisation keeps officers under close command (Waddington 1993). 
This 'command and control' approach is meant to suppress the discretion of 
individual officers and mitigate police subcultural values that glorify 'action and 
excitement' (Holdaway 1983) in the context of public order events, which have the 
potential for large scale disturbances and violence, leading to deaths, as was the 
case in 2011. It is argued that riot equipment is merely defensive and protects 
police employees working in a hazardous environment, which goes unquestioned 
in other areas of employment, such as the fire service (Waddington 1993). A BBC 
news article (Kelly & Fraser 2011)  on the 9 August 2011 discussed the merits of 
using weaponry to stop the riots. It contained a warning from Shirlow, a public 
order expert, that although water cannon can be a useful way of containing rioters 
by directing them into a specific area, because it has never been used in Great 
Britain before, the authorities risk ‘sending out a message that we have lost 
control’ and inflaming tensions ‘in a country that has never been comfortable with 
the idea of militarisation’. This highlights how the social context can affect how 
styles of policing and tactics are perceived by the public and, hence, the reaction 
they are met with. 
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2.14 Conclusion 
The literature points to the importance of styles and techniques of policing that 
treat people fairly. Procedural fairness is more important than outcomes for 
building police legitimacy and compliance with the law.  Repressive and 
discriminatory policing has historically been associated with poor police-
community relations, which at times as resulted in outright conflict. 
Advocates of ambient policing may have understood the importance of police-
community relations, but not necessarily how to improve them. An emphasis on a 
visible police presence can serve to undermine police ratings in two ways: by the 
unfair actions of street-based officers; and by positioning security as the dominant 
discourse for understanding social problems, which can make people feel less 
secure. 
Whilst legislation is essential for setting out the legal boundaries for police 
conduct, concerns have been expressed about its ability to regulate discretionary 
practice. Performance management seems to have been slightly more successful 
in influencing police practice, albeit towards crime-related targets. Yet, 
performance management is credited with the potential to promote professional 
and ethical standards as a better approach to legitimate the police and make 
people feel secure.  
Rebalancing control of the police has been a long-running debate, with proponents 
of democratic policing against both centralising tendencies and approaches that 
may confer advantage to the vocal majority at the expense of quieter groups in a 
bid for community empowerment. Their preference is for full representation in the 
consultation process, with a final weighing of public views against the general 
principle of equity. 
Of particular importance moving forward into the empirical research is the role of 
police discretion in promoting order and legitimacy, on the one hand, and 
fostering unrest on the other, dependent upon perceptions of fair treatment. This 
applies both in the context of community policing and public order policing. In a 
crowd situation, fair treatment can avoid provocation and prevent discrepant 
elements uniting against the police. Thus, fair treatment, legitimacy, and the 
perception of police accountability, will be explored as potential explanations for 
where disorder occurred in 2011. 
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Chapter 3 - Methodology chapter 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter documents how the literature and the theoretical framework, 
covered in the preceding chapters, have influenced the design of the empirical 
investigation. The aims and research questions are restated before going on to 
demonstrate the logic linking the research questions and their relevant theoretical 
propositions to the empirical research strategy. The case study method chosen for 
this study is justified according to the aims of the research and the epistemological 
framework. A researcher's view of how the social world can be 'known' will have 
an overarching influence on the study. Thus, this is made explicit, explaining how 
critical realism is operationalised using Layder's adaptive approach to discover 
findings both inductively and deductively through the processes of transcription 
and qualitative and quantitative data analysis. The chapter details how the study 
was conceived and revised over time to take account of problems and 
opportunities encountered along the way. The initial design is compared to what 
was achieved in practice, reflecting on the implications for the quality and rigour of 
the study. Ethical issues are considered, particularly in terms of the costs and 
benefits for the people involved in the study. Finally, attempts are made to locate 
the researcher within the study, to demonstrate how the social and personal 
characteristics of the researcher affect the co-production of the data with 
participants, as this may have a bearing on the possible replication of the study. 
3.2 Aims and research questions 
The study was prompted by the 2011 English Riots, which lasted four days, 
beginning in Tottenham and eventually spreading to 66 locations across the 
country. The literature emerging shortly after these riots offered a broad 
consensus on why the rioting erupted in Tottenham. This was due to the police 
killing of a young Black resident and the police mishandling of a community protest 
about this. There was less agreement about why disorder occurred in other parts 
of the country, especially outside London. As detailed in Chapter 1, commentators 
referred to various contextual factors including criminality, poor police-community 
relations, relative deprivation, social exclusion, and weak community bonds. Yet, 
there was little empirical evidence showing how these factors ‘caused’ unrest, or 
how they were mitigated in non-riot affected localities. The present study hopes to 
makes a distinct contribution to criminological knowledge by addressing this gap in 
understanding. 
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Linked to findings spotlighting the role of the police in previous disturbances, and 
recognising that social order maintenance is an explicit function of police in the 
UK, the research focused on the activity of the police and policing partners in the 
2011 English riots. Recognising that policing activity does not take place in 
isolation, the study additionally sought to explore the role of other contextual 
factors. Context is assumed to be critical, because ‘what works’ in one place may 
not work in another, due to nature of the locality, including the physical and social 
environment. Thus, the over-arching aim of the study was to understand the 
aetiology of the 2011 English Riots outside London and the objectives were: 
1. to understand why riots occurred in some locales, but not others, 
highlighting the role of both risk and protective factors; 
2. to explore the role of police and partners in preventing and containing 
unrest, as the actors primarily responsible for community safety and public 
order maintenance; and 
3. to identify key contextual factors undermining and promoting order at local 
levels, which might limit the capability of policing partners to prevent and 
contain imminent unrest. 
 
This study was intended to be of academic interest, adding to the knowledge base 
about what urban disorder is, why it happens, and how it might be avoided in the 
future. The study also intended to have impact beyond academia by providing 
information and guidance to policymakers and practitioners, who play a more 
immediate and practical role in preventing and containing disorder. As a result of 
the research, persons and organisations involved in the maintenance of public 
order, particularly the police and local government, might be provided with a 
better understanding of what happened in August 2011 to help prevent and 
contain violent disorder in the future, tailored to the local context. Interventions 
which seek to address symptoms rarely lead to long-term outcomes, and so the 
intention of this study was to provide an understanding of causal processes. 
Recognising the possibility that the 2011 English riots may represent a series of 
multiple riots rather than a single phenomenon (Gorringe & Rosie 2011), a full 
investigation might involve 66 in-depth case studies -  one for each of the localities 
affected, and even more to understand why other locations were not affected. 
Clearly this does not fit the realities of time and resources, or even inclination for 
many researchers. Another approach, taken by this study, is to take stock of 
existing accounts of the 2011 English Riots, as well as accounts of previous 
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disorder in the UK and elsewhere; to identify relevant propositions about why the 
August disturbances occurred ‘when’ and ‘where’ and ‘how’; and then to select a 
small number of locations as case studies to explore in-depth how these 
propositions fit with the events. The findings can help confirm or dispute existing 
theory and to suggest further lines of enquiry for future research. 
The primary aim of a literature review is to develop sharper and more insightful 
questions, rather than to determine the answers about what is known on a topic, 
as is often thought (Yin 2003, p.9). The research questions developed from the 
literature and which inform the empirical investigation within the two case studies, 
include: 
1. What was the nature of the threat / occurrence of disorder? - What 
happened, where, and who was involved? 
 
2. What was the nature of the police and partner response? - Who was 
involved and how? What was intended and what happened in practice? 
How timely and informed was the response? 
 
3. What was the nature of people, place and community in the affected / at 
risk locales? 
 
4. How did the police and partner response influence social order outcomes? 
 
5. How did local contextual factors play a role in promoting/undermining 
social order? 
 
6. How prepared are police and partners to respond to future threats of urban 
unrest? – What lessons have been learnt and how have these been put into 
practice? How has capability been affected by recent organisational 
changes? 
 
These six questions interrelate and combine to meet the aims of the study and 
break the study down into manageable themes. Three are ‘what’ questions, and 
therefore exploratory in nature, including ‘what was the nature of the disorder?’; 
‘what was known about the police and partner response?’; and ‘what was the 
nature of the communities affected?’. It is important to establish the ‘what’ before 
progressing to any ‘how’ or 'why' questions, which are explanatory types of 
inquiry. For example, ‘how did the response influence social order outcomes?’ 
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(question 4), required information regarding the nature of the disorder and the 
nature of the policing response (questions 1 and 2 respectively). Similarly, 
answering 'how did local contextual factors play a role in promoting/undermining 
social order' (question 5) required information about the nature of the case study 
locales (question 3). Considering 'how prepared are police and partners to respond 
to future threats of urban unrest' (question 6), required information on lessons 
learnt in preventing and containing unrest (question 4) and key contextual factors 
(question 5), alongside additional information about police and partner resources, 
skills, policies and practice, that may affect how this learning can be 
operationalised.  
3.3 Epistemological framework 
The study is approached from a critical realist perspective. Critical realism was 
pioneered by Roy Bhasker (1978; 1979; 1989). It assumes that social structures 
(patterns of social relationships and social institutions that together compose 
society) have some form of independent existence, but that these structures are 
created by people, especially powerful groups pursuing their interests at the 
expense of less powerful groups. Social structures are assumed to be ‘real’ only in 
their effects; and ‘causal relations’ exist but they are highly specific in time and 
space. The research explored how individuals and groups were pressurised and 
constrained by social structures in the context of urban unrest. Accepting that 
public order policing is an emotive subject (D. Waddington 1998), the aim was to 
provide a thorough and fair-minded view of the facts. People were expected to 
have different perspectives on events in August 2011 linked to their whereabouts 
and specific role at the time; as well as the ‘positioning’ of events by powerful 
forces since they occurred. Critical realists can accept the ‘reality’ of competing 
accounts, but maintain the possibility and importance of critically evaluating why 
they compete and, based on the general weight of the evidence, aim to make 
reasonable conclusions about what actually happened. 
Critical realism has roots in Marxism, which maintains that social structures are not 
only unobservable, they are often disguised by ideology, which is the dominant set 
of social norms and values promulgated by ruling groups to justify and protect 
their position in society (see Farganis 2004). The Marxist notion of ideology sets up 
the possibility of a distinction between ‘truth’ and ‘falsity’ in the realm of ideas. 
This provides a rationale for the study of unobservable social structures and 
requires that concepts and theories are judged more in terms of their logical 
coherence and explanatory power, than their conformity with empirical evidence. 
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Taken to the extreme this ‘rationalism’ can abandon the world of experience, 
activity and observation and can justify ‘abandoning the subject’ (Layder 2006). 
Critical realism offers a more satisfactory resolution by recommending the study of 
underlying (and to some extent unobservable) social phenomena together with 
the subjective experience. The unobservable can by studied because ‘real’ 
generative mechanisms, which exist independently of but are capable of producing 
patterns of events and behaviour, can be ‘out of phase with the actual patterns of 
events’, making it both necessary to carry out research and possible to assess the 
validity of research results (Bhasker 1978). Similarly, experiences can be ‘out of 
phase’ with ‘actual’ events, and this is why a rigorous scientific method and trained 
researchers are so important. 
Critical realism bridges the binary divide between positivism and social 
constructionism. Positivism emerged in the second half of the nineteenth century, 
with the aim of studying human behaviour in the same way as the natural 
sciences. Positivist researchers assumed that ‘sense data’ provided ‘real facts’ 
about the social world, which could be reported dispassionately by the scientific 
observer. They preferred experimental approaches, using quantitative rather than 
qualitative data. Their social scientific method was seen to be the initial collection 
of facts, followed by the formulation of a theoretical hypothesis, by logical 
processes, and then the rigorous testing of that hypothesis, to verify or falsify it. 
Any necessary modification of the hypothesis was re-tested, and so on. This 
process became known as the ‘hypothetico-deductive’ method. Under the 
influence of Karl Popper, it came to be seen as the paradigmatic procedure for 
generating valid knowledge in the twentieth century (Bottoms 2008). Post-
positivists have since ‘jettisoned’ the unsustainable notion that facts are theory-
neutral (Bottoms 2008), but still continue to focus on the concepts of cause and 
explanation, to prefer quantitative data, and to use the ‘hypothetico-deductive’ 
method. A key strength of the hypothetico-deductive method is its emphasis on 
systematic and rigorous testing of theoretical ideas and hypotheses. 
Compared with positivism (and post-positivism), social constructionists put more 
emphasis on the meaning of social actions to actors, as a way of uncovering the 
deep cultural meanings and normative bonds that are assumed to be important in 
everyday social life. Ethnography is a method used by social constructionists as a 
means of accessing this type of meaning via in-depth qualitative data produced 
from the researcher’s documented experiences, observations and interviews with 
the people in a real-world context. This typically requires the emersion of the 
researcher in the real-world context alongside the subjects being studied, and 
often their participation as well. Constructionists are usually suspicious of 
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theoretical generalisations, and insofar as they do generalise, they have a strong 
preference for the inductive rather than the deductive approach to theory 
construction. However, the inductive, or ‘grounded theory’ approach (Glaser & 
Strauss 1967), implies the existence of theory-neutral facts and its prioritisation of 
qualitative data seems as unjustified as the positivists’ prioritisation of quantitative 
data. 
This study seeks to bring together the strengths of grounded theory and the 
hypothetico-deductive method by using the ‘adaptive theory’ approach developed 
by Derek Layder (1998). This approach regards induction and deduction ‘as equally 
important and mutually influential approaches to knowledge, according to 
different empirical and theoretical circumstances. The latter will reflect the 
ongoing nature of particular research projects.’ (p36). The adaptive approach 
recommends that researchers be aware of the ‘theory-ladenness’ of data. This 
requires researchers to construct an explicit ‘theoretical scaffold’ from the outset 
of the research process. These ‘theories (including frameworks and perspectives) 
should never be imposed on the research data as total systems of explanation. 
Rather they should be suggestive, sensitising and informative regards possible 
lines of enquiry and explanation’ (Layder 2006). Moreover, these pre-developed 
theories can be modified at any stage in the research (through the processes of 
induction or formal testing of hypotheses); and modifications may be relatively 
slight or fundamental. Adaptive theory also advocates ‘pragmatism’ in encouraging 
researchers to utilise both quantitative and qualitative data, as appropriate to the 
phenomena and theoretical underpinnings of the study. 
3.4 Case study method 
The research design is summarised in the diagram below (Figure 3.1). The research 
design is a ‘blueprint’ of the study (Yin 2003). Its purpose is to avoid the situation 
in which the evidence does not address the research questions. Thus, it deals with 
logical problems, rather than logistical ones. The diagram shows how the empirical 
strategy was built upwards from the research questions, which were already 
informed by the overall aims of the study. It shows how the type of inquiry, 
together with the proposition(s), determined the nature of the evidence required 
for each question. It followed that the case study was the most appropriate 
research method. This is because the case study method can be used for different 
types of research question and can deal with a variety of evidence. Perhaps the 
most important justification for choosing the case study method, however, was its 
ability to study phenomena in its real-life context, especially where the boundaries 
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between the phenomenon and the context are not clear. Question 5 refers 
explicitly to context, although the importance of the real-life context is assumed 
across the study. 
According to Thomas (2011), ‘a case study provides a form of inquiry that elevates 
a view of life in its complexity’. Experiments, for example, deliberately divorce 
phenomenon from context to focus attention on only a few variables. Surveys can 
try to deal with phenomena and context but their ability to investigate context is 
extremely limited (Yin 2003). The case study recognises that the phenomenon and 
context are not always distinguishable, and so investigates both. Yin’s definition of 
the case study captures this: 
A case study is an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries 
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident. (p.13) 
The case study method is also preferred for the investigation of contemporary 
events where behavioural manipulation is neither possible nor desirable. While the 
2011 riots occurred in the past, they can be investigated as a ‘contemporary event’ 
because relevant persons were still alive to report what happened, albeit 
retrospectively. 
Some social scientists believe that the case study has implications for the kind of 
data that are collected, and how these are analysed (Hammersely & Gomm 2000). 
In particular, the case study implies the collection of unstructured data, and 
qualitative analysis of those data. Others argue that the case study strategy should 
not be confused with qualitative research (Yin 2003). Ethnography is a qualitative 
strategy which similarly aims to provide close-up detailed observation of the 
natural world, but does not necessarily produce case studies (ibid). Conversely, 
case studies do not have to include observations as a source of evidence. They 
might include, and even be limited to, quantitative evidence. Ethnography was not 
considered a suitable approach for this study for several reasons. Firstly, because 
the events of August 2011 were historical and so could not be observed directly. 
Secondly, capturing the lived experience of communities was not a primary aim of 
the study. In accordance with a critical realist perspective, it was assumed that 
local accounts of the events may not be the 'real' or the whole explanation, 
particularly with regard to the explanatory power of structural factors. Thirdly, this 
study intended to explore existing theories of causation, unlike ethnography which 
largely claims to enter the field with no prior commitment to a theoretical model  
(Van Maanen et al. 1982). 
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Figure 3.1: Summary of the research design 
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3.4.1 Theory and generalisation in case study research  
The role of theory development prior to data collection, is a key point of difference 
between case studies and related methods such as ethnography and grounded 
theory, which typically avoid specifying any theoretical propositions at the outset 
of the inquiry (Yin 2003). The case study design requires ‘a [hypothetical] story 
about why acts, events, structure, and thoughts occur’ (Sutton & Staw 1995, 
p.378). Schuller (1988) uses the metaphor of a piece of string to illustrate the 
importance of theory in making the case study both purposeful and manageable. 
The researcher must ask not only how long is the piece of string, but also how 
thick it is, and how close or loose its weave. Length is fundamental and relates to 
when the study starts and finishes. The thickness of the string relates to the 
different strands or elements of the study, making the string thinner or thicker. 
The weave refers to the degree of detail incorporated in the study; the more detail 
that is omitted, the looser the weave. However, a denser weave is not necessarily 
better, if the detail does not support the research questions. Sometimes a looser 
weave is more effective (p61). A pre-developed theory can ensure the researcher 
does not get lost in the case, by defining what is relevant and can realistically be 
achieved within the resources available for the study.  
It is argued that notions of intrinsic worth relax the requirements on researchers to 
proceed in principled ways (Gomm et al. 2000), which may be responsible for 
another prevalent criticism of the case study method, concerning its lack of rigor 
(Yin 2003). Consequently, Gomm et al. (2000) take the view that most case study 
research must be directed towards drawing general conclusions, either by the 
process of 'theoretical inference' or ‘empirical’ or ‘statistical generalisation’. 
Theoretical inference is what happens with a given degree of probability in a 
certain type of theoretically defined situation. Empirical generalisation draws 
inferences about features of a larger but finite population of cases from the study 
of a sample drawn from that population.  For example, if half of a study population 
had been a victim of violent crime, an empirical generalisation would infer from 
this that half of the whole population had been a victim of violent crime. The 
authors acknowledge that the greater the heterogeneity of the population, the 
more problematic are empirical generalisations based on a single case, or handful 
of cases. However, Gomm et al. suggest it is possible to take account of population 
heterogeneity in two complementary ways: (1) by using theoretical ideas and 
information about the case and the population in their analyses; and (2) by 
selecting cases for study on the basis of such ideas and information. This would be 
similar to quota or stratified sampling in survey research, whereby respondents 
are selected into a sample on the basis of pre-specified characteristics so that the 
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total sample has the same distribution of characteristics assumed to exist in the 
population being studied. 
Some authors suggest that social science can only ever achieve theoretical 
generalisation. Yin (2003, p.10) argues that both case studies and experiments are 
only generalisable to theoretical propositions and not to populations of the 
universe: ‘in doing a case study your goal will be to expand and generalise theories 
and not to enumerate frequencies’. Even statistical generalisation, which requires 
numbers of cases, is merely about the concomitant variation of two 
characteristics, and analysts must always go beyond the sample and resort to 
theoretical thinking to link those characteristics together (Mitchell 1983). Thus, 
case studies are just as good a basis for such inference as other sorts of studies. 
The propositions underpinning the case study design are the main vehicle for 
generalising the results. The question is not whether case studies can legitimately 
be used in reaching generalisations, but from what one can reasonably generalise 
to what (Platt 1988). Cronbach (1975, p.125) reminds us that ‘when we give proper 
weight to local conditions, any generalisation is a working hypothesis, not a 
conclusion’ and another community may still require its own evaluation. 
It is often suggested that a key weakness in the use of a single case study or just a 
small number of cases, is that it is too easy to devise an interpretation to fit them; 
and so the interpretation offered cannot even be treated as valid for the particular 
case(s). However, the strength of the case study approach lies in the nature of the 
data (Platt 1988). If there is a rich and detailed account of many features of the 
case(s), it may be a considerable achievement to devise an interpretation which 
can deal with all of them, and this may be harder to do than the fitting of 
superficial generalisations to larger numbers. On the ability of the case study 
method to provide generalizable findings, one can conclude that: 
There seems no reason to except case studies from the normal assumption 
that one can reasonably make generalisations from what one knows 
already until information inconsistent with this becomes available; 
whatever is true in one instance should also be true of other instances of 
the same sort. (p.18) 
The difficulty lies in establishing which instances are of the same sort in relevant 
aspects. This again supports the need for an appropriate base of information, or 
‘thick description’ (Geertz 1973). The issue of what constitutes thick description, 
however, has not been completely resolved, in part because relevant descriptors 
for facilitating transferability depends on assumptions about the ways in which 
other cases are likely to be similar or different (Lincoln & Guba 2000). 
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3.4.2 The case study design 
The case study design for this research involved two cities as the primary cases and 
two neighbourhood subcases in each of these cities. The subcases were a 
methodological tool for accessing data on community level variables. The two 
cities were Nottingham, which experienced two nights of disturbances in August 
2011, and Sheffield, which experienced no major disorder, but was considered to 
be at risk of rioting by local agencies. The rationale for a single case study may be 
to investigate a critical case in testing a well-formulated theory; to describe or 
explore an extreme or unique case; to capture the circumstances and conditions of 
a commonplace situation; a revelatory case, previously inaccessible to scientific 
investigation; or to explore change over time, revisiting the same case at two time-
points (Yin 2003). However, a major drawback of the single case design is that the 
case may turn out not to represent what it was thought to be at the outset. 
Moreover, it is argued that empirical results are more potent if two or more cases 
support the same theory (Yin 2003; Platt 1988).  
Another reason for multiple cases is that they offer the potential to hold some 
factors constant while others are examined, with differences imputed to the 
remaining factors. This is like the ‘replication’ logic used in experimental research, 
whereby a significant finding from a single experiment would be re-tested by 
duplicating the exact conditions or altering some of the conditions to see whether 
the finding can be duplicated (Yin 2003, p.47). In case study research, replication 
logic can be applied in two ways, either as a ‘literal replication’, selecting cases 
that predict the same results; or a ‘theoretical replication’, selecting cases that 
predict contrasting results, but for predictable reasons (ibid). The design of this 
study was underpinned by the logic of theoretical replication. The two cities were 
selected on the basis that they had contrasting social order outcomes for 
predictable reasons. The predictable reasons were assumed to be the theoretical 
propositions outlined in research questions 3 and 4. 
The study was designed according to the working hypothesis that in August 2011 
major disorder occurred in Nottingham and not in Sheffield due to the different 
nature of the police and partner response, police/agency-community relations, 
and intra-community relations in the two cities. More specifically, the empirical 
design sought to test the hypothesis that Nottingham experienced major disorder 
because the police and partner response was less cohesive, proactive, and less 
focused on liaison with at risk groups; and the affected communities were more 
marginalised, less cohesive, and had poorer relationships with the police and other 
public agencies compared to ‘at risk’ communities in Sheffield. 
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Nottingham and Sheffield were selected due to a combination of theoretical and 
practical reasons. Both belonged to the ‘core cities group’, a partnership of eight of 
England’s largest cities outside London. Of the cities in the affected and unaffected 
groups, Nottingham and Sheffield were well matched in terms of size and social 
characteristics, including those associated with disorder in the literature. As  
Table 3.1 shows, in 2011, the cities were broadly comparable in terms of 
deprivation, ethnic diversity and levels of crime. Compared to Sheffield, 
Nottingham had a marginally smaller population (305.5K compared to 552.5K), but 
greater ethnic diversity (29% non-White compared to 16%) and deprivation 
(ranked 20th most deprived local authority compared to 56th). Nottingham also had 
a higher incidence of crime (71 notifiable offences per 1K population compared to 
52), including proportionally more violence offences. These were key contextual 
variables in the explanatory model of disorder for this study (see Figure 3.2). 
'Controlling' for these put other explanatory variables – such as the nature of the 
policing response, police/agency-community relations, and the nature of 
community – in the spotlight, as per the quasi-experimental method. From a 
practical perspective, Nottingham and Sheffield were also geographically close to 
each other, and not too far away from the researcher’s location, making fieldwork 
manageable. 
 
Table 3.1: Social characteristics of the case studies, reflecting broad comparability 
  
Nottingham Sheffield 
Population  No. of usual residents 1 305,680 552,698 
Ethnicity % BME (non-White groups) 1 28.5 16.3 
Deprivation Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) 
rank (of 326 districts) 2 
20 56 
Crime No. of total notifiable offences per 1K 
population 3 
71 52 
Violence No. of violence with injury offences 
per 1K population 3 
10 5 
                                                     
1 Census 2011, published by ONS 
2 Indices of Deprivation 2010: Local Authority Summaries, supplied by DCLG, 
published by ONS. Rank of 1 indicates the district is the most deprived 
according to the measure and a rank of 326 indicates the district is the least 
deprived 
3 Notifiable Offences Recorded by the Police, 2011/2012, supplied by Home Office, 
published by ONS 
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Figure 3.2: Working hypothesis for causal factors affecting social (dis)order outcomes 
 
 
Experiments are done when a researcher can manipulate behaviour directly and 
systematically. Quasi-experiments are used when no direct manipulation is 
possible, but some control can still be achieved by selecting cases that are 
matched according to certain characteristics under investigation (Spilerman 1971). 
The ability of researchers to delimit the range of situations, for example by 
‘matching’ comparator groups, is influenced by natural variation in the population 
of cases and the measures available to gauge this variation. Researchers often rely 
on social statistics collated by government and public agencies to match people 
and places, although these come with caveats regarding completeness and 
accuracy. Much has been written about the ‘dark figure’ of crime, which is omitted 
from official statistics due to under-reporting and under-recording of offences (see 
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Coleman & Moynihan 1996). Cronbach (1975) raises a more fundamental concern 
about fixing aspects of the conditions under which the subject is observed. He 
suggests this may conceal the interactions of any fixed aspect, which may be 
pulled into the main effect or into the interactions of other variables, and may 
even wipe out a real main effect of the variable that chiefly concerns the 
researcher. Arguably, however, this risk is mitigated in case study research by the 
focus on contextual factors and not merely the main phenomenon. 
A ‘nested’ case study design was used to facilitate access to relevant data on 
contextual variables, which included the nature of community and police/agency-
community relations. ‘community’ is a complex and contested concept, which can 
refer to a community of place (contained within specific boundaries and rooted in 
a particular social, physical, cultural and economic context); a community of 
identity (composed of people with a common culture often related to shared 
ethnic or religious characteristics); or a community of interest (comprising people 
who share in an activity or interest, for example work, leisure, politics, religion) 
(Platts-Fowler & Robinson 2013). For this research, community of place was 
deemed most relevant, and the neighbourhood is a good proxy for this. This focus 
on neighbourhoods is not to deny that people are likely to be members of multiple 
communities that transcend geographical boundaries. However, neighbourhoods 
are the setting for much of daily life and their form and nature has real 
consequences for the people who live in them (Martin 2003). Most importantly for 
this research, the neighbourhood represents a tangible material setting and 
discernible target for service interventions by police and other public agencies. 
The original plan was to focus on just one neighbourhood in each city. In 
Nottingham, this was to be a neighbourhood acutely affected by disorder and, in 
Sheffield, a neighbourhood deemed ‘at risk’ of disorder. Riot-affected and at risk 
neighbourhoods in the two cities were identified through analysis of documentary 
material and early interviews with local stakeholders. In Sheffield, several 
neighbourhoods were identified as being at risk in August 2011 by local 
respondents. The risk was gauged by local stakeholders on the basis of 
neighbourhood levels of deprivation, crime, ethnic diversity, and proportion of 
young people with little to do and little to lose, demonstrating some shared 
understanding with the researcher about factors promoting and undermining 
urban unrest. However, none of the respondents identified police/agency-
community relations as a risk factor; so either this was not recognised as a risk 
factor for urban unrest generally, or not in the Sheffield context.  
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The revised decision to focus on two neighbourhoods per city was made a short 
way into the fieldwork as a combination of pragmatic and theoretically 
‘interesting’ opportunities presented themselves. The decision was partially 
determined by who agreed to participate in the research. Interviews in the original 
target neighbourhood in Nottingham proved difficult to arrange at first, and 
opportunities arose to speak to target groups in another neighbourhood similarly 
affected by disturbances in 2011. A potential downside of increasing the number 
of study sites is that the researcher’s time and resource is spread more thinly, 
potentially limiting the depth of the research. However, doubling the number of 
study neighbourhoods did not double the total number of interviews because a 
proportion of the target participants worked at the city level, or at least across a 
wider area of the city than just one neighbourhood. Consequently, interviews with 
these participants merely needed to cover issues relating to both study 
neighbourhoods; although perhaps making these interviews longer to conduct, 
transcribe and analyse. 
The first study neighbourhood in Sheffield was chosen because it shared several 
characteristics with the two riot affected neighbourhoods in Nottingham. 
Specifically, it had a relatively high African-Caribbean population; it was known for 
gang-related activity; it was located near the city centre; and local people had 
experienced antagonistic policing recently preceding the 2011 riots linked to a 
covert policing operation that had led to the arrest of a large cohort of younger 
residents. The second study neighbourhood in Sheffield was chosen because it had 
a record of previous disorder, which occurred annually around Bonfire Night, when 
local youths set fire to bins and vehicles, and targeted police with fireworks and 
other missiles. This seemed pertinent given the nature of the 2011 disturbances in 
Nottingham, which also involved attacks on police officers and property. The 
second site had a relatively high non-White population like the other three sites, 
but this was largely South Asian, as opposed to African-Caribbean, providing an 
opportunity to explore variation within the context of ethnicity. 
3.5 Data Collection 
The relevant data sources for answering the research questions and therefore 
meeting the overall aims of the study were decided according to the particular 
inquiry type and propositions associated with each question, as described above. 
These data sources included documentation, such as paper documents and online 
written material; multi-media sources, such as radio, television and video 
recordings; archival data, such as organisational records and statistics; and face-to-
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face interviews. This section will explain specifically why these data sources were 
appropriate for the study compared to potential alternatives; how the data were 
collected; and how useful they were in practice, reflecting on the 'authenticity' of 
the data. 
The study draws on data that are both qualitative and quantitative in nature, 
which warrant the study being classed as ‘mixed methods’ research.  This may 
raise issues for researchers who distinguish between qualitative and quantitative 
methods not on the basis of the type of evidence, but on the basis of wholly 
different philosophical beliefs. In recognition of this, mixed methods research is 
referred to as the ‘third path’ (Gorard & Taylor 2004), the ‘third paradigm’ 
(Denscombe 2008) or the ‘third methodological movement’ (Teddlie & Tashakkori 
2003). The first movement is qualitatively oriented, working primarily within the 
constructivist paradigm and principally interested in narrative data and analyses. 
The second movement is quantitatively oriented, working primarily within the 
(post) positivist paradigm and principally interested in numerical data and analyses 
(Teddlie & Tashakkori 2009). The third movement includes mixed methodologists 
working primarily within the ‘pragmatist’ paradigm and interested in both 
narrative and numeric data and analyses. This does not mean that ‘anything goes’ 
(Denscombe 2008), but rather the use of whatever methodological tools are 
required to answer the research questions under study (Teddlie & Tashakkori 
2009). 
A particular advantage for a study using mixed data sources is the development of 
converging lines of inquiry, or ‘triangulation’. In the social sciences, triangulation 
can be traced back to Campbell and Fiske (1959), who argued that more than one 
method should be used to ensure the variance reflected that of the trait and not of 
the method. This is termed by Denzin (1978) as the ‘between (or across) methods’ 
type of triangulation; as opposed to the ‘within-method’ type, which uses multiple 
techniques within a given method to collect and interpret data, such as having 
multiple questions within a survey to measure the same phenomena. It is 
suggested that some studies combine qualitative with quantitative research, not as 
a third methodology, but to meet a post-positivist research agenda with the aim of 
achieving more ‘accurate’ results (Meyer 2005; Giddings 2006). They use 
triangulation only as a means of validation. However, this overlooks the strength 
of true mixed research methods, which combines qualitative and quantitative 
research to explore complexities and contradictions in their own right (Denscombe 
2008) to capture a more complete, holistic, and contextual portrayal of the 
phenomena under study (Jick 1979). That is, beyond the analysis of overlapping 
variances, the use of multiple methods may uncover some unique variance which 
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may have been missed otherwise. The value of triangulation rests on the premise 
that the weaknesses in each single method will be compensated by the counter-
balancing strengths of another; although there needs to be some checks that 
liabilities are not compounded (ibid).  
3.5.1 Documentary data 
Documentary data were gathered from the outset, to get an overview of what had 
happened and why in August 2011 in the case study cities and neighbourhoods. 
National and local newspapers were searched online by day for August, and then 
again, with no time criteria, but using relevant search terms, such as ‘riots’ 
‘disturbances’, ‘disorders’. The searches were refined using search terms specific 
to events occurring in the two case study cities. For example, there was an incident 
in Nottingham where rioters climbed onto the roof of a girls’ high school and 
threw missiles at the police. Hence, the name of this school became a search term. 
The aim was to collate information on disorder and pre-disorder events. Data on 
incidents were recorded in a database, with the location, date and time, and 
details of what and who was involved. This was 'cleaned' of duplicates. In the case 
of Nottingham, this information was useful context when speaking to police and 
other stakeholders about events. Appearing to know ‘facts and figures’ helped to 
build rapport, especially with some police officers, who seemed initially peeved to 
be speaking to a PhD student. The details from media reports were also used as 
prompts to seek respondents’ reflection on which accounts were more ‘truthful’. 
In addition to media documentation, local reports were identified, such as those 
written by local organisations in response to the events. In Nottingham this 
uncovered a report by the local Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnership (CDRP) 
(One Nottingham 2011). This did not cover the events in any detail, but focused on 
explanations for their occurrence in Nottingham and the characteristics of the 
places and people involved. The data on who was involved was based solely on the 
117 people arrested for offences associated with the disturbances. This data 
included where arrestees lived; their biographical characteristics such as sex, age, 
ethnicity; and whether they were previously known to the police. Of course, this 
data provided only a partial picture, which may have been changed - slightly or 
drastically - by the addition of data on those who were not arrested. One police 
respondent was asked about persons responsible for the damage of forty vehicles 
parked on a residential street in one of the study neighbourhoods. The response 
was that ‘no one was caught for that’. 
Documentation must not be regarded as a literal recording of events (Yin 2003). 
Written accounts are as likely as verbal accounts to contain inaccuracies and 
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biases, because they are both constructed by people, who are fallible and often 
partisan. It is likely that reports are written with a particular audience in mind. The 
CDRP is the strategic partnership for the city, comprising a range of organisations 
from the public, private and voluntary sector. It can be assumed that most of these 
partners, especially Nottingham City Council, would be mindful of presenting 
themselves and the city in good light. Thus, we can assume some bias along these 
lines in the One Nottingham report. This was perhaps reflected in the comment of 
one respondent, who was frustrated with the city’s focus on public image in the 
aftermath of the 2011 disturbances because this jeopardised potential learning 
opportunities: 
...we know that we've got to put a public face on things. We've got to give a 
presentation of it. So, you know, ‘the disturbances were superbly managed, 
great partnership working’; but I was very keen in the aftermath to say 
‘let's not get taken in by our own hype’. [Nottingham Manager 6] 
The internet has made 'unofficial' accounts of events more accessible. Anyone can 
post written or visual data on the web. Undoubtedly, there are concerns about the 
authenticity of online information because it can be posted by anyone (Mack et al. 
2008; Litvin et al. 2008; Magnini 2001), but there is also evidence that online 
information is considered more credible than other traditional sources, dependent 
upon the author(s) and the message itself (Ismail & Latif 2013). The present study 
accessed information about events in Nottingham and Sheffield via social media 
sites, such as YouTube and the 'Sheffield Forum', which is a discussion website 
used by Sheffield residents and businesses. One YouTube clip showed the attack 
on Canning Circus Police Station in Nottingham (OfficialLondonRiots 2011). This 
was recorded using a mobile phone and included a running commentary by the 
person filming. It was a useful piece of visual data that the study was able to 
consider alongside the verbal account provided by Assistant Chief Constable 
Broadbent at the Home Affairs Committee (Home Affairs Committee 2011c).  The 
YouTube clip contradicted Mr Broadbent's claim that the disturbances were not 
riots because at no point were there 12 or more people together for a common 
purpose with intent to commit the act of rioting. The film commentary claimed 
‘there's quite a lot of them’ and the image showed at least 12 people involved. 
The original plan was to obtain data of public order incidents recorded by the 
police during the August 2011 disturbances. These were to be analysed alongside 
the incident database constructed using documentary sources.  Relevant police 
officers were asked during interview about the possibility of acquiring incident 
data, as well any reports referring to key events. Police respondents were relaxed 
- 98 - 
talking about the details of incidents during interview, but nervous at the prospect 
of sharing any official archival material. The response given by several people was 
that someone else would need to be contacted, or that they would have to check 
with someone else first. Follow up emails and telephone calls about obtaining the 
police data were ignored, and the incident data was never obtained. Assurances 
had been given about the researcher's experience of working with police data and 
of data-sharing and storage protocols, so this was unlikely to have been the 
barrier. Eventually it was decided that the study should proceed without the police 
incident data. Documentary sources had produced some aggregate figures on the 
number of police recorded incidents and officers deployed during the riots, as well 
as the nature of some key events. This was considered sufficient for the study 
aims. Moreover, there was some concern that further chasing of the incident data 
might sour ongoing relations with Nottinghamshire Police. 
3.5.2 Interviews 
Interviews were the study's main source of data collection. Interviewing involves 
the researcher asking questions of one or more people. Interviewing can be used 
for a variety of purposes, but in the context of research, it is technique used for 
the purpose of improving knowledge (Wengraf 2001). An interview is a special 
type of conversational interaction, which must be planned and prepared for in 
advance, like other forms of research activity. This study used semi-structured 
interviews. These tend to have some pre-planned questions or topics, but also 
have a degree of openness, which allows the respondent to raise additional issues 
which may not have been conceived in advance.  Thus, semi-structured 
interviewing fits with Layder's adaptive approach, by seeking knowledge both 
deductively and inductively. 
All interviews need to be fully planned to ensure that the data produced is tailored 
to the aims of the study. Semi-structured interviews do not mean half the 
preparation of fully structured interviews, and in fact the degree of openness in 
the semi-structured interview can mean they are more challenging to undertake 
(Wengraf 2001). This is because during a semi-structured interview most of the 
respondent's responses cannot be predicted. Thus, the interviewer has to 
improvise, which ‘requires more training and more mental preparation than simply 
delivering lines prepared and rote-learned in advance’ (p5). Under the right 
conditions semi-structured interviews can offer more than fully structured ones, 
but under the wrong conditions they may offer nothing at all (ibid). For example, 
failure to follow up on an answer or a badly phrased question may result in the 
'loss' of relevant data. Considering how the interview has been conducted is 
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especially important for semi-structured interviews, to consider how the 
interviewer might have proceeded better by making different decisions. This can 
be one reason for transcribing and starting to analyse interviews within the 
fieldwork phase, to improve later interviews, as was done for this study. 
As an alternative to interviews, it is argued that observation offers access to 
‘naturally occurring’ data, situated interaction in which local meanings are created 
and sustained (Emerson et al. 1995). Data derived through observation is ‘naturally 
occurring’ because it ‘appears to arise without an investigator intervening directly 
or providing some ‘stimulus’ to a group or respondents’ (Silverman 2007, p.50). 
Silverman (2007, p.60) argues that naturally occurring data is superior to the data 
‘manufactured’ by interviews, which take place in 'artificial' research settings 
imbued with the researcher's own categories, embedded in questions, probes, 
stimuli, vignettes etc.. Faith is placed in depth interviews because it is assumed 
that people have a deep interior that can only be accessed through interrogation 
of what information is held in their brain (p.43-4), rather than observing how 
‘experiences’ and ‘motives’ are made available in innumerable everyday contexts 
(p.46). 
Arguably, however, even observed data is 'manufactured' in the sense that 'reality' 
never speaks for itself but has to be apprehended by the simple logistics of 
research. There are also specific events that cannot be observed as they naturally 
occur. Historical events, such as riots, are one example. The importance with 
interview data is to understand that it is an account which positions itself in a 
particular context; for example, as somebody responding to an interviewer’s 
question and as a person claiming a particular identity (e.g. a ‘family member’, a 
‘police officer’ etc.), who often has a particular interest in presenting a particular 
version of events. A respondent’s account will depend on recall, but there is also 
the possibility that asking someone about past events invites a retrospective ‘re-
writing of history’, with an unknown bearing on the causal problem (Garfinkel 
1967). Sacks (1992) suggests that telling someone about our experiences involves 
telling a story, and often story-tellers prefer to display some kind of ‘first hand’ 
involvement in events. If these contextual factors are taken into account, there is 
no reason that interviews cannot inform (cautious) conclusions. The researcher 
must view what people say as ‘an activity awaiting analysis and not as a picture 
awaiting a commentary’ (Silverman 2007, p.56). 
3.5.3 Sampling 
This study was not interested in the general population, but in specific ‘types’ of 
people involved in the events of August 2011 in specific areas of Sheffield and 
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Nottingham. Interviewees were therefore ‘purposively sampled’. This is where 
people are selected based on the purpose of the study and knowledge of the 
relevant population(s). This compares to ‘random sampling’, which aims for an 
unbiased selection of individuals, so that if many samples were drawn, the average 
sample would accurately represent the population, and findings could be 
generalised to the population. The following types of people were considered 
important to the study and represented the sampling framework for each of the 
case study cities: 
1. Public order police - including strategic, tactical and frontline officers, as 
well as communications and planning officers involved in the response. 
2. Neighbourhood Policing Teams - including police officers and police 
community support officers (PCSOs) in position at the time of the 
disorders. 
3. Partner agencies – managerial/strategic level positions in public 
agencies in the statutory, voluntary or private sectors involved in the 
public order response or working with residents in the study 
neighbourhoods.  
4. Community - community-based practitioners and representatives 
including youth workers, community development officers, local faith-
based organisations, ward councillors, and community activists. 
These groups were not mutually exclusive. Police officers working in 
neighbourhood policing teams might also be public order officers. There was also 
some difficulty deciding on the two non-police categories. Initially they were 
defined as statutory stakeholders and voluntary-community sector stakeholders. 
However, as fieldwork began there was a realisation that strategic and managerial 
roles in the statutory sector and voluntary-community sector had more in common 
with each other than they did with practitioners in their own sector. Moreover, 
variations in public provision, particularly with regards to outsourcing, meant that 
the same role could reside in different sectors in the two case study cities. For the 
purposes of the study then, community-based practitioners and representatives 
regardless of their sector were defined as ‘community stakeholders’, and all 
operational and strategic managers were termed ‘policing partners’. Allocation to 
a stakeholder group was done pre-interview as part of the sampling, but 
sometimes re-allocation was necessary post-interview. 
A target of 60 interviews was set, to be equally divided between the two case 
studies. This was deemed the maximum achievable with the timeframe and 
resources of the study. Ideally the number of interviews would be determined by 
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the ‘saturation point’, which is the point at which the researcher stops hearing 
anything new in relation to the research questions. Although, one can never really 
know if another interview might offer something novel. Table 3.2 shows the 
number of interviews targeted and achieved by type and city. It shows that in the 
end only 45 interviews were achieved, mainly due to problems accessing 
community-based participants, who were reluctant to engage with the research. 
The reasons for this are discussed in more detail below. 
The refusal rate was 35 per cent across the two cases studies, meaning that just 
over a third of people contacted never responded or directly refused to participate 
in the research. However, this figure does not represent the effort dedicated to 
accessing people considered to be key actors. These were individuals who been 
recommended multiple times due to their important role in events taking place in 
August 2011 or their significance within the study neighbourhoods. One 
community practitioner in Nottingham was contacted several times by phone, by 
email and a personal introduction took place, arranged by an existing participant, 
and yet an interview never materialised.  However, with other individuals, efforts 
did pay off. In any case, these efforts were critical to the success of the study. A 
larger sample of ‘easier’ participants could have been achieved, but the aim was 
for ‘quality over quantity’. For the rigor of the case study comparison it can be 
regarded as an achievement that the final samples were broadly similar in size and 
type across the two cities.  
 
Table 3.2: Number of interviews targeted and achieved, by group and case study 
 Nottingham Sheffield Both Case Studies 
  Target Ach’d Diff Target Ach’d Diff Target Ach’d Diff 
Public Order Police 6 8 2 6 6 0 12 14 2 
NPTs 4 4 0 4 4 0 8 8 0 
Partner Agencies 8 5 -3 8 9 1 16 14 -2 
Community 8 3 -5 8 6 -2 16 9 -7 
All Groups 26 20 -6 26 25 -1 52 45 -7 
Refusal rates: Nottingham 38% (12), Sheffield 32% (12), Total 35% (24) 
 
3.5.4 Access 
To access police officers as participants for the study, the first step was a formal 
letter to the Chief Constables in Nottinghamshire and South Yorkshire Police 
Forces. It was anticipated from the outset that a key obstacle for the study would 
be gaining the consent of Nottinghamshire Police, which was likely to be 
concerned with the presentation of their policing approach, specifically because 
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riots did occur. With no rioting in Sheffield, South Yorkshire Police had less to fear. 
With some surprise, both police forces offered their support for the research 
relatively easily and quickly. The only concession made to South Yorkshire Police 
was that the force logo would appear on research documents used with officers 
participating in the study, such as information sheets and consent forms. This had 
the potential to undermine the independence of the study and so organisational 
independence and the researcher's commitment to anonymity and confidentiality 
were emphasised in conversation with participants. It was expected that the logo 
might make some officers more willing to participate, by demonstrating the 
approval of their organisation. Access to statutory stakeholders was sought in a 
similar way. Formal letters were sent to the Chief Executives of Nottingham City 
Council and Sheffield City Council and both offered their support to the research 
relatively quickly. 
Nottinghamshire Police appointed a named contact to provide practical assistance 
to the study. This person was helpful in identifying officers who had been involved 
in policing the disorders and those in Neighbourhood Policing Teams at that time. 
These officers would have been difficult to identify otherwise. The two senior 
officers in charge of the operation in Nottingham were named in various media 
reports, but had since left the force. Thus, the named contact was a valuable 
‘gatekeeper’, typically defined as an individual, group or organisation that acts as 
an intermediary between researchers and participants (De Laine 2000).  However, 
the use of gatekeepers can be problematic. They have the power to grant and 
withhold access to the people and situations of interest and may influence the 
research by limiting or providing selective access. In addition to the interviews 
organised by the appointed gatekeeper, other officers at Nottinghamshire Police 
were identified via documentary sources and by existing participants in the study. 
One neighbourhood officer was personally introduced by a community practitioner 
during a field visit. Recruiting officers via a range of methods ensured a sample 
that had not been entirely determined by a gatekeeper, whose bias and influence 
were difficult to gauge. 
That said, no gatekeeper can be completely sure, nor control, what officers say in 
an interview situation, especially when anonymity and confidentiality have been 
promised by the researcher. In the company of a trusted researcher, Reiner and 
Newburn (2008) suggest that many police officers are only too glad to talk about 
their own views and experiences. The formal access granted by police managers is 
only the first of two ‘gates’ through which researchers much gain passage (Fox & 
Lundman 1974). The second gate is the access that must be sought separately 
from the officers identified for participation in the study. This might also be 
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defined as the difference between ‘physical access’ and ‘social access’ (Cassell 
1988). Physical access does not ensure social access, which depends upon the 
researcher’s ability to build trust, rapport, and convince the participant of their 
credibility (Sixsmith et al. 2003). It is at the level of social access where the 
researcher can overcome some of the bias introduced by gatekeepers.  
Beyond Nottinghamshire Police, most interviewees were identified though a 
version of ‘snowball sampling’, a recruitment method whereby current 
participants are asked to recommend new people for the study. For this study, it 
meant asking participants to identify others who had been involved in the 2011 
events or had worked in relevant positions, organisations or neighbourhoods. One 
disadvantage associated with snowball sampling, is the likelihood that participants 
identify people with similar views to themselves, introducing bias to the study. 
Police and statutory sector participants were specifically asked to identify 
community organisations and activists in the study neighbourhoods.  This was 
because, as an outsider, it can be difficult to establish which organisations work in 
which neighbourhoods, and even more difficult to know which are most valued by 
that community. This was a key reason for staging interviews with community 
stakeholders last.  Another reason was to provide ample opportunity to pick up on 
any local sensitivities that might be relevant to fieldwork.  
It was assumed that community stakeholders would be the most willing to 
participate because the research would provide a rare opportunity to present their 
version of events. This was not the case, particularly in Nottingham. Community 
stakeholders were reluctant to participate due to concerns about the stigma 
associated with rioting. One community stakeholder, who finally agreed to 
participate, angrily reported: ‘for people in this area, it’s still there; the fallout 
from it is still there; still upset about being associated with it as being a riot. So, no, 
they’re not happy’ [Nottingham Practitioner 2]. So, after the relative ease of 
completing two-thirds of the research interviews, the final third with community 
stakeholders was more problematic. Emails were often ignored in both 
Nottingham and Sheffield, possibly because this medium of communication was 
less routine in their jobs. Telephone numbers were not easy to find, but were 
marginally more effective. It became apparent that practitioners most valued for 
their work in the community were the busiest and least likely to prioritise the 
needs of a researcher over the needs of local people. 
3.5.5 Fieldwork tools 
Consent forms (see Appendix C) were used with all participants. This was to 
protect both the participant and the researcher. The researcher would be 
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protected from any later claims that the interview had been conducted under 
pretence. No vulnerable groups were knowingly contacted. The interviews were 
mainly with professionals. The consent form listed details that participants needed 
to make an informed decision. It made clear that participation was on voluntary 
basis. This was particularly important where the individual’s organisation had 
agreed to support the project. Individuals needed to know that organisational 
support did not make their participation compulsory. Participants were required to 
sign the form to show they had understood the purposes of the research and had 
consented to their involvement, as defined in a separate participant information 
sheet (see Appendix B). These together formed the basis of the research ‘contract’. 
The participant information sheet additionally set out the commitment to 
confidentiality and anonymity and the secure storage of any data collected from 
them. There was an option to leave some sections of the consent form unsigned. 
For example, one participant did not agree for their interview data to be used in 
any relevant future research. 
The interview topic guides (see Appendix D) were devised to reflect the research 
questions. Additionally, the four stakeholder groups were asked specific questions 
acknowledging their 'position' in relation to events. For example, public order 
officers were expected to know more about the public order approach and tactics 
used and how these were communicated from strategic command to frontline 
officers. Neighbourhood Police Officers were thought to be better placed to reflect 
on the nature of place and community in the study neighbourhoods; police-
community relations; local partnership working; and, of course, their own 
involvement (or lack of) in public order events. Policing partners were asked to 
reflect on partnership working within and across their organisations both prior to 
and during the events. Community stakeholders were expected to know about the 
nature of community; community relations with police and other public agencies; 
how local people felt about events and the policing response in 2011; and possibly 
‘why’ local people were involved. It was also necessary to tailor the wording of 
some interview questions according to the city and particular study 
neighbourhood. 
As the interviews progressed, the base schedules were adapted to build in specific 
questions that picked up on specific events and issues mentioned by previous 
respondents. For example, if a pre-disorder event had previously been reported, 
this was used as a probe to seek more information about the event. This technique 
was also a form of ‘within-method’ validation. The lead question for the interviews 
was variously changed across the first few interviews to see which would work 
best. The lead question can play an important role in setting the tone of the 
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interview and can serve to put respondents at ease or make them uncomfortable, 
suspicious, and worse, uncooperative. An early version of the topic guide led with 
a question asking respondents to reflect on why the disorders occurred in 
Nottingham or why they didn’t occur in Sheffield. Another version led with a 
question asking respondents about their role. The latter worked better in terms of 
putting respondents at ease; no doubt, because people feel more comfortable 
talking about their job than about their opinions, which may involve thinking about 
what is the ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ opinion to have. 
Another important fieldwork tool was a digital voice recorder to record the 
interviews and make possible verbatim transcription for analysis. All participants 
were asked whether they were comfortable with the voice recorder and informed 
that the recording would be stored securely and used only for the purposes of the 
research.  Everyone agreed to be recorded. Many police officers quipped that they 
were used to being recorded anyway. However, one officer did email the day after 
the interview to confirm again that the recording would only be used for research 
purposes. This triggered interest in what they may have said in the interview that 
was particularly sensitive or controversial. Another participant adopted a 
whispering technique to avoid certain things being recorded, and possibly heard by 
others. The voice recorder was, however, sensitive enough to capture this 
whispering, making it possible to include this data in the analysis. Unfortunately 
two interviews went unrecorded, including one because the battery died at the 
start of the interview (after a full day of interviewing on a partial battery) and the 
other because the record button was never pressed. Notes for these interviews 
were made contemporaneously and after the interview from memory.  
3.6 Reflection and reflexivity 
Harding (1987) maintains that the researcher must appear ‘not as an invisible, 
anonymous voice of authority, but as a real, historical individual with concrete, 
specific desires and interests’. This is important for the study as a whole, but 
specifically in relation to interview data. Studies have shown that these attempts 
to create rapport are mediated by the personal characteristics of researchers, such 
as sex, age, education, race and previous experience can affect rapport. The sex of 
the researcher is particularly pertinent in researching the police, because police 
occupational culture promotes masculinity and ‘the denigration of women is a 
central part of this culture’ (Horn 1997). Although there is some inconsistency in 
the literature about how rapport affects the interview, it is generally seen to be 
valuable in motivating the respondent and in generating free and frank answers 
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(Goudy & Potter 1975). However, studies have shown that researchers’ 
perceptions of rapport do not always correlate with data validity (Hill & Hall 1963). 
An interviewer who thinks they had a good interview because rapport was good 
may find that the interview was poor in terms of the amount and clarity of data 
produced. Nevertheless, many researchers retain confidence in rapport as a 
meaningful component of the interview situation and try to put respondents at 
ease, often trying to demonstrate that they are of ‘likeable character, worthy of 
another’s friendship and respect’ (Van Maanen 1981).  
It was difficult to know whether some of the male officers interviewed for this 
study were responding to me based on my femaleness or my position as a student. 
One officer asserted his position in the interview situation by challenging my right 
to be there at all. It felt at the time as though the interview depended on my 
response to determine whether the interview proceeded at all. Before the 
interview was underway, the officer casually poured himself a hot drink and sat on 
the other side of the table between us, reclined in his seat with legs crossed 
casually and assertively, and said ‘so tell me about yourself then’. I felt the need to 
reach into my employment history to show that I was an experienced and 
competent researcher, not ‘just’ a PhD student. I felt the need to share that I had 
held several posts previously that involved close contact with the police, ‘dropping’ 
the names of senior officers that he would probably recognise to demonstrate that 
I was in some way qualified to interview him. This technique, although driven by 
my own insecurity, did seem effective. The officer proceeded on more respectful 
terms throughout the remainder of the interview. With other officers, I utilised the 
role of the ‘naive student’, presumed to have little experience of the world outside 
education, to venture into contentious topics; for example, to access their 
personal views about local gangs, disorder events and policing practice. From a 
more ‘expert' researcher, similar questioning may have closed down dialogue.  
I was most surprised, and perhaps upset, by the reaction of some of the 
community stakeholders to the study and me as a researcher. As mentioned 
above, some were angered that this research on riots focused on 'their' 
neighbourhoods in case it caused reputational harm. Linked to this concern was 
their perception that I was a middle-class educated White woman, who could have 
little understanding of the lived experience of local people.  This perception was 
communicated to me through respondents' various statements about what it was 
'really' like for people living in socially deprived places. One respondent was so 
sure I did not understand, she insisted on taking me on a tour of the 
neighbourhood. She pointed out the poor condition of housing, public buildings 
and the dilapidated youth centre. The respondent seemed almost gleeful showing 
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me these things because she assumed this provided me fresh and shocking insight.  
I was torn by the success I had achieved in appearing like I had not grown up in 
such a place. The long and purposeful process of self-improvement through 
education and imitation of middle-class appearance, speech and behaviours had 
fooled them. Others have noted the significance of self-presentation and 
appearance in providing clues about who the researcher is (Coffey 1999; De Laine 
2000). However, to claim I was anything other than I seemed to these respondents 
would have sounded fraudulent. My deeper concern was that I no longer could 
make this claim. 
The interviews with the community stakeholders felt the most challenging. Their 
perception of me as an outsider, insensitive to their issues, naturally made them 
defensive. Listening back to some of the interviews this possibly made me 
defensive too. On reflection, I might have gained more data on particular topics via 
additional questions and probes, had I not been so concerned to justify why I had 
raised a topic at all. Where I had made use of the naïve student persona with the 
police, with community stakeholders I was keen to prove that I was not naïve 
because, rightly or wrongly, I perceived that demonstrating my understanding of 
local issues would improve our rapport. I also wanted to show that I cared about 
local issues. In trying to achieve both these things, I sometimes revealed my 
hypothesis, which was that negative experiences of policing and social conditions 
had undermined social order at local levels. This potentially undermined the rigor 
of the study by promoting a particular point of view. However, listening to audio 
recordings of these interviews within the period of the fieldwork meant that I was 
able to learn and adapt my practice with subsequent respondents. Moreover, the 
detail and emotion revealed by respondents make it hard to believe they had 
created an account of local events purely to confirm my views. A fieldwork diary 
was kept to note and reflect on these types of issues as they occurred.  
3.7 Ethics and anonymity 
Ethical approval for this study was obtained from the Research Ethics Committee 
at the University of Leeds. It was agreed that participants would be informed 
about the research in a way that highlighted the benefits for them. For example, 
information provided to the police emphasised lesson learning to prevent and 
maintain unrest. It omitted the additional focus on identifying police practice that 
might promote unrest. The consequences of this approach were made apparent 
later in the research during an uncomfortable situation when one police officer 
disclosed he had read the researcher's journal article, which mooted the idea that 
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the disturbances in Nottingham were, at least in part, a reaction to antagonistic 
policing. This exposed a side to the research that Nottinghamshire Police were 
sure to be unhappy about. I consoled myself that the police would have guessed 
this aim anyway. That said, the revelation of the article coincided with the 
withdrawal of research support by the named contact at Nottinghamshire Police. 
She stopped responding to emails and no reason was given. The contact might 
have changed position, or left the police altogether or, alternatively, the force may 
have become nervous about the direction of research. 
A key principle of research ethics is avoiding harm to participants (ESRC 2010). 
Concerns about reputational harm kept resurfacing throughout the study.  There 
was from the start of the study a concern that the police might refuse to 
participate due to concerns about reputational harm, in case the findings 
suggested they were ‘responsible’ for the unrest. One option considered as a way 
to secure their involvement was an offer to anonymise the cities, thus, protecting 
their identity. This is not an uncommon approach in empirical studies, but was to 
be a last resort given the difficulties in anonymising places while at the same time 
exploring links with local contextual factors. Once access was granted by the police 
and the local authority, the idea to anonymise the case studies was firmly 
discounted. There was, however,  a continued concern about the reputation of the 
study neighbourhoods because reporting on problems in particular locales has the 
potential to perpetuate stigmatising discourses (Clark 2006). Again, anonymisation 
was considered as a way to prevent this. However, pseudonyms offered a thin veil 
alongside details of local characteristics and events, which might be used by 
anyone via a quick google search to discover the real neighbourhood names. And, 
given the importance of local context in the pre-study hypothesis of where riots 
occurred in 2011, omitting too many details would compromise the findings. 
Hence, the actual place names were used in the end, not merely as a compromise, 
but because this offered the potential for social justice by drawing public attention 
to ways in which the study neighbourhoods had not been adequately supported or 
protected. Using real names can also encourage researchers to be more careful in 
their authorship which should always be a key technique for protecting 
participants (Guenther 2009).  
Anonymity was assured for all individual participants. Anonymity is the process of 
not disclosing the identity of a research participant, or the author of a particular 
view or opinion (ibid). A senior figure in one of the case studies claimed not to 
mind if they were identified in the research, on the basis that there was a lot to be 
learnt about what had been achieved in their city. However, this waiver was not 
accepted due to the researcher's responsibility to protect participants even if they 
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would not protect themselves. What this participant reported as 'good practice' 
may not have been good practice according to the findings of the study; and this 
may have publicly undermined him. The research involved conversations with a 
good many senior positions in both cities. As unique public figures, this required 
careful authorship to protect their identities. A commitment was made that drafts 
of the thesis would be shared with participants to ensure that any disclosive 
details could be identified and removed before the final version. Additionally, a 
promise was made to Chief Constables of both police forces that they would ‘be 
provided with an opportunity to comment on any reports or papers ahead of 
publication’ (see Appendix A). This was not an offer of editorial control, but a 
goodwill gesture recognising the role of the police in making the research possible. 
It was not just the reporting of findings, but also the study's approach to sampling 
that potentially compromised participant anonymity. Snowball sampling, as 
described above, involves existing participants recommending other participants 
for inclusion in the study, making it possible for those making recommendations to 
identify these participants in the findings. Risk is heightened when the study, like 
this one, is relatively small and concentrated in small areas where only a small 
number of people (sometimes only one person) occupy certain positions. Further 
risk was introduced for some youth workers participating in Sheffield. After 
organisational support for the study had been obtained, relevant youth workers 
were contacted directly by the researcher. However, one sought reassurance from 
their line manager, who then contacted other managers to check if it was 
appropriate (a) for him to be contacted in this way, and (b) for him to participate in 
the research. The manger's motivation may have been to protect her staff, but 
ultimately her actions did the opposite because a protocol was hitherto agreed 
that the researcher would contact senior personnel as a route to accessing all 
further participants. Thus, revealing the identity of participants to people with 
influence over their jobs. Consequently, findings do not specify the role of 
interview respondents in any more detail than the stakeholder type and city. Thus, 
youth workers are identified generally as ‘practitioners’ for all quotations and 
sometimes within the discursive analysis. 
3.8 Data analysis 
Before the analysis could properly begin it was necessary to transcribe the 
recorded interviews. This was done verbatim. The resulting transcripts became the 
main source of qualitative data. Tilley (2003) cautions that a transcript is only a 
text that 're'-presents an interview; it is not the event itself. She argues that the 
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text is influenced by the transcriber's interpretive/theoretical lens, which informs 
decisions about how much to include in the text, such as pauses, laughs, 
affirmative noises etc.; and how to record it, with regard to punctuation, emphasis 
of particular words and phrases according to how they were spoken, and the 
dynamics between the researcher and the respondent, such as cutting in and 
speaking over each other. Thus, the process of transcription must be viewed as a 
part of the analysis, which cannot be divorced from the aims of the project. 
Reading Tilley's article altered the approach initially taken to transcription, with 
more of the researcher-respondent dynamics and unspoken data recorded in 
subsequent transcripts. 
As outlined above, this study draws on Layder's (2006) ‘adaptive’ approach, which 
recognises the equal importance of inductive and deductive approaches to 
analysing qualitative data. The approach addresses the weaknesses of perspectives 
that favour either induction or deduction as distinct and incompatible approaches. 
For example, grounded theory tends to overlook macro-level structures, by 
focusing on situated and interpersonal aspects of events and behaviours. 
Alternatively, structural perspectives overlook micro-level phenomena. The result 
is that both fail to advance knowledge about the relationship between structure 
and agency. Giddens’ (1976) structuration theory attempts to overcome agency-
structure and macro-micro dualisms. However, it conflates the two dimensions, 
creating a ‘duality’ that overlooks the ontological and explanatory power of 
structure (Layder 2006). Adaptive theory instead offers a multi-dimensional 
approach, comprising four social domains (contextual resources, social setting, 
situated activities, and psychobiography). Figure 3.3 illustrates the vertical 
organisation of these domains, which indicates ‘ontological depth’ (ibid). The 
lower layers represent more immediate, personalised aspects of social reality, 
while the higher ones are relatively more remote and impersonal. The diagram 
demonstrates that the domains also have a horizontal dimension, existing in both 
time and space, and are interconnected through social relations of power. 
Analysis of the interview data was not structured by these domains, but merely 
guided by them. For example, the domain of psychobiography was explored at the 
intersection of the biographical experience and social involvements of the four 
stakeholder groups. The situated activity domain was particularly important for 
this study, given its focus on interactions within and between policing partners and 
communities. Social settings form the immediate environment of situated activity, 
‘distinguishable from other domains in that they are local aggregations of 
‘reproduced’ social relations, positions and practices’ (Layder 2006, p.280). For the 
purposes of this study, social settings were explored in terms of the cultures and 
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practices of the groups and organisations involved in the events. Contextual 
resources, as a more encompassing feature of the social environment, has two 
constituent elements, including: (1) the distributional aspect, in which material 
resources may be unevenly allocated and aligned across groupings, such as those 
based on class, ethnicity, age and gender etc.; and (2) the historical accumulation 
of cultural resources, such as knowledge, artefacts, media representations, and 
(sub-)cultural styles. These socio-structural factors were also considered in the 
study as context to the events. 
 
Figure 3.3: The layering of social domains and power in time and space in the ‘adaptive 
social theory’ approach 
 
(reproduced from Layder 2006, p.273) 
 
It is worth noting that Layder's theory of domains aligns closely with the 
‘flashpoints model of public disorder’ developed by Waddington et al. (1987), 
which outlines six interdependent levels of analysis for understanding the 
aetiology of riots. The authors argue that the six levels provide an explanatory 
framework, which is ‘flexible enough to encompass a variety of types of disorder 
while at the same time allowing for the uniqueness of each situation’ (p.159): 
1. Structural – macro-sociological factors such as material and social 
inequalities, political impotence, which may lie at the root of collective 
grievances. 
2. Political/ideological – actions or role of political and ideological institutions, 
as perceived by dissenting groups. 
3. Cultural – shared conditions and experiences, which may inform members’ 
definition of themselves and others, and may influence the potential for 
conflict. 
4. Contextual – socio-historical incidents and relationships, and the dynamic 
processes leading up to events, such as media or political statements or 
pre-event liaison. 
Contextual resources
Social setting
Situated activity
Psychobiography
Stretched
across
time and space
Relations of
power
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5. Situational – spatial or social determinants of (dis-)order, such as the 
symbolic significance of locations, physical configurations of space that 
support or undermine (dis-)order and the policing of it, the organisational 
and tactical dispositions of police and citizens. 
6. Interactional – face-to-face interactions between individuals and groups, 
which may provoke specific emotions, situations, or outcomes, including 
the ‘spark’ for disorder. 
 
The categories in the two frameworks do not overlay exactly. Layder’s 
psychobiography domain is absent altogether from the flashpoints model. 
Otherwise the analytical features are broadly similar. Layder’s contextual domain 
approximates to Waddington et al.’s structural and cultural levels; the social 
settings domain approximates to the situational and contextual levels; and the 
situated domain is broadly similar to the interactional level. Waddington et al.’s 
‘political/ideological’ level is less easy to place because is covers both the role and 
the actions of political and ideological institutions. The actions of political 
organisations would approximate to Layder’s situated activity domain, but roles sit 
better with the social setting domain. The inconsistent mapping of elements in the 
two models may be explained by Layder (2006, p.282) himself when he suggests 
that his four domains ‘do not operate separately or autonomously’. 
The intention was to use Waddington’s flashpoints model to frame the thematic 
analysis. Themes capture patterned responses to help answer or at least say 
something meaningful about the data in relation to the research question(s) 
(Braun & Clarke 2006). Thematic analysis is compatible with both inductive and 
deductive inquiry making it is possible to identify patterns based on pre-existing 
theory or independently of this. Thematic analysis was operationalised using 
Nvivo, which is a computer software tool that makes the task easier to perform, 
but does not interfere with the decision-making process. The thematic analysis 
was focused around known risk and protective factors summarised in Figure 3.2 
above, while at the same time examining line by line whether respondents 
referred to others. The analysis was an ongoing process of identifying and refining 
themes and subthemes across all 45 interviews, sometimes going back to 
transcripts considered nearer to the start. When it came to fitting the final themes 
into the flashpoints model, it became clear that this was merely an academic 
exercise that was helpful for capturing the relatedness of themes. Hence, like 
Layder’s adaptive model, the flashpoints model was merely instructive. It 
underpinned theoretical understanding about the aetiology of urban unrest, but 
not used to present the findings.  
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3.9 Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated how the extant literature on the 2011 English Riots 
and other contemporary riots in Britain, France and the USA, detailed in the 
previous chapter, was used to develop a working hypothesis about what might 
have promoted and inhibited unrest in the two case studies (see Figure 3.2). 
Within this hypothesis, key contextual factors included intra- and inter-agency 
relations, police and agency relations with local people, the nature of community 
and structural factors affecting communities, such as poverty and crime, as well as 
socio-historical events, likely to include previous urban unrest. The working 
hypothesis identified the nature of the public order response as having a more 
immediate influence on social order outcomes. Key components of the response 
included timeliness, partnership working, intelligence gathering and 
communication within and between partners and communities. 
The notion that local context was an important part of the explanation informed 
the use of the case study method. Similarly, the presumed importance of 
community level variables informed the selection of neighbourhood ‘sub cases’. 
Neighbourhoods refer to communities of place, which are the setting for much of 
daily life and, importantly for this research, represent a tangible target for 
interventions by police and other public agencies. The study drew on a ‘mix’ of 
data, including social statistics and documentary data, but primarily qualitative 
interviews with 45 people with public order officers, neighbourhood policing 
teams and managers and practitioners who work with the police or with the target 
communities. 
Taking place several years after the 2011 English Riots, this was a historical study 
benefited from events being recent enough that people were still alive for 
interview, but raised the challenge that participants might be motivated to 
reconstruct these events according to political and personal motives. Had events 
been less contentious or further in the past participants may have been more likely 
to provide a detached appraisal. In any case, triangulation was used to help weigh 
the evidence for competing accounts, underpinned by a critical realist perspective, 
which assumes that all accounts are equally meaningful, but they may not be 
equally true. The findings, presented over the next four chapters, are a best 
attempt at recounting and understanding what actually happened in August 2011 
and why, according to a range of people who were involved. 
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Chapter 4 - Places and Events 
This chapter provides important detail 
about the case studies and the events 
associated with the 2011 Riots in each 
of the case studies. The case studies 
include Nottingham, as the riot-
affected city and Sheffield, as the non-
riot affected city. As a methodological 
tool to access community level 
variables, two neighbourhood 
subcases were selected in each city. 
These were selected according to the 
rationale detailed in Chapter 3. A 
combination of administrative 
statistics, documentary material and 
interview data are examined within 
this to help understand the nature of 
the physical and social space at city 
and neighbourhood levels. Contextual detail has been confined here to socio-
demographic characteristics that demonstrate key similarities and differences 
between the study locations and between other parts of the country. This detail is 
not merely for scene-setting purposes.  Context is a key focus of this study. 
Context was intentionally captured within the research design in accordance with 
the hypothesis that it forms part of the explanation for why disorder occurred in 
some parts of the country and not others. 
The second part of the chapter provides an overview of the main disorder and pre-
disorder events occurring in these locations during the period of the 2011 riots. 
'Pre-disorder' events are defined within the study as the antecedents to more 
serious disorder, according to extant theory and previous empirical research. Pre-
disorder events may include gatherings (McPhail & Wohlstein 1983), aggressive 
group behaviour, and the throwing of objects to cause harm or damage (Rosenfeld 
1997). Pre-disorder events might never escalate to the point of becoming disorder 
and, consequently, they are distinct but related to actual disorder. This also 
presents a challenge when categorising events because one person's pre-disorder 
may be another person's disorder. This will be explored in more detail, with 
examples, in Chapter 5. The second section is dominated by events in Nottingham, 
Figure 4.1: London and the two case studies 
- Sheffield and Nottingham 
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as the riot affected city, but it does refer to some notable events in Sheffield, 
which demonstrate that there was a level of risk.  
4.1 The Two Case Study Cities 
The two case study cities - Nottingham and Sheffield - are located over a hundred 
miles away from London where the rioting initially erupted on Saturday 6 August 
2011. Nottingham is located in the East Midlands region and Sheffield, slightly 
farther North, is in the Yorkshire and Humberside region. Despite being in different 
regions, the two cities are also geographically close, as can be seen in the map 
(Figure 4.1). This helped with the logistics of fieldwork. However, the main reason 
for selecting these two cities was that they were broadly comparable in several 
ways. 
Nottingham and Sheffield, both located in the North of the country, are two of 
England's largest cities, each with their own industrial legacy dating back to the 
Victorian era. For Nottingham, the main industries, historically, were textiles and 
coal mining. The city was famous for lace-making and hosiery. For Sheffield, the 
main industries were steelwork and coal-mining. With the decline of industry and 
manufacturing across the UK, both Nottingham and Sheffield had experienced 
economic decline, impacting negatively on levels of employment and poverty. 
These effects had not been distributed evenly and there was huge variation in 
wealth and other correlated outcomes such as health, education and crime for 
different populations within each city. The study neighbourhoods, detailed below, 
represent some of the most disadvantaged of these populations.  
Table 4.1 illustrates how Nottingham and Sheffield compared with each other and 
the rest of the country around the time of the 2011 English Riots. Compared to 
Sheffield, Nottingham has a marginally smaller population (305.5K compared to 
552.5K), but greater ethnic diversity (29% non-White compared to 16%) and 
deprivation (ranked 20th most deprived local authority compared to 56th). 
Nottingham also had a higher incidence of crime (71 notifiable offences per 1K 
population compared to 52), including proportionally more violent offences. 
Compared to the city average for England, both Nottingham and Sheffield have 
higher levels of ethnic diversity, unemployment and overall crime. Sheffield only 
compares favourably with the England average for violence, with a marginally 
lower number of offences per resident population. 
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Table 4.1: Social Characteristics of the Case Study Cities 
    Nott Sheff England 
Population size Usual residents (no.) 4 305,680 552,698 53,012,456 
Ethnic diversity % BME (non-White groups) 1 
28.5 16.3 14.6 
Deprivation IMD rank* (of 326 local authorities; 
1 being the most deprived) 5 
20.0 56.0 n/a 
Unemployment % Jobseekers Allowance Claims (of 
working age residents)6 
6.4 4.8 3.8 
Crime Total notifiable offences per 1K pop 
(no.) 7 
71.5 52.1 44.0 
Violence Violence with Injury offences per 1K 
pop (no.) 4 
10.1 5.3 6.0 
4.2 Study Neighbourhoods 
The two Nottingham study 
neighbourhoods were St Ann's and 
Radford. These are not officially 
'neighbourhoods'. In the absence of 
official neighbourhood level data in 
Nottingham, ward level data have 
been used to indicate the general 
nature of people and place. Wards are 
used to elect local government 
councillors and are the building blocks 
of UK administrative geography. Ward 
population counts can vary 
substantially, but the national average 
is about 5,500. While it is unlikely that 
all (if any) of the study participants 
had the same understanding of ward 
                                                     
4 Census 2011, published by ONS 
5 Indices of Deprivation 2010:  Local Authority Summaries, supplied by DCLG, published by 
ONS. Rank of 1 indicates the district is the most deprived according to the measure 
and a rank of 326 indicates the district is the least deprived 
6 Claimant Count data, August 2011, published by ONS 
7 Notifiable Offences Recorded by the Police, 2011/2012, supplied by Home Office, 
published by ONS 
 
City 
Centre 
Figure 4.2: Nottingham ward boundaries and 
the two study neighbourhoods 
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boundaries when being asked about St Ann's and Radford, the data provide useful 
context. More about local understandings of place will be discussed later in this 
chapter. It should be noted that the ward is officially called 'Radford and Park', but 
the abbreviated name is used consistently from this point onwards. 
The two Sheffield study neighbourhoods were Broomhall and Darnall. They are 
two of 100 neighbourhoods in Sheffield, which were defined by Sheffield City 
Council using a combination of natural boundaries and census output areas. Since 
2003, the Council and other agencies in Sheffield have calculated statistics for 
these neighbourhoods (using published Lower Layer Super Output Area (LSOA) 
data). In 2011, Sheffield had 28 wards, therefore, on average there were three 
neighbourhoods per ward. However, neighbourhoods did not fit neatly within 
wards and some overlapped ward boundaries. To avoid confusion, it is worth 
noting that there is both a ward and a neighbourhood called Darnall. The Darnall 
neighbourhood sits entirely within the boundary of the Darnall ward. Unless 
otherwise stated, figures are provided for the Darnall neighbourhood. 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Sheffield neighbourhood boundaries and the two study neighbourhood 
 
A key reason for using neighbourhood level data to understand the socio-
demographic nature of the Sheffield study areas is that Broomhall sits mostly 
Darnall 
Broomhall 
City Centre 
- 118 - 
within the central ward, which also comprises the city centre. Thus, using ward 
level data would over-estimate Broomhall's experience of things like crime and 
anti-social behaviour, which tend to be higher in the city centre compared to 
residential areas due to retail activity and the night-time economy. To ensure 
comparability between the study areas, social statistics have been calculated as 
'rates' based on the population count to make spatial scales less of an issue. 
Datasets were sourced for time periods closest to 2011 to reflect the nature of the 
study cities and neighbourhoods around the time of the riots. The statistical data is 
supplemented with information from documentary sources, with some 
impressionistic accounts from study participants about the nature of people and 
place. 
4.2.1 Nottingham Study Neighbourhood 1 - St Ann's 
The St Ann's ward is located North East of the city centre, taking in parts of the city 
centre itself including the Victoria Shopping Centre and the Corner House Sector, 
which is an entertainment complex. In 2011, the population density for St Ann’s 
was greater than the city average. It had a higher percentage of working age adults 
(16-64); a relatively low percentage of student households; a high proportion of 
single person households; and a slightly lower proportion of households with 
dependent children (23% compared to 27% for the City) with over half of these 
being lone parent households (13% compared to an average of 10% across the 
City8). 
Of the 20 Nottingham wards, St Ann's had the third highest proportion of BME 
residents, accounting for half of the population. The largest ethnic category was 
Asian/Asian British (16%), followed by Black/Black British (14%)9. There was also a 
relatively large proportion of residents in the Mixed category (10%). In St Ann's this 
broad census category mainly comprised people within the subcategory 'Mixed 
White and Black Caribbean'. This was due to a long history of immigration dating 
back to the 1950s when the first West Indian workers, primarily young men from 
Jamaica, came to settle in the ward. Initially the Jamaican community and the 
White residents struggled to get along, due to competition for jobs, housing and 
                                                     
8 Unless specifically referenced, social statistics for Nottingham are sourced from 
publications and tables published and made available by Nottingham City Council: 
www.nottinghaminsight.org.uk 
9 Office for National Statistics, 2011 Census: Key Statistics. Categories are based on 
respondents own perceived ethnic group and cultural background. Sourced from 
https://www.nomisweb.co.uk/ 
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the attention of the local girls  (McKenzie 2015, p.33). Later, however, following a 
major civil disturbance between Blacks and Whites in 1958, enormous efforts were 
made by local people to successfully carve out a St Ann's community. It was said 
that currently 'St Ann's is as much about being Jamaican as it is about the white 
working class' (p.32-33) and local women talk of the pride of being 'more than just 
white' and of their 'beautiful mixed-race children' (p.126). 
In 2011, St Ann's ranked second highest in the city for levels of multiple 
deprivation10 and the proportion of residents living in households reliant on means 
tested benefits was a third higher than for the city as a whole. Total crime is also 
well above the city average. In 2011, St Ann's ward had the second highest rate, 
187 recorded crime incidents per 1,000 residents compared to 110 for Nottingham 
as a whole. Violent crime was also high. In 2011, St Ann's ranked fourth, with 13 
violent crimes recorded per 1,000 residents compared to 10 per 1,000 at the city 
level. 
GCSE achievement for pupils residing in St Ann's was significantly worse than 
nationally (Nottingham City Council 2011c) and below the city average, with only 
40 per cent of pupils aged 16 achieving the equivalent of 5 GCSEs at grade A*-C 
including GCSEs in Maths and English in 2011 compared to 44 per cent across the 
city (Nottingham City Council 2012). A range of indicators suggested St Ann's 
residents had relatively poor health. Life expectancy for both males and females 
was worse than the national and city average; a significantly higher proportion of 
residents smoked; and a significantly lower proportion were a healthy weight. A 
number of medical practices in the ward reported a higher prevalence of severe 
mental illness than the national and city average (Nottingham City Council 2011c). 
4.2.2 Nottingham Study Neighbourhood 2 - Radford 
Radford is also located around the centre of Nottingham City and contains part of 
the city centre boundary. Due to its location, in 2011, Radford had a high student 
population, which contributed to a relatively high proportion of working age adults 
(16-64), 86 per cent compared to 70 per cent in the city. Like St Ann's, Radford had 
a relatively high proportion of BME residents, 49 per cent compared to 35 per cent 
for the city as a whole. This included a relatively high proportion of Black-
Caribbean and Mixed Black-Caribbean residents, as well as Pakistani residents, 
                                                     
10 Ward IMD figures produced by the London Health Observatory and North East 
Public using methods consistent with those used by DCLG, i.e. averages of 
LSOA-level scores population-weighted using adjusted 2008 mid-year 
estimates. 
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tending to be located towards the Northern tip of the ward (Nottingham City 
Primary Care Trust 2006). As with the other study areas, described above, the main 
period of migration from the Caribbean occurred in the 1950s and from Pakistan in 
the 1960s. 
In 2011, the overall deprivation score for Radford was half that of St Ann's and 
somewhat lower than for Nottingham as a whole. However, while Radford may 
have ranked better than 65 per cent of wards in England, it did contain subareas 
(super output areas (SOAs)) that were in the worst 10 per cent (Nottingham City 
Council 2011a). The rate of crime in Radford was also lower than the Nottingham 
average (91 compared to 110 recorded crimes per 1,000 residents); albeit in part, 
due to some especially high ward rates at the top end of the scale. Radford's 
overall crime rate was still more than twice as high as the lowest ranking ward and 
Radford ranked third highest for violent crime, with 18 recorded violent crimes per 
1,000 residents, compared to 10 per 1,000 residents for the city as a whole. 
In 2011, the proportion of pupils aged 16 achieving the equivalent of 5 GCSEs at 
grade A*-C including GCSEs in Maths and English was just above the level for all 
pupils resident in the city, but still well below the attainment in the highest 
achieving ward, for example, compared to 87 per cent in Dunkirk and Lenton 
(Nottingham City Council 2012). A range of indicators pointed to relatively poor 
health in Radford; for example, Life expectancy for both males and females was 
worse than the national and city average and the prevalence of severe mental 
illness is significantly higher than the national average (according to records 
collated by local medical practices). On the other hand, Radford had a significantly 
lower percentage of overweight/obese resident and significantly higher 
percentage at a healthy weight (Nottingham City Council 2011b) and a lower 
proportion of residents who smoked and binge-drank, although not 'significantly' 
lower than the city average. 
4.2.3 Nottingham overview 
In general, the socio-demographic data suggests that both the Nottingham study 
neighbourhoods were ethnically diverse, with a relatively high proportion of 
people of Black-Caribbean heritage. Both neighbourhoods were challenged across 
a range of indicators including deprivation; educational attainment; pupil 
engagement; crime, especially violent crime; substance misuse; poor diet; and 
physical and mental health. At the ward level, Radford presented as being slightly 
less challenged than St Ann's except for rates of violent crime. The interview data 
was rich with references to these and other challenges, often related to poverty, 
facing the two study areas.  
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Respondents were highly likely to refer to the criminal reputation of St Ann's and 
Radford, especially with regard to violent and gang-related crime. A number of 
local high profile criminal incidents had contributed to this reputation. In 
particular, the reported gang-related shooting of 14-year-old Daniella Beccan in St 
Ann's in 2004. A local carnival is held annually to commemorate her death.  
Incidents of this type, but not necessarily in St Ann's or Radford, had impacted on 
the city's reputation nationally and internationally and contributed to the 
nickname 'Shottingham' the gun crime capital of the UK (Nottingham Post 2015). 
There was also a report published a few years later by a think-tank, which used 
statistical analysis to conclude that Nottingham was the UK's 'most dangerous city' 
(Gibbs & Haldenby 2006) and this was splashed across the national headlines. 
Gangs were almost always mentioned by police respondents. Many were keen to 
describe the names and particular features of the gangs that were apparently 
based in the two study areas. Three gangs had been 'mapped' as part of 
Nottingham’s Ending Gang and Youth Violence work. It was reported that at least 
one of these gangs was 'very present on the street' and members were involved in 
anti-social behaviour, drug-dealing and could 'get very uptight when other people 
go into their areas', thus demonstrating territoriality [Nottingham Manager 5].  
Some community practitioners, however, disputed the existence of gangs in 
Nottingham. Gangs emerged as an important theme within the research and will 
be revisited in more detail in Chapter 6. 
In addition to gangs and guns, respondents referred to prostitution, drug dealing 
and crack houses as local problems, as acknowledged elsewhere (McKenzie 2015, 
p.99). However, despite crime being prominent in discussions about the 
Nottingham study neighbourhoods, it was also reported that community safety 
had improved over the last decade. For example, one participant said that: 
[St Ann's was] completely different to what [it] used to be 10 years ago...  
Lots of members of the community would say how different it feels because 
there's just not the levels of crime. We used to have firearms discharges 
probably every other day and through lots and lots of work from the police, 
from the City Council and all the partnerships within the City Council, it's 
nowhere near what it used to be. [Nottingham NPO 1] 
Moreover, when asked whether disorderly behaviour was a common occurrence in 
the study area(s), to explore whether 'normal' behaviour had simply been re-
defined as 'riotous' in the context of national unrest, the response was 'certainly 
no'. Although the study neighbourhoods regularly experienced 'low level anti-
social behaviour… and teenagers roaming the streets', the situation wasn't such 
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that there were 'fights in the street every other night and it all kicking off at the 
weekend' [Nottingham NPO 2].  
Concurring with the statistical profiles, both study neighbourhoods were 
characterised as being economically poor. Levels of unemployment were said to be 
high and home and car ownership, low. Ethnic diversity was raised as a positive 
and a negative aspect of community life. While it was acknowledged that both 
study areas were mainly African-Caribbean, they were otherwise massively 
diverse, hosting residents of Polish, Kurdish and South-Asian descent. On the one 
hand, different ethnic groups generally got on well together, but on the other 
hand, many groups that had more recently arrived were unable to speak English 
and this presented a problem, especially for service providers rarely able to afford 
interpreters. 
It has already been mentioned that the study neighbourhoods are geographically 
close to Nottingham city centre. St Ann's was purpose-built near to the city centre 
in the 1800s to house the working poor, who supplied labour to the City's Lace 
Market,  and was originally known as New Town (McKenzie 2013, p.23). Study 
participants reported that drug-dealing was a latter-day implication of local 
geography, which offered easy 'thoroughfare in and out of the city' [Nottingham 
NPO 2]. Yet, despite their proximity to the city centre, St Ann's and Radford were 
reported each to have their own distinct centres comprising shops and public 
amenities. Much has been written about the importance of this type of 
arrangement, which offers informal public gathering places, or third places, that 
can be the heart of a community’s social vitality and the foundation of a 
functioning community of place (Oldenburg 2000).  They serve to render places 
discernible, create habits of public association, and provide a setting for local 
activism and politics; and can offer psychological support to individuals through 
the promotion of shared experiences and values (Mean & Tims 2005).                                                          
While it seems that administrative data can help to paint a picture of the 
challenges facing localities, statistics may offer less insight into more positive 
aspects of living in the study areas. A term that was repeatedly used to describe 
both St Ann’s and Radford was ‘tight knit’ and respondents spoke positively about 
a 'huge sense of community' [Nottingham NPO 1], meaning that 'everybody looks 
out for everybody' [Nottingham Practitioner 3]. These accounts add to findings 
from previous research (McKenzie 2015) which has found that people in St Ann's 
greatly benefit from the support of each other. Previous research has also found 
that despite problems in St Ann's, many residents actually wanted to live there 
(p149); although a key reason for this was to keep themselves safe from stigma 
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and the possibility of 'being looked down on'. The topic of identity and belonging 
will be picked up again in Chapter 7.  
4.2.4 Sheffield Study Neighbourhood 1 - Broomhall 
Broomhall is located close to Sheffield city centre and was frequently described by 
respondents as a ‘diverse’ neighbourhood. Ethnicity data was not available at the 
neighbourhood level, but school data suggested , in 2011, 85 per cent of children 
(5-16 years) were from Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) groups, compared to 31 
per cent for Sheffield as a whole. The largest ethnic group was Black/Black British, 
which accounted for almost half (45%) of the school age population. The 
Black/Black British population in Broomhall was mainly people of Somali heritage 
and a smaller proportion of Caribbean heritage. Broomhall was also a popular area 
for students to live due to its proximity to both of the city’s universities. This 
helped explain the neighbourhood's relatively high proportion of 15-24 year olds 
(39% compared to a 17% in Sheffield overall)11.  
There was no official figure on the number of Somali people in Sheffield. Estimates 
vary considerably from around 3,000 to 10,000 people, which represented around 
1-2 per cent of the population (Harris 2004; Sheffield City Council 2014a). 
Sheffield's Somali population was thought to date back at least to the 1930s, when 
Somali seamen, who originally settled in port locations, were drawn to industrial 
centres such as Sheffield by employment opportunities. The Somali population 
grew dramatically from the 1980s with the arrival of asylum seekers into the city 
following the outbreak of civil war in Somalia. 
Deprivation levels in Broomhall were higher than the Sheffield average and crime 
were also significantly higher. In 2010/11, 54 crime incidents were recorded per 
1,000 residents compared to 39 for the city as a whole. Both primary and 
secondary school attendance rates were significantly low. Despite this, educational 
attainment at the end of primary school and at GCSE level was statistically similar 
to the Sheffield average. In 2011, Broomhall residents had poorer health than the 
Sheffield average. They had significantly high mortality rates (for both men and 
women); high rates of mental health referrals; high rates of accident and 
emergency attendance (for all age groups); high levels of hospital admissions for 
alcohol related conditions; and significantly high prevalence of smoking 
                                                     
11 Source: Sheffield Neighbourhood Health & Well-Being Profiles 2012, Public Health 
Intelligence Team, Sheffield City Council. Online at 
https://www.sheffield.gov.uk/caresupport/health/health-wellbeing-board/what-the-
board-does/JSNA/health-and-wellbeing-across-sheffield/neighbourhoods-health-and-
wellbeing-data.html 
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(modelled). On the other hand, data indicated a more positive pattern in terms of 
diet, with Broomhall residents having a significantly high level of five-a-day fruit 
and veg consumption and adults exercising 5 times per week; and related to this 
low adult obesity (modelled). 
4.2.5 Sheffield Study Neighbourhood 2 - Darnall 
Darnall neighbourhood is located to the west of Sheffield, further out from the city 
centre than Broomhall. In 2011, it had a larger than average proportion of children 
compared to Sheffield as a whole; with 27 per cent of the population in Broomhall 
aged under 15 years compared to 16.5 per cent for the city. It was one of the 
neighbourhoods with the highest proportion of school children from a BME group, 
89 per cent (compared to 85% in Broomhall and 31% across Sheffield). The largest 
BME group was Asian/Asian British, accounting for 61 per cent of the school age 
population, mainly comprises people of Pakistani heritage and a smaller 
proportion of Bangladeshi heritage.  
In 2011, the Pakistani population in Sheffield was estimated to be about 22,000 
people, or 4 per cent of residents, and nearly a quarter lived in the Darnall ward. 
The Bangladeshi population was estimated to be about 3,500, or 0.6 per cent of 
the Sheffield population, and over half lived in the Darnall ward. Pakistani and 
Bangladeshi settlement in the UK dates back to the 17th century when Lashkar 
seamen arrived and settled in port towns and cities. The biggest wave of 
immigration began in the 1950s when young men were encouraged to come to the 
UK to fill post-war labour shortages. In Sheffield, this was mainly in the steel and 
coalmining industries. As manufacturing industries that employed these early 
migrants have declined, this ethnic population has moved towards small 
businesses, especially in the restaurant and catering industries (Sheffield City 
Council 2014c; Sheffield City Council 2014b).  
In 2011, deprivation levels in Darnall were higher than the city average. In fact, the 
IMD overall score was fourth highest of Sheffield's 100 neighbourhoods. Crime was 
significantly high. In 2010/11, 65 crime incidents were recorded per 1,000 
residents compared to 39 for the city as a whole. Both primary and secondary 
school attendance rates were significantly low; as was educational attainment at 
Y6 (age 10-11) and in terms of pupils gaining 5+ GCSEs grades A* to C including 
English and Maths. Health indicators were similarly poor. Mortality rates were 
significantly higher than the city average for both men and women and A&E 
attendance was significantly high. Darnall had high levels of alcohol related 
hospital admissions, prevalence of smoking (modelled) and mental health 
- 125 - 
referrals. Diet was poor and child obesity rates were high (in children aged 4-5 and 
aged 10-11). 
4.2.6 Sheffield overview 
In summary, both the Sheffield study neighbourhoods were challenged across a 
range of variables. They had relatively high levels of deprivation and reported 
crime; poor school attendance and educational attainment; high levels of 
substance misuse; and poor physical and mental health. The only indicator bucking 
an otherwise negative trend was a relatively healthy diet in Broomhall. Both 
neighbourhoods were ethnically diverse, with the largest ethnic group in 
Broomhall being of Somali heritage compared to a large Pakistani-Bangladeshi 
population in Darnall. These statistical patterns were confirmed by research 
respondents. Interview data reported a great deal of community-related activities 
in the study neighbourhoods, including festivals to celebrate local identity and also 
provision to support various groups and local issues. Strong ethnic identities in 
each neighbourhood informed the cultural life of residents, focused strongly 
around prayer and religious events and holidays.   
4.3 The Disorder Events 
This section looks at disorderly and pre-
disorder events that occurred in the 
two case study cities over the course of 
the 2011 English Riots. As several 
respondents acknowledged, places 
outside London had a 'heads up' on 
disorder and a range of activities were 
triggered as a consequence of this 
forewarning. These activities, which I 
will refer to as the 'public order 
response', are covered in the next 
chapter. The present section is limited to the types of disorder that occurred. 
Factors helping to 'explain' these incidents, which may include the public order 
response itself, will be discussed across the remaining findings chapters. The aim 
of this section is to set the scene in terms of what happened, where and when. The 
section is unsurprisingly dominated by Nottingham by virtue of it being the riot-
affected city. However, in Sheffield, there were some minor incidents and threats 
of disorder that are worth mentioning here. 
  
Figure 4.4: Damage to cars and properties 
on Pym Street (source: Nottingham 
Post) 
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4.3.1 Nottingham Events 
4.3.1.1 Monday, 8 August 2011 
Study participants and a range of other sources suggested that disorder began in 
Nottingham on Monday evening in the St Ann's area, where a group of about 30 
people were 'roaming the streets’ and 'throwing bricks at police cars'. It has been 
difficult to ascertain the exact order of events, whether the marauding groups 
came before or after the attack on St Ann's Police station or whether it was all 
happening at around the same time. Either way, the Station was attacked at 
around 11:30pm. Members of a large group threw bricks and masonry at the 
police station and threw two petrol bombs into the large car park at the back of 
the police station. 
It was generally felt that the disorder in 
St Ann's was targeted at the police and 
police property. Unsurprisingly, 
however, it caused concern for local 
residents and a degree of real harm as 
well. It was reported that 'hundreds and 
hundreds of calls' were made to the 
police [Nottingham NPO 2]. These calls 
'were of windows going through' and 
cars being damaged [Nottingham PO 
Officer 6]. The national media (BBC 
2011c) reported the distress caused to 
one particular household when a brick 
was thrown through the bedroom 
window of a three-year-old boy. 
Although it caused no actual harm, 
because the boy was not in his room at 
the time, the father was unable to go 
back to sleep 'for four or five hours … 
thinking that they were going to come 
back'. 
Most of the damage to community property was on Pym Street, in St Ann’s. This 
included damage to approximately 40 cars, including ten that were set on fire, and 
a number of homes, which mainly constituted broken windows. Cars on other 
nearby streets (Luther Close and Kelham Green) were also affected. One 
respondent also referred to disorder at St Ann’s Community Farm, also located in 
Figure 4.5: At 19:50 a group in St Ann's was 
tracked across the city by a police 
helicopter (source: Nottingham Post) 
Figure 4.6: Damage at the Victoria 
Shopping Centre (source: Nottingham 
post) 
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St Ann’s, which was associated with wider disorder occurring in the area rather 
than a targeted attack. Occurring around the same time as this a container of 200 
tyres was set on fire in Gawthorne Street, New Basford. This was originally 
reported as part of the disturbances, but  was later confirmed as accidental (BBC 
2011c). 
A group broke into the Victoria Shopping 
Centre (Clifton 2011), where they 
attempted to break into a number of 
stores, including JD Sports, House of 
Frazer, and an independent Jewellery 
shop. On this first night, however, 
looters were unsuccessful in making 
away with any goods. Police thought the 
groups in the city centre were the same 
people who had previously caused 
disorder in St Ann's, but this was never 
confirmed.  
4.3.1.2 Tuesday, 9 August 2011 
Following the previous night of rioting, it 
was reported that by about 3 o'clock in 
the afternoon, most shops in the city 
centre had been boarded up, private 
security guarded some sports shops and 
phone shops and ‘police were 
everywhere’ (McKenzie 2015, p.184). 
General disorder began again in St Ann's 
early on Tuesday evening. It was 
reported in the local press that a group 
of 15 to 20 males threw bricks at police 
officers in Peas Hill Road before running 
off. Police then used a helicopter to 
follow the group, which eventually 
ended up on the roof of Nottingham 
Girls' High School, just outside St Ann's 
in the neighbouring ward of Arboretum.  
Press coverage was reported (Clifton 2011) suggested that the boys had been part 
of a much larger group, which had congregated in nearby Arboretum Park earlier 
Figure 4.7: Youths on the roof of 
Nottingham Girls' High School (source: 
Nottingham Post) 
Figure 4.9: Attack on Canning Circus Police 
Station (source: BBC News) 
Figure 4.8: Some shops choosing to close 
and board up in Nottingham City Centre 
(source: Nottingham Post) 
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that evening. This gathering, of around 100 teenagers, began to form in the park 
after arrangements to do so had been disseminated via Blackberry Messenger. 
Riot police arrived on the Arboretum about 7pm and scattered the crowds, and it 
was at this point that the breakaway group occupied the roof of the adjacent 
Nottingham High School and began throwing missiles at the police. Thirteen 
people were later arrested and charged with violent disorder.  
Clarendon College, which was part of 
New College Nottingham in Sherwood 
Rise, was fire bombed at about 10pm. A 
glass door was smashed and 
considerable damage was caused 
before firefighters put out the blaze. 
However, in an attempt to maintain 
'business as usual', the campus opened 
the next day. 
Probably the most serious event of 
Tuesday night was the petrol bombing 
of Canning Circus Police Station, which 
also happened at approximately 10pm. 
According to respondents, no less than 
35 people were involved [Nottingham 
Manager 1]. The incident was captured 
on video using a mobile phone from the 
vantage point of a nearby multi-storey 
residence. This video was later 
uploaded to the internet and is 
available on YouTube 
(OfficialLondonRiots 2011). The footage 
shows a large group walking towards a 
disused public house 'Severn Public 
House', which ran parallel to the main 
row of shops on Alfreton Road.  
In addition to Canning Circus Police 
Station, four other police stations were 
attacked on Tuesday night, including St 
Ann's (for the second time), The 
Meadows, Bulwell and Oxclose. A study 
Figure 4.11: The Meadows Police 
Station after the attack (source: BBC 
News) 
Figure 4.10: Police at the Nottingham Girls' 
High School (source: Nottingham Post) 
Figure 4.12: Jewellery Store looted on 
second attempt (source: Nottingham 
Post) 
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participant reported how a police car was ‘burnt out’ in front of The Meadows 
Police Station just before the building was attacked by a group of about 15-20 
youths [Nottingham NPO 1]. The window was smashed with a hammer and petrol 
poured through. There was a police officer inside, but he wasn't harmed.  
Late on Tuesday night, at around 11.30pm, the independent jewellery store that 
was attacked in the city on Monday evening was broken into again. This time 
thieves got away with stock estimated at £1,600 (Nottingham Post 2011a). 
According to the store owner, the haul included watches and gold teeth.  
4.3.1.3 Overview 
The disorder in Nottingham erupted on Monday 8 August, but most incidents 
happened on Tuesday night. Officers reported dealing with 600 more incidents 
than usual on Tuesday evening (Nottingham Post 2012) Respondents noted that 
there were no street stand-offs between rioters and the police, instead the 
disorder in Nottingham was 'very mobile' and 'fluid' [Nottingham NPO 1]. Even 
some of the larger events only involved about 40 people. 
It was perhaps possible for the public to believe that Nottingham was less affected 
than other cities because most of the disorder events occurred in residential areas, 
primarily in St Ann’s, where the police station was attacked twice. Four other 
police stations were also attacked. While cities like Manchester and Birmingham 
were associated with large-scale looting in the city centre, Nottingham had very 
little. The main incident was a burglary at an independent jewellery store on the 
outskirts of the city centre.  
4.3.2 Sheffield Events 
There was a level of fear among some groups about disorder erupting in Sheffield, 
particularly as people became aware of unrest spreading through the country and 
reaching large cities in northern regions of the country, not dissimilar to Sheffield.  
As one local police officer said: 
We were observers really and thinking ‘oh that’s pretty bad down there’, 
and then it went to Liverpool or Birmingham next I think, and then 
Manchester, and our collective realisation was ‘hang on a minute, this could 
be coming our way’. And a phrase that we used at the time was ‘this is 
spreading virally’ and obviously with the benefit of hindsight it came to the 
stage where we were probably one of the few cities of our size in the area 
that didn’t [riot]. [Sheffield NPO 3] 
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Not everyone was worried about unrest coming to Sheffield and no store 
owners/managers were so concerned that they closed early. Types of shops that 
had been attacked elsewhere were most worried, including Footlocker. 
There were rumours about disorder events occurring in various parts of Sheffield 
thought to be most at risk of rioting by the authorities. These rumours were 
spread via text messages and social media, including an online discussion site 
called Sheffield Forum. On Tuesday 9 August, a post on Sheffield Forum claimed ‘I 
did read on someone's Facebook who’s [sic] sister is a police officer that there is 
trouble on London Road and Pitsmoor’. It was difficult for respondents to recall 
the sequence of events as far back as 2011, but it is most likely these rumours 
began circulating on Monday night (8 August). 
On Tuesday morning (9 August), a major local radio station, Hallam FM, 
disseminated its own rumours about disorder taking place in parts of the city 
[Sheffield PO Officer 6]. The radio station was contacted by the police and 
reminded of its responsibility to report facts. Subsequently, the radio station made 
no further reports of this type. Other rumours circulating about riots occurring 
locally included that the City Hall had been set on fire, which was without 
foundation.  
In addition to rumours about disorder occurring on London Road, respondents 
reported that some incidents did actually take place there. These incidents fell 
outside the riot category, but can be categorised as pre-disorder incidents. They 
included youths congregating and ‘the odd bottle thrown at a passing police 
vehicle’. ‘The million dollar question’ [Sheffield PO Officer 3] was whether these 
were related to the rioting or whether they were usual incidents seen through a 
different lens. Some respondents argued the latter. London Road is a busy street 
with a range of bars and restaurants and is located between two areas of the city 
that have some reputation for low level disorder, including one of the study areas. 
Low level disorder events in other parts of the city included a group of 15 youths 
throwing stones in a deprived suburb (Hackenthorpe). It was later confirmed that 
this had ‘nothing to do with riots’ [Sheffield Manager 6]. There were also 
gatherings of young people reported in both of the study neighbourhoods. 
Gatherings are not synonymous with collective behaviour, but provide the 
circumstances in which it may occur (McPhail and Wohlstein 1983 p.580) and, of 
course, collective behaviour (of 12 people or more) is central to the definition of a 
riot. 
Accounts relating to gatherings in the two study neighbourhoods were not entirely 
consistent. There were several accounts of gatherings in Darnall. According to one, 
- 131 - 
the gatherings were not particularly threatening and were monitored and 
appropriately dealt with, in some cases dispersed, by community leaders and local 
practitioners. Some accounts suggested the gatherings involved non-resident 
youths, who had travelled from other parts of the city looking for trouble. Another 
version suggested there were no ‘big gatherings at all of any nature’ in Darnall 
[Sheffield Practitioner 2].  It is difficult to conclude whether these competing 
accounts can be explained by partial perspectives or due to the re-writing of 
history to suit political interests.  
There were similarly competing accounts of gatherings in the City Centre. One 
statutory partner involved in the public order response said ‘to the best of my 
knowledge, there was no groups that were identified as either looking to cause 
trouble, or mobbing up to stop trouble’ [Sheffield Manager 5]. Conversely, a police 
officer also involved in the response recollected officers reporting ‘some people 
that are walking around town looking for a group to join’ and also that ‘there was 
some activity around places like Primark’ [Sheffield PO Officer 5]. This latter 
version of events was confirmed by another a respondent, who claimed they 
‘vaguely’ recalled a ‘potential risk of Primark and McDonald's’ [Sheffield Manager 
4].  
Several interviewees referred to the arrangements communicated by potential 
rioters via social media, particularly Facebook, to meet outside a large discount 
department store, TJ Hughes. This was conveniently placed for transport 
connections into the centre of town. The plan was to meet just before midday. 
People working as Young Advisors to the local youth service passed on this 
information and, consequently, a plan was put in place, involving police helicopter 
surveillance, to monitor the situation, which never materialised. 
The most significant event was a firearms discharge in a relatively central, but 
residential part of the city. It occurred in an area known as Park Hill. The incident 
occurred on Friday 5 August, the evening ahead of the riots erupting in London. It 
was recounted by one respondent as being drugs-related and that it resulted in a 
man being shot in the leg. It was publicly reported as an isolated incident, which 
presented no risk to the wider community, although some practitioners were 
concerned that potential rumour and speculation presented a risk during the 
context of unrest elsewhere in the country. 
4.3.2.1 Overview 
It was difficult to distinguish between routine disorder and pre-disorder events 
that might be associated with the riots taking place elsewhere in the country. 
There were lots of rumours about disorder taking place, but few were 
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substantiated. The events that were of greatest concern were those in and around 
the study neighbourhoods, including some missiles thrown at passing vehicles and 
gatherings, which caused police and youth workers to mobilise. 
4.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided an overview of the case study characteristics as 
important context to the events taking place in August 2011 and explanations for 
these events. It has shown that in 2011 the cities were characteristically similar. 
Although Nottingham was marginally more challenged across a range of social 
variables previously associated with urban unrest, including deprivation, crime and 
unemployment. Nottingham also had a higher proportion of BME residents.  
At the neighbourhood level, factors previously associated with urban unrest were 
more acute than at the city level. The Nottingham neighbourhoods had a 
reputation for crime and disorder, especially violent offending, associated with 
gangs. By comparison, violent crime was not such an issue in the Sheffield study 
neighbourhoods, but social disorder, verging on riotous behaviour, was a concern 
in one of the neighbourhoods, occurring on an annual basis around Bonfire Night.  
The Nottingham neighbourhoods were predominated by Black and Mixed race 
people, whereas the Sheffield neighbourhoods were predominantly South Asian 
and Somali respectively. Communities in both case studies were referred to as 
having a strong sense of identity and being 'tight knit', meaning that members 
routinely provided social support to each other. 
In Nottingham, disorder events were characterised by attacks on the police and 
police property, involving criminal damage to five police stations. There was 
damage to residential property, but this was almost entirely on a single street. 
There were minor attempts to loot in the city centre, but only a jewellery store 
was successfully burgled. In Sheffield, there were some gatherings, possibly intent 
on unrest, but little disorder was evident; only a few bottles were thrown at cars. 
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Chapter 5 – Public Order Response 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the combined activities of police, partner agencies and 
communities in responding to the threat of unrest. This is how the ‘public order 
response’ is conceptualised within this study. It is not merely the activities of 
public order police, which is how Nottinghamshire Police possibly interpreted it. 
Consequently, they failed to enlist the support of other agencies that might have 
mitigated the police tendency to ‘control’ groups presumed likely to disrupt public 
order (Earl & Soule 2006). The section on policing tactics suggests that officers in 
Nottingham were not violent, but they harassed and unfairly arrested people 
based on pre-conceived notions of who was intent on rioting. The chapter shows 
how the public order response in Sheffield demonstrated a stronger commitment 
to partnership working, which was instrumental in promoting a less antagonistic 
approach. The first section examines the timeliness of the activities in the two case 
studies, on the basis that a proactive approach offers greater opportunity to 
prevent unrest. The second section looks at the willingness and capability of 
partners to work together and the implications of this for social order outcomes. 
The subsequent sections look at the style of policing, tactics used and how these 
were perceived by local people. Finally, the chapter looks at information sharing 
between policing partners and with communities, as a means of achieving an 
integrated public order response and of disseminating positive and protective 
messages to groups at risk of rioting. 
5.2 Timeliness of interventions 
The disorder in London erupted in Tottenham on Saturday 6 August, spreading to 
other parts of London the next day, but only reaching other parts of the country on 
Monday 8 August. Hence, this afforded towns and cities outside of London at least 
a couple of days to consider the implications for their own populations and to start 
to develop contingency plans. A great many issues affecting London rarely impact 
on the rest of the country, but there were precedents. As detailed in Chapter 1, 
the Brixton riots in 1981 were followed by disturbances in a small number of cities 
a few months later, including Birmingham, Liverpool, Manchester, Leeds and 
Nottingham. The Brixton riots in 1985 were also followed by riots in other cities 
just a few days later. The riots in the early 1990s and the early 2000s, similarly, 
were characterised by riots in multiple localities within a relatively short space of 
time. The most recent riots in France, in 2005, also spread to as many as 300 
- 134 - 
localities. On this basis, it might have been expected that the scale of the events in 
London would be on the radar of police and partners elsewhere in the country, 
promoting their consideration of how to respond locally. Although urban unrest is 
characterised by its unpredictability, research has previously found that a 
proactive well-planned approach can be successful in preventing and containing 
disorder (see Campbell 1993). On this basis, the study set out to explore the 
timeliness of interventions in the two case studies and whether this affected social 
order outcomes. 
5.2.1 Nottingham 
In Nottingham, respondents reported watching events unfold in the media and 
during Monday daytime, police officers were starting to discuss the likelihood of 
anything happening locally. These discussions were facilitated by routine meetings, 
which had relatively recently been put in place, to inform strategic planning for 
recent and upcoming issues. Consequently, some officers were put on alert and 
assigned to the public order command team should anything occur, but otherwise 
no specific plans were put in place. The command structure being considered at 
this point by the police was the Gold, Silver, Bronze (GSB) structure. This command 
structure was created by the Metropolitan Police Service following the Brixton riot 
of 1985. It is now used by all emergency services and some partner agencies as a 
means of delivering a strategic, tactical and operational response to large scale 
operations and critical incidents (see College of Policing 2013). The GSB command 
structure is meant to ensure clarity of roles and that information and decisions are 
communicated effectively. In Nottingham, it was reported that apart from putting 
officers on standby, the police did not begin any preventative activities because no 
intelligence had been received implying real risk and because policing should not 
be ‘knee jerk’ or based on ‘gut feeling’, particularly where this might incur financial 
costs to the organisation [Nottingham PO Officer 2]. 
Respondents from other agencies in Nottingham reported how the events in 
London did cause concern. Those with direct experience of the 1981 riots, which 
had affected Hyson Green in Nottingham, suspected that disorder might reach the 
city. The problem was they were not expecting it to arrive so soon and, 
consequently, they were not fully prepared.  For example, one agency respondent 
said: 
I did rather naïvely say at the time ‘this will come our way but it's probably 
not going to hit us until probably Wednesday or Thursday of this week … we 
have got a little bit of time to actually prepare for things, but we need to 
start to get our act together today’. And you know, the surprise for 
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everybody is that it wasn't Thursday, it was that night. [Nottingham 
Manager 3] 
The fact that Nottingham City Council had an emergency planning structure, like 
the police GSB structure, was reported positively, even if not all Council personnel 
were confident in using it. However, the structure was not brought into action 
until disorder had already erupted. As one respondent put it ‘Tuesday morning 
was when the button was pressed’ [Nottingham Manager 3]. It seems that both 
the police and other statutory agencies had arrangements for dealing with critical 
incidents, but did not consider using them in a preventative way. 
Respondents talked about meetings at various levels between the police, other 
agencies and communities; but, again, these were primarily in response to events 
that had already taken place. The primary aim of community meetings was to 
reassure rather than to develop local solutions to the problem of disorder. There 
was one meeting of particular significance, instigated by a senior police officer 
with the purpose of establishing dialogue with a number of community 
practitioners who work in the neighbourhoods most affected by the disorders on 
the Monday night, including the two Nottingham study neighbourhoods – St Ann’s 
and Radford. Pre-existing politics between these practitioners most likely 
prevented this meeting occurring any earlier and strained inter-agency relations 
limited what could be achieved by it. Nevertheless, the meeting secured valuable 
funding at an early stage to enable outreach activity that may have not have been 
possible otherwise. Inter-agency relationships and their role in the Nottingham 
disorders will be returned to later in this chapter and again in Chapter 6 as the 
longer-term context to social order outcomes.  
Local officers spoke about how members of the public were being proactive in 
reporting groups of youths wandering the streets. Although many of these groups 
were routinely on the streets, others were ‘not the local guys, [not] the ones you 
normally get issues with’ [Nottingham NPO 3]. A community respondent also 
reported unusual large groups of young people roaming the streets, although 
quickly added that ‘they didn’t do a thing’ [Nottingham Practitioner 1]. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, it was likely that many young people, aware of 
events around the country, were simply out on the streets just to watch for riots 
(McKenzie 2015). It is difficult to know whether these reports of groups on the 
streets represented genuine concerns for safety and public order; over-zealous 
helpfulness; or merely an opportunity to report youths more regularly considered 
a nuisance. It is also difficult to know how these reports affected the police 
response; whether they were incorporated into the city’s disorder incident figures, 
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boosting the level of perceived risk, dealt with by local officers, or simply ignored 
as more urgent matters were attended to. 
5.2.2 Sheffield 
There is potential difficulty in assessing how proactive the Sheffield response was 
by the mere fact that large scale disorder never erupted; and so, in theory, the 
whole response was proactive. An alternative way to make an assessment is by 
looking at when activities began in relation to events elsewhere. In Nottingham, 
disorder erupted on Monday night and so it seems appropriate to explore how 
well Sheffield would have been prepared by this point. Three years on, some 
respondents struggled to recount which day certain things happened, but these 
have been placed by other key events. For example, one senior officer recounted 
becoming concerned ‘when the fire happened in Croydon’ [Sheffield PO Officer 6], 
presumably referring to the burning down of Reeves furniture store on Monday 9 
August, which was widely reported. Consequently, the officer initiated a meeting 
the next day, which would have been Tuesday 9 August, and, therefore, not very 
proactive if events had unfolded by Nottingham’s timeframe. As a result of this 
meeting, however, it was reported that that the police ‘started to staff up in the 
evenings’, and a public order command team moved into the force’s call centre, to 
ensure readiness for events occurring from that point [Sheffield PO Officer 6]. 
As mentioned previously in the thesis, Sheffield stakeholders were consistent on 
which neighbourhoods were most at risk of engaging in disorder, according to 
which were most often affected by crime and disorder issues within the city, and 
this informed where activities comprising the public order response were largely 
targeted. A number of stakeholders working in these at risk neighbourhoods, 
including the two study neighbourhoods, reported becoming concerned over the 
weekend watching the news of riots spreading across London and arrived at work 
on the Monday morning with a view to putting special provisions in place. A 
community practitioner reported: ‘I called a meeting initially on the Monday, 
straight away, with my manager and we started to formulate a plan’ [Sheffield 
Practitioner 1]. This meeting secured additional staff to engage with young people 
locally and these were in place by Monday evening. Community practitioners 
reported attending ‘a bigger meeting later on in the week’, but in the first instance 
were focused on their own neighbourhood as a priority. 
So it seems there was important work taking place in parts of Sheffield as early as 
Monday morning, particularly talking to residents, tension monitoring and direct 
engagement with at risk groups. Local structures were in place to coordinate some 
of these activities. One of these was the Community Assembly structure, which 
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replaced local area panels in May 2009. The capacity and focus of Community 
Assemblies was drastically affected by local austerity measures in 2014, but in 
2011 there were still seven, each covering four wards and having budgets, which 
were allocated according to levels of deprivation, to spend on local services, such 
as parks, libraries and street cleaning. The purpose of Community Assemblies was 
to inform local people about what was happening locally and to involve them in 
decision-making via regular meetings throughout the year. Respondents viewed 
Community Assemblies positively as a focal point for partnership working, being 
supported by representatives from the police, health services, voluntary groups 
and businesses. Respondents suggested that local devolvement of some decision-
making also enabled them to be responsive and proactive: 
At that time, Assemblies were quite a powerful thing in the communities, so 
we wouldn’t actually be instructed to do anything. … they had the respect 
to understand their areas, so there was no guidance from above. There was 
probably at the time ‘just be aware of anything happening’, but most of my 
guidance was through the police. I was working alongside the Inspector 
helping him. He was helping me. We were working together. [Sheffield 
Manager 7] 
There were a number of centrally organised city-wide meetings for practitioners, 
but these did not happen until the Wednesday morning, which some respondents 
thought was too late: 
 ‘Without being too critical, it was just a bit like ‘It’s a bit late. Maybe you 
should have got us in on Monday morning’. So it was a bit slow to react’ 
[Sheffield Manager 6] 
Local practitioners who had in their view already done a lot of work to prevent 
unrest felt these meetings on Wednesday failed to acknowledge what had already 
been done. However, some managers reported that these midweek meetings 
were not the beginning of the strategic level response. They were a continuation 
of earlier telephone and email communications between key partners, including 
the Council, the Police, and the youth service, which was outsourced to a voluntary 
sector organisation called Sheffield Futures.  As one senior level agency 
respondent recalled: 
We quickly mobilised into having an e-mail exchange between different 
professional groups and myself, as a senior manager at the time, was part 
of that email exchange and in effect on call throughout that whole week. 
Just via emails really and making a bit of a chain of command in terms of 
information sharing. [Sheffield Manager 3] 
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Email communications were facilitated by existing email networks for partnership 
working, meaning there was no time wasted establishing points of contact. In 
particular, there were routine emails as part of the city’s tension monitoring 
process, sent to community members, councillors, youth workers, housing officers 
and schools etc., which facilitated communication at various levels. 
5.2.3 Overview 
People in both case studies reported a level of concern when events were 
occurring in London over the weekend of 6-7 August. However, these concerns 
stimulated little activity in Nottingham at this stage. Community practitioners 
reported engaging with local people to assess the level of risk, but the police 
merely put public order officers on standby and seemingly hoped for the best. 
Officers justified their approach by claiming there was no intelligence that 
anything was going to happen. However, this merely shows how poorly the police 
were connected into communities, who were thought, by some practitioners, to 
be likely to riot. Sheffield was more proactive, especially at the local level. 
Meetings to agree the centralised response did not happen until Tuesday / 
Wednesday. However, local partnership structures supported inter-agency 
activities with communities at the neighbourhood level on the Monday morning, 
which seems critical, as Monday night is when most unrest outside London began.  
5.3 Partnership Activities 
The extant literature says very little, if anything, about the role of other agencies 
beyond the police in policing the 2011 English Riots. A focus on the police is 
unsurprising, given that a primary responsibility of the police is ‘to keep the 
Queen’s Peace’ (Home Affairs Committee 2008, para.9). No other institution has 
this as a primary responsibility. It is also unsurprising that commentators might 
look primarily to the police in trying to explain the disorder, given their 
documented role in previous riots, as discussed in Chapter 1. However, with the 
emphasis on policing through partnership following the Crime and Disorder Act 
1998 even the policing of riots is likely to involve other agencies. This section looks 
at who was involved in activities to prevent and contain unrest in the two case 
studies over the period when disorderly events were occurring elsewhere in the 
country and how well different agencies worked together. 
5.3.1 Nottingham 
Respondents’ accounts of the public order response in Nottingham suggest that ‘it 
was a pure police response in terms of the tactical element of it’ [Nottingham 
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Manager 5]. Other agencies were not integrated into the street-based response. 
When directly asked whether community practitioners were involved, one public 
order officer said: 
Not that I'm aware of. I didn't see it. I worked the night shifts around public 
order so from the evening, I think it was from seven in the evening till seven 
in the morning so I was not briefed on any community workers out there. So 
if they had been, then yeah there was a communication breakdown but I 
never came across anybody. [Nottingham PO Officer 1] 
Nottinghamshire police commanded their response through the GSB structure and 
operationalised it mainly using Police Support Units (PSU). These are specialist 
units of police officers who have undergone tactical training in public order and 
riot control. A basic PSU (a beat duty unit) consists of three officers, including one 
inspector, three sergeants and 18 constables.  More highly trained PSUs comprise 
an additional three officers as drivers of protected personnel carriers (see College 
of Policing 2016b). Although there are no specific equipment requirements for a 
basic PSU, respondents suggested that most officers wore personal protective 
equipment (PPE), which is their riot uniform. Police dogs and mounted horses 
were also deployed. 
Officers participating in this study noted how the staffing requirements for the PSU 
deployment had implications for policing generally across the city. According to 
information provided to the Home Affairs Select Committee (2011b), an additional 
150 officers were specifically allocated for disorder on the Monday night and 250 
on the Tuesday night. One public order officer reported that, in the first instance, it 
was difficult to find enough officers for the PSUs and that taking these officers 
away from their usual duties left the force short for routine policing:  
One of the issues about mobilising a PSU from within staff that are on duty 
is that we pretty much run at minimum critical staff levels anyway during 
the night, so trying to find trying to find 20 cops out of maybe the 60 on 
duty actually leaves other areas vulnerable then; so it exposes you to a bit 
more risk. So essentially on the first night … we didn't really have enough 
staff. [Nottingham PO Officer 4] 
Helping to alleviate the problem of there not being enough staff on duty, it was 
reported how officers meant to be off-duty were turning up for work on the basis 
that they wanted to help. The ‘goodwill’ of officers was described by many as a 
success factor of the police response in Nottingham. One officer described how 
‘there was a real buzz in the officers around ‘this is our opportunity to keep the 
streets safe’’. This perhaps links to the action-focused disposition of the police, 
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depicted as one of the more positive aspects of police culture; albeit a trait of 
machismo, accompanied by other traits, such as a propensity for risky and 
dangerous behaviours, which can be  less desirable in certain circumstances 
(Reiner 2000). 
Community respondents in both study neighbourhoods complained that the 
officers who remained to police their localities during the disturbances were not 
the usual faces, and consequently were blind to the local context. These ‘outside 
police’, as they were referred to, used styles of policing and tactics that 
antagonised local people. One community respondent described how ‘youths were 
just sitting on the park, messing about, and they were chased off’. A local police 
officer responding to this study explained how it was necessary to tailor 
community policing. Based on their experience in one of the study 
neighbourhoods, they said: 
It’s not a bad area, but it’s a hard area, as people don’t really want to 
engage with the police. It’s about adjusting the way you police. You have to 
be a bit more casual, or the people feel as if you are talking down to them. 
[Nottingham NPO 3] 
The same officer also referred to the importance of local knowledge within a 
public order context. NPTs reported that many of the youth gatherings, proactively 
reported to the police by members of the public, were quite normal for the time 
and place. On this basis, officers responded to them in their usual way, saying 
‘hello … to kill them with kindness’ [Nottingham NPO 3]. After the first night of 
disturbances, the groups were reported to be friendlier than normal, even saying 
‘hello’ back to officers. It seems the crisis situation had interrupted the usual rules 
of engagement. Perhaps the youths perceived they were on the same side as local 
officers in wanting to avoid riots and this brief interaction was intended to signal 
their support. It is difficult to know. The key point is that officers unfamiliar with 
the neighbourhood might have perceived these groups as a threat to social order, 
causing them to respond differently, which might have provoked an altogether 
different reaction from the youths. The elaborated social identify model, discussed 
in Chapter 2, theorises that treatment of a crowd perceived as unfair can 
undermine police legitimacy and lead to conflict.  
Most of the disorder in Nottingham occurred in the evening and this was one 
explanation suggested by respondents for why neighbourhood policing teams 
(NPTs) were largely excluded from the main public order response.  Where 
neighbourhood officers (NPOs) were involved operationally, this was within the 
PSU structure, rather than within the neighbourhood policing structure. It was 
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reported that their local knowledge was highly valuable, for example, informing 
public order commanders about the local geography. This information was critical 
in preventing the PSUs becoming easy targets: 
What these groups were trying to do, from what the officers were telling 
me, they were trying to pull them into areas so they could set about the 
Police vehicles. So pulling them into cul-de-sacs, where if you stop them 
coming out, you are going to be targets. [Nottingham NPO 2] 
Some NPOs reported feeling frustrated at being left out of the main response. One 
respondent said they ‘felt like lost children’. Their disconnection from the police 
response was illustrated by the fact that as Canning Circus police station was being 
petrol-bombed on the Tuesday night, officers inside were on the telephone to 
senior managers to ask whether they should remain on duty, as they were aware 
officers elsewhere in the city had been asked to. 
Although NPTs were outside the main response, there were involved in the wider 
policing activities surrounding the response, primarily by doing more of what they 
usually do. For Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs) this meant providing 
more reassurance. One respondent recalled being told to ‘get your biggest 
brightest coat and go out and chat to local shops; talk to anyone ... tell them they 
don’t have to shut’. Another way NPTs were involved was in writing community 
impact assessments (CIAs). The purpose of community impact assessments is to 
record the effect any recent events have had on the community and identify issues 
that may affect community confidence in the police (College of Policing 2016a). 
Where confidence has been damaged, community impact assessments are meant 
to inform plans for how the police might rebuild community it and learn lessons 
for the future. According to one respondent, NPTs were also serving as a point of 
contact for other local stakeholders wanting to provide or seek information about 
the disorders, especially for local Councillors. NPTs were also involved through the 
investigative process to identify and arrest local people involved in the disorders, 
which was likely to have been an issue for the community impact assessments, 
linked to the fact that some local people felt the policing had been too aggressive 
and had resulted in unnecessary arrests. 
Although the public order response was dominated by the police, other agencies 
were involved in a number of ways both at a strategic level and in terms of 
frontline activities. The local authority would usually be expected to play an 
important role in responding to major incidents and was especially likely to be 
involved in August 2011 because the political leader of the Council, Cllr Jon Collins, 
was also the ward counsellor for St Ann's, the first residential area to be affected 
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by disorder on the Monday night. Consequently the leader was involved in 
coordinating activities both at a city and neighbourhood level in St Ann's. It was 
reported how his was the phone call to inform some senior managers that unrest 
had erupted on Monday night. It was also reported how he instigated the 
community meetings in response to this, with the help of a community manager, 
who had the contacts and relationships to make these happen. Ward councillors in 
other neighbourhoods were also involved in setting up meetings as a first response 
following the events of Monday night.  
These meetings, instigated by Councillors, can be considered part of the 
community-based response rather than the statutory response, because in this 
role Councillors were acting on behalf of their constituents. It was described how 
the main aim of the meetings was to provide reassurance to local people. They 
were attended by NPOs, who set out to achieve this aim by explaining that the 
police were doing everything possible to protect them: 
I've never been to a community meeting like it, it must have been about two 
or three hours long, it was very much around what the police were doing so 
you know it was a case of literally nobody is having any leave, nobody is 
having any time off, the entire Force is working 12 hours on 12 hours off, 
everybody had their rest days cancelled, it will be constant until we get this 
under control. Again reassurance. [Nottingham NPO 1] 
It was reported how local residents were especially interested to know what had 
happened the previous night, especially in relation to young people and the police 
running around the estate. Some residents also used the meeting as an 
opportunity to voice wider issues affecting the community. They identified 
problems with aspects of the physical environment that they felt affected 
community safety, including street-lighting, (lack of) CCTV, barriers and the locking 
of particular gates. On this basis, one NPO concluded that the meeting had been a 
valuable opportunity for community engagement: 
So there’s a lot of things that came out of that, that people raised, which 
wouldn’t have got raised normally [and] that we managed to address. 
[Nottingham NPO 2] 
This response, however, highlights potential concern about why these community 
safety issues were not being raised and dealt with prior to the disorders through 
the usual channels; for example, through processes referred to as Police and 
Community Together (PACT).  PACT processes are meant to involve NPTs and their 
partners engaging and consulting with the community to ascertain local concerns, 
set priorities and develop tailored solutions through mechanisms such as 
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meetings, surgeries, postcards and environmental visual audits (EVAs) (College of 
Policing 2014). Research, however, has found that PACT meetings are often poorly 
attended and conducted; and generally lack definition as to what role they are 
performing within the wider neighbourhood management process (Innes et al. 
2009). With this as context, it can be reasoned that some residents were either not 
fully engaged or frustrated with existing processes; evidenced by questions about 
why concerns previously raised (e.g. about CCTV) had not been addressed. 
Structures were in place in Nottingham to facilitate partnership working in crisis 
events. Council directorates involved in the public order response included 
Community Protection, Children and Families and Environmental Services. 
Community Protection, referred to by some as the 'enforcement arm' of the local 
authority, was well-established in partnership working arrangements with the 
police and had staff co-located at the central police station. This meant they were 
well-placed to hear about the disorder as it erupted on Monday evening and were 
able to communicate information quickly to other colleagues within the Council. It 
was also reported how Community Protection staff played a role in communicating 
information to NPTs. Community protection staff did not, however, coordinate the 
Council’s strategic response. Instead, council officers within Nottingham's Crime 
and Drugs Partnership (CDP) took on this role, which began with a series of 
meetings and briefings for the executive management team, wherein some senior 
managers voiced their uncertainty over the Council's involvement in a situation 
that was not strictly life-threatening, nor a major disaster, for which the 
emergency planning structure had been conceived. Nevertheless, a critical incident 
response was endorsed, and members of the CDP continued as the Gold tier for 
the Council’s GSB structure.  
Council input to the public order response was important but not central to the 
policing of the disturbances, being focused primarily on environmental issues 
rather than people. The Council’s contribution involved Environmental Services in 
preventative action and clean-up efforts after disorder had taken place. The clean-
up was arranged quickly to reassure the community; and also, in accordance with 
'broken windows' theory (see Kelling & Wilson 1982), to vanquish as soon as 
possible any tangible signs of disorder in case these should promote further 
disorder. Preventative action was described in terms of gathering up loose items 
across the city that could be used as missiles by rioters, such as loose gates and 
fence posts, as well as 'big structural things, where windows were boarded up and 
leisure centres and schools were secured' to reduce opportunities for arson. Large 
housing associations, such as Nottingham City Homes, which had a lot of 
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properties in the St Ann's area, were also involved in this type of activity via 'a 
command and control type approach' [Nottingham Manager 4]. 
However, this description of a command and control approach does not sit easily 
with the notion of partnership working. Command and control emphasizes top-
down decision-making and unity of command that is meant to eliminate discretion 
and ambiguity in the chain of authority. This approach is associated with police 
culture and has been evaluated as a natural and beneficial response to some 
aspects of police work (e.g. Kelling et al. 1988). However, command and control 
can be contrasted with the main strength of multi-agency partnership working, 
which acknowledges that other agencies may have a different purchase on a given 
crime problem (Crawford 1997) by virtue of their particular expertise or position, 
including their relationships with a range of different social groups. It is also worth 
noting the distinction between ‘multi-agency’ relations, which merely involves the 
coming together of a number of agencies around a particular problem, and ‘inter-
agency’ relations, ‘which entail some degree of fusion and melding of relations 
between agencies’ (Crawford & Jones 1996, pp.30–1). In Nottingham’s public 
order response, there was some melding of relations between the police and the 
local authority, but this was probably not in the way that Crawford and Jones 
anticipated. Rather, it was because a proportion of the people contributing to the 
Council response were ex-police officers: 
A number of ex-police officers working within the City Council [were pulled] 
out of their roles and [asked to] remember how to be a cop for a little while; 
and ‘now use your skills in this environment… and sort of apply the skills 
from the policing world into the local authority world and use those skills to 
understand what information was [sic] coming in, understand where people 
are, understand what your response is and get people to respond quickly 
rather than sitting on things’. [Nottingham Manager 3] 
The melding of police-local authority relations was also helped by some of these 
ex-police officers having retained their personal links with serving officers. 
Although this facilitated communication, the lack of boundaries between the two 
agencies most likely meant that the Council’s particular expertise was lost from the 
public order response. However, the Council is a diverse organisation, with a 
number of different services and types of expertise and based on conversations 
with a range of respondents, it would be inaccurate to refer to ‘a’ Council 
response. There were lots of things happening within the Council, in addition to 
those coordinated by the CDRP. For example, some council managers sought the 
help of community practitioners to do outreach with at risk groups. As already 
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mentioned above, this was done by inviting a number of agencies to a meeting. 
This was instigated by a senior police officer, but in partnership with the Council’s 
Community Protection and children and families’ services. 
Accounts of this meeting demonstrate the lack of trust between agencies in 
Nottingham, especially between the statutory and the voluntary sector. It was 
reported that these types of multi-agency meetings were unusual and so, firstly, 
there was the problem of knowing how to contact some of the practitioners 
identified as being influential within riot-affected neighbourhoods; and, secondly, 
there was the problem that some did not want to attend. One community 
practitioner explained: 
I said ‘I’m not coming, because we just go around talking the same shit and 
then we leave and nothing else changes’ …I said ‘I haven’t got time. I’ve got 
kids that I need to see’. [Nottingham Practitioner 1] 
Reluctance to attend this meeting was linked to poor relationships within the 
voluntary sector as a consequence of rivalries and tensions between agencies, 
frequently pitted against each other when applying for funding from an ever-
decreasing pot of money. Tensions were also linked to a sense that not all 
providers were equally effective, linked to their lack of interest in helping local 
people. It was reported that some agencies were almost entirely motivated by the 
money: 'I would say eight out of ten are there to fill their pocket. Two out of ten 
are there to do something about it. … There's no relationship. … They hate each 
other.' [Nottingham Practitioner 1]. In highly deprived neighbourhoods, this was 
unpalatable and agencies perceived to be in this category were referred to as 
‘poverty pimps’ because they were living off people’s misery. The Council’s 
inability to filter out this type of agency within its funding process had affected 
how it was perceived by more committed agencies and local practitioners. The 
view articulated by several respondents was that the Council had ‘no backbone’ to 
deal with poor performance and this had undermined the willingness of agencies 
to work together, even in the face of a crisis.  
While community-based organisations and practitioners played a critical role in 
preventing and containing unrest, in Nottingham they were not cohesive as a 
group. Their usual combative relationship and silo mentality prevailed even after 
additional funding was made available to them within the context of unrest. This 
undermined local coordination and made it difficult for other agencies to engage 
with them strategically at a city level, which is captured in the following 
comments:  
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They all had their own little neighbourhoods to go and work in, so one 
group went over here, and one group went over here, and one group went 
over here, and one group went over here. [Nottingham Practitioner 1] 
When asked about the nature of the outreach activities, it was clear that 
community practitioners, including youth workers, were involved in a range of 
efforts to help prevent and contain unrest in their localities. Concerned about the 
consequences of urban unrest for the whole community, some practitioners tried 
to establish the level of risk. Going into the community and speaking to local 
people was an approach used by some to seek information about what might be 
planned and who might be involved. This included speaking to women, who were 
thought to be a good source of information: 
For me it was about talking to people who you wouldn’t normally talk to. 
…so I spoke to … young women ‘cos they’ll know which guys are going to go 
out and do what, and who are they going out with. And they were all saying 
‘no, no-one’s interested. Looting and robbing. No, it’s not going to happen’. 
[Nottingham Practitioner 2] 
In addition to the women, shop keepers were also reported to be a good source of 
information in the study neighbourhoods, where small local shops were used 
frequently by residents. The reasoning was that 'shop keepers see the people we 
don't see. Your local gangster goes to the shop to get his fags … [and] five years 
coming and buying something, [they] talk about what they're going to do 
next'[Nottingham Practitioner 2]. This emphasises the importance of not merely 
relying on the 'usual suspects' and traditional mechanisms of community 
engagement, such as tenants and residents associations (TARAs) and community 
meetings, as was explicitly understood by a number of community practitioners: 
'Local residents, I went to speak to them. I’m not talking about residents’ 
associations; knocking on people’s doors' [Nottingham Practitioner 2]. 
Additional provision for diverting young people might have been beneficial in 
some localities, but it was reported that pre-existing activities were more likely to 
be trusted; and some felt that these played a critical role in containing unrest in 
Nottingham. It was reported how some young people were accessing regular 
youth club sessions because 'it was their regular place to be' or they knew it to be 
a place they might learn the 'gossip' on what was happening. Other young people 
'on the periphery, were [attending] because they weren't sure where they were 
supposed to be' [Nottingham Practitioner 1]. Respondents emphasised the 
importance of these being regular youth club sessions, which meant that young 
people knew in advance when and where they could find them, providing a safe 
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and familiar space to be during the unrest. These sessions also provided a 
distraction for some young people, who might otherwise have become involved in 
events by mere fortune of being in the wrong place at the wrong time. Youth 
workers reported that the youth club sessions also provided an opportunity for 
them to hear what young people knew about events in Nottingham. Access to this 
information was facilitated through their pre-existing relationships with regular 
attenders at the club; again impressing the importance of this provision being in 
place before the unrest. 
That said, funding was made available for additional youth provision, with the aim 
of diverting young people, who might otherwise be tempted to get involved in the 
disorder. In some cases, youth workers took them out of their usual 
neighbourhoods altogether: 
So actually on the Tuesday evening there were all sorts of things going on 
among youth workers. So they were taking them off to the Showcase 
Cinema on Derby Road, so out of their own areas, where they'd be milling 
around on the streets.  Obviously it was a very short-term approach, and 
actually quite limited, because we couldn't occupy them at midnight, but at 
least they were kind of... there was a lot going on over those two or three 
nights. [Nottingham Manager 6] 
However, there were mixed reports about the additional youth provision. Some 
felt ‘it made things worse … because you’re putting a plaster on, [but providing] 
nothing to sew it up; then when you have gone, there’s blood pouring out’ 
[Nottingham Practitioner 3]. This comment was indicative of wider concerns about 
the quantity and quality of community support provision and especially youth 
provision, which will be covered in more detail in Chapter 7. Of direct relevance, 
however, to the public order response, was the political wrangling about whether 
the additional diversionary activity could be justified, even in the context of 
imminent unrest, if this impacted on wider provision. For example, it was reported 
how some politicians were concerned that they would fall out of favour with 
constituents if children’s daytime activities over the summer were closed to allow 
youth workers to do outreach during the evenings.  Evening youth provision was 
reported to have been significantly reduced, linked to austerity measures, as had 
youth work generally, and so ‘it felt very flaky at the time’, meaning that resources 
and goodwill were in short supply in Nottingham at the time of the 2011 Riots. 
5.3.2 Sheffield 
Although some respondents claimed that South Yorkshire Police took a lead role, 
there was a consistent view that Sheffield’s public order response was 
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characterised by genuine partnership working: ‘each organisation played an 
important part [but] …South Yorkshire Police were at the forefront’. The police 
taking the lead was not viewed problematically by any of the respondents, 
because the officers involved, at the neighbourhood and city level, listened and 
involved other agencies. In fact, there were many examples of the police being led 
by other agencies on particular aspects of the operation. 
South Yorkshire Police reported a better experience of partnership working during 
the period of the riots due to usually slow bureaucratic processes being speeded 
up in the context of a crisis, as reported by one NPO: 
Partnership working is sometimes frustrating because their method of 
working is different to ours, but during that period there was much more of 
a proactive approach and greater degree of traction behind the work that 
they were offering. [Sheffield NPO 1] 
These frustrations of partnership working have been reported elsewhere before 
(Pearson et al. 1992). Previous findings have also pointed to the police tendency to 
dominate partnership working. There were reports from community practitioners 
explicitly on this point, suggesting this was not the case and that other agencies 
were able to act according to their particular knowledge and expertise: 
Everybody was working together. Everybody knew the importance of it, of 
collective responsibility. Although what the police had to do, they had to do 
their way, what the youth services they had to do their way, but collectively 
they agreed, ‘this is what we will take on, this is what they will take on, how 
to move it forward’ [Sheffield Practitioner 2] 
Although, South Yorkshire Police were typically viewed as the lead agency, many 
respondents felt that ‘youth workers were key’ to the response [Sheffield 
Practitioner 1]. This was recognised by public order commanders from the start, in 
part, based on their experience of working with the youth service during the 
Sheffield’s Dark Nights operation. This was a multi-agency operation aimed at 
tackling anti-social behaviour, typically fire-work related, that occurred in some 
parts of the city around Halloween and Bonfire Night. Some respondents were 
keen to minimise the seriousness of the incidents occurring around this time, but 
others recounted how police had previously been attacked and burning debris had 
caused roads to be closed, confirmed by local newspaper reports and posts on the 
Sheffield Forum. Dark Nights involved a number of partners, including South 
Yorkshire Police, South Yorkshire Fire and Rescue, Sheffield City Council, Sheffield 
Homes, Trading Standards, Youth Offending Service, Sheffield Futures and Activity 
Sheffield. Partners took part in a lengthy planning process each year, generally 
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beginning around July for events taking place at the end of October and early 
November. 
Officers acknowledged the importance of involving youth workers in the city’s 
public order response in August 2011. This was due to the ‘influence’ that some 
youth workers had with young people in at risk areas. As reported by one officer, 
‘even the police need influence’ and especially ‘at the front end’ [Sheffield PO 
Officer 3]. In one of the study neighbourhoods, PCSOs and youth workers worked 
very closely together, attending the same venues and even pairing up to patrol the 
streets during the evening to engage with young people. These joint patrols had 
been tried before in Sheffield and there was an appetite from the police to use 
them more. However, some partners were resistant to this because it had the 
potential to undermine rapport between youth workers and young people. In the 
second neighbourhood, NPOs and youth workers still worked in partnership, but 
this was more backstage. This was because young people in the second 
neighbourhood were particularly difficult to engage. One NPO reported that ‘a lot 
of them had probably gone past the engagement side’ [Sheffield NPO 2]. A 
community practitioner agreed with this, explaining that ‘in every corner, every 
city, every area, they’ll be youngsters that will always be difficult to reach out to’ 
[Sheffield Practitioner 2]. They put this down to the exclusionary consequences of 
structural factors, particularly the lack of employment opportunities. 
To engage this harder to reach group, it was deemed necessary to deploy youth 
workers separately and to involve youth workers who had worked in the area for a 
long time because they offered the best chance of ‘influence’. So, while NPOs were 
out on foot walking ‘figures of eight’ for reassurance and as ‘eyes and ears’, youth 
workers were ‘in the shadows’. They were less visible to the general public 
because they were positioned in the parks and other places where young people 
hung out: they were even ‘in stairwells, just doing good detached youth work’ 
[Sheffield Practitioner 1]. Youth workers remained in contact with the NPT via 
what as referred to as ‘the bat phone’. This constituted an arrangement whereby 
youth workers had a dedicated phone line to the local police station and if it rang, 
the phone would be answered immediately ‘no matter what’. This ensured that 
the police could respond urgently to an incident if youth practitioners felt they 
were unable to deal with it, safeguarding youth workers and preventing an 
escalation of disorder should this start to occur. The arrangement also ensured 
that youth workers were not seen to be working with the police. If a situation was 
challenging but not urgent, youth workers asked the police to delay their response 
long enough for them to get out of the way so the ‘kids didn’t think [they] were 
telling tales’. As was the case in Leeds, youth workers spoke positively about the 
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police withdrawing and letting them deal with the situation (Clifton 2012a), 
acknowledging that young people were challenging boundaries, which might have 
been made worse if the police had ‘come in too heavy handed, dispersing groups’ 
[Sheffield Practitioner 1]. 
Youth workers and other community practitioners were not only engaging with 
young people on the streets. It was reported how youth clubs were opening 
though the night to offer a safe place for young people to be. This was a special 
measure that was reported to be particularly helpful at the time because it was 
Ramadan. It has previously been suggested that Muslims were less likely to 
becomes involved in the riots because it was Ramadan (Morrell et al. 2011). 
However, practitioners in Sheffield reported that they were more likely because 
they gathered on the streets longer and later than usual waiting to break their 
daytime fast and afterwards many returned onto the streets enticed by the 
warmer weather: 
A lot of them, because it was really warm as well weren’t it during that 
period, so a lot of them, they weren’t sleeping in between breaking their 
fasting and starting their fasting again, so of course, it was ‘well we’ll just 
go and hang about on the street, and have a chat and what have you’. 
[Sheffield NPO 2] 
It was reported that the community practitioners keeping the youth clubs open 
and providing additional diversionary activities in one of the study neighbourhoods 
at least were not being paid for this. The goodwill and initiative of key people was 
consistently reported to have made all the difference in preventing and containing 
unrest. 
Partnership working was strong between the Police and other community 
practitioners, which is a term used within the study to represent a range of 
community-based roles, including service providers, community leaders or 
representatives, faith leaders and elected councillors. It was described how 
community practitioners initiated key aspects of the public order response and 
partnership working in both study areas. It was reported how in one of the 
Sheffield study neighbourhoods, community practitioners initiated a series of 
meetings between community leaders, imams of the mosques, statutory agencies 
and the police. Their actions were underpinned by fear of a Bradford-style riot 
reaching Sheffield. The Bradford disturbances in 2001 served as a reminder to the 
predominantly South Asian community of what might happen if riots did erupt. It 
was agreed that messages would be disseminated to the whole community, but 
especially to parents, to ensure they knew where their children were and were 
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doing everything possible to prevent them from getting involved.  The police were 
asked to keep by community practitioners to keep them informed of events, to 
help them correct any myths and rumours in real time. It was detailed how the 
pre-existing relationships between community practitioners and the police, 
especially with senior officers, were critical in facilitating these activities. 
Relationships will be explored in more detail in the next chapter. 
For policing the city centre, pre-existing relationships between the local 
community and the police were also critical in promoting partnership working. In 
this area of the city, the local community was largely the business community. 
Most likely linked to the reporting of widespread looting in London, businesses 
were early to get in touch with the central Safer Neighbourhood Team (SNT) with 
concerns about being attacked and for advice on whether to close. Safer 
Neighbourhood Team s have more recently (in 2015) been replaced by local 
policing teams (LPTs), but in 2011 they constituted a geographically focused 
partnership of police and statutory roles. A key role within Safer Neighbourhood 
Team s was the Safer Neighbourhoods Officer (SNO), employed via the local 
authority to provide operational support for the community safety partnership. 
Safer Neighbourhoods Officers were line-managed by Community Assembly 
managers, but were typically co-located with the police. Safer Neighbourhoods 
Officers were identified by a range of respondents as an important role in August 
2011, facilitating partnership working and communication across agencies. In the 
city centre, the Safer Neighbourhoods Officer tended to be the first point of 
contact for businesses, due to their involvement with a range of local partnerships, 
including the Neighbourhood Action Group (NAG), which, like PACTs (Police and 
Community Together), typically bring together residents, the police, local 
authorities, businesses and schools. Due to their pre-established relationships with 
communities and the police, supported by co-location, the central SNO was invited 
to join the Silver tier of the police-led public order response; whereupon, they 
began to immediately utilise existing networks to disseminate messages to provide 
reassurance and quell rumours and also relay information between partners. 
5.3.3 Overview 
Multi-agency working was evident in both cities, which meant that a number of 
different agencies were involved in trying to prevent unrest and, in Nottingham’s 
case, contain it. Inter-agency working, by comparison, is when the activities of 
different agencies are integrated. In Sheffield, an inter-agency approach was made 
possible by the nature of pre-existing relations between police and partners, which 
had promoted trust, but also practical arrangements relating to communication 
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and decision-making that were also beneficial to the public order response. 
Conversely, rivalries and mistrust between agencies in Nottingham undermined 
willingness and capability to work together and this was largely responsible for the 
pure police response, which was not best suited for preventing unrest in 
communities that, historically, had poor relations with police response teams.  
5.4 Style of Policing 
This section seeks to describe the general approach taken by policing partners in 
their attempts to prevent and contain unrest. It reflects on why a particular 
approach was taken in each of the case studies and how this affected events in 
terms of who was involved, what happened and where. 
5.4.1 Nottingham 
There was absolute consistency in the way respondents described the approach of 
the police in Nottingham as ‘very fast, very hard’ or ‘assertive to put in politely’. 
Elaborating on what this meant in practice, respondents described how officers, 
dressed in full personal protective equipment (PPE), were deployed in large 
numbers and were focused on controlling the situation through the dispersal and 
arrest of individuals intent on causing trouble. This approach was taken because 
‘the police wanted to prove a point that they’d make sure that it didn’t get out of 
hand’ [Nottingham Practitioner 1]. Respondents were also consistent in describing 
how this approach came as a ‘shock’ to the community. Divergence appeared only 
in the way respondents theorised the implications of this approach. According to 
some, it meant that the disorder was limited both in scale and duration, which 
corresponded with the official view expressed in the local post disorder report 
(One Nottingham 2011, p.4): 
A heavy police presence combined with a coordinated response from 
Nottingham City Council and its partners in the city resulted in a 
stabilisation of events on Wednesday 10th August. 
The opposing view was that this approach contributed to the disorder by 
antagonising people, who were not originally intent on violence, but provoked by 
the indiscriminate use of repressive tactics. 
Key context to the approach taken in Nottingham includes the events taking place 
elsewhere in the country and how these were being reported in the media, not 
least because ‘cops read papers too’ (Gorringe & Rosie 2008, p.193). Newspaper 
headlines on Monday morning, before the disturbances erupted that evening 
included ‘Police attacked as London burns’ (The Guardian 2011a) and ‘Police and 
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the riot blunders’; followed on Tuesday morning by headlines such as ‘The Anarchy 
Spreads’ (Daily Mail 2011), ‘Mobs rule as police surrender streets’ (The Times 
2011) and ‘Riots: the madness spreads’ (Metro 2011). These headlines tell a story 
of police failures, allowing chaos to ensue. It is a discourse closely aligned to 
Gustave Le Bon’s (1895) outdated but still influential theory on ‘mob psychology’. 
Media reporting is relevant to public order policing because research has found 
that when police expect to be confronted by a mad mob – for example, at a 
football or sporting event -  they focus on trying to control it using tactics of 
containment, arrest or dispersal (Gorringe & Rosie 2008).  
The influence of the media was not merely inferred. One respondent recounted 
the backdrop to the command suite on Tuesday morning: ‘there was News 24 
playing all over the room and you could see all these like really proper destruction 
and you would call it rioting and violence and disorder taking place in London’ 
[Nottingham PO Officer 4]; and from this coverage, the officer concluded that ‘it 
was escalating everywhere else so why would it not escalate in our area’. Officers 
on call, in particular, reported keeping their eye on the news; and there is some 
implication that this coverage influenced how the first ‘disorder’ events in 
Nottingham were interpreted and responded to: 
so on the Monday night I was actually on call and I was specifically 
watching Sky News, watching Greggs go up in Tottenham or wherever it 
was, … and started to monitor some stuff coming into St Ann’s, in the inner 
city, and clearly it started.  There was bits of disorder, bits of windows going 
through that you wouldn't normally see. So as a result of that … I said we 
need to mobilise here. We need to get some staff together, we need to 
actually set up a civil command and we need to do this because the 
numbers of jobs coming in now is over and above what was normality. 
[Nottingham PO Officer 6] 
Without the police data it is difficult to gauge how unusual events in St Ann’s were 
at this point in time. As discussed in Chapter 4, crime and anti-social behaviour is 
generally high in St Ann’s compared to other parts of Nottingham; and members of 
the public, as noted earlier in this chapter, were proactively reporting incidents 
that they might typically ignore. With this as context, it is worth considering that 
both the police and public were overly sensitive and reactive to local events, based 
on what they had seen and heard in the media about events elsewhere. 
The media coverage contributes to what Della Porta and Fillieule (2004) term 
‘police knowledge’, which frames their understanding of who they are confronting, 
through the generation of stereotypes and short-hands. Police reliance on 
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stereotypes has been explained according to their usefulness in enabling officers 
to make quick decisions in life-threatening situations, but these stereotypes can 
also lead to discriminatory behaviour (Skolnick 1966), which may have been the 
case in Nottingham. With pre-formed conceptions of what they were dealing with, 
public order officers participating in this study reported how it was easy in August 
2011 to ‘differentiate between the baddies and goodies’ [Nottingham PO Officer 
6]. Officers talked about a typical public order event, like a football match or an 
organised protest as comprising ‘red blobs and white blobs’ and based on the 
theoretical principles of the Elaborated Social Identity Model (ESIM) (see Chapter 
2) about the importance of keeping the white blobs on side to promote police 
legitimacy and prevent grievance against the police and to only ‘hammer the red 
blobs’ [Nottingham PO Officer 6], who are intent on violence. Officers' 
understanding of crowd behaviour was informed by guidance and training for 
public order policing, which was explicitly underpinned by the theoretical 
principles of the Elaborated Social Identity Model (HMIC 2009a; HMIC 2009b; 
ACPO 2010a).  
On the basis of this public order guidance, Nottinghamshire Police did take a 
differentiated approach, but by geography, rather than within a crowd. They 
adopted reassurance policing in the city centre to ensure 'business as usual' and to 
avoid scaring away or antagonising the 'white blobs', who were there to consume. 
By contrast, the police took a paramilitary approach in poor Black neighbourhoods 
associated with gangs, including St Ann’s and Radford. In these neighbourhoods, 
anyone out on the street at night was viewed as having intent to riot and hence 
seen as the 'red blobs' form their public order training. This justified a single 
approach, focused on tactics of control, as this respondent reported: 
A lot of it was just getting to an area, dumping officers, getting control. ... I 
think what they had to get their mind set over was it was a different 
policing arena to a football match. The majority of people that would be out 
on that night were there for criminal intent, so you would not get a normal 
crowd dynamic of 99 per cent of people will not want to be involved and 
you will get the one per cent that want to cause trouble. [Nottingham PO 
Officer 1] 
The comments above denote the 'command and control' response taken in 
Nottingham. Officers described how in usual day-to-day policing officers were able 
to use their own discretion in dealing with incidents. Police discretion can be 
affected by personal prejudice and stereotypes, but it can also allow officers to 
tailor their decisions to the situation, informed by understandings of contextual 
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factors and weighing up the implications of certain actions in light of these factors. 
However, in public order situations, due to the increased threat of danger, 
military-style policing is often adopted (see Waddington 1991). This was the case 
in Nottingham, where officers were clearly briefed on the importance of complying 
with orders:  
What we train our Officers to do day-to-day is sometimes, if you are told to 
do something, they will question it and go well ‘is that the right way boss, 
do we do it this way?’; whereas in public order you want ‘I told you to take 
that ground, take it, don't come back and we will have a discussion’.  So 
they very quickly got into it and, again, I think that was from the briefings 
from the top-down it was very clear what we were about. [Nottingham PO 
Officer 1] 
This top-down approach meant that officers were following orders and not 
necessarily operating according to their own frames of reference. Who constituted 
the ‘red blobs’ and the ‘white blobs’ was largely decided by senior commanders. 
In the city centre, the emphasis was on highly visible, but ‘normal policing’ to 
reassure, which meant officers in standard uniform and PCSOs in their distinctive 
yellow jackets. It was reported how PCSOs ‘were drafted in from across the 
County, to come into the city, to bolster those numbers’ [Nottingham PO Officer 
1]. As well as protection of the public, another reason suggested for why the city 
centre was prioritised was due to its ‘iconic’ status. This rationale was underpinned 
by ‘learning from … the Bradford stuff’, meaning the Bradford riots in 2001, when 
the police made a conscious decision to protect the commercial centre. This 
approach, as noted in Chapter 1, was critiqued by Bagguley and Hussain (2008) for 
deliberately forcing rioters into residential areas, where, consequently, most of the 
damage occurred (Bagguley & Hussain 2008). The respondent recognised the 
tension between ‘looking after commercial people and not residential areas’, but 
justified this approach on the basis that residential areas ‘are very vast’, meaning 
that to provide the same level of resource as the city centre was not possible in all 
residential areas. 
However, the resource put into some residential areas was substantial. The main 
issues relate to why only some residential areas, and not others, and why the 
resource was deployed so differently compared to the city centre. The response 
provided by one public order officer was: 
We deployed our staff into those estates around the outskirts [of the city 
centre] in public order gear because of the fact that tactically it wasn't 
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difficult to work out who was actually out on the streets causing problems 
[Nottingham PO Officer 6] 
There is evidence to suggest that police targeted particular estates on the outskirts 
of the city, including St Ann’s and Radford, due to pre-conceived notions about 
mad mob rioters, which aligned with police stereotypes about gangs and other 
lawless types thought to reside there. How these stereotypes had formed will be 
returned to in the next chapter in the context of community policing and police-
community relations. 
Officers involved in the public order response variously referred to how individuals 
intent on disorder could be identified according to what they were wearing, 
specifically ‘masks’. For example, one officer said ‘it is not difficult here to 
differentiate between the people we need to get at and the people we don't 
because they were frankly in masks’ [Nottingham PO Officer 6]. This contrasts with 
the response from another officer, who claimed that the force ‘maintained local 
operational officers at the front so that they could identify would-be rioters’ 
[Nottingham PO Officer 3]. The latter response, supports a version of events where 
the ‘usual suspects’, meaning those previously known to the police, were the main 
targets during the unrest.  Probing for details of what the masks looked like, 
established that these were ‘just a kerchief’, or a bandana. One officer, described 
how these bandanas were coloured according to an individual’s gang affiliation, 
but also claimed that the bandanas were ‘a daily item of wear’, which would 
perhaps making it difficult for officers to separate those intent on rioting from 
those merely affiliated to a gang. Rather, it seems these two groups were viewed 
as one and the same thing. Some respondents challenged the existence of gangs in 
the study neighbourhoods, which is an issue that will also be explored in the next 
chapter. 
5.4.2 Sheffield 
Recognising that Sheffield’s approach was undoubtedly different to Nottingham’s 
precisely because large-scale unrest did not occur, it still cannot be discounted 
that Sheffield’s approach was instrumental in preventing unrest. It was reported 
how emerging out of the early communications between partners, at the city and 
neighbourhood level, ‘was a general message of restraint and everybody agreed 
and more or less signed up to that’ [Sheffield NPO 1]. Respondents consistently 
referred to a ‘relaxed’ approach, which meant ‘not upping the ante’, by flooding 
areas with resources, and avoiding trigger points. As well as limiting the visibility of 
the police resource, the visibility of youth work resource was also limited. Youth 
work managers and practitioners both described how an unusually high youth 
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work presence in response to anti-social behaviour had previously been found to 
raise tensions. So whilst there was a specific focus on engaging young people, this 
was balanced against perceived risks. 
A number of respondents referred to the importance of keeping ‘riot cops’ out of 
sight, on the basis that this gives young people ‘something to kick against’ 
[Sheffield PO Officer 5].  Community practitioners involved in the response 
reported discussing this explicitly with their policing contacts: 
We were quite clear with the police as well about their community policing. 
‘Don’t just drop your big boys in with truncheons and undo 25 years of 
work. Your PCSOs, who are out in the community every single day, who the 
kids know. You need to cut them some slack.’ [Sheffield Practitioner 1] 
Respondents described how public order trained officers were out on the streets 
or in vans, but ‘they were dressed in normal uniform’ [Sheffield PO Officer 5]. The 
main response was through existing neighbourhood policing structures already 
located within at risk areas.  
In the first instance it would be local police. I think that’s probably one of 
the other things by and large Sheffield gets right; they don’t go in mob-
handed at first. When all we had was rumour and speculation, it was very 
much left to the safer neighbourhood teams across, not just the city centre, 
but like Broomhall and Sharrow, and I guess the East end of the town as 
well. The PCSOs and the local police were ‘get out on foot, but we’re not 
going to flood the city centre with TSG officers in riot gear or anything like 
that’, and then really it was a case of a lot of people driving around, 
checking out things. [Sheffield Manager 5] 
As in Nottingham, the GSB structure was deployed to manage the public order 
response. This was described as being multi-agency at each of the three tiers. The 
Gold tier was much less active in Sheffield than in Nottingham, probably because 
major disorder never erupted, and activities were largely taken forward by the 
Silver and Bronze tiers. At the time, some questioned whether the GSB structure 
was appropriate given its typical emphasis on command and control, which was at 
odds with a whole community approach. However, others opined that the right 
mind-set, particularly of those in commanding positions, ensured an integrated 
approach.  Being police led, it was the mind-set of commanding police officers that 
was particularly important, as well as their pre-existing relationships with partners. 
In this case, respondents suggested that key officers involved in the operation 
were not ‘Tackleberries’, meaning unlike the character Eugene Tackleberry in the 
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Police Academy films, they were not inclined to over-react and go in all guns 
blazing, likely turning a relatively minor incident into something more serious . 
In Sheffield, NPTs were more fully integrated in the main operation than in 
Nottingham. It was reported how officers in Silver Command positions reached out 
to local police and practitioners for information, especially when there were 
reports of pre-disorder, for example: 
So where we had had reports, a mob assembling on London Road, the 
police went up. In the first instance it would be local police. I think that’s 
probably one of the other things, by and large Sheffield gets right, they 
don’t go in mob-handed at first. When all we had was rumour and 
speculation, it was very much left to the safer neighbourhood teams. 
[Sheffield PO Officer 3] 
A view was expressed by one of the public order officers that the use of PSUs 
tends to lead to a different dynamic, which is down to the PSU tactic itself rather 
than the individual officers. Nevertheless, the same respondent felt that traditional 
public order tactics, including the use of water cannons, were required in some 
cases, especially where violent disorder was already in full swing. This highlighted 
the importance of preventing it occurring in the first place and this where other 
methods could be more useful. 
It was suggested that the approach taken in Sheffield was influenced by a number 
of recent events. One of these was the Liberal Democrat party conference held in 
Sheffield city centre earlier the same year, in March 2011. The event was expected 
to draw angry protesters following the party’s formation of a Coalition 
Government with the Conservatives and especially after Nick Clegg’s backtracking 
on funding for higher education. However, the event passed with virtually no 
violence due to a dialogue policing approach using Police Liaison Officers (PLOs), 
wearing distinctive light blue tabards, PLOs aim to cultivate relationships with the 
public and to provide context-specific, real time information to commanding 
officers (Waddington 2013). Negotiated management, as discussed in Chapter 2, 
has been increasingly used to manage public order events, but the PLO role was 
newly specified (HMIC 2009b) and not operationalised in the UK before its use by 
South Yorkshire Police (Gorringe et al. 2012). Commanding officers can be 
reluctant to use negotiated management due to lack of evidence that it works 
(Stott et al. 2013). However, in August 2011, with the same officers still in post, 
South Yorkshire Police had direct experience of its success. Undoubtedly, this gave 
commanding officers the confidence to re-use the approach, albeit re-modelled, in 
the context of the 2011 English Riots. 
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A partnership approach, rather than agencies seeing it as entirely a police matter, 
was the city’s experience of dealing with disorder on an annual basis for the Dark 
Nights Operation (see sec. 5.3.2). It was reported how this had provided a clear 
structure for managing the public order response in August 2011. For example, 
one agency respondent said: 
We have got this type of structure in how we do things. It is not that 
dissimilar to how we do things around dark nights.  So partnership planning 
with clear leads, it's in each organisation, and that lead is then responsible 
for disseminating the relevant information, communicating with staff, being 
able to deploy staff to different places if you need to. So it was a scaled up 
approach to some extent. [Sheffield Manager 3] 
Another recent event that was reported to have influenced the partnership 
response to the threat of unrest, was a recent covert drugs operation, which had 
significantly affected one of the study neighbourhoods because it resulted in the 
arrest of a large number of local males including juveniles as young as 13 years 
(see The Star 2011a). In the study neighbourhood predominated by South Asian 
people another historical event was reported to be important context to the public 
order response. This was the 2001 Bradford riots, which mainly involving South 
Asians. This served as reminder of the consequences of disorder, in terms of 
reputational damage for whole communities and criminal convictions for 
individuals. These events were reported to have given the parental generation 
greater impetus to police their young people, proactively and in partnership, to 
maximise the chances of preventing unrest. Community issues will be returned to 
in Chapter 7. 
5.4.3 Overview 
The terms used to describe the style of policing in each of the cities were vastly 
different. In Nottingham, the consistent view was that the style of policing was 
aggressive and antagonistic, which was explicitly linked by respondents to the 
violent reactions of young men, who felt they were being unfairly treated. By 
comparison, the style of policing in Sheffield was relaxed and restrained to ensure 
young people had nothing ‘to kick against’. The integration of non-police partners 
from the earliest stage in deciding the policing approach was important. Other 
factors promoting a less antagonist approach in Sheffield was the mind-set of the 
public order commander and partners’ recent shared experience of trying to 
maintain order in parts of the city that are prone to volatility around Bonfire Night 
each year. 
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5.5 Policing Tactics 
The general policing approach includes the strategic plan and style of policing, as 
discussed in the previous section, and tactics are the specific ways in which these 
strategic objectives are operationalised. Tactics used by police and partners in the 
two case studies and the consequences of these tactics are now discussed below. 
5.5.1 Nottingham 
The use of the PSU tactic in Nottingham 
has been considered above. Other key 
tactics used in the city include guarded 
perimeters, engage to disperse, stop 
and search, large-scale arrest, police 
dogs and mounted horses. It was 
reported that the use of dogs can be 
effective in public order situations, 
because they are highly mobile and are good at clearing crowds, but the 
comments of one particular officer illustrate how they are not always easy to 
control and can escalate tensions: 
I mean dogs are tremendous. When you have got a snarling dog they are 
difficult to control, they often bite cops because they get that excited but 
the effect they have is worth probably six officers, the ability for a dog to 
move crowds back. It's almost like the dog is better than a horse because 
they know a horse is not going to bite you. [Nottingham PO Officer 1] 
Guarded perimeters were used a number of times in Nottingham. One account 
suggests that officers were put in place around Canning Circus police station to 
provide security after it was attacked.  Another instance was when police officers 
were positioned in numbers around the central rail station during the Nottingham 
Forest Vs Notts County football match on Tuesday, 9th August. This was made to 
look like a football management operation, but was primarily to control who was 
coming in and out of the city, based on fears that people might travel to 
Nottingham to riot. The main guarded perimeter was around the city centre aimed 
at protecting shops and businesses. It was reported how the physical layout of the 
city enabled it to be protected in this way because it did not have many routes in 
and this made it ‘sealable’ [Nottingham Manager 4]. 
There were mixed reports on the efficacy of this ‘ring of steel’, as it was sometimes 
referred to. Many opined that the lack of looting in Nottingham, compared to 
other cities, was directly attributable to the perimeter, by deterring opportunists. 
Figure 5.1: Guarded perimeter, 
Nottingham City Centre 
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A senior officer suggested that it was because the perimeter had thwarted attacks 
on the city centre that rioters had ‘[taken] their frustration out on the peripheral 
police stations’ [Nottingham Manager 3]. Other respondents claimed that the 
perimeter was only successful because ‘there was no intention for anyone to go’, 
evidenced by the fact that ‘no-one came to challenge it … [except] a few silly kids’ 
[Nottingham Practitioner 2]. They suggested that had ‘someone with a brain’ really 
wanted to attack the city centre, this would have caused problems for the police 
regardless. Only one respondent claimed they had actually seen people approach 
the perimeter, but their account seemed heavily influenced by their view of what 
this group was intent on, rather than actual behaviours:  
So you could see from the control centre in the evening groups, a St Ann’s 
group on the CCTV, trying to come into the city centre and there was clearly 
the desire to have this great sort of festival of burglary that other cities had 
had [Nottingham Manager 4] 
Speaking to the Home Affairs Select Committee (2011b) after the riots, Assistant 
Chief Constable Broadbent identified another key tactic as ‘engage to disperse’. He 
claimed the tactic worked well because it meant that the police ‘were able to keep 
those people who were intent on disturbances primarily on the back foot’ (Ev 71). 
As discussed above, police interpreted ‘intent’ if individuals were present on the 
streets at night in particular parts of the city, especially if they had been in trouble 
with the police before. The engage to disperse tactic was used because, unlike 
other riot-affected cities, the police were not faced with large groups of people 
overtly intent on conflict, but instead ‘small numbers of people – generally around 
about 10 or a few more – on street corners who we felt were prepared to commit 
violent acts if we didn’t go and engage with them in the ﬁrst place’ (ibid).  
The dispersal tactic was referred to alternatively as ‘cat and mouse’, which on the 
first night was reported primarily to be a way of keeping people out of the city 
centre. Officers involved, reported the result to be ‘fairly chaotic’, but successful: 
I almost felt like yeah we are playing a bit of cat and mouse with them, but 
if all we are doing is chasing people around and they are not actually 
burning things down and smashing things up, to an extent we are kind of, 
they are going to get tired after a bit and they will go home and you know 
to an extent by about four o'clock in the morning it was almost like it is 
bedtime now we are going to go home. It didn't kind of like, it wasn't kind 
of like they weren't so you know incensed to sort of keep it going and create 
more and more disorder. [Nottingham PO Officer 4] 
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A NPO provided a similar account, but wherein the young people ‘weren't looking 
to get into the city; they were just playing games with the police really. There were 
lots of places that they could go, like little cut-throughs and they were just using 
that’ [Nottingham NPO 2]. This latter version suggests the dispersal tactic actually 
contributed to a sense of disorder in the city. 
A third and more negative account of the ‘engage to disperse’ tactic suggests that 
it raised tensions and directly promoted conflict and violence. McKenzie, a 
resident academic in St Ann’s, claimed that the dispersal tactic, targeting young  
people gathered in a local park actually provoked violence on the Tuesday night 
(cited in Clifton 2011). A gathering, of around a 100 teenagers had formed in 
Arboretum Park after arrangements had been disseminated via Blackberry 
Messenger. Riot police arrived at about 7pm to begin dispersing the crowd, and it 
was at this point that a breakaway group of eight young males occupied the roof of 
the adjacent Nottingham Girls’ High School. Immediately surrounded by police, the 
group began to throw missiles, including roof tiles, at officers. With no opportunity 
to escape, the group were down within an hour and arrested. One young female 
bystander recounted: 
The police chased them for no reason, for what they looked like and the 
way they was. …and if they hadn't chased them, they were not going to 
loot, and they were not going to climb on a building and shout abuse, or 
whatever they were suspected of doing. (cited in Clifton 2011) 
A newspaper article (BBC 2012) claimed that the group on the roof were 
associated with an older group of males that had been tracked to the park by a 
police helicopter after throwing missiles and causing damage in St Ann’s.  
However, officers involved in the incident did not recall this association when 
interviewed for the study. Instead, they reported that their main concern at the 
time was to prevent this group of boys, deemed to be of a type likely to riot, 
causing them more serious problems further down the line: 
So we had them kind of surrounded. Well my view was we were in a 
position where we could keep back people that weren't involved so I set up 
a kind of outer cordon I suppose really. They were on the roof. I got staff on 
the roof. I made it clear to people I did not want people going on there and 
fighting on the roof because there was obviously risk. They weren't going 
anywhere. It very quickly materialised that they were some of the key 
potential protagonists in the St Ann’s area that were going to cause us a lot 
of problems. They were all known to us and they were all kind of key players 
in terms of, or the intelligence suggested they were key players around 
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other matters that might have been happening in St Ann’s. [Nottingham PO 
Officer 4] 
Five of the eight boys, one as young as 13 years old, later appeared in court 
charged with violent disorder. There were mixed views about this outcome, even 
amongst police officers. One officer claimed these males were affiliated to a 
known urban street gang, which explained their behaviour and justified the 
outcome. Another officer claimed they were just kids caught up in the moment 
and the outcome was especially unfortunate given the harsh sentences handed 
out by the judiciary for offences linked to the 2011 Riots (see Piper 2011). 
Accounts of the Pym Street disturbances suggest the police chasing of young 
people directly contributed to the damage to residential properties and vehicles. 
During this incident, it was reported that the police aim was more to corral and 
arrest, than disperse, but it was the chase that was primarily responsible for the 
criminal damage. It was reported how the police were in St Ann’s after reports of 
disorder, whereupon officers began chasing a group of youths down Pym Street. 
The youths were intentionally channelled down Pym Street because it had limited 
exit points. It was as they progressed down the street to the single pedestrian exit 
at the bottom that the damage was caused. Respondents described how the 
youths jumped on cars and knocked off wing mirrors, most likely as a show of 
strength or frustration. Consequently, the damage on Pym Street was referred to 
as 'collateral damage' by officers [Nottingham PO Officer 3], because it was neither 
pre-planned nor maliciously targeted at the affected residents. Rather, ‘they had 
been chased by the police and they took the opportunity’ [Nottingham NPO 2]. 
Nottinghamshire Police also put a section 60 in place, at least by the Tuesday 
evening. Section 60 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (CJPOA) is an 
exceptional power of stop and search to tackle imminent threat of violence, 
allowing officers to search anyone in a certain area, without reasonable suspicion. 
Once in place, a section 60AA enables a similar authorisation to be given 
permitting constables to require the removal of face coverings if the constable 
reasonably believes these are worn wholly or mainly for the purpose of concealing 
identity.  The power to stop and search provided by the Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1984 has attracted a great deal of criticism (Bowling & Phillips 2007; 
Delsol & Shiner 2015). It is typically perceived to be unfair by individuals affected 
and statistics suggest it used discriminately with BME populations, especially Black 
people.  Section 60 has attracted similar criticisms and additionally on the basis 
that its use is poorly monitored and, consequently, poorly regulated (Runnymede 
Trust n.d.). It is increasingly used to respond to low level disorder and linked to this 
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a Home Affairs Select Committee report (2011a)  suggests that although section 60 
powers are designed to prevent imminent acts of violence, their use in the months 
leading up to the riots may have had the opposite effect.  
The intelligence used to inform the decision of Nottinghamshire Police to put a 
section 60 in place was not accessed by this study, but accounts of how it was used 
and its consequences were revealed during interviews. Respondents suggested 
that the tactic used in the immediate context of the riots may have caused at least 
some of the violence in Nottingham. For example, an account by one officer 
implied that the use of section 60 provoked conflict with the police, due to anger 
on the part of people who felt they had been treated unfairly: 
There were people throwing bottles and bricks at police cars, and yeah you 
may have been searched and you may have thought there wasn't any 
grounds for it, but we put a section 60 in place. That for me would be the 
negative side. [Nottingham NPO 2] 
The section 60AA additionally supported the tactic of large-scale arrests by making 
a person refusing to remove his or her face covering when requested liable to 
imprisonment for up to a month or a fine. In practice this meant that 'they would 
just get arrested, not questioned at all' [Nottingham PO Officer 6]. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, research has previously found that arrests deemed unreasonable by 
people in a public order situation can escalate tensions. 
Large-scale arrest was a defining tactic of the police response in Nottingham. One 
officer involved in the public order response referred to the human rights 
implications of arrest, which deprives people of their right to liberty, set out in 
article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and enshrined in 
British law by the Human Rights Act 1998. The right to liberty is a limited right, 
meaning that it can only be interfered with in specific circumstances, for example 
in the case of lawful arrest or detention for criminal offences after conviction by a 
competent court; for non-compliance with the lawful order of a court or to secure 
the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; or to bring a person before the 
competent legal authority after committing an offence or on 'reasonable suspicion' 
of having committed an offence or being about to commit an offence. In relation 
to the Nottingham arrests, most were made for latter reason, i.e. due to 
reasonable suspicion of an offence about to be committed. The respondent made 
reference to how officers have to weigh the human rights of the individual against 
the rights of the wider public (e.g. the right to life): 
If you are taking somebody’s liberty then that's quite an infringement on 
people's human rights isn't it? But then you need to look at the necessity 
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factors that might mean that you might want to arrest somebody. So seeing 
this individual I clearly think if I let them go from here, there is a real risk of 
a further breach of the peace taking place, even if they haven't actually 
caused that petrol bomb to be ignited down the road. [Nottingham PO 
Officer 4] 
This response illustrates the conundrum for officers working in stressful and 
potentially life-threatening situations. What is deemed 'reasonable' in such 
situations may seem less so in the cold light of day. Officers referred to arrests 
made proactively in this way - with the sole aim of removing people from the 
streets - as 'positive arrests'; despite these potentially contravening article 5. 
Positive arrests were not, however, merely a product of frontline conditions. 
Officers were strongly and clearly directed 'down to the last officer on the van' to 
use arrest as a way to prevent and contain disorder; and this was commanded 
from the highest level: 
Mr Broadbent, part of his strategy and his briefing was that he wanted us 
to have a proactive approach towards arrests. So he did not want us to give 
people lots of chances to go on their way and then go and cause some 
damage around the corner. So he did not want us to give people lots of 
chances to go on their way. [Nottingham PO Officer 4] 
It was reported how officers would usually be more considered about making 
arrests, not least because of the paperwork involved. In public order situations 
specifically, officers were usually instructed 'to take prisoners as a last option' and 
instead to negotiate wherever possible. In this respect, the order given in August 
2011 directly conflicted with usual protocol. Temporary arrangements were put in 
place to facilitate mass arrests. Officers were told 'there will be a prisoner handling 
team … so you won't have to deal with it yourself. All you will be required to do is 
make the arrest and put a witness statement in' [Nottingham PO Officer 4]. 
Officers were additionally told that 'if necessary we will double people up in the 
cells … You deal with what you need'. The aim was to create the circumstances 
whereby officers would 'take action'. 
This tactic resulted in more than 117 arrests. From these arrests, 75 people were 
charged (Nottingham Post 2012), meaning that at least 42 people were arrested 
without sufficient evidence to tie the suspect to the crime. Nearly a third of the 
arrests were youths (aged 10-17 years) and more than three-quarters (78%) were 
younger than 25 years (One Nottingham 2011), fitting with the younger age profile 
of rioters generally across the country. More than half were Black or Mixed 
ethnicity and the overwhelming majority (91%) were previously known to the 
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police. This latter statistic may be explained by officers targeting the 'usual 
suspects', as discussed above, due to preconceived notions of who was likely to 
riot.  
5.5.2 Sheffield 
Respondents spoke about the importance of preventing gatherings, likely to lead 
to disorder by using a dispersal tactic. This was identified as an appropriate 
response to a plan, uncovered by a group of the city’s Young Advisors, for people 
to meet in the city centre outside a large department store, TJ Hughes. It was 
described how police deployed a helicopter to detect and groups travelling to this 
spot so that officers on the ground could be informed and sent to disperse them 
before they arrived. It was not clear how many groups were detected or dispersed, 
but ultimately there was no gathering outside TJ Hughes. The other tactic used to 
prevent the gathering in the town centre was mounted horses, which were 
apparently positioned close to the department store, but there were no police cars 
or vans, which some respondents felt might have been antagonistic. It was noted, 
however, that the police were not dispersing groups in residential parts of the city. 
As discussed above, NPTs and community practitioners were taking the lead in 
their local areas, primarily focused on engagement. Where groups were identified 
as needing to be dispersed, practitioners reported being the ones to deal with this 
in the first instance. As one respondent said, the police ‘didn’t come in too heavy 
handed, dispersing groups. They kind of let us deal with that’ [Sheffield 
Practitioner 1]. The police played only a supporting role when contacted by youth 
workers for help in specific situations.  
The main policing tactic deployed in Sheffield was liaison, which is a key aspect of 
the PLO role, deployed by South Yorkshire Police (SYP) for the Liberal Democrat 
party conference in March 2011. This communications-oriented approach was 
consistent with recommendations contained in recently published HMIC reports 
(2009b; 2009a). It was also due to the force’s mission statement, formally 
committing all ranks to re-establishing the public trust and confidence that had 
been lost as a result of the its controversial roles in the 1984–1985 miners’ strike 
and the Hillsborough football stadium disaster of 1989 in which almost a hundred 
spectators died amidst allegations of police mismanagement (Waddington 2013; 
D. Waddington 2007). The force’s mission statement is likely to have promoted 
SYP’s permissive approach again in August. The recent development and use of 
PLTs subsequently provided a tangible framework for operationalising this 
permissive approach. A case study of the Liberal Democrat party policing operation 
(Waddington 2013), named Operation Obelisk, reports how PLTs mingled with 
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protesters to cultivate a relationship  of mutual trust and rapport and how this 
reduced the ‘chance of inducing the type of hostility and opposition that would 
have greeted their more conventionally deployed police colleagues’ (p.63). The 
study also reports clear lines of communication between PLTs and Silver Command 
to accurately inform decision-making, thereby avoiding the perception of 
indiscriminate and unjust police interventions. 
The success of Operation Obelisk thus informed Operation Mimosa, SYP’s name for 
their public order response in August 2011. PCSOs, alongside other influential 
community practitioners, mingled not with protesters, but with local people, to 
similarly cultivate a relationship of mutual trust and rapport and to reduce the 
chance of inducing hostility and conflict. The lines of communication were similarly 
clear between the PCSOs and Silver Command. In this respect, PCSOs were 
transmuted to what might be termed ‘Community Liaison Officers’, rather Police 
Liaison Officers, in the context of unrest. For Operation Obelisk, many of the PLOs 
were trained negotiators. No doubt this training provided invaluable skills for a 
range of scenarios, including protests, but in the study neighbourhoods these skills 
may have not been enough. It was reported how it took a long time to build trust 
in these neighbourhoods and local people were highly suspicious of new people 
who tried to befriend them. For example, one community practitioner reported 
how they were suspected of being a covert police officer when taking up their 
position in one of the study neighbourhoods: 
When I first came into [the study neighbourhood], if I had a pound for every 
time a young person said to me ‘are you five-o?’. I had to say ‘no I’m not’. 
I’ve gone out with very experienced youth workers, who’ve 20 years’ 
experience of working that community, and I’ve had to say to kids ‘ask 
[another practitioner], I’m not the old bill’. [Sheffield Practitioner 1] 
Hence, PLOs could have made matters worse. Local knowledge of who was who in 
local communities also meant that PCSOs could identify outsiders. Unfamiliar 
groups coming into the area was reported as a tension indicator. Community 
Practitioners in one of the study areas were worried about groups coming to stir 
their young people into violent action. 
It has already been detailed how, in Sheffield, PSUs were not visibly deployed, 
especially in residential areas, in case they escalated tensions and gave young 
people something to kick against. However, it was reported how PSUs were 
available in the background in case they were needed. As for the Liberal Democrat 
party conference, PSUs were placed in back streets out of sight, but close to the 
city centre to enable a fast response. Respondents reported how this arrangement 
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increased their confidence to carry out their roles during the unrest and, 
consequently, they reporting feeling worried when PSUs from Sheffield were being 
transported to other cities to provide mutual aid. Other tactics, such as engaging 
parents to help deal with their children, were seen as a more effective. This 
confirms what others have previously reported about the importance of non-
formal authority figures in preventing rioting (Morrell et al. 2011). For example, 
one NPO reported: 
I think sometimes the lads, particularly when they’ve got the riot vans 
there, they play up to it, because they always say to me, ‘oh [respondent’s 
name], you don’t chase me, why don’t you chase me because those others 
will’. ‘Well I know where you live, I know your mother. If I’ve got a problem 
I’ll go and knock on your door and speak to your mum and dad about it, and 
we’ll sort it out’. [Sheffield NPO 2] 
The concept and role of informal social controls will be returned to in Chapter 7. 
This Chapter builds on some of the findings briefly indicated here about how 
communities were involved in many activities to protect themselves. 
5.5.3 Overview 
Many of the tactics used by Nottinghamshire Police were provocative and it was 
reported that they escalated tensions and caused conflict with people who 
perceived they had been treated unfairly. These tactics included chasing young 
people around their local areas, searching them without reasonable suspicion and 
large-scale arrest based on ‘intent’ rather than actual behaviours. South Yorkshire 
Police, by contrast, used dialogue policing to engage with at risk groups in more 
positive ways. For groups with less favourable relations with the police, the 
involvement of youth workers to ‘negotiate’ the situation was a success factor.  
5.6 Information and Intelligence 
The flow of information has been covered to some extent in discussing who was 
involved in the public order operations in each of the case studies. This is because 
communication is central to how partners work together and can be a barrier to 
partnership working. However, a distinct section is warranted here to explore the 
role and effectiveness of different channels of communication, such as social 
media, which is of increasing interest in the context of critical incident 
management (Procter, Crump, et al. 2013). The section will also reflect on the 
distinction between information and intelligence, which emerged as an important 
theme due to its relevance in decision-making.   
- 169 - 
5.6.1 Nottingham 
Communications within Nottinghamshire Police Force were supported by the GSB 
structure, as well as regular briefings, which ensured that officers across the three 
tiers, on day and night shifts, were well-informed about what was happening and 
the approach to take. The picture was less clear on the effectiveness of 
communications between the GSB structure and NPTs. As discussed above, some 
NPTs reported feeling isolated from the response, suggesting that information was 
not being systematically disseminated to them. However, it was still possible that 
information was being fed upwards from NPTs to the public order operation.  One 
NPO reported receiving information about possible trouble in one of the study 
neighbourhoods and ‘feeding it into the uniform inspectors that were patrolling 
the areas’. A respondent involved in the strategic response also reported that 
decisions were being made on current intelligence about ‘activity [and] what was 
known about the individuals who were planning to commit disorder’ and that 
intelligence was ‘the brain of it all’. Responses such as these support a version of 
events where local information was being utilised. Alternatively, another police 
respondent reflected on the failure to use local intelligence in the early stages, 
which might have prevented unrest: 
Part of the problem with police intelligence is it relies on what’s happening 
in their locality, and their intelligence is the big square thing in the corner 
[i.e. a television]. That was the intelligence for us all. I think we failed to 
properly respond to it. [Nottingham Manager 1] 
Communication issues arose within the police force in relation to the police 
control and radio system. While there is no evidence that these necessarily 
impacted on local disorder, they are worth considering for future events on this 
scale. It was reported that there were ‘blockages’ in the control room due to the 
amount of calls received. The role of the control room is critical during a large 
operation, due to its coordinating role when hundreds of officers are on the same 
radio frequency. It was reported that officers are typically instructed not to use 
their radios to allow information from the control room to be heard. However, 
during the public order operation, commanders found it difficult receiving 
instructions from their tactical advisers at the same time as the control room. 
There was also the problem that personnel in the control room were not well 
placed to make decisions about where to deploy officers due to the fast changing 
nature of events, and in some cases commanders had to overrule them. Officers 
did not always wait for instructions from the control room, but sometimes self-
deployed. As officers became aware of the petrol bombing at Canning Circus Police 
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Station, they immediately responded. This makes sense from the perspective that 
officers’ lives were in danger, but nonetheless undermines the command and 
control arrangement, intended to limit the use of discretion within public order 
situations (Waddington 1993). 
Documentary and interview data together suggest that agencies in Nottingham 
worked well together to communicate with the general public via the use of social 
media. Nottinghamshire Police and the City Council received a joint award for their 
use of Twitter, associated with the huge number followers amassed during the 
disturbances, rising from about 3,000 to 16,500 over a two week period 
(Nottingham Post 2011b). However, this research confirms the findings from 
previous studies (Procter, Crump, et al. 2013; Procter, Vis, et al. 2013) that Twitter 
can present both a challenge and an opportunity. In Nottingham, social media 
provided an opportunity to reassure the public in real time, to quell rumours, 
correct misinformation and disseminate positive messages about how well the 
police were managing the situation. As one respondent put it: 'within a minute of 
us reading some nonsense we were able to put something out saying 'no, that is 
just not true'' [Nottingham PO Officer 6]. It was reported how Twitter was used to 
promote 'business as usual', a key aim of the policing response, by ensuring that 
people had accurate information about Tuesday night's football game. People 
were informed that the game was still on, dispelling existing rumours that it was 
cancelled, and that buses and trams were running as usual to help them get there.  
The challenge emerged in relation to how well social media can be a source of 
information for the police. Although social media was reported to have been used 
to identify individuals trying to incite violence and to identify where disorder was 
occurring, many of these tweets ‘weren't true' (Jo Hall, new media 
communications officer for Nottinghamshire Police Force, cited in the Nottingham 
Post 2011b). Respondents reported that it was impossible to rely on information 
received from the public, via social media or otherwise, because (a) the amount 
was overwhelming, and (b) because it was impossible to gauge its accuracy. As one 
respondent explained 'intelligence is only really information that's been graded' 
[Sheffield PO Officer 3], but it was almost impossible to grade all of the incoming 
information. Consequently, a lot was disregarded. There is the additional problem 
for the police that inaccurate tweets have the potential to raise anxiety and fear to 
an extent that outweighs their own reassurance efforts. Research found that 
rumours on Twitter were largely ‘self-correcting’ during the 2011 English riots, but 
nevertheless there remains a public safety case for providing information and 
advice via sources that the public can better trust in a timely way (Procter, Vis, et 
al. 2013).  
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Police officers referred specifically to the use of the National Decision-making 
Model (NDM) in managing the public order response. The NDM is a decision-
making tool used by the police to help determine a suitable course of action across 
a range of situations (College of Policing 2013b). It has five key elements - 
information, assessment, powers and policy, options and action and review - 
which are bound together by the code of ethics as a sixth element. Some officers 
in Nottingham referred to the NDM without contention, but others expressed 
concerns about its usefulness, on the basis that it was only ever as good as the 
information being fed into it; and, because decision-making was ultimately 
subjective. Consequently, risk might be assessed differently by different 
commanders using the same model: 
I mean we have looked at the multi-dimensional risk assessment, so we look 
at the subject, location and see what the threat is, whether it is low; but it's 
difficult because it is subjective quite of a lot of the time, you know it might 
be your opinion that it's going to be high ... So I feel it's not a real great 
model in assessing threat, risk and harm really. You could have six different 
commanders and we will all probably have different viewpoints on the 
threat. [Nottingham PO Officer 2] 
The flow of information from community practitioners was not been fed directly 
into the public order response. However, it was reported that where relationships 
were good, practitioners did share information with NPTs, meaning they did have 
the potential to inform decisions where NPTs were integrated in the public order 
response. It was reported how some community practitioners were never going to 
hand over their information to the police. These tended to the practitioners 
closest to young people in the Nottingham study neighbourhoods. Reasons for not 
sharing information with the police included (a) because there was a lack of trust 
between these practitioners and local officers; and (b) because their relationships 
with young people were built on trust and confidentiality, which might have been 
undermined by any disclosure to the police. There were, however, certain officers 
in the police force and within the Council’s Community Protection team who were 
trusted by practitioners with information. But, there remained some concern, 
given the fast pace of events, whether this information reached decision-makers in 
time, due to the convoluted chain of communications: 
Some of our communication channels weren't as well joined up as they 
might have be, but informal channels were working, and they were working 
up and down and across grades.  So you had … a voluntary sector partner, 
talking to a youth service manager, who was then talking to somebody who 
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wasn't actually in [their] own line management chain; then I was talking to 
a [senior manager] in a different directorate, and he then used his links in to 
the police … to highlight the risk.  Now it’s clear that even then it nearly 
went wrong, because there was some, early evening, there were some 
disturbances … [and] the police turned up in large numbers’ [Nottingham 
Manager 6] 
 
5.6.2 Sheffield 
Respondents in Sheffield also referred to the National Decision Model. Officers 
involved in the public order response reported how the model supported the 
process of decision-making, but did not resolve anything in itself. Its strength was 
that it promoted ‘logical thinking’ over ‘emotional thinking’. Ultimately, however, 
the model relied on the quality of the information being fed into it. It was reported 
how the police tended to rely simply on the use of the model without considering 
this. In 2011, officers reported that emphasis was duly placed on intelligence. In 
this case intelligence was referred to as the contextualised information provided 
by local police and practitioners on the frontline. Their intelligence was prioritised 
in decision-making over that received even from police analysts on the 
understanding that however well trained police analysts were likely to be blind to 
the important nuances of the situation. For example, it was reported how: 
Young men from deprived areas, if you don’t know what you’re looking at, 
look aggressive because it’s culturally what they’re trying to do. They’re 
trying to be young men. So if you don’t know what you’re dealing with, it’s 
having the confidence to say ‘I’m going with the PCSO. They work it 
regularly. They know’ [Sheffield PO Officer 3] 
Information not only flowed between local policing teams and central command, 
but in multifarious directions. As discussed above, a number of structures 
supported the flow of information, including partnership structures, such as 
Community Assemblies, Safer Neighbourhood Team s; regular meetings, such as 
Neighbourhood Action Group meetings; and shared processes and projects, such 
as the school tension monitoring system and the Dark Nights operation. 
Additionally, community structures facilitated communication with certain 
communities. For example, the Sheffield Federation of Mosques, facilitated 
communication with Muslim people across the city. Police were texting key 
contacts in the Federation of Mosques to provide reassurance and to correct 
rumours and these texts were being disseminating widely through the Federation’s 
own networks, especially through Friday prayers. Hence, it was a conduit for 
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information that also ensured a unified message to prevent confusion that might 
become a source of tension. Respondents from the Muslim community also 
reported the importance of the local radio station for communicating positive 
messages via one of the Asian programmes broadcast: ‘The local radio played a 
positive role, where you were able to go on radio and say ‘no, no no, this is what 
we need to be doing’. I think it was giving that positive message’ [Sheffield 
Practitioner 2]. 
South Yorkshire Police had a small number of staff responsible for the social media 
aspect of Operation Mimosa as well as a greater number of officers using social 
media in their own way. It was reported how the aims of the social media strategy 
were not only to quell rumours but to enhance the reputation of the force, ‘to 
engender some public feeling’, and ‘improve morale in the County’. The 
centralised social media activity was predominantly via Twitter, a micro-blogging 
site set up in 2006, allowing users to post messages, known as 'tweets', of up to 
140 characters. Unlike some other social media, such as Facebook, Twitter's model 
is directed and non-reciprocal, meaning that users can follow without having to be 
followed back. Another distinctive feature of Twitter, which was particularly useful 
in the context of the 2011 riots, is 'hashtags', which offer a way for users to label a 
tweet with a topic, distinguished by the prefix '#'. This facilitates information 
discovery and sharing, as anyone searching for the hashtag can see what everyone 
else is saying about this topic. The social media team were located in the next 
room to the Silver Command and so they had a direct line of communication, 
ensuring that messages were accurate and timely. It was reported how a decision 
was taken not to respond directly to individuals, as some other forces did, but 
send out a report based on a number of messages. 
Another social media campaign was orchestrated by a team of the city’s Young 
Advisors, who are trained as consultants to guide the Council and its partners on 
the needs and experiences of young people. Young Advisors were reported to be 
drawn from diverse backgrounds and were not ‘your typical A-star students’. 
Under the guidance of the youth service, this team came up with a strategy to 
spread positive messages to and about young people during those early weeks of 
August 2011. One member of the team came up with the strapline ‘Steel City, Not 
Steal City’, with reference to the looting that was taking place elsewhere and to 
draw on the pride of Sheffield residents associated with its reputation for stainless 
steel manufacturing. It was reported that the Young Advisors used Twitter and 
Facebook to quickly and effectively get messages out. They were also challenging 
negative messages. An example was given whereby they asked a user to delete 
their link to video footage of looting in Birmingham with a question along the lines 
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‘are we going to do this in Sheffield?’. It was the Young Advisor’s monitoring of 
social media that first identified the plan for young people to gather in the town 
centre. They were also correcting rumours about police plans to use repressive 
tactics. The real success of the Young Advisors’ involvement in the public order 
response was that the police listened to them. The police took their role and 
information seriously and allowed the Young Advisors to report things 
anonymously. Hence, it ‘felt safe’ for them [Sheffield Manager 8].  
5.6.3 Overview 
Nottingham’s use of social media during the riots was celebrated, specifically 
because the police increased their number of twitter followers more than five-fold. 
However, the content of tweets mirrored their approach to street-based policing. 
They largely used social media to provide messages of reassurance to the general 
public and not to engage with at risk groups, as was the case in Sheffield. Young 
people in Sheffield were involved in identifying threats to social order on Facebook 
and other social media sites. They also disseminated messages to instil a sense of 
pride in the city to mitigate motivations to riot. Inter-agency communication in 
both case studies was promoted by pre-existing partnership structures; and 
communication with local people in Sheffield was facilitated by community 
structures that increased the reach of protective messages.   
5.7 Conclusion 
Reflecting across the public order responses in both case studies it can be 
concluded, unsurprisingly, that being proactive offers a better chance of avoiding 
unrest. However, this is only the case if the approach taken by policing partners is 
generally relaxed and does not visibly flood localities with resources, which can 
raise tensions. The general approach was not decided in a vacuum, but influenced 
by local contextual factors, including agencies’ perceptions of ‘would-be’ rioters; 
recent events that may have influenced these and/or provided understanding of 
how to manage a community crisis; and pre-existing relationships and channels of 
communication between policing partners, including community-based 
practitioners. 
Socio-structural factors may be responsible for the marginalisation of some 
groups, making them more likely to riot. This requires the involvement of people 
who can best reach them, which may not be the police, but youth workers who 
have been able to build some level of rapport through sustained local 
engagement. This puts an emphasis on long-term youth provision and policing 
partnerships involving youth providers, but at a level that does not compromise 
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youth workers’ relationships with young people. Social media is a good way of 
communicating with the public to reassure and quash rumours as soon as they 
emerge and before they can incite violence. There is evidence that social media 
can also be used to engage those at risk of rioting, which, again, is most likely to be 
effective when the messages derive from people with influence, most likely people 
within the community.  
NPTs have a role to play in managing the threat of urban disorder. While they may 
not have relationships with the most marginalised youth, they may have an 
understanding of who they are, who has influence with them, and what their 
normal behaviour looks like. On this basis, NPTs, and especially PCSOs, are well 
placed to feed intelligence to inform the decision-making of public order 
commanders. PCSOs can be deployed in similar a role to PLOs, used in other public 
order situations, such as football events and political demonstrations, by virtue of 
their pre-established rapport with local people, knowledge of the local area and 
community engagement skills, which together prepare them well for dialogue 
policing. 
The style of policing informs the choice of tactics by police and partners. Dispersing 
people before they get chance to gather as a crowd was used to some extent in 
both case study areas with variable success. It seems critical who is involved in the 
dispersal and how it is done, in terms of perceptions of procedural fairness. 
Dispersing usual street-based groups is likely to antagonise, underlining the 
importance of involving people who know what is ‘normal’ for the time and place. 
Arrests may be required to protect people and property, but using large-scale 
arrest as a strategy from the outset to prevent disorder by taking ‘would-be’ 
rioters off the streets is likely to have the opposite effect.  
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Chapter 6 – Local Policing and Partnerships 
6.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter focused on the immediate context to urban unrest in 2011, 
specifically how the activities of police and partners over a brief but critical period 
influenced outcomes. The current and following chapters take a wider perspective, 
exploring local contextual factors over the longer term, in the years and decades 
preceding the unrest. This chapter will specifically look at the pre-existing 
relationships between local agencies and communities. It is argued that the nature 
of these relationships determined the capability and willingness of various 
stakeholders to work together. The chapter begins by looking at police-community 
relations. As with previous disturbances, evidence suggests that simmering 
tensions due to repressive policing were most probably the tinder for riots in 
Nottingham. The spark was an antagonistic public order response, as described in 
the previous chapter. It is legitimate to consider that the crime-fighting activities of 
the police are likely to affect some relationships within communities; however, the 
Sheffield case study demonstrates that neighbourhood level tensions can be 
diffused by certain remedial actions, which themselves can provide a framework 
for responding to future crises. Remedial actions need to be perceived by 
communities as both genuine and effective. Ineffective resolution processes are 
likely to undermine police legitimacy further. 
The chapter moves on to look at relationships between the police and other local 
agencies, exploring the realities of policing by partnership in the two case studies.  
A key finding is that pre-existing partnership relationships provide tried and 
trusted ways of working together, including channels of communication and 
decision-making processes, which are essential for managing a crisis. Trying to 
establish relations in the moment is thwart with difficulty. A key challenge in the 
Nottingham case study was the lack of mutual trust between agencies, which 
tends to be promoted by positive experiences and shared successes and, hence, 
can only be built over time. Tense relations, linked in part to local funding 
arrangements, meant that partnership working was only partial. Despite routine 
but low level incongruities between agencies in Sheffield, goodwill and routine 
partnership processes kicked in to promote a more joined-up response. A range of 
factors has historically supported partnership working in the city, including co-
location of agencies and dedicated partnership structures and roles. Given the 
timing of this study, respondents were able to reflect on the impact of austerity 
measures. Unanimously, recent and planned changes were thought to be 
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detrimental to partnership working, undermining future capability to respond to 
unrest and other critical incidents. 
6.2 Police-Community Relations 
The nature of police-community relations have been spotlighted in explanations of 
previous riots. In particular, riots in the early 1980s were linked to Black people’s 
anger at the police due to failures in community policing and the use of repressive 
practices, particularly stop and search (see Chapter 1). Some explanations of the 
2011 Riots resonate with this. The report of the Riots Communities and Victims 
Panel (2012) described how in riot-affected areas young people’s trust in the 
police was ‘close to zero’ due to stop and search, which was ‘not necessarily 
intelligence-led’ and was carried out in a demeaning manner (p.106). This section 
examines the nature of police-community relations in case studies to help consider 
whether social order outcomes were somehow related. It describes how 
disproportionate targeting of young Black and Mixed race men in parts of 
Nottingham in the months and years preceding the unrest had produced anger, 
which was the 'tinder' for the riots locally. Although Nottingham's local inquiry 
(One Nottingham 2011) into the disturbances made no reference to police-
community relations, many respondents, including police officers, suggested that 
the actions of rioters were primarily 'against the police and against establishments’ 
[Nottingham PO Officer 3]. The police investigation found that a number of the 
individuals involved in the bombing of Canning Circus Police Station had visited 
police hatred websites [Nottingham PO Officer 7]. This section suggests that 
police-community relations were better in Sheffield. Similar to Nottingham, 
repressive practices were largely used by specialist response teams, but local 
grievances had been mitigated by the efforts of both senior officers and 
Neighbourhood Policing Teams, who had directly engaged with communities to 
make amends.  
6.2.1 Repressive and unfair practices 
It was described how the ‘relationship between the police and the Black 
community in Nottingham [was] exceptionally poor, and particularly in St Ann’s 
where quite a lot of the individuals came from that were involved’ [Nottingham 
Manager 5]. Some police respondents suggested that police-community relations 
could be worse, on the basis that the force was not ‘having officers assaulted 
routinely [or]… cars attacked’ and there were no ‘no-go areas’ where officers felt 
unsafe, although in some neighbourhoods ‘you can absolutely feel that it ain’t your 
territory [Nottingham Manager 1]. The dominant explanation for the poor 
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relationships was repressive policing. Officers and other senior stakeholders in the 
city referred specifically to anti-drugs operations that had antagonised the 
residents in the study neighbourhoods over several years leading up to the 
disturbances. As discussed in Chapter 5, Nottingham had historically received 
negative attention for being the UK’s most dangerous city (Gibbs & Haldenby 
2006) and dubbed ‘Shottingham’, the gun crime capital (Nottingham Post 2015). 
This had given impetus to a range of policing strategies and operations to deal with 
violence in the city. It was reported how policing activities had focused on the 
illegal drugs market as a ‘route into organised crime gangs’ [Nottingham Manager 
3]. This ‘campaign’ was associated with some successes, including £40 million of 
heroin seized, but was recognised as having a detrimental impact on community 
relations, particularly with the city’s Black community.  
It was reported that these anti-drugs operations in Nottingham, involving covert 
surveillance and house raids, took place between 2008 and 2010 and most of the 
convictions were in 2010 and 2011. Approximately 80 per cent of those arrested 
were given custodial sentences, estimated to be about 175 individuals. Some study 
participants emphasised the necessity of these operations because criminal 
elements must be dealt with and because the community had asked the 
authorities to deal with drug dealing on their streets. Few might challenge this 
basic proposition, but the way the issue of drug dealing was dealt with was 
contentious. Community practitioners reported that house raids, in particular, had 
angered people because they were repeatedly targeted at innocent households: 
Another thing that people were complaining about was, there’s a lot of 
houses where they were breaking into their houses and then, you know, 
nothing. So they kick someone’s door off, ‘ooh, wrong address’ or the 
information they thought they were going to get isn’t there. But if you do it 
to a set, certain amount of people all the time, it then looks like a game 
doesn’t it? And then if you saying you’re using intelligence, then why 
haven’t you found what you’re looking for? So that adds to the grievance. 
[Nottingham Practitioner 2] 
Officers themselves recognised the terrifying impact of house raids on whole 
communities: 
That normally means police officers with all the helmet and riot gear into a 
house. Well, a lot of these people they still live with their families, their 
parents so the consequence of going after one person usually when you go 
to a house you might have half a dozen people there; and it is an 
environment that is usually highly charged, you know for all sorts of 
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reasons, people don't want the police flooding in through their door having 
used an enforcer to take the door off its hinges. So that did have a knock on 
into the local community. [Nottingham PO Officer 3] 
Despite their acknowledgement that these types of interventions were responsible 
for poor police-community relations, some officers tried to defend house raids as 
not being entirely negative on the basis that they provided opportunities to make 
homes more secure and to engage with local people about police work: 
Our policy for quite a while was we would always replace a door with a 
more secure door to give the families a sense of security and we would 
always remain in that area so people could speak to us, so that we told 
them what we were doing, so there was an engagement aspect to it as 
well. [Nottingham PO Officer 3] 
These comments may be purely defensive or may demonstrate a genuine lack of 
understanding about what constitutes good community engagement. 
The disproportionate impact of Nottingham's anti-drugs operations on Black 
communities was explained as being ‘nothing to do with race issues. It was about 
who has got the biggest bag of drugs and who is dealing the most’ [Nottingham 
Manager 3]. A similar explanation is frequently cited by the police for 
disproportionate rates of stop and search (Bowling & Phillips 2007). Specifically, it 
is argued that BME people are disproportionately affected because they commit 
more crime (see EHRC 2010). Self-report surveys, however, suggest that offending 
behaviour and drug use is similar among Black and White people, and significantly 
lower among Asian people (Graham & Bowling 1995; Sharp & Budd 2005; 
Armstrong et al. 2005). 
As illustrated in Figure 6.1, official figures show that for the five years between 
2009/10 and 2013-12, South Yorkshire Police made greater use of stop and search 
than Nottinghamshire Police12. In 2010/11, the period preceding the 2011 Riots, 
South Yorkshire Police recorded 23,900 stop and searches compared to 
Nottinghamshire’s 4,763 in, meaning that South Yorkshire Police used the tactic 5 
times as often. It is important to note that the South Yorkshire Police Force Area 
includes three other local authority districts as well as Sheffield and distribution 
across these geographies is not reported. Figure 6.2 illustrates the proportion of 
                                                     
12 Number of persons and vehicles searched under section 1 of the Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1984, by police force and self-defined ethnicity, 
excluding vehicle only searches. Sourced from Home Office 'Police Powers and 
Procedures England and Wales' annual statistical bulletins. 
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arrests resulting from these stop and searches. It indicates that arrests rates were 
were lower for South Yorkshire Police across the five years compared to 
Nottinghamshire Police and England and Wales as a whole, suggesting they use the 
tactic less effectively. Nottinghamshire Police compares less favourably with South 
Yorkshire Police in terms of the stop and search ratio for BME compared to White 
groups (see Figure 6.1). 
 
Figure 6.1: Self-reported ethnicity of PACE s.1 stop and searches by Police Force Area  
 
 
Figure 6.2: Resultant arrests for PACE S.1 stop and searches by Police Force Area 
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Both Nottinghamshire Police and South Yorkshire Police have been identified as 
having some of the worst disproportionately rates in the country. In 2007/8, 
Nottinghamshire had the second highest disproportionality ratio for Black people 
(Black people being 5.5 times as likely to be stopped as Whites) and South 
Yorkshire had the third highest disproportionality ratio for Asians (Asian people 
being twice as likely to be stopped as Whites) (EHRC 2010, Tables A13-14). A 
respondent in Sheffield claimed this historical data had inaccurately reflected the 
BME experience of stop and search locally because the population estimates used 
to calculate the ratios were out of date. They claimed the reality was that South 
Yorkshire Police was ‘very middle of the road’ [Sheffield NPO 3]. This claim was 
given some support by the 2014/15 disproportionality ratios, which were 
calculated using population estimates from the 2011 Census estimates and 
showed that although BME people were still nearly twice as likely as Whites to be 
stopped in the South Yorkshire Police Force Area, this ratio was now slightly lower 
than the national average (HMIC 2016a; 2016b). 
Another explanation for disproportionate stop and search rates relates to the 
‘available’ population (FitzGerald & Sibbet 1997; Waddington et al. 2004). This 
explanation recognises that some groups, stratified by ethnicity, are more likely to 
spend their time in private space, such as work or the home, compared to other 
groups that spend more time on the streets, thus making them more ‘available’. 
Empirical research supports this theory. One study (Waddington et al. 2004)  found 
that when the characteristics of the available population is taken into account, 
racial minorities are proportionately no more likely, and often less likely, to be 
stopped by the police. A police officer in Sheffield gave a similar explanation for 
disproportionate stop and search rates of Asians in one of the Sheffield study 
neighbourhoods:  
South Yorkshire Police have been under the spotlight for disproportionate 
use of stop and search against BME backgrounds to the point that we had 
about 18 months ago, the MPI came out and they rode round [the study 
neighbourhood] with a couple of my officers to see why, to see for 
themselves why we were stopping a disproportionate number of Asian 
people, and the quote was after driving around [the study neighbourhood] 
for half an hour ‘do you know, all we’ve seen is Asian people. Where’s all 
the White folk?’ Because the White folk are either at home, in the club or in 
the pub, the Asian folk are on the streets [Sheffield NPO 3]. 
While the systematic differences in the street population may add a caveat to the 
per capita figure, some argue that 'they do not diminish their value in assessing the 
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experience of being subjected to stop and search with the population as a whole'  
(Bowling & Phillips 2007). 
Disproportionate use of stop and search was a particular issue in Nottingham 
around the time of the 2011 riots. Participants claimed that stop and search was 
not a feature of the anti-drugs operations, discussed above. Rather, it was a 
‘normal policing tactic’ that many felt was used disproportionately against young 
people in deprived neighbourhoods. Although stop and search was never 
mentioned in the Nottingham inquiry (One Nottingham 2011), respondents 
indicated that it was locally understood to be a contributing factor to the 
disturbances. One senior stakeholder said: 
Now stop and search did go on as a normal policing tactic; and I know that 
the data is again a matter of public issue there and people are very 
unhappy about the disproportionality of stop search. So that probably is the 
background to why you end up with twenty-odd individuals being influential 
in attacking police stations. I think that was an opportunity to respond to 
what the police had been doing over a long period of time.  [Nottingham 
Manager 3] 
This demonstrates how an official narrative can deviate from what people actually 
know and think. Most likely, the official narrative was constructed to minimise 
reputational harm. Greer and McLaughin (2010) remind us that police forces have 
well-resourced communications offices to ensure that ‘brand’ image and message 
are accurately and/or positively represented. 
The experience of stop and search in Nottingham was reported to be extremely 
negative, not only in terms of unfair targeting, but because stop and search was 
carried out in ways perceived to be procedurally unjust, as this respondent 
recounted:  
A lot of the lads that we work with will say ‘yeah, yeah, I kind of get it, 
that’s their job and that’s what they have to do, but do they have to be so 
bloody rude about it?’. [Nottingham Manager 5] 
A community practitioner reported that young people felt that searches were too 
intimate, leading to a sense of having been ‘sexually abused’: 
Kids used to tell me they felt like [they were] being sexually abused, that’s 
their actual words, the way how they used to search them, you know, go up 
to them, whatever, put their hands down their baggies, you know looking 
for drugs. [Nottingham Practitioner 3] 
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This comment raises the possibility of human rights violations with respect to 
article 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998, prohibiting inhuman and degrading 
treatment. The sense of being violated was similarly reported by a local survey of 
BME young people (Wright et al. 2013). The survey was conducted as part of a 
wider study commissioned by the Nottinghamshire Police and Crime 
Commissioner in the aftermath of the 2011 Riots to explore BME perceptions of 
the police. Survey responses indicated concerns about the lawfulness of stop and 
search encounters, for example, because individuals were not always given a 
reason for the stop or were denied information identifying the officer(s) involved. 
The vast majority of respondents affected by these types of issues (95%) said they 
had never formally complained because either they were worried about the 
consequences of 'police harassment' or because they lacked confidence in the 
complaints process (p.42).  
Despite higher numbers of stop and search in the South Yorkshire Police Force 
Area, the tactic was rarely mentioned spontaneously by respondents in Sheffield 
and it was not reported to be a major issue, as it was in Nottingham. Respondents 
suggested that unfair targeting of stop and search had been a concern in the past, 
but less so now. However, it was suggested that officers in Sheffield, like 
everywhere in the country, used stop and search indiscriminately when trying to 
identify a suspect and this did impact negatively on trust and confidence in the 
police: 
I remember my mum used to have respect for the police, the British system 
and all of this, she went through the transition of being re-educated … the 
police don't always serve the best purpose of young people and 
communities … because when they came to [the study neighbourhood], if 
you could not find the culprit even if you are Somali whatever it is, you grab 
the very next person that's just there. So you have got this element of Police 
just coming in, just grabbing everybody stop and search and then you are 
going through this bitter experience of 'why am I being stopped?  It is my 
God given right to pass through and get to where I need to go to'; but 'oh 
you look like somebody, you fit a description' and it's always the same story 
whether you are in Sheffield or London. [Sheffield Practitioner 4] 
Otherwise, little was said about the manner in which South Yorkshire Police 
carried out stop and search. In fact, it was reported that the policing in Sheffield 
was generally less aggressive than in some other cities, such as London and 
Liverpool, and local officers were generally were more open to dialogue:  
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When you come across the Mets or the Tridents you just look back, you say 
'Yes Sir, how high Sir, no problem Sir', whether you are a young person, 
whether you are Black, whatever you may be; you have got to really do it 
for the well-being of yourself. Sheffield Police you can argue with them, 
'What are you doing?' [Sheffield Practitioner 4] 
In addition to stop and search, respondents in Nottingham raised concerns about 
stop and account. As detailed in Chapter 2, stop and account refers to encounters 
where police officers stop (and in many cases, effectively detain) members of the 
public to ask them to account for they actions, behaviour or presence in an area, 
but do not go on to search them. In April 2005, changes were made to the Police 
and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) Codes of Practice to require the police to 
record and monitor stop and account in the same way they did stop and search. 
This required police officers to provide anyone stopped, regardless of whether 
they were searched, with a receipt documenting key information about the 
encounter, including the reason for the stop, the outcome and the person’s self-
defined ethnicity. But, in March 2011, new revisions gave discretion to police 
forces whether to record stop and account. Consequently, only ten forces 
continued to do so  (Bridges et al. 2011). These legislative changes, made with no 
public consultation (ibid; Reiner 2010), were meant to ‘minimise the bureaucracy’ 
(Code of Practice A, para.22A). In reality, however, the personal data of those 
stopped was still frequently recorded (Bridges et al. 2011); only now this 
information cannot be accessed by them, nor monitored in the public interests.  
Although Nottinghamshire was one of the forces that claimed to still record stop 
and account (ibid), some respondents said that individuals were not typically given 
a receipt following an encounter. The lack of a receipt was a major issue for young 
people because it meant they had nothing to prove to suspicious onlookers what 
their interaction with the police was about. Specifically, they were concerned that 
others might suspect them of snitching; suggesting that sharing information with 
the police was not generally approved of locally: 
These are the grievances: ‘I get stopped, I get asked for somebody’s name, I 
don’t get the piece of paper that I’m supposed to get to say who they are, 
why they stopped me, what they’ve done. How do I address that?’ … Police 
are saying from their point of view it’s a friendly way of talking to people, 
but then from a cultural point of view, let’s say for those particular youths if 
you’re a bad youth in an area, Black, White or whatever, who’s the last 
person you want to be seen talking to. Then for someone looking on, what 
are you now? A grass! What problems does that bring into your life that 
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you don’t need? So you don’t want that interaction. [Nottingham 
Practitioner 2] 
Thus, stop and search was preferable to stop and account, because at least these 
encounters were more transparent: ‘from the onlooker’s point of view, that’s a 
strange interaction; and then from the point of view of accountability, it’s a 
strange interaction because where’s it noted?’ [Nottingham Practitioner 2]. 
Because there was a legal obligation to record stop and search, there was greater 
potential for holding the police to account: Removing the requirement to record 
stop and account removes ‘statistical evidence of both good and bad policing’ 
(Bridges et al. 2011, p.45), making it impossible to evidence discriminatory and 
disproportionate use or any improvements; and, ultimately, this undermines police 
legitimacy. 
6.2.2 Forms of accountability 
Unsurprisingly, how concerns about policing are dealt with by the police emerged 
as being important to police-community relations.  As in Nottingham, Sheffield 
respondents reported concerns about repressive anti-drugs operations, 
particularly one known as 'Operation Mach'. This had been a city-wide operation, 
but had acutely affected one of the study neighbourhoods. Operation Mach was 
one of South Yorkshire Police's largest drugs operations (The Star 2011a), which 
began in August 2009 and lasted for 18 months, culminating in more than 200 
officers taking part in house raids and resulting in 83 people being sentenced for a 
total of 150 years. Like the Nottingham anti-drugs operations, it was reported  by 
the police to be a response to community concerns about rising levels of violent 
and gang-related crime (BBC 2011a). The language of gangs and guns was explicitly 
used by the Superintendent leading the operation. The complaint of residents in 
the study neighbourhood was that the operation failed to apprehend any high-
level drug dealers, so instead turned its focus to low-level dealers and children as 
easier targets. The community accused the police of ‘entrapping’ young people by 
giving them money or promising them designer goods to bring officers drugs. This 
fits with some of the facts publically shared about the operation, notably that 
officers posed as salesmen offering designer clothes in exchange for drugs (The 
Star 2011c).  
Given the timing of Operation Mach and the court judgements related to the case 
in early 2011, some respondents felt there was a risk that tensions might still be 
running high at the time of the August riots, which might have provided an 
opportunity to ‘take out vengeance’ on the police [Sheffield Practitioner 3].  
Conversely, this research found that Operation Mach was a protective factor due 
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to police and partner efforts to help address community grievances in the period 
leading up to the riots. These efforts were instigated by a small number of 
influential residents, including a ward councillor, following agitated scenes outside 
the courts where families gathered to express their anger. Local people, especially 
mothers of the accused, were encouraged to meet together to discuss their 
grievances within the community. A member of the NPT reported these meetings 
to be challenging at first. The community used the meetings to vent its anger, but 
this was perhaps a necessary first step in re-building relations, which the NPT 
began to do by clarifying that they had not been involved in, or even aware of, the 
Operation: 
The first meeting that I went to, because it was trying to get the message 
over, particularly to the parents again, and the wider community that I 
didn’t even know that was happening. There were about 200 people at the 
first meeting that we had after it, all shouting that it was entrapment, and 
we’d set these children up, and that they were good boys, they’d never 
done anything wrong and we’d set them up for it. So it was a real 
challenge. [Sheffield NPO 2] 
Over time, local police-community relations began to thrive, even beyond their 
level before Operation Mach. A women’s group continued to meet regularly for 
about 18 months, providing a conduit for dialogue between the community, the 
NPT and other public agencies. A PCSO regularly attended these meetings to offer 
information and even formal courses about the criminal justice system to facilitate 
local understanding about what had happened during Operation Mach, as well as 
rights and risks more generally. The NPT claimed to benefit from these reformed 
relationships through the sharing of community intelligence to help tackle crime, 
as per theories of community engagement (Myhill 2006; Rogers & Robinson 2004): 
There’s real reluctance in the area, even now to a certain extent, even 
though we’ve done all the work with the parents and the community, that 
they feel that they shouldn’t be telling us that things are happening. They’ll 
sort of hint to us. I’ve had the ladies group tell me that they’re really 
worried because there’s someone drug dealing on the flats, but they’ll not 
tell me directly. So I’m like ‘right I’m just going to the loo. If there happens 
to be a piece of paper on my desk when I come back from the loo’. And 
they’re happy to jot it down for me, but they’ll not tell me face to face. 
[Sheffield NPO 2] 
In addition to the efforts of local police officers, it was described how the response 
of senior officers was critical for addressing tensions produced by Operation Mach. 
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Influential members of the community orchestrated a meeting between local 
people and senior officers. This meeting was supported and facilitated by the City 
Council, which provided language interpreters to maximise participation. 
Respondents were positive about the commitment of officers in coming to these 
meetings and in trying to identify solutions:  
It was really good that they were committed to come, attend these 
meetings after meeting, bringing officers, officers, officers and taking notes 
of what went wrong when they went to the houses; which part of that was 
why I did the training for them because somebody said to them ‘what are 
you going to do’ and they said ‘well we are going to have to get training or 
something’. I put my hand up and I said ‘well I'm a consultant and I train 
people in Somali so I can train you here. I can help you’. So that's the thing. 
They were willing. [Sheffield Practitioner 3] 
These activities taking place in the aftermath of Operation Mach provided some 
confidence that police and other agencies might be willing to work with the 
community again to resolve difficult issues; including, for example, if groups in 
Sheffield had rioted in 2011: 
If the riot did happen then it would have been nice, it would probably be the 
same thing, people would meet the same way, kind of understand where it 
went wrong and the police you know dealing with this. [Sheffield 
Practitioner 3] 
As discussed in Chapter 2, trust in the police is a positive feeling about their future 
actions (Barbalet 2009) and a powerful predictor of compliance and legitimacy 
(Tyler 1990). Despite community perceptions of unfair treatment in relation to 
Operation Mach, South Yorkshire Police appeared to have been able to regain 
legitimacy through the resolution process and by committing to ongoing changes. 
Conversely, respondents referred to processes in Nottingham to address concerns 
about stop and search as ‘tick box’ exercises, which produced little significant 
change. A key concern was that officers were not 'seen' to be listening. Rather 
they turned up at meetings and talked at the public using pre-written scripts: 
We had a new, whatever, Chief Superintendent who came in a couple of 
years back, and we had a few of them meetings.  Again for me – and I’m 
not a pessimistic, I’m just a realist as I see things – was it a waste of time?  
Yes.  Did it seem like a tick box?  Yes. As the guy was speaking it was like he 
was doing a lecture.  It’s like you’re not even, you know when you like 
already pre-presented it and you are just getting the point across and 
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you’re just talking all about theory. …  I haven’t seen anything done 
differently throughout the 20 years. [Nottingham Practitioner 3] 
Another respondent talked about the defensive approach of officers in public 
meetings, which prevented issues being progressed: 
I think it wasn’t an open approach been taken at that meeting by the police 
officer, inspector, at the time, who attended. It was more defensive. So then 
at the end of the meeting, you didn’t get the resolution that you might have 
needed. [Nottingham Practitioner 2]. 
It was reported how these processes left community representatives feeling 
‘powerless’ and ‘humiliated’ when returning from meetings with the news that 
nothing had been resolved. This stands in contrast to accounts of the resolution 
processes in Sheffield after Operation Mach. Although, it is important to recognise 
that Operation Mach was time-specific, unlike stop and search, which is an 
ongoing activity in Nottingham, as in other parts of the country, despite calls for ‘a 
fresh approach’ (Bowling & Phillips 2007).  
There have been some attempts by the police to address concerns about stop and 
search since the 2011 riots. Nottinghamshire Police invested in the development 
of a Blackberry Data Application to record stop and search data to enable the force 
to easily and accurately map the location of encounters. It is not clear to what 
extent this was a response to the riots or to other pressures, such as reports by the 
HMIC (2013), which identified Nottingham as one of several forces nationally 
where concern over the use of stop and search had occurred. Wright et al.’s (2013) 
local study was unable to assess the effectiveness of the Blackberry application, as 
its development was ongoing at the time of fieldwork. Officers involved in this 
study, however, reported it to be an important for tool for ensuring transparency 
and accountability at both the organisational and officer level: 
Now we can actually identify officers who do the most searchers. We can 
identify officers who do the least number. We can identify officers who only 
target certain areas and it allows us to intervene with the officer and say 
‘right why is it that you are doing this, why is it that every person that you 
stop is for drugs?’  [Nottingham PO Officer 3] 
In addition to this technological response to disproportionate stop and search, 
officers reported being given more guidance and training, which was a 
recommendation of the National Police Improvement Agency’s (NPIA) ‘Next Steps’ 
review (Nottinghamshire Police and Crime Commissioner 2012). The review was 
commissioned by Nottinghamshire Police to help ‘understand the Force’s position 
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on stop and search and draw upon best practice nationally’ (p.8). The NPIA also 
recommended that the force immediately cease to record stop and account, 
directly contradicting StopWatch’s (Bridges et al. 2011) recommendation to 
reinstate the national recording requirement and to amend PACE accordingly 
(p.45). 
6.2.3 Perception and treatment of gangs 
What the plethora of official reports fails to consider when looking at stop and 
search is the mediating factor of gangs, or at least the police perception of gangs, 
as at least a partial explanation for the disproportionate targeting of BME young 
men. Respondents in Nottingham claimed that young men were frequently 
stopped by the police on suspicion of gang-involvement, based on little more than 
where they lived. Most respondents referred to gangs in some way, but 
particularly police officers, who provided detailed information about gang names, 
territories and identifiable ‘colours’. The main gangs in Nottingham were said to 
include the Brewster’s Crew in St Ann’s; the Certified Marmion Gang (or CMG) on 
the Marmion estate in St Ann's; and Radford MPR (an acronym for ‘Money Power 
Respect’) in Radford. Respondents mentioned another, the Waterfront Gang, 
associated with The Meadows area; although everyone agreed this was historical 
and no longer existed. Some respondents maintained that all the Nottingham 
gangs were historical; claiming that they existed merely as a convenient 
explanation for the police whenever things went wrong:  
Most people I know who’ve said they were MPR were in that ten years ago 
when they were kids - 19, 20, 17, 16. They’re adults now. They’re not 
interested in that. Got kids growing up. So whoever’s using the label it isn’t 
them, and the question they ask me now is ‘how do we get rid of this label? 
Because it’s like a kiddie thing, we’ve grown out of it, but then we’re still 
getting hammered with it because it keeps getting raised every time 
something goes wrong.’ [Nottingham Practitioner 2] 
Other respondents described a more nuanced picture, whereby the main gangs 
were ‘broken down even more’ within neighbourhoods. This perhaps reflects the 
complexity and fluidity of ‘gang’ identity.  Previous research describes how young 
people are ‘constantly changing the names of their groups’, but continue to refer 
to gang names from decades ago ‘in order for outsiders to understand who they 
are talking about’  (Adekunle 2011, p.25). Additionally, gang identity has been 
found to play a number of non-violent and non-criminal roles, which vary at 
different stages of young people’s social development (Fraser & Atkinson 2014). 
Friendship and loyalty were central roles, as well as claims for distinction at both 
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individual and community levels within the context of the ‘street’. This resonates 
with comments made by community respondents in this study. They described 
how groups were frequently misinterpreted as gangs, and therefore harassed by 
the police, despite their primary purpose being to socialise. It was also said that 
young people socialised in groups for safety on the streets, including protection 
from certain police practices: ‘they walk out in numbers for safety, and sometimes 
the safety is not about other people, it’s about stop and account’ [Nottingham 
Practitioner 2]. 
The fixation on gangs is not merely a police issue. A considerable amount of media 
time and research literature has been given over to the topic of gangs, leading to a 
general moral panic and the rise of a ‘gang industry’ (Hallsworth 2011). The gang 
industry 'experts' 'consisting of largely liberal oriented policy makers and 
academics’ have similarly failed to reach consensus on whether gangs even exist in 
the UK context (Joseph & Gunter 2011), making it exceptionally difficult for 
agencies instructed to deal with the gang issue. The first piece of legislation to 
specifically mention gangs is the Policing and Crime Act (PCA) 2009, which came 
into effect on 31 January 2011. It defines a gang as a group that: 
a) consists of at least three people; 
b) uses a name, emblem or colour or has any other characteristic that 
enables its members to be identified by others as a group; and 
c) is associated with a particular area. 
This definition was evident in the descriptions of gangs by Nottinghamshire Police 
officers, particularly in the way they referred to colours as a defining characteristic.  
You can see that inter-gang rivalry that results in firearms, so generally they 
don’t stray onto one another’s turf because they do know one another. And 
then the gang colours come into play. Whether they want to be copycat 
Americans. You’ve got Radford have red bandanas, sorry it is St Ann’s that 
will have red bandanas, The Meadows which will identify as blue bandanas, 
and Radford that will identify as black bandanas with a paisley pattern. 
[Nottingham PO Officer 7] 
Community respondents who refuted the existence of gangs in their 
neighbourhood also contested the reality of these colours. In their view, police 
perceptions of gangs locally were skewed by media representations of gangs in the 
US: 
What colours? [sounding exasperated] But do you see what I’m trying to 
say to you? I couldn’t tell you what these colours are, what people are 
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supposed to be wearing to say we’re part of this gang. It’s just, I don’t 
know, to me it’s like you’ve watched too much American tv and tried to 
translate it to Britain. You need to understand America’s history has come 
from a different place to Britain’s. [Nottingham Practitioner 2] 
Officers themselves spoke of American gang culture, as evidenced by the 
quotation above, but on the basis that young people were actively copying this. 
Despite the view of some officers that the disturbances were nothing at all to do 
with gangs, Nottinghamshire Police used colours to try and demonstrate 
association between individuals charged with riot offences in 2011; in particular to 
demonstrate that Radford MPR was responsible for the petrol bombing of Canning 
Circus Police Station.  Yet, respondents reported discrepancies in the evidence. An 
officer described how 'all bar about one, carried a black and white bandana' 
[Nottingham PO Officer 7], which was not strictly the black and paisley, apparently 
associated with Radford MPR. In addition, a blue bandana had been recovered at 
the scene, which police explained away as 'just a strange quirk' despite blue being 
the colours associated with the former Waterfront Gang. 
The fact that Nottinghamshire Police were trying to prove association between 
defendants indicates use of the common-law doctrine joint enterprise. This was 
introduced in 1536 as a means of prosecuting duellers and their associates (Pitts 
2014), but since 1985  has mainly been used to prosecute young men thought to 
be involved in gangs (Green & McGourlay 2015). Joint enterprise has emerged as a 
prosecution tool for collective punishment, whereby by all members of a group are 
liable for the criminal acts committed by the principal offender (Home Affairs 
Committee 2012) where it can be proved there were ‘in it together’ (Williams & 
Clarke 2016). There are two competing explanations for its use with gangs: Firstly, 
that joint enterprise provides a powerful deterrent message to would-be affiliates 
(Pitts 2014); and, secondly, that joint enterprise incapacitates as many affiliates as 
possible (Green & McGourlay 2015). Underpinning both is the perceived 
dangerousness of gangs, linked to a 'moral panic that has been raging thorough 
Europe in recent years about 'street violence' and 'delinquent youth'' (Wacquant 
2009, p.243). The revival of joint enterprise is contentious because it introduces a 
lower burden of proof, which is concerning given that most cases involve serious 
crimes, typically murder (Green & McGourlay 2015). Campaigns against joint 
enterprise, by organisations such as the Prison Reform Trust and Joint Enterprise 
Not Guilty by Association (JENGbA), have prompted a series of inquiries (Justice 
Committee 2012a; 2012b; 2014). These have revealed a distinct lack of 
quantifiable data on joint enterprise, with neither the CPS nor the Home Office 
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actively logging its use. Consequently, research on joint enterprise has had to rely 
on Freedom of Information requests (see McClenaghan et al. 2014).  
Due to gangs being racialized (Williams & Clarke 2016), joint enterprise has 
disproportionately impacted on Black and Mixed race young men (Justice 
Committee 2014; Crew et al. 2014). A group of young Black men in Birmingham 
were prosecuted using joint enterprise during the 2011 Riots. The group included 
Jermaine Lewis, even though CCTV footage could not put him at the scene. His 
prosecution was based on evidence of gang affiliation, which largely revolved 
around online rap videos and pictures downloaded to defendants' phones, which 
were used to demonstrate his attitudes to guns and the police (Williams & Clarke 
2016). Lewis received a sentence of 23 years in prison. Just as Nottinghamshire 
Police referred to colours to substantiate gang identity, officers in Birmingham 
referred to a hallmark hand gesture known as 'throwing sixes', observed in rap 
videos made by some of the defendants. This demonstrates the tenuousness of 
evidence required for joint enterprise cases and of police intelligence about gangs. 
It also provides support  for the idea of 'policing by association' (McAra & McVie 
2005; Medina Ariza 2013; Ralphs et al. 2009), meaning that police attention is 
more strongly associated with who individuals hang out with than what they do. 
This has implications for people living in gang-affected neighbourhoods, who are 
labelled even if they do not self-define as a gang member, hold anti-gang views 
and are not criminally active (Ralphs et al. 2009). This is because police are not 
aware of the lived reality of these places, where gang-involved and non-gang-
involved people live side by side and lead overlapping lives (Pitts 2014). 
Respondents in Nottingham described how the gang label was being 
indiscriminately applied to people living in the study neighbourhoods, particularly 
young people who socialised on the streets, or were 'on road' (Gunter 2010). 
Consequently, they received undue attention from the police in the form of stop 
and search and stop and account, as detailed above. The gang label also meant the 
conflation of minor crime and anti-social behaviour with more serious violent 
crimes, as found in other studies (Smithson et al. 2012). Community practitioners 
felt the police view that all crimes in the neighbourhood were gang-related was 
nonsensical and antagonistic, as indicated by this comment: 
As long as you live in these areas and you get any attention from the police, 
you’re in that gang, even if you’re not in a gang. So that winds them up 
even more. Because you’re getting stopped on the assumption that you 
must be in this gang, but how can every individual in the area, just because 
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you’ve nicked someone’s toilet roll, but now I’m in MPR. [Nottingham 
Practitioner 2] 
Being labelled a gang member also intensified young people's social exclusion. 
Respondents in Nottingham spoke about the number of young people in special 
educational provision after being excluded from school and those barred from 
certain youth facilities. Ralph et al's ethnographic research (2009) describes in 
more detail how this exclusion occurs for suspected gang member. Another risk of 
the gang label is that young people take on the criminal identity assigned to it 
(Becker 1963; Matza 1969). 
Some commentators have highlighted that the quantity of information collected 
on those under the ‘police gaze’ is of serious concern (O’Neill & Loftus 2013).  It 
can amount to whole dossiers on individuals and their associates. Seemingly 
mundane recordings of people’s movements, appearance and socialisation habits 
contribute to a growing, searchable database of personal information. This 
information is more easily and readily shared as a consequence of multi-agency 
working, representing new invasions into the private lives of the already 
vulnerable, multiplying state control and amplifying existing social inequalities 
(ibid). Gang-involvement is identified predominantly by street-based police 
officers, but increasingly by civilian office-based analysts as well (Fraser & Atkinson 
2014). The discretion of these intelligence analysts offers the potential for a new 
'edge' in law enforcement, but may also represent a point of failure in the 
intelligence cycle (ibid). Civilian analysts tend to supplement more traditional 
intelligence on ‘gang’ members with evidence found on social networking sites, as 
detailed above, 'despite the evident extension of processes of self-presentation 
and imagined selfhood onto their online lives' (p.165). It is also reported how 
street officers’ resistance to ‘top-down’ knowledge has meant persistent targeting 
of the ‘usual suspects’ (Brodeur & Dupont 2008), which are invariably the types of 
young people regarded as ‘police property’ (Reiner 1992, p.48). 
Gang databases were developed in the U.S. to assist police in conviction rates for 
gang members (Katz et al. 2000). There has been a take up of this approach in the 
UK, but research on some of these ‘gang’ databases suggests they are merely 
facilitate policing of the ‘usual suspects’.  Williams (2015) reports that three-
quarters of those listed on gang databases are not even regarded as ‘active’ 
members by the police; and the notion of ‘active’ was subject to interpretation, 
with some officers noting this meant ‘being predominantly seen on the street … 
[even if] he might not have done anything wrong’ (p.29). The same research also 
confirms that BME individuals are more likely to be listed, despite being less 
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involved in serious youth violence than Whites (Williams 2015; Williams & Clarke 
2016). Williams (2014) maintains that it would be untenable not to consider the 
racial composition of 'gangs' as a feature of racist policing, which must be 
understood within a wider social and historical context. The ‘Othering’ of Black 
men dates back to colonial times (Williams 2015), becoming spotlighted in British 
policing in the 1970s when Policing the Crisis (Hall et al. 1978) documented how 
street robbery had been racialized as ‘mugging’ and represented in the media as 
an epidemic requiring swift and punitive intervention against young Black men. It 
seems this earlier concern about mugging has been transferred to gangs, which is 
frequently identified as a racial problem with references to ‘Black culture’ being 
responsible for violence and ‘nihilistic gangsters' and criminal 'hotspots' in areas 
known to be predominated by BME communities (Williams 2015). 
In Sheffield, respondents rarely referred to gangs and when they did, it was usually 
to refute their existence. In the words of one respondent: ‘I would say in 20 years 
of being a youth worker, I’ve never come across an organised gang of young 
people’ [Sheffield Practitioner 1]. The same person, however, did express some 
concerns about a potentially changing picture and another respondent claimed 
that a shooting in 2009 had been gang-related [Sheffield Manager 5]. Otherwise, 
respondents were more likely to speak about ‘groups’ to describe affiliations that 
had endured over time, even if they were sometimes involved in criminality: 
Interviewer: You’ve talked about people that have previously been involved 
in criminality; are those groups, is it a tight group or is it just a mix of 
individuals? 
Respondent: No, they’ve probably known each other all their life. They’ve 
always knocked about with each other. Some will have probably gone to 
school together, and they still hang about on the streets now, together. 
[Sheffield NPO 4] 
The rare mention of gangs in Sheffield at the time of the research was surprising 
given that the city had recently received funding to address the problem via the 
Ending Gangs and Youth Violence (EGYV) programme. The EGYV programme was a 
national response to the 2011 Riots that spotlighted the role of gangs on the basis 
that ‘one in five of those arrested in connection with the riots were known gang 
members’ (Home Office 2011, p.3). The EGYV programme re-stated the link 
between gangs and violence and set out the need for multi-agency working to be 
targeted in ‘gang-impacted communities’ (p.4); thus, providing the remit for racial 
targeting by geography, as suggested by Williams (2015). Although some 
voluntary, community and faith sector organisations (hereafter referred to as the 
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voluntary sector), reported concerns about the way the EGYV money was allocated 
in Sheffield – in uselessly tiny sums – they expressed some relief that the over-
arching strategy was largely preventative and welfare-based.  
Respondents in Nottingham were similarly vexed that EGYV funding had been 
allocated piecemeal to the voluntary sector; and some voiced particular concern 
that the statutory sector had retained the lion's share of it: 
[the] statutory [sector], how I see it, got like a million out of it, … some of 
the people must command big wages because I know half a million got to 
go in a justice gang issue, half of that went on wages and then a measly 
£500 or a grand here would go out to community projects to try and 
address the gang issue, like ‘yeah right, 1500 quid, you are absolutely crazy’ 
[Nottingham Practitioner 3] 
It was suggested that the EGYV funding had mainly been used to support and 
extend interventions in place before the riots, which meant a continuing focus on 
enforcement. Although ‘Stealth’ has elsewhere been (Williams 2015; Williams & 
Clarke 2016) identified as the specialist (gun and) gang unit in Nottingham, this 
was never mentioned by respondents. Instead, respondents referred to Vanguard, 
which was said to comprise two components: (1) Operation Vanguard, a police 
enforcement team set up in 2008; and (2) Vanguard Plus, a multi-agency team led 
by Nottingham City Council, focused more on preventative strategies. Vanguard 
Plus was established ahead of the disturbances but was not properly in place to 
feed into the public order response. Operation Vanguard was responsible for the 
types of anti-drugs operations detailed above, which had negatively affected 
police-community relations.  On this basis, it was difficult for Vanguard Plus, with 
virtually the same name, to make inroads with communities. As one respondent 
conceded, ‘my name was mud over there for the better part of nine months’ 
[Nottingham Manager 5]. Despite reports that Vanguard Plus was taking a 
different approach to engage and support young people suspected of gang 
involvement, some respondents were still reluctant to partner an organisation that 
had such obvious links with the police.  
An early activity of Vanguard Plus was mapping the city's gang members. This 
exercise supports the claim that Nottinghamshire Police had an unrealistic view of 
gangs. At the start of the exercise, there were meant to be 800 members 
according to police intelligence. This number was eventually reduced down to 360 
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with closer adherence to ACPO’s13 definition of a gang (Home Office 2011). This 
has slightly more detailed criteria than the Policing and Crime Act 2009 definition, 
but is not substantively different. Some argue that the debate over gang 
definitions is not especially helpful in gaining a truer picture of gangs because it is 
'essentially an argument over the correct description of a ghost' (Katz & Jackson-
Jacobson 2004, p.106); meaning it is an invisible symbol onto which fear and 
prejudice is loaded (Fraser & Atkinson 2014). The study certainly revealed signs of 
prejudice in the way officers described individuals and events in the study 
neighbourhoods. They spoke about local criminals as if they were all part of the 
same group, dismissing the possibility that criminals could ever be victims too, 
which raises concerns about fair treatment under the law:   
St Ann’s was an absolute failure, in terms of the attack on that police 
station because the petrol bombing didn’t make contact with the building 
and ironically did nothing more than seize a car that had been seized from a 
drug dealer in St Ann’s and kept in the back of the nick. So their effectively 
destroyed one of their own vehicles. [Nottingham PO Officer 7] 
Officers also expressed deprecating views about 'gang' members that had less to 
do with behaviours and more to do with where they lived and the social 
disadvantage characterising those areas; for example: 
I will say, from a personal point of view, they’re not the brightest individuals 
in the world….  when you look at where they come from, none of them are 
academics, none of them got an A-level onto university [Nottingham PO 
Officer 7] 
Interestingly negative views were more likely to come from officers in senior and 
strategic roles than from NPOs, who had more day-to-day contact with 
communities. Non-police respondents spoke more favourably about 'gang' 
members. Contrasting with the officer’s comments about intellectual ability, a 
community practitioner said 'these gang members, or whatever, … are more clued 
up than what people think they are' [Nottingham Practitioner 3]. Another 
respondent supported this view with claims that many of the young people 
suspected of gang involvement had relatively high educational attainment: 
                                                     
13 The Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) was considered the definitive 
collective of chief officers and, as such, the Government legislated on a 
number of occasions to provide a duty to consult with ACPO before making 
certain directions, regulations, or before issuing certain codes of practice. 
ACPO was replaced by the National Police Chiefs’ Council (NPCC) on 1 April 
2015.  
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The Brewster lads are very bright lads, to be fair. We did a provision bit of 
research, pre- pre- everything. You’d got, I think, between about 15 and 20 
per cent of the lads that we looked at across that group were 'gifted and 
talented’ in school. Two or three of them left. One lad who’s moved out of 
the area now left school with something like five A*s  for his GCSEs and 4 
Bs. He could have done anything.  [Nottingham Manager 5] 
Community practitioners in the study neighbourhoods acknowledged the disparity 
between their view and the general police view of groups and individuals living in 
the study neighbourhoods, even reporting that they had tried to do something 
about it:  
I used to go to meetings and we used to talk about these different kids and 
they’d say 'what are they like in your centre?' and I’d be like 'I’ don’t know 
what you’re talking about. The kid that I’ve got and the kid that you’re 
talking about, they don’t meet'. So it’s like 'are you sure?'. 'Come and see it, 
come and see it for yourself'. I used to have police officers in my sessions 
and all sorts to try and break the barrier and create an understanding on 
both sides. [Nottingham Practitioner 1] 
In recognition that poor police-community relations were a motivating factor for 
the disturbances in Nottingham, a range of events were organised afterwards to 
address this, including a local radio debate on Kemet FM between 
Nottinghamshire Police and young people. An issue to emerge from this event was 
that young people across Nottingham felt poorly treated by the police, evidenced 
by the question posed by a female university student when she asked 'why do 
nightclub bouncers treat me with more respect than your officers?'. 
6.2.4 Heterogeneous relations with the police 
However, police-community relations were not all bad in Nottingham. A finding to 
emerge across the case studies was that communities did not perceive the police 
to be a homogenous entity; meaning that communities were able to discriminate 
between different parts of the organisation, allowing them to have both positive 
and negative relationships with different groups of officers. As with the community 
affected by Operation Mach in Sheffield (detailed above), respondents in 
Nottingham reported that despite repressive treatment by police operational 
units, communities were still able to have good relationships with NPTs where 
they were perceived to be independent of operational units. This might explain 
why the local police station in one of the Nottingham study neighbourhoods 
escaped attack in 2011 despite five others having been targeted. Community 
practitioners suggested this police station was left alone because local people 
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generally had positive relationships with the NPT located there because ‘they’re 
out all the time [and] people know them’. The station was in the heart of the 
community, on the High Street, and therefore an easy target. Another police 
station on the outskirts of the neighbourhood and closer to the city centre was 
attacked. Some explained that this was because the officers based here policed 
differently: 
We’ve got different inspectors. How one inspector runs their thing is one 
thing. I’m assuming that each inspector runs their teams how they feel fit 
with their kind of ethos. So what I’m saying, what we had here was good. 
[Nottingham Practitioner 2] 
In the second Nottingham study neighbourhood, where the local police station 
was attacked, accounts suggest a drugs operations team was co-located with the 
NPT. This drugs team accompanied and supported centrally co-ordinated raids on 
local homes. So, while there was some evidence of good community relations with 
the NPT, the police station likely symbolised something oppressive in terms of 
some of its functions and perhaps also in terms of its physical design:  
It looks like a prison… It is a very formal building at the front and then it is 
literally 20 foot high fences all the way round it. So you know from like an 
engagement ‘come in and talk to us’, it does not have that. [Nottingham 
NPO 1] 
Community practitioners in Sheffield recounted incidents of repressive policing 
involving young people ‘literally being picked and put against the wall at school’ 
[Sheffield Practitioner 3] and the use of police dogs to perform arrests in 
residential areas. One respondent recounted how his position as a community 
practitioner made little difference to how he was treated when the police visited 
his neighbourhood. The police treated him as any other Black resident, suggesting 
the officers had entered the neighbourhood with a ‘them and us’ mentality that 
was difficult to penetrate: 
I clearly had my badge on, me and my manager saw it could go a bad way 
… we knew if it continued it would become physical. … the police dog went 
for me, just jumped at me and honestly, as it got to there, the copper pulled 
it back and I said ‘what are you doing mate’ and he goes ‘I am not your 
mate, don't call me mate’. [Sheffield Practitioner 4] 
These negative experiences, of course, had implications for police legitimacy, but 
because they were generally associated with special operational teams, they did 
not completely undermine community relations with NPTs.   This highlights the 
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importance of NPT involvement in community crises. Where police legitimacy is 
low, based on negative experiences of special operational teams, sending in 
another operational team to maintain order is illogical. NPTs with pre-existing 
relations are better placed to calm tensions. There is no doubt that particular 
crises require specialist knowledge and expertise, which is often managed through 
the Gold-Silver-Bronze structure, but, given that NPTs have specialist knowledge 
and expertise in the context of community, there is a rationale to accommodate 
them too within the structure when seeking to prevent and contain community 
unrest. 
It was reported how police-community relations were largely developed in the 
case studies through PCSOs. This is unsurprising given their role within the NPT 
structure. Despite an initial lack of clarity  when PCSOs were introduced under the 
Police Reform Act 2002 (Home Office 2008), community engagement has become 
one of their main functions (ACPO 2007). Previous research has found that taking 
on this role with the NPT, over time, earned PCSOs the support of their warranted 
colleagues, who have been freed up to focus on other matters (O’Neill 2015). The 
current study supports this finding:  
When PCSOs first came in… I don’t think we were particularly bothered 
about having them if I’m honest. It was a little before my time, but to 
paraphrase, it was a little like ‘right, well, err, get out there for a wander 
then’ and there’s a little resistance from the cops because like 'they might 
be taking my job here’. The fact that he or she is going to walk the streets 
and you don’t want to do it anyway and you weren’t going to be made 
redundant anyway seems a bit lost on people. And progressively over the 
years, we have got far more clued up as to their capacity and what they’re 
able to do for us. [Sheffield NPO 3] 
PCSOs were referred to as 'professional natterers', with an emphasis on the value 
of this for police-community relations and intelligence gathering.  
A Sheffield respondent claimed there had been a recent drop in PCSO numbers, 
amounting to about 15-20 per cent across the force. Numbers were often down 
due to natural wastage because, as documented elsewhere, a proportion of  
PCSOs were said to be in the role merely as a career step to becoming a police 
officer (Cooper et al. 2006; Johnston 2007), leaving gaps when they moved on. 
Other PCSOs proudly declared that they were in it for the long haul. The recent 
drop in PCSOs, however, was primarily linked to austerity measures; and financial 
pressures across the force meant that remaining PCSOs were increasingly used for 
crime fighting activities at the expense of community engagement. An alternative 
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or additional explanation for this shift in focus relates to the hunkering down of 
South Yorkshire Police following recent spotlight on their role in the Hillsborough 
disaster (see Scraton 1999) and the sexual exploitation scandal in Rotherham (see 
Jay 2014). This had compelled senior leaders to pursue good news stories, thereby, 
putting an emphasis on activities that were more readily quantified than 
community rapport: 
I just feel they’re in a phase at the moment where they’re fire-fighting, and 
they haven’t got time to necessarily think about some of those other things. 
There [have] been a lot of changes. I think it’s a struggle to maintain; as I 
say, it’s those lower level engagement things that are so difficult to justify, 
when instead you could send PCSOs out to do vulnerable vehicle notices and 
car crime, and you’ve got stats there where you can say ‘look we’ve done x 
number of this and that’. You just can’t quantify some of the other work 
that PCSOs used to do. [Sheffield Manager 5] 
It was reported how a shift away from community engagement was evident across 
the wider policing family in Sheffield, with statutory policing roles also being 
squeezed out due to cost-cutting. This meant that 'innovative work in terms of 
engagement and addressing issues' was suffering and 'a lot of positivity [had] been 
drained out of people' [Sheffield Manager 5]. Consequently, respondents across 
stakeholder groups felt that Sheffield would be in a much weaker position in the 
future to respond to critical incidents affecting communities. 
In the previous chapter, it was described how the involvement of officers at 
Inspector level was critical to averting to the public order response in one of the 
Sheffield neighbourhoods, which was predominated by Asian people. Their 
involvement in the public order response was built on pre-existing rapport, which 
was sought by influential members of the Asian community because they 'are very 
rank conscious' [Sheffield NPO 3]. It was thought that part of the reason for being 
rank conscious was that rapport with senior officers helped reinforce their 
reputation and position of influence in the community. Although the issue of 
gender was not directly discussed, it is difficult to overlook that the 'influential' 
members of the community in this context were primarily men. This is not to 
overlook that some female residents may have sway within the Asian community, 
but they were less conspicuous. It was men that held key positions in the study 
neighbourhood's formal community structures, for example, as imams, ward 
councillors or chairpersons of community or faith-based organisations. Although 
the police force is largely male, senior police officers in particular tend to be men. 
The proportion of female police officers has risen slightly, but they still only 
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represent 21 per cent of senior ranks and 30 per cent at constable rank (Home 
Office 2015). PCSOs were more evenly split, with 55 per cent female. This may be 
another reason that rank was deemed important in this particular case. 
Gender did present as an issue within neighbourhood policing. It was reported that 
one of the PCSOs in the Sheffield study neighbourhood regularly had abuse 
shouted at her by young Asian males, relating to her sex and racial characteristics: 
One of [the] PCSOs in [the study neighbourhood] happens to be a White 
blond female. Some of the abuse she gets from young Asian lads is 
horrendous. You know 'I’m gonna fucking rape you, you White slag', 'I’m 
gonna rape your mother, you White bitch', all this sort of stuff; horrible, 
horrible. [Sheffield Manager 5] 
However, this was juxtaposed by polite and even protective behaviour from other 
Asian men. Nonetheless, this type of abuse could make street-based policing more 
difficult for female officers in this neighbourhood, as this NPO conceded: 
It’s definitely more difficult being a female working [in the study 
neighbourhood], than it is male, just because of their attitude towards, I 
think towards females in general, but also females in uniform is even more, 
you know they just don’t like it. [Sheffield NPO 4] 
In contrast, it was described how female officers could sometimes have it easier 
than male officers in the Nottingham study neighbourhoods predominated by 
Black and Mixed race young men. A NPO reported that she had worked with male 
officers, who had constantly been threatened by groups of young men hanging on 
the street. Although the same groups were often 'lippy' towards her, they were 
never threatening. She speculated this was because being seen to threaten a 
woman might be damaging to their reputation, by undermining their 'macho 
image' [Nottingham NPO 3]. It is difficult to know how to interpret these findings. 
Research on gender differences in policing have tended to focus on women's 'soft 
policing' skills (McCarthy 2013) and their reduced likelihood of using force (Porter 
& Prenzler 2015; Lonsway et al. 2002). There is less published on gendered 
experiences of policing different communities beyond this. 
Diversity training for police officers was identified by respondents as one solution 
to the problem of poor police-community relations, as it was by Scarman (1981) 
following the Brixton Riots. More and improved race and diversity training has also 
been a consequence of the Lawrence Inquiry (McGhee 2005; Bennetto 2009), 
which identified 'institutional racism' as the collective failure of the police in 
providing 'an appropriate and professional service to people because of their 
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colour, culture, or ethnic origin' (Macpherson 1999, para.6.34). Although racism 
was implicit in some complaints about the police, respondents never used this 
term. The suggestion of diversity training was linked to the police needing to be 
more culturally sensitive. For example, by understanding 'the sacred things', such 
as not entering an Islamic home when the women are not wearing their hijab 
[Sheffield Practitioner 3]; and being sensitive to different types of victimisation for 
some ethnic groups, such as female genital mutilation. Community practitioners in 
both cities felt that officers needed to be generally more 'clued up' about the 
neighbourhoods they were working in. Their comments were often about styles of 
community policing or the 'softly stuff', which meant knowing how to deal with 
'little Johnny, whose dad is an alcoholic, or he's done a double digit sentence, his 
mum's a heroin addict' [Sheffield Practitioner 1].  They suggested that sometimes a 
'quiet word' with an individual who is 'getting a little bit lary', or with their parents, 
can be more effective than hauling them down to the police station.  
6.3 Police and Partner Relations 
The previous section looked at relationships between the police and communities. 
The current section turns to relationships between the police and other agencies, 
particularly those involved in policing.  The term ‘policing’ is used to mean 
activities performed under the broad banner of 'community safety', which has 
been defined as 'community-based action to inhibit and remedy the causes and 
consequences of criminal, intimidatory and other related anti-social behaviour' 
(LGMB 1996).  The Morgan Report (1991), which was instrumental in defining and 
promoting community safety, distinguishes it from the narrower concept of crime 
prevention. The report also advanced the notion of multi-agency partnerships as a 
means to achieve it (Berry et al. 2011), even pointing to the irrationality of local 
authorities not previously sharing responsibility for community safety or  crime 
prevention with the police (Squires 1999). This changed with the Crime and 
Disorder Act 1998, which placed a statutory requirement on local authorities and 
health authorities to work with the police to tackle crime-related issues. Yet, off 
the back of the Morgan Report, local authorities had already begun appointing 
community safety officers and developing partnerships with a range of statutory 
and voluntary sector bodies, resulting in a complex and variable picture nationally 
(Gilling 1999). The nature of partnerships in the two case studies is explored here 
as important context to events in August 2011. The previous chapter argued that a 
partnership response, compared to a pure police response, was better able to 
prevent and contain unrest, by virtue of the specialist expertise, local knowledge 
and community rapport that other agencies were able to contribute.  Although 
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partnerships may be strengthened by a crisis event, the interview data suggests 
that a certain level of inter-agency working needs to be in place beforehand, which 
this section aims to explore. 
There has been a massive proliferation in posts and teams linked to the 
community safety agenda (Hughes & Rowe 2007). Community Safety Partnerships 
(CSPs) offered a formal structure for co-ordinating partnership working at the 
strategic level, although much of their activity has been carried out through other 
local partnerships that tend not to have the same statutory backing (Berry et al. 
2011). In Sheffield, a key partnership structure at the sub-district level was 
Community Assemblies, as mentioned in the previous chapter. There were seven 
Community Assemblies, each comprising four wards and run by 12 local 
Councillors with support from City Council officers.  The aim of Community 
Assemblies was to join-up the activities of the various Council services, the private 
sector, voluntary and community sector and other agencies, including the Police. 
In the words of one respondent, another aim was 'to make the Council more 
accessible, move away from this idea that it was some kind of monolithic Town 
Hall centred organisation' [Sheffield Manager 9]. Each Community Assembly had a 
dedicated budget to boost spending on local services and locally defined issues, 
agreed through public consultation and set out in an annual Community Plan. 
There were some concerns over how well Community Assemblies had been able to 
engage with local people, as public meetings were often poorly attended; but, 
otherwise, respondents were positive about their role in supporting partnership 
working. Formally putting agencies under the public spotlight together can itself be 
the impetus for partnership working because agencies want to be seen to be 
'doing something' to address any perceived lack of legitimacy in the eyes of the 
local community  (Crawford & Jones 1995). 
Police officers in Sheffield did refer to aspects of partnership working that were 
frustrating: 
Partnership work is a little bit sometimes frustrating because, their method 
of working is different to ours. … I suppose because it’s just as police 
officers, our nature is very, fairly quickly look at a problem, have a solution, 
implement it within an 8-hour shift period [laughs a little]. You want to 
solve the world’s problems. Whereas partners, it is perhaps their structures, 
it’s their decision-making process and possibly lack of resources; and all 
those things that may prevent them from operating in the same way we do. 
This 'clash of cultures' has been reported elsewhere (Hughes 2007; Pearson et al. 
1992; Hughes & Rowe 2007), however, in the main, officers celebrated what 
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partnership working had achieved for them. NPOs, in particular, recognised that 
other agencies were able to contribute specialist expertise and resources to help 
tackle certain community safety issues, such anti-social behaviour. Due to the 
subjective nature of its base and the extreme flexibility of each category, ASB has 
the potential to generate an almost endless number of infringements, including 
begging, public drunkenness, urinating in public, letting off fireworks, 
neighbourhood noise, hoax calls and a range of youth behaviours etc. (Mooney & 
Young 2006). The Crime and Disorder Act (1998) defines ASB as behaviour ‘that 
caused or was likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress to one or more persons 
not of the same household as [the perpetrator]’. ASB, therefore, frequently 
encompasses non-criminal behaviour that can be dealt with by non-police agencies 
(Jacobson et al. 2005). For example, housing associations have specialist 
knowledge and organisational powers that can better equip them to deal with 
tenants. 
Officers in Sheffield sang the praises of specific roles that supported partnership 
activity. One such role included Safer Neighbourhood Officers (SNOs). SNOs were 
managed by Community Assembly managers, but physically located within Safer 
Neighbourhood Teams (SNTs), a sub-district partnership comprising the 
Neighbourhood Policing Team and community safety posts employed by the local 
authority. It was expected that the title of Safer Neighbourhood Teams would 
produce better chances of 'buy-in' from non-police partners; as would 
'Neighbourhood Management' over 'Neighbourhood Policing' (Hughes & Rowe 
2007). Police officers in Sheffield voiced strong support for SNOs, for their practical 
role in identifying and bringing agencies together: 
They pull everything together; so anything that needs feeding back between 
organisations. [The SNO], she’s worth her weight in gold. Well she has been 
for me because I deal with all the anti-social behaviour from our team, and 
sometimes you’re dealing with private landlords, council tenants, you need 
schools there, some have got social services involved, others have got high 
support, there’s building successful families, Shelter. I mean sometimes 
trying to get everybody to sit around the table and have a meeting is really 
difficult, but if I ever need any help [the SNO] will either come to the 
meetings or she’ll pull them together. … The people that she knows are 
invaluable that are higher up the chain. So sometimes, when you feel like 
you’re just banging your head against a brick wall, you tell her what’s 
happening. [Sheffield NPO 4] 
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These comments illustrate the complexity of some community safety issues and 
the requirement for multiple agencies to work together to address them. They also 
illustrate the difficulty in coordinating partnership working. Officers reported that 
SNOs were the 'glue between [the police] and the Council and the Councillors' and 
expressed concern about the number of posts recently cut  from nine to six, with 
the chance of the role being lost altogether as part of local austerity measures 
[Sheffield NPO 3]. Officers’ comments in Sheffield challenge the early literature on 
multi-agency working, which focuses on police scepticism to partnerships (Liddle & 
Gelsthorpe 1994; Pearson et al. 1992). They contribute to a growing evidence base 
that, at least some parts of the force, the police have '(re)-negotiated police 
culture' and are embracing inter-agency working (O’Neill & McCarthy 2012).  
This study was also able to look at how other agencies had experienced working 
with the police. In Sheffield, it was reported that rather than dominating 
partnerships (Skinns 2011), the police were generally cooperative and responsive 
to agencies and communities:  
Although everyone moans about South Yorkshire Police, I think, in general, 
within Sheffield they have been really great partners; and I think maybe 
that's increasingly difficult because they are under pressure and having 
staff cut and whatever, but through Community Assemblies we work very 
closely with the police and they were generally really great, responsive and 
kind of community-oriented partners. [Sheffield Manager 9] 
Being cooperative and responsive did not mean that partners were always in 
agreement. In fact, they sometimes faced difficult conversations due to competing 
views and ways of doing things. However, as this respondent suggests, healthy 
partnerships can accommodate conflict: 
We have those open conversations with the police and other partners and 
sometimes they are not that easy to have the conversations, but we get 
there in the end because we’ve got that sort of mutual respect at the 
moment with the people we are talking to. [Sheffield Manager 3] 
Although co-location was generally viewed as a success factor in promoting good 
inter-agency relations, some were concerned about the blurring of organisational 
boundaries. Non-police members of  the SNT  had at times been reminded by their 
managers – in only a half-joking manner – to 'just remember who you work for' 
and warned not 'go native' working in a police station [Sheffield Manager 5]. These 
concerns played out in the aftermath of events in August 2011. Partnership 
working between police and non-police members of SNTs began immediately and 
organically in response to disturbances elsewhere in the country. As described in 
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the previous chapter, NPTs and SNOs began tension monitoring and engaging with 
local partners and residents ahead of any strategic level direction; and one SNO, 
based on their SNT relationships, joined the police-led silver command team. 
While some respondents reported these partnership activities to be part of 
Sheffield's success in averting unrest, others identified them as a topic for 
discussion at the formal debrief. Questions were asked about why staff in SNTs 
had played a greater role in the response than other local authority roles, such as 
the community cohesion team. Rather than this ‘debrief’ representing a genuine 
desire to learn lessons, some respondents felt it was really to allow those who 'felt 
slightly disgruntled' to let off steam [Sheffield Manager 5]. Certainly, the findings 
of the debrief were never written up or disseminated. To some extent this 
situation represents intra-agency, rather than inter-agency, failures; whereby 
frontline community safety roles employed by the local authority were simply 
getting on with their usual jobs, unaware of any protocols to link up with 
centralised teams for critical incident management. 
6.3.1 Relationships with the youth sector 
There were concerns about the blurring of organisational boundaries linked to 
partnership arrangements between the police and youth provision. In the previous 
chapter, joint working between officers and youth workers was described as a 
success factor in helping to prevent and contain unrest in Sheffield. In one of the 
Sheffield study neighbourhoods, youth workers and PCSOs paired up to patrol the 
streets to show the community they were united, with the youth workers 
providing additional reach in terms of engagement. It was reported how this 
pairing-up of officers and PCSOs was not a nightly occurrence, but it was not 
entirely new. It was described as one of the various ways in which the NPT sought 
to build relationships with local practitioners and young people: 
Usually at night we’re paired up. I do sometimes go and meet up with some 
of the youth workers, and we’ll have a walk round and have a chat to 
people. I also try and get into the youth clubs and do work in the youth 
clubs. … I’ll just sit on the sofas in there and having a chat with the lads and 
what have you. So it’s just getting into places where they are, and trying to 
engage with them. [Sheffield NPO 2] 
In the second Sheffield study neighbourhood, police and youth workers were in 
regular contact as part of the public order response in 2011, but agency patrolled 
independently on the streets (see Chapter 5). This was to protect youth workers’ 
rapport with young people, who might become suspicious of youth workers 
working too closely with the police. Youth workers in both cities spoke about the 
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importance of being seen to be independent of the police, restricting their level of 
visible contact with police officers and involvement in community safety initiatives. 
For example, youth agencies reported turning down requests from the police to 
provide ‘pre- and post-support’ for covert criminal investigations, like Operation 
Mach, to protect the standing of ‘youth workers, who spend months, if not years, 
building up community relationships’ [Sheffield Manager 3]. They had also argued 
against the involvement of youth workers in patrolling the night-time economy 
because this took them away from young people in communities. This was despite 
some obvious benefits to this role in keeping young people safe and ‘brokering’ 
young people’s relationship with the police: 
The detached youth workers, we used to, as I say we used to do that on 
Friday nights, and really it was about identifying young people who were 
either vulnerable in terms of being victims of crime or exploitation and also 
trying to prevent young people getting involved in anti-social behaviour and 
crime. So, the youth worker there was really like an engagement tool, I 
suppose in some ways brokering that relationship with the PCSO. [Sheffield 
Manager 5] 
Respondents emphasised that this was ‘not a youth work role… because youth 
work is all about engagement and it’s not a sort of emergency service… [or] a 
babysitting service’ [Sheffield Manager 3]. It was reported that youth agencies had 
since redrawn their boundaries and were no longer providing this universal street-
based support for young people who may simply be drunk or rowdy; and, if any 
young person had been a victim of crime, they argued that ‘this need[ed] to be 
dealt with as a policing matter’ [Sheffield Manager 3]. Again, the nature of the 
partnerships in Sheffield meant that youth agencies were able to have their case 
heard by the police and respected: 
As agencies we understand each other’s boundaries … we are able to say 
‘actually no we are not going to do that. This is our role and this is how we 
can support it and how we can work together; but actually it is not 
appropriate for us to be doing that because of X, Y and Z.’ [Sheffield 
Manager 4] 
Senior managers negotiated the general role of partners in multi-agency initiatives, 
but frontline practitioners had to negotiate the day-to-day realities of working 
together. For community practitioners, including youth workers, this meant 
balancing their relationships between the community and the police in the context 
of information sharing. Previous research on partnerships has reported how inter-
agency communication is often conducted through informal channels, such as 
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corridor conversations or text messages, which has implications for data 
protection and human rights (O’Neill & Loftus 2013). For youth workers, it also has 
implications for their rapport with young people, who suspect a confidence has 
been broken. On this basis, youth workers limited not only their visible contact 
with officers, but also what they shared with them; thus provoking a degree of 
animosity. NPOs conceded that youth workers ‘have a duty of care’ to young 
people; but suspected they sometimes withheld information that should really be 
shared. The respondent quickly followed this accusation with the comment ‘that’s 
they job isn’t it really?’, but at least a minor tension was revealed. That said, some 
practitioners worked hard to get the balance right. The quotation below reveals 
how a practitioner in Nottingham sometimes shared information with the police 
through a trusted third person: 
They won’t talk to neighbourhood police. They will to some degree; they 
won’t share things with them in the same way they will with us. [The 
community practitioner] quite often will ring me and say ‘I’m ringing you 
because I need to tell you this. I don’t want to tell [the police] because I 
want to tell you and I want you to tell me what you think I need to do 
before I go and see a police officer’; which can sometimes make it really 
difficult for me because I’m like ‘ok let’s think this through from a whole 
range of different issues’; and then I might have to go and share that with 
somebody before I can go back to him with a response, before I can kind of 
go to the next stage; and partly that’s about keeping them safe as well. 
[Nottingham Manager 5] 
Police secondments were identified as offering both benefits and challenges for 
partnership relations. The Police Advisory Board for England and Wales (2013) 
defines a secondment as ‘the agreed detachment of a person from their regular 
organisation for a temporary, time limited, assignment elsewhere which does not 
affect the employment status of the secondee’ and the Board sees them as a 
valuable tool for employee and organisational development (p.4). In Sheffield, 
respondents referred to the nine police officers seconded to community youth 
teams. These were described as being like the old school police officer, dealing 
with school-based incidents, but with additional links to SNTs and youth workers. 
They supported restorative justice interventions and dealt with out-of-court 
disposals for the Youth Justice Service. Respondents in the youth service reported 
feeling ‘lucky’ to have them as a dedicated resource, but also reflected that the 
police had different ways of doing things, which the organisation ‘hit up against on 
a daily basis’ [Sheffield Manager 3]. The culture clash was most noticeable when 
police secondees first arrived and so the transience of police officers was an issue. 
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There was a 50:50 split between officers coming into the role ahead of retirement 
and officers working towards their sergeant’s exam. The latter group were ‘very 
keen and willing but then moved very quickly’, either when they passed the 
sergeant’s exam or failed it, which made the youth agency question how 
committed these individuals really were to the role. The constant rotation of 
officers also drew complaints from communities. Transience in the police due to 
career progression has been typically covered in the literature as a problem for 
PCSOs, but respondents in Sheffield claimed that PCSOs tended to stay in role 
longer than warranted officers and this undermined partnership relations. 
In Nottingham, Vanguard Plus, the preventative arm of the EGYV work had police 
secondees. Again, respondents reported pros and cons to this arrangement.  
Vanguard Plus had a difficult time already setting itself apart from the 
enforcement work of Operation Vanguard by virtue of its name. With a team 
comprising six police officers and six PCSOs, this was even more difficult. Although 
the officers seconded to Vanguard Plus were usually dressed in plain clothes, 
people knew they were officers and this presented a challenge for working with 
agencies that needed to maintain the appearance of independence from the police 
to protect their rapport with communities, especially young people: 
I have to be really careful when I go. I don’t just turn up ever. I’d always say 
to [the community practitioner] ‘Is it alright if I come down? When can I 
come down and see you?’  And we’re really careful with that, as well with 
the police officers. They know they’re cops even though they’re plain 
clothes; but, again, we’d never just turn up because it damages the 
relationship and it’s a fine line all the time trying to win the confidence, 
trying to win them over. [Nottingham Manager 5] 
Again, a culture clash between police secondees and civilian staff was reported, at 
least when they first arrived at Vanguard Plus. Respondents said they were able to 
mitigate the risk of secondees completely unsuited to the role by interviewing 
applicants in advance. Successful applicants had to demonstrate a grasp of the 
various personal and societal factors explaining why some people became involved 
in crime. They also had to demonstrate some awareness of how to engage with 
offenders. On a very basic level, officers had to demonstrate they could do more 
than simply arrest their way out of a situation. According to one respondent, this 
vetting process had helped to produce ‘a team of police officers who I wouldn’t 
have any doubts about’ [Nottingham Manager 5]. 
It seemed important what the specific role was of each secondee in terms of 
challenges and successes. In Sheffield, there was a police secondee specifically 
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recruited to promote and manage partnership working. The position was jointly 
funded by the police and the City Council. While some respondents suggested 
there were challenges for the role in remaining connected to all the police 
structures while based at the Council, the role was regarded as a success in terms 
of joining-up agencies, especially at the strategic level. As with most things, the 
achievements of the role were not fully realised until after it had gone. Cuts to 
public sector funding meant the role was axed a few years after the riots (in March 
2013). Like SNOs, this role was described as the 'glue' between partners: 
[the partnership role] was extremely well linked between the two 
organisations at a time that, prior to [the partnership role], I wasn’t aware 
of a connection as close as we had then; and since his departure, with the 
retraction of funding, whatever, we’ve got nothing like it now. I would think 
we probably had a couple of years, two-three years in around that time 
with [the partnership role] being that glue between the two organisations. 
[Sheffield NPO 3] 
Meetings and networks put in place and/or maintained by the role were described 
as being instrumental to a coordinated public order response in August 2011. 
These were surviving to some extent, but respondents were concerned for how 
long without further investment. It was reported that this police secondment and 
the wider commitment to partnership working by the police in Sheffield was 
associated with the outlook of senior officers at the time. As documented 
elsewhere, police leaders are seen by officers as both figureheads and role models 
for conduct and so the values and standards they set are important variables in 
organisational behaviour (Porter et al. 2015). Both a risk and benefit of this is that 
the culture and organisational practice of a police force can be transformed by 
new leadership.  
Schools are another policing partner, involved in promoting community safety by 
making referrals to youth provision for interventions. Tension monitoring was 
carried out by Sheffield schools and respondents referred more generally to the 
role of schools in determining the life chances of young people. There was some 
suggestion that schools, especially in the Nottingham, were quick to exclude young 
people; even ignoring the appeals and assistance of community practitioners keen 
to keep individuals engaged. Previous research suggests the practice of excluding 
young people is part of an emerging trend of a heightened sense of risk that 
schools and other agencies are alert to (Ralphs et al. 2009). It is difficult for young 
people to find a replacement school once they are deemed as posing a ‘high risk’, 
thus triggering a spiral of increasing marginalisation. Schools were not involved in 
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the public order responses in either city because in August schools were closed for 
the summer break. Youth workers, however, reported that schools can play an 
important role in preventing disorder because students are likely to be involved or 
have knowledge of events, as illustrated by the comments of this practitioner: 
I think schools are key, absolutely key. That’s the grapevine. There’s 1300 
kids in a secondary school and you know what Chinese whispers are: it 
starts with a little Y7, ‘it’s gonna kick off on London road tonight’, by the 
time it gets to Y11 and the kids who are running school, it’s on and it’s 
arranged. [Sheffield Practitioner 1] 
The rationale behind Sheffield's tension monitoring system in schools is that 
information circulating among students might also provide insight into tensions in 
the wider community. In practice, however, the tension monitoring system was 
underused by schools because they were worried about the impact of reported 
tensions on the school’s reputation. Due to the same concerns, it was reported 
that some schools were not keen to work with youth agencies, making it difficult 
for youth workers to access individuals and groups for interventions. Reluctant 
schools tended to be the ones higher up the attainment tables, perhaps because 
they had more to lose from negative press. 
6.3.2 Relationships with the voluntary sector 
Pre-existing relationships between the statutory and voluntary sectors were 
especially important in defining the public order responses in the two case studies. 
As detailed in the previous chapter, weaker relationships in Nottingham meant 
agencies in the two sectors were less willing or able to work together than they 
were in Sheffield. Local commissioning arrangements and funding decisions 
emerged as an explanatory factor for this.  In Nottingham, it was reported that the 
City Council's commissioning processes for community and youth provision did not 
always favour the best providers. It was widely acknowledged that only a few 
organisations and individuals had the expertise to work with acutely marginalised 
groups in Nottingham. Yet, these agencies were under-resourced and under-
supported by the Council, as this respondent suggests: 
We're still very dependent on a relatively small number of providers who 
are particularly good at engaging with certain parts of the community. … 
There's probably half a dozen individuals who, you would have to say, if 
they weren't there, would we necessarily we manage without them?  And 
the corollary to that is, and how well do we support them?  Most of those 
people are still on a kind of slightly hand to mouth existence in terms of the 
stability of their projects. [Nottingham Manager 6] 
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Some voluntary sector agencies were reported to be only ‘in it for the money’ 
[Nottingham Practitioner 1] and local residents were aware of this, referring to 
them as ‘poverty pimps’ to imply they were merely ‘riding on the back of [their] 
misfortune’ [Nottingham Manager 5].  Consequently, during the 2011 
disturbances, these organisations were not well placed to engage with 
communities; and some did not even try: 
Some of the organisations we gave money to, there was one in particular, 
which despite the fact that they receive £60,000 a year, and operate in that 
area, closed at 3 o'clock on the Tuesday afternoon and actually abandoned 
sessions. [Nottingham Manager 6] 
There were a number of reasons put forward for why the better-regarded agencies 
struggled to secure funding. One reason was that although they were ‘brilliant at 
engaging communities’, they were not necessarily good business managers. 
Alternatively, it was argued that the bureaucratic burden put on them by funders 
was unrealistic: ‘the amount of stuff, the hoops that you have to do is unrealistic at 
certain points, you know, to actually do the work, if that make sense. Just the 
amount of paperwork’ [Nottingham Practitioner 3]. This paperwork might be 
important to funders if it was used manage performance, but respondents 
suggested it was a meaningless form-filling exercise because the data was never 
interrogated:  
I can get a form to fill in, put anything I want on it, and I know nobody ain’t 
checking it; or people are checking and just putting the input. They’re not 
checking the input is correct. It’s a very touchy subject. [Nottingham 
Practitioner 1] 
Hence, the paperwork did little to make procurement transparent or the hold 
contractors accountable. Community practitioners claimed the Nottingham study 
neighbourhoods received large pots of funding to tackle deprivation and other 
social problems, but either it was unclear where the funding had gone and what it 
had achieved; or, more seriously, they suspected corrupt relationships had 
channelled the funding to a select group of agencies, including some that 
consistently underperformed, but the Council had no ‘backbone’ to deal with the 
problem ‘because they don’t want to deal with the drama’ [Nottingham 
Practitioner 1]. These grievances helped to explain why there was little goodwill 
from voluntary sector agencies, who were community minded, to work in 
partnership with the statutory sector when asked for help in August 2011. 
Concerns about commissioning had understandably undermined relationships 
between statutory and voluntary sector organisations, but they had also 
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undermined relationships within the voluntary sector. The lack of transparency, in 
particular, seems to have increased the sense of competition between agencies. In 
an unfair game, players were less concerned about playing nicely. Consequently, 
respondents claimed that ‘it’s very territorial in Nottingham. People will tear your 
eyes out for ten grand, [which] is not even big bucks’ [Nottingham Practitioner 1].  
Referring specifically to the situation in one of the study neighbourhoods, a 
community practitioner reported ‘it’s horrible for politics’ [Nottingham 
Practitioner 3]. In summary, some voluntary sector agencies ‘hate[d] each other’ 
[Nottingham Practitioner 1]. Despite this backdrop of inter-agency tensions, 
however, some voluntary sector organisations in Nottingham were trying to work 
together, against the challenges of austerity, to make a difference: 
Coming up to 2011, when the funding started to cut there was a group 
especially in [the study neighbourhood] that none of us was accessing. We 
put on a lot of voluntary stuff because we knew that there's a load of crazy 
kids coming up and they are not getting the activities. Very bright and 
intelligent but there is no services and there was a lot of worry. 
[Nottingham Practitioner 3] 
Promisingly, in the aftermath of the disturbances, there was reported to be some 
funding that had been set aside for ‘capacity building … where [agencies] were 
talking to each other’ [Nottingham Manager 1] to facilitate consortia that might 
help smaller organisations to pool their strengths and presumably have a better 
chance of producing successful bids in the future. 
In Sheffield, relationships between statutory and voluntary sector agencies were 
reported to been facilitated by commissioning arrangements. Respondents spoke 
about voluntary sector provider networks in each Community Assembly area that 
were used to communicate funding opportunities to voluntary sector agencies. 
These networks were set up and managed by the statutory sector. It sometimes 
felt like ‘an uphill struggle’ [Sheffield Manager 3] because ‘the emphasis on trying 
to work together can sometimes be a bit difficult’ [Sheffield Manager 4], but 
generally the networks kept lines of communication open. As referred to above, 
voluntary sector organisations had been antagonised by the allocation of EGYV 
funding; because they felt small grants undermined what could be achieved. The 
Council responded by setting up at a network of all the agencies working on the 
EGYV agenda to help them coordinate their activities. An individual from the 
voluntary sector was recruited to manage the network to maximise buy-in. It was 
likely that these networks played a role in promoting positive relationships 
between voluntary sector agencies. Generally, respondents reported that the 
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voluntary sector in Sheffield was strong. However, recent austerity measures had 
reduced the commissioning role of local authorities and with it the rationale for 
these networks. Network meetings survived for a brief time with a few ‘stalwarts’, 
but even their attendance eventually dropped off [Sheffield Manager 3]. 
There had been renewed efforts to keep in contact with voluntary sector agencies 
via newsletters, email circulars and themed workshops, but due to reduced 
capacity in the voluntary sector – linked to reduced funding – these had had been 
relatively ineffective.  On this basis, statutory sector respondents felt it might be 
difficult to integrate the voluntary sector into any future critical incident response, 
as in 2011, because they might not know whom to contact. However, there were 
still some voluntary sector networks, which may not have been conceived by the 
statutory sector but, nonetheless, offered routes in for dialogue and collaboration. 
For example, in one of the study neighbourhoods, there was a network called the 
Group of Groups, or the GOG. As its name suggests, this was essentially a structure 
that aimed to bring together the multifarious voluntary sector agencies working 
within the neighbourhood, including a number of different faith-based groups. The 
GOG was set up and continued to be managed by these agencies with an 
appointed chair. Its rationale was to help resolve tensions between groups so they 
might see themselves as partners rather than competitors, especially in relation to 
funding bids. Statutory agencies, including NPOs, were already accessing the GOG 
and found it useful for getting information to and from the groups represented. 
There were other voluntary sector networks, organised around communities of 
identity, as opposed to communities of place. For example, the Federation of 
Mosques, representing Muslim faith-based groups, which played a role in the 
public order response in Sheffield by facilitating communication between the 
police and the Asian community residing in one of the study neighbourhoods.  
Other community-based structures will be explored in more detail in the following 
chapter, which moves the focus from institutional to community relationships and 
considers how these might also constitute important context for urban unrest at 
local levels. 
6.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has considered pre-existing relationships as the longer-term context 
to local events in August 2011. As in previous riots, this study highlights poor 
police-community relations as part of the explanation for disturbances in 
Nottingham. Based on interviews with a range of agencies, including the police, it 
emerged that repressive policing targeted at drugs and gang-related crime had 
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antagonised whole communities through, for example, the use of house-raids, 
stop and search, and stop and account, which is a relatively unchecked police 
power to detain, easily used to harass the 'usual suspects'. Anger at the police 
following a covert drugs operation was a risk factor in one of the Sheffield study 
neighbourhoods, but this was mitigated by what were perceived by local people to 
be genuine efforts from the police to make amends. Furthermore, structures 
leftover from these remedial efforts were able to be used by police and partners to 
engage communities in a proactive and integrated public order response in August 
2011. Accounts cross-cutting both case studies demonstrated the role of NPTs and 
particularly PCSOs in promoting good police-community relations, and police 
legitimacy, which was instrumental in preventing disorder at the neighbourhood 
level. This provides a rationale for involving NPTs, at the earliest stage, in 
operations to prevent and contain community disorders. Specialist response teams 
with little local knowledge are, on their own, likely to make matters worse. 
The pros and cons of partnership working have been researched before, but not in 
the context of urban unrest. This chapter has detailed how pre-established 
partnerships are the foundations of a successful public order response. 
Relationships can be slow to build and trying to throw agencies together in the 
moment is unlikely to work. Police-agency relations can be promoted through 
multi-agency teams and co-location; and positions with a particular remit for 
facilitating partnerships were highly regarded by agencies in Sheffield. The police 
found them especially useful in co-ordinating the input of non-police agencies 
often required to deal with complex community safety issues, such as ASB. 
Unfortunately, these roles have been some of the first to go in various rounds of 
public sector cuts and respondents had already noticed a detrimental impact on 
inter-agency working. In Sheffield, this raised concerns about future capability to 
respond to critical incidents, as a repeat of previous activities would not be 
possible. The role of fair and transparent commissioning processes were 
spotlighted as important for good relationships between statutory and voluntary 
sector agencies and within the voluntary sector. There was a mixed picture across 
the case studies, and nationally, about which services were commissioned or 
which were provided by the local authority, nevertheless, voluntary sector 
agencies remained valuable partners in preventing and containing unrest because 
they frequently employed the few individuals able to engage with the most 
marginalised groups in communities. In Nottingham, a number of agencies were 
able and willing to respond to the threat of unrest, but not necessarily together 
and this undermined the possibility of a partnership response. Sheffield had much 
stronger track record of partnership working, and agencies were able to put any 
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outstanding grievances on hold, in the knowledge that pre-existing mechanisms 
could be used to resolve them once the crisis was over. 
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Chapter 7 – Community Context 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter considers the nature of community in the case studies as potential 
variable affecting order outcomes in August 2011. Thus far, the term community 
has been used to mean the people living in the study neighbourhoods, which, as 
noted earlier, are place-based communities that may contain and be overlapped 
by other types of communities, such as communities of identity and of interest. 
Beneath this seemingly simple typology, however, lies a long-standing controversy 
about the term ‘community’, leading some to question whether it means anything 
at all (Stacey 1969; Cohen 1985). At the extreme, Young (2007) claims it is a 
dangerously exclusive concept, which, to boot, is sociologically outmoded for 
these liquid times of ‘lightly engaged strangers’. Arguably, however, there is a 
need to conceptualise how people live and interact together in groups that are not 
completely transient. Leighton (1988) offers the solution of the ‘social network’ 
approach, which he claims is implicit in a large body of criminology theory and 
research. The social network approach facilitates an understanding of community 
as a form of social organisation based on social interaction and common social 
bonds, which may be local or non-local or constituted by both. Some 
commentators have added a ‘sense of belonging’ as another key element of 
community (e.g. Wardak 2000). A sense of belonging has been referred to as a 
fundamental human need that places behind only physiological and safety needs 
(Maslow 1943). At the community level, it correlates with the ability of members 
to function competently (Glynn 1981) through the process of empowerment 
(McMillan & Chavis 1986) and collective problem solving (Bachrach & Zautra 1985; 
Wandersman & Giamartino 1980). 
Chapter 4 provided socio-demographic profiles of the cities and neighbourhoods 
being studied, drawing largely on official statistics and reports. The aim of this 
chapter is to provide an understanding of social life in the case studies with greater 
reference to the interview data. Community was a focus of this study because 
explanations of previous riots had spotlighted dysfunctional community as a 
contributing factor. South Asian communities in England’s northern mill towns 
were accused of segregating themselves, which undermined inter-group relations 
and promoted conflict (Cantle 2001). While there is little evidence in the extant 
literature that the 2011 events represented ‘race riots’, the over-representation of 
BME participants suggested that issues of ethnicity and diversity were worth 
exploring. Alternatively, Campbell (1993) identified the different ways in which 
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men and women navigated the challenges of poverty and unemployment as part 
of the explanation for disturbances in the early nineties. These community 
explanations make implicit reference to social disorganisation theory, defined as 
‘the inability of a community structure to realise the common values of its 
residents and maintain effective social controls’ (Sampson & Wilson 1995, p.45).  
The chapter begins by looking at social disorganisation theory, charting key 
conceptual developments that can inform explanations of urban unrest at local 
levels. It details how the systemic model has articulated a link between social 
order and social capital on the basis that depleted social networks undermine a 
community’s ability to realise common values or to enforce them. Hence, the 
chapter goes on to examines the evidence for social capital in the study 
neighbourhoods, with reference to the three different types of social capital 
identified by Putnam (2000; 2002): bonding, bridging and linking. The first type 
requires an understanding of which distinct groups reside within the study 
neighbourhoods and how well individuals feel attached to their group. The second 
type requires an understanding of how well the various groups get on together at 
neighbourhood and city levels. The bonds between social groups are referred to as 
bridging social capital, which has also been conceptualised within the police 
discourse as community cohesion. Finally, the chapter explores how community 
practitioners were an important source of linking social capital in the study 
neighbourhoods, helping local people to secure critical resources and to address 
local grievances, mitigating the tendency of marginalised young men to participate 
in riots. 
7.2 Social Control Theory 
This section explores how the nature of community in the case studies can provide 
the capability to prevent urban unrest via informal social control.  In its broadest 
sense, informal social control is ‘the ability of social groups or institutions to make 
norms or rules more effective’ (Reiss 1951, p.196). For a community this means 
regulating the behaviour of its members in accordance with desired and 
established norms and this protects the general well-being of the whole 
community. Social controls consist of the rewards and penalties, real or imagined, 
that accumulate from adhering to or deviating from these group norms 
(Kornhouser 1978). There are two dimensions to these controls (ibid): the internal-
external dimension, relating to whether the control comes from within the 
individual or is triggered by others; and the direct-indirect dimension, relating to 
whether actions are aimed at limiting deviance or whether actions are a by-
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product of relationships established for other reasons. For example, internal direct 
controls result from an individual’s own acceptance of community values and 
norms, regulated by feelings of guilt or shame. Internal indirect controls relate to 
conformity on the basis of satisfying relationships with others in the community. 
External direct controls include supervision and surveillance by others. External 
indirect controls relate to the obligations placed on individuals due to their 
relationships with others. 
Across time and space, explanations of urban unrest have focused on 
dysfunctional communities, linked to criminality, subcultures of poverty and 
ethnicity (see Chapter 1). These explanations resonate with social disorganisation 
theory, which emanates from the Chicago-school research of Shaw and McKay 
(1942; 1969), who argued that low economic status, ethnic heterogeneity and 
residential mobility disrupted the social organisation of communities; and, in turn, 
these accounted for variations in crime and delinquency. Population churn was 
seen has been particularly detrimental to social controls because incoming social 
groups are likely to have their own values, increasing the challenge of consensus 
values at the neighbourhood level. It is the tendency of disadvantaged areas to 
experience high levels of population change  due to a range of factors that prompt 
household relocation, due to the emigration of people dissatisfied with the area 
and the immigration of  people attracted to cheaper accommodation (see Pearson 
& Lawless 2012). The existence of 'buy to let' housing is associated with population 
change in the UK, because it can be attractive to transitory households. For 
example, agencies rely on this type of housing to accommodate asylum seekers 
(Aden et al. 2007) and the homeless (Travers et al. 2007). A Neighbourhood Police 
Officer in the Nottingham described a situation in which population change can 
also be promoted by social housing policies, in this case where 'trouble' families 
were relocated as a sanction [Nottingham PO Officer 3]. The respondent opined 
that this policy had undermined local relationships, with consequences for crime 
and other social problems. 
Social disorganisation theory has developed over time, increasing understanding of 
how social dynamics within neighbourhoods affect crime and disorder. For 
example, systemic theory (Berry & Kasarda 1977; Bursik & Grasmick 1993) has 
focused on 'the degree to which a neighborhood can employ the interactional 
networks that tie together community residents to effectively regulate the nature 
of the activities within its boundaries' (Bursik 2000, p.92). Further development of 
systemic theory provided a more specific definition of social ties in the form of 
'collective efficacy' which is defined as 'social cohesion among neighbors combined 
with their willingness to intervene on behalf of the common good' (Sampson et al. 
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1997, p.918). Social cohesion results when there are high levels of trust among 
neighbours, which develops from shared expectations of how to behave, as the 
source of social controls. Where individuals are confident they know community 
standards for behaviour and that neighbours will support them, they are more 
likely to intervene. Collective efficacy, like systemic and social disorganization 
theories, holds that residential stability is critical for the formation of social 
networks that underpin effective social control by residents. However, social 
networks can also impede the development of social control if criminal types are 
embedded within them (Browning et al. 2004; Sampson 2006; Pattillo 1998). This 
puts emphasis on what the norms and values are within communities and not 
merely how well individuals are tied together. 
7.3 Groups Identities 
This section looks at the different social groups residing in the study 
neighbourhoods and the commitment of individuals to group norms and values. It 
draws on Putnam's (2000) notion of 'bonding' social capital, which refers to 
relationships amongst members of a network who are similar to each other and 
have shared interests. This can be distinguished from 'bridging' social capital, 
which represents the relationships between networks of people who are different 
to each other. Bridging social capital represents weaker ties, but the 'strength of 
weak ties' is the access they provide to information, including jobs, outside an 
individual's own social circle, increasing their opportunities for social mobility 
(Granovetter 1973).  On the other hand, people are more likely to get social 
support from bonding social capital, although in the absence of bridging social 
capital it can produce deleterious consequences. ‘Too much bonding’ can promote 
exclusionary practices based on distrust, intolerance and outright hate of outsiders 
(Fukuyama 2001), manifesting as territoriality (Webster 2003; Kintrea & Suzuki 
2008) and ethnic conflict (Putnam 2000). 
 
7.3.1 Familial networks 
The origins of social capital can be found in the writings of Bourdieu (1980; 1986; 
1993), Loury (1977) and Coleman (1988; 1990), who saw family as being the main 
source of social capital, which inheres in the structure of intergenerational 
relationships, especially between parent and child. Parents invest in their children, 
who are expected to support them in later life. Children will benefit from the 
development of an intense relationship with their parents, comprising attention, 
support and the transmission of norms and values, and this increases their human 
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capital, particularly in the form of educational achievement, which can provide 
economic rewards. Parental networks outside the home can widen the norm-
enforcing environment, increasing social capital at a community level and further 
increasing the child’s human capital. Coleman (1988) refers to this phenomenon as 
‘intergenerational closure’. Research has found mixed results for Coleman’s 
hypothesis, pointing to the additional effects of the child’s own social networks 
and the ethos of the school on academic attainment (Morgan & Sorensen 1999; 
Carbonaro 1998); therefore, demonstrating the complexity of social capital.  
Family as a source of social capital is acknowledged in more recent theoretical 
developments by Putnam (1996; 2000; 2002) and Fukuyama (1995; 1997; 2001), 
but their primary focus is on the generation of social capital through large 
aggregates, such as communities, regions and nations (Edwards et al. 2003). Social 
capital is seen as a public good, embodied in civic engagement, which has 
consequences for democracy and economic prosperity. Putnam implicates 
changing family life as a causal feature of social capital decline, notably linked to 
the role of women as household earners, which has reduced their capacity to 
participate in school and neighbourhood associations (Leigh & Putnam 2002). 
Arguably, this is a rosy account of female domesticity, which overlooks the 
relationship between structural inequality and interpersonal dynamics (Oakley 
1974). However, it does place the issue of working hours at the heart of 
understandings about social capital, which relies on people being able to engage in 
relevant spheres of social life. The downplaying of structural factors is a general 
criticism of social capital theory. 
Fukuyama more deliberately decentres the family by referring to the ‘private-
regarding’ nature of the social capital they generate (Edwards et al. 2003). He 
claims there is ‘something of an inverse relationship between the bonds of trust 
and reciprocity inside and outside the family; when one is very strong, the other 
tends to be weak’ (Fukuyama 1999, pp.17–18). Consequently, he argues that the 
‘breakdown of the family’, while constituting a loss of social capital, may actually 
lead to some members of the family increasing their social ties elsewhere. Thus, 
Fukuyama (2001) moves the blame for the recent decline in social capital from the 
family to modern democracy’s promotion of excessive individualism. These 
debates about social capital have informed this chapter’s focus on both family and 
community ties as sources of norms and values, which can be used as levers of 
social control (Portes 1998), thus helping to prevent and contain urban unrest 
where this is deemed valuable by the community. 
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7.3.2 Ethnic identity 
The importance of familial networks overlapped with ethnic identity in the study 
neighbourhoods. As detailed in Chapter 4, all four study neighbourhoods had 
relatively high BME populations. However, this did not mean a high degree of 
heterogeneity. In fact, each study neighbourhood had a dominant ethnic group 
that influenced the identity and wider cultural life of the community. In the two 
Sheffield study neighbourhoods, the dominant ethnic groups were reported to be 
Somali and South Asian respectively. The term ‘Asian’ was more generally used by 
respondents to refer to the South Asian group, which was mainly people of 
Pakistani heritage and smaller population of Bangladeshis. Similarly to Wardak’s  
finding (2000) about Edinburgh’s Pakistani community, the Asian community in the 
Sheffield study neighbourhood had a high degree of social interaction, which was 
facilitated by regular participation in particular kinship/friendship networks, 
known as Biraderi, and also the Mosque. Biraderi provided a sense of belonging to 
members, promoted by endogamy. But, more importantly than this, Biraderi 
provided reciprocal relationships that were an important source of social capital. 
In Wardak’s study, it was reported that Biraderi were actually stronger in Britain 
than in Pakistan, as a response to the immigrant community’s sense of social and 
psychological insecurity, linked to experiences of discrimination and racism (p.81). 
Consequently, Asian people were more likely to seek support from someone 
within their ethnic community. This was evident in the current study. For example, 
it was reported that, despite the other ward Councillors being ‘extremely active 
and extremely good’ [Sheffield NPO 3], members of the Asian community tended 
to approach the Asian Councillor on the basis that he understood ‘the politics [the] 
community very well’ [Sheffield NPO 3]. 
Respondents referred to the benefits of Asian kinship networks in terms of 
facilitating the engagement of local agencies with the community. Specifically, 
kinship networks were reported to have a ‘multiplier effect’, maximising the 
impact of information disseminated: 
It’s understanding the group, the family dynamics. If you have one 
individual kin, that kin maybe related to a number of different families, so 
by engaging with that individual you are then impacting on possible five-ten 
families. It’s like a force multiplier [Sheffield Practitioner 1] 
The same was said of the mosques, which together with family ties meant it was 
possible to reach most sections of the Asian community, including women and 
young people, who tended not to attend the mosque as regularly as men: 
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Same with the mosque. You know, Friday prayers, you do get the young 
people and so within that, and you get the elderly so you might have 300-
400 people, but then you multiply that, the message that gets back, you 
know to a number. [Sheffield Practitioner 1] 
In the sense that Coleman spoke about family ties providing human capital to 
children, this was explicitly recognised by respondents as a strength of the Somali 
community in the other Sheffield study area.  Despite experiencing high levels of 
deprivation, as measured by official statistics, there was reported to be a rich 
family environment that was protective of local children, by providing material and 
social care within the home and encouraging and supporting children's 
engagement with school: 
Somali community, nine times out of 10 the children their children will go to 
University, even the drug dealers you will find they have got degrees….They 
have got both parents there and even if they have got one parent, there it is 
warm, the house is clean, they have always got food, they are always being 
bought new clothes, they go on holiday so come on, you know, let's be 
honest with ourselves. … without family, there is no community [Sheffield 
Practitioner 4] 
Family was not explicitly identified as a protective factor in Nottingham, where the 
dominant ethnicity in both neighbourhoods was African-Caribbean. Official 
statistics failed to represent this due to the high level of mixed parentage and the 
limitations of how ‘ethnicity’ is measured. A history of immigration from Jamaica 
meant that a proportion of residents fell into the Mixed Census category. 
However, many Mixed race and White people living in the study area, culturally 
identified as being ‘Black’ due to the value placed upon Caribbean food and music 
within families and the wider community (McKenzie 2015). Despite the term dual 
heritage becoming more common in ‘polite’ discourse, this thesis makes a point of 
using Mixed race, after it was recounted by one respondent that local people were 
disdainful of the recent name change, which had happened without their 
consultation. Banks (1999) argues that outsiders to mixed parentage cannot 
impose terminology on those who are insiders. Just as the term Black was 
reclaimed in the 1960-70s, he suggests that in the future people of mixed 
parentage may be able to advocate their own term. Another critique of the dual 
(or mixed) heritage term notes its emphasis on cultural inheritance, despite 
culture being complex, intermixed and not genetically produced and transmitted in 
the way that racial characteristics are (Phoenix & Tizard 2002). There is another 
term, ‘ethnic group’, which refers to people who share more than just physical 
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traits, including a common history, language and culture as well. Thus, official 
categories are not really ‘ethnic’ but ‘racial’ categories because they fail to capture 
these additional components of identity.  
As with other communities in Britain, group identity in the Nottingham study 
neighbourhoods was reinforced by how members were treated by outsiders (e.g. 
Wardak 2000; Webster 2003). These predominantly Black communities 
experienced repressive policing on a regular basis due to perceptions of gangs (see 
Chapter 6). The reputation for violent crime and gangs in the study 
neighbourhoods was linked to a number of high profile murders, but arguably, 
there was also a racial dimension to the policing.  Racism against Black people has 
changed over time, but still exists and is currently being expressed though 
derogative discourses about Black culture, more punitive responses in the criminal 
justice system and over-policing of Black people via targeted crime hotspots, which 
tend to match the geographical areas where Black people live (e.g. Williams 2015). 
It was reported that local people in the study areas were aware of how they were 
thought of by outsiders and this had both emotional and practical implications for 
them. As one community practitioner put it: ‘a lot of people have an impression of 
the area that isn’t correct as it is. For the people who live here, and love it, it’s 
heart-breaking for them’ [Nottingham Practitioner 2]. A police officer reported 
how the stigma of living in the study neighbourhood probably also impacted on 
how residents were treated and their life opportunities: 
I could imagine that they probably do find a number of things difficult. Like 
particularly young people, particularly young Black men in [the study 
neighbourhood]. You put down where you live, I have got no evidence of 
this, but it seems you know human nature would suggest that you know 
when you apply for a job and you put that address down, I'm sure lots of 
people form the opinion straightaway, ‘oh, you know, the gun capital of 
Nottingham’. [Nottingham NPO 1] 
The positive implication of neighbourhood stigma was that it had increased 
residents’ social cohesion within the neighbourhood. As detailed in Chapter 4, 
respondents described the Nottingham study neighbourhoods as having a ‘sense 
of community’, which meant that 'everybody looks out for everybody' 
[Nottingham Practitioner 3]; and despite problems of poverty and crime, it was 
reported elsewhere that many resident choose to remain living there (McKenzie 
2015). This possibly represents Wacquant’s (2008) ‘shield’ against prejudice, which 
is commonly used by urban outcasts. The shield protects people from ‘being 
looked down on’, but it also prevents them from engaging in life beyond the 
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screen and from bridging with other social groups, which has the potential to 
improve their life opportunities. 
In a similar way to the 'multiplier effect' of familial networks in Sheffield's, which 
meant information was more easily disseminated, familial networks in Nottingham 
were reported to multiply the impact of negative treatment by public agencies. As 
previously detailed, the poor treatment of one family member by the police was 
reported to affect the feelings of the wider family. This raises a concern about 
whether members of the community were inclined to intervene to prevent 
disorderly behaviour and violence towards the police in 2011. Respondents across 
a range of stakeholder groups referred to young people from ‘bad homes’ in the 
Nottingham study areas, but this was necessarily related to poor parenting. Some 
community practitioners were keen to promote understanding of social structures 
impacting negatively on family life, which was necessary to make a difference, as 
captured in the comments of this respondent: 
 [The police] had a prejudiced perception of these kids, whether they were 
White or whether they were Black, it didn’t make no difference, they’re all 
shit and they’re all crap, and they were never gonna get anywhere. They 
knew that they came from these bad homes, some of ‘em did, some of ‘em 
didn’t, but there was no understanding of why their life was the way that it 
was; why they were known to the police in the first place. [Nottingham 
Practitioner 1] 
The attachment to family and community is particularly relevant if there is validity 
in the explanation that some people participated in the 2011 Riots because they 
had ‘nothing to lose’ (Morrell et al. 2011). Social ties bind people into to a situation 
where they have something to lose, namely the ongoing support of their family, 
friends and neighbours for contravening accepted rules and norms and ignoring 
any obligations associated with these. 
7.3.3 Too marginalised to riot 
In previous English riots in the 1980s, the protagonists were mainly Black, which 
has been explained by their marginalised status in mainstream society 
compounded by repressive policing. Some commentators (Newburn, Lewis & 
Metcalf 2011) have hypothesised that the increased role of White people in the 
2011 Riots points to a White underclass that now feels comparably excluded. 
Respondents in this study expressed a similar view. Respondents in Sheffield 
identified some White communities on the periphery of the city that were more 
marginalised from mainstream society than either of the two study 
neighbourhoods. A community practitioner, who worked in a predominantly White 
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area of the city, suggested this was because they did not have a sense of identity in 
that way that most BME communities did. Previous studies of White working class 
neighbourhoods found a ‘strong affiliation to the virtues of hard work, self-
reliance, responsibility and independence’, but more recently this had been 
undermined by a popular discourse that defined them as ‘broken’ due to high 
unemployment and poverty, which set them apart from ‘the rest of us’ (Cole et al. 
2011). Some respondents felt that White groups were let down because there was 
little focus on cultivating a sense of belonging, which at the national level can be 
done by a focus on shared history, experiences, customs and culture (Hedetoft 
2004). Concerned about the implications of this, one practitioner talked about an 
occasion when they sought funding to take a group of White youths to London to 
help them connect with their heritage: 
So you know the youth club was these young people said to me, I have 
never been to London. I was shocked when they said we have never been to 
London. I was appalled. So I said we've got to do something about this. And 
they were very negative from the get go, we will never get anything and we 
won't get it and I was like no, it took me about three or four months to turn 
them around and then we made the application, on the basis of ‘We have 
never been to London. We are always asked to learn about others, but we 
don't know our own heritage and our own culture’; and that really touched 
me because I am very grounded in my culture and my heritage and I 
celebrate that, whilst embracing others; and I just felt these young people 
had such a loss for me that I had to do something about it. So we applied 
for it. [Sheffield Practitioner 4] 
The respondent described how despite being pessimistic at the outset, the young 
people eventually threw themselves into the bid, even presenting it to the funding 
panel themselves. The bid was unsuccessful, as many inevitably are because 
funding is finite and needs to be rationed. However, it is difficult not to wonder if 
the lack of success in this case was because promoting a sense of belonging among 
White children is rarely thought of, never mind prioritized. From someone who 
was themselves a member of a BME community residing in an inner-city 
neighbourhood of Sheffield, the comments of this practitioner were especially 
poignant in acknowledging that funding rarely goes to the White peripheral 
estates: 
The young people presented themselves … and you know that was such a 
big thing, you know if you were to believe in something and give it, you 
would have given it to those young people because they would have visited 
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London, they would have seen the Houses of Parliament, they would see 
Buckingham Palace, and the history; and whilst within that they would have 
had a little bit of fun, eat out and celebrate that, they would have told that 
story for how many years to come and they would probably have had a 
connection with their country and their history and their heritage. But we 
didn't get that funding. Where did the funding go do you think? It went to 
inner-city areas. [Sheffield Practitioner 4]  
Rather than seeing the marginality of these White working class neighbourhoods 
as being more likely to engage in urban disorder, the general view was that they 
were ‘too marginalised’ to riot. 
7.3.4 The role of socio-historical events 
Academics have begun to consider mechanisms for strengthening communities, 
including local festivals, which can provide opportunities for shared, collective 
action and experiences (Finkel 2010; Quinn & Wilks 2013; Wilks 2011). Local 
festivals have been found to promote a sense of identity and pride, which local 
authorities rarely take into account when deciding where the weight of spending 
cuts should fall (Platts-Fowler & Robinson 2016). It was reported that one of the 
study Nottingham study neighbourhoods was even excluded from these types of 
events. Other neighbourhoods were described as having big community events, 
but the study neighbourhood, by comparison, had no 'real focal thing' 
[Nottingham Manager 1]. A reason for this was said to be the geographical 
character of the area. Other neighbourhoods had more appropriate venues for fun 
days and carnivals because, for example, they were either by a riverside or by a 
forested area. The only annual event that the Nottingham study neighbourhood 
hosted was a memorial for the teenager, Danielle Beckham, who was killed 
accidentally in a gang-associated shooting. Nevertheless, this event offered 
potential for generating bonding social capital among residents because, as Groff 
(2015) claims, even negative events play a role in strengthening group 
cohesiveness if they remind members that they share a common fate.  
Just as community events can have a bonding effect, so can external threats to the 
neighbourhood. As discussed above, the Nottingham study neighbourhoods 
experienced external threat through the stigma of poverty and crime, which had 
promoted an in-group versus out-group bonding. The Asian and Somali 
communities in Sheffield were also affected by poverty and crime, but did not 
experience the same level of stigma. However, they were affected by other 
external threats, including neo-fascist demonstrations. The Asian community had 
been most acutely affected by these, as captured in the comments of this NPO:  
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Locally our Asian communities have a certain fear of the EDL or fear of the 
scenario, and I can explain it better: it’s almost like there’s going to be a 
Viking raiding party. [Sheffield NPO 3] 
The threat of the English Defence League (EDL) was not merely about the threat of 
violence from racist outsiders, but also from inside the community, associated with 
the potential defensive actions of its own men. The older generations were fearful 
of Asian young men bringing their community into disrepute by fighting the racists, 
which might lead to imprisonment and have negative implications for their own 
lives. Bagguley and Hussain (2008) explained the 2001  disturbances in Bradford, 
Burnley and Oldham partly by the defensive actions of Asian young when police 
failed to prevent neo-fascist incursions into their areas of residence. Members of 
the Asian community in Sheffield were particularly mindful of these events 
because they involved other Asian people. Other BME groups, including the Somali 
community in the other Sheffield study neighbourhood, were reported to be less 
fearful. Ahead of a recent EDL march, agencies reported being concerned about 
the Roma migrants, but found they were not affected in the same way. In fact, 
they were not even aware of them because Slovakian television, their main media 
source, made no reference to these UK events. 
Another threat collectively felt by the Asian and Somali communities, linked to 
their shared religion, but also a wider world politics, was the radicalisation of their 
young people; both girls and boys. Interestingly the term ‘radicalisation’ was never 
used by community practitioners. Instead they referred to the risk of Muslim 
young people being ‘groomed’ by extremist groups, as evident in the quote of this 
practitioner: 
One of the elements we are addressing at this very moment of time is how 
people are, you know, managing to be groomed and to be sent to Syria or 
go to Syria. Who groomed them, how?  And this is something which is 
something worrying for the Muslim community and for everybody. Who is 
doing it and why we don't know about it, why it is not visible there, it's not 
physically there. [Sheffield Practitioner 5] 
The concern that their child could be next had created a sense of fear in the Somali 
community, which they responded to by ‘watching’ their children ever more 
closely. Implicit in respondents’ comments was the notion that parents were not 
merely watching their own children, but that everybody was watching everybody’s 
children. Just as the fear was collective, so was the response: 
You know what, I think the Somali community got scared and kind of 
watched their kids more, not worried about the Police watching them or 
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anything but worried about the fact your child can go at any time, ‘you 
know so and so’s child has gone. Oh mine could be next because so and so 
was so good’. … The 13-year-old girl who disappeared from Bristol is the 
shocker for everybody. [Sheffield Practitioner 3] 
The efforts of agencies and particular professionals in addressing the problem of 
radicalisation were acknowledged, including those by members of the city’s 
Prevent team. Prevent was the strand of the Labour government’s ‘CONTEST’ 
counterterrorism strategy, launched in 2003. Its aim was to ‘prevent’ individuals 
turning to (or sympathizing with) violent extremism. Although conceived as a 
‘hearts and minds’ approach, it was widely regarded as ‘failed and friendless’ 
(Thomas 2010). Prevent was criticised as a vehicle of increased state surveillance in 
Muslim communities, which was especially problematic when merged with the 
government’s community cohesion agenda, of which more will be said later in this 
chapter. It was argued that this merger dissipated the goals and rational of Prevent 
while at the same time securitising and undermining community cohesion 
(Husband & Alam 2011). On coming to power in 2010, the coalition government 
announced a review of Prevent, which detached it from community cohesion, but 
arguably left local actors with little guidance on integration or community 
engagement; although this may have the advantage of promoting ‘unintentional 
localism’, which ‘may sustain more participatory modes of engagement with 
Muslims’  (O’Toole et al. 2012, p.387). The comments made by participants in this 
study, suggest that even before the revised strategy, Prevent was not simply being 
‘done to’ the Muslim community. It was reported that influential people in both 
the Somali and Asian neighbourhoods had been proactive in engaging with the 
external agencies to ensure they got the support they specifically needed. One 
respondent, who emphasised the importance of being proactive, reported having 
just met with a police officer about Prevent before their interview for this study: 
I’ve just been having a meeting with the police, just now, he’s just walked 
away, I don’t know if you met him downstairs. And that is looking at what 
do we need to do now at this moment in time, with the ISIS and the child 
grooming; … how do we really get these positive messages out; how do we 
make our children aware, of tell-tale signs to kids? It was a very positive 
meeting. I think it’s being proactive. If you see something coming, or you 
sense ‘oh no, it will never happen here’. That doesn’t work. [Sheffield 
Practitioner 2] 
In the Somali community, being proactive meant getting the right information 
about the prevention of radicalisation to mothers, who were the most fearful and 
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due to their role in the family possibly in the best position to act on the 
information: 
I approached them and I said ‘do you want to do work around these 
sessions, around these issues to kind of deliver to the women in how to be 
safe, how to make sure your child is safe?’.  [Sheffield Practitioner 3] 
It was described how the Somali community’s willingness to work with external 
agencies in relation to the risks of radicalisation demonstrated the extent of their 
concern because generally ‘people don't really want to involve these agencies’ 
[Sheffield Practitioner 3]. It was explained that part of the reason for this was, 
despite being resident in the UK for some time, the Somali community was not 
fully aware of the legal responsibilities of various institutions, including the police, 
in keeping their children safe. Somali people were used to performing this role on 
their own as families and communities. Not wanting to undermine the protective 
and supportive role of state and other welfare provision, it worth noting its 
potentially deleterious consequences on the parental role. According to Coleman 
(1988), the existence of state welfare services creates an ‘antibiotic resistance’ 
that negates the economic and social rationality of parental investment in their 
children, as well as investment in other family members and community members, 
by incurring trust-based obligations to help one another; and depreciating social 
capital (cited in Edwards et al. 2003). Coleman suggests this is one reason that 
‘strong families and strong communities … are much less often present now than 
in the past, and promise to be even less present in the future’ (p.S118). According 
to participants in this study, the solution lies not in eroding state welfare, but in 
considering what is delivered and how to promote rather than inhibit social 
capital. The topic of community and youth provision will be discussed later in this 
chapter. 
Another shared concern of the Somali and Asian communities, but especially the 
Somali community, was the ‘westernisation’ of their children. This was a recurring 
topic across interviews with a range of stakeholders. But, some wondered whether 
what was being framed as a clash of cultures was largely an expression of inter-
generational tensions, which had been experienced by White communities over 
many generations: 
I don't know in a way that is the kind of the microcosm of what happens in 
every society and particularly I don't know probably what happened in 
white British society in the 1960s, kids were going out dancing to The 
Beatles and parents were going this is disgusting, you know but yeah, I 
think that would just be an ongoing issue but in a way, it's kind of 
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interesting as the generation of Somali young people who have been born 
and brought up and educated in this country then sort of have their 
families, it's going to be interesting to see you know whether that gets 
easier or more difficult really because it is about sort of reconciling your sort 
of indigenous culture and Western culture and deciding how best you sort 
of balance all of that stuff. [Sheffield Manager 9] 
However, a particular reason was articulated by the Somali community for wanting 
to retain young people’s attachment to their culture, because they felt a distinctive 
identity protected them from being affected by the problems of other 
communities. One of the messages being disseminated to young people to prevent 
them getting involved in urban unrest in 2011 was that this had ‘nothing to do 
with the Somalis’ [Sheffield Practitioner 3]. 
7.3.5 Overview 
There was a dominant social group in each of the study neighbourhoods, based 
around ethnicity. In the two Sheffield neighbourhoods, ethnicity overlapped with 
familial and religious networks, which served to reinforce social networks and 
group identity. In Nottingham familial and religious ties were reported to be less 
important. Instead the identity of local people, who largely identified as 'Black', 
was more strongly focused around geography. It was perceived that residents in 
Nottingham's poor Black neighbourhoods were unfairly treated by police and 
other public agencies because of where they lived. The shared experience of this 
prejudice had strengthened local bonds; albeit their collective identity was imbued 
with negative associations.  
7.4 Social Cohesion 
The previous section considered the identity of the dominant social groups within 
each study neighbourhoods. The current section now looks how well these groups 
got on with others, at the neighbourhood and city level. There is a correlation 
between ethnic diversity and disorder, but 'bridging' can have a mediating effect, 
by providing a sense of attachment that fosters a greater sense of responsibility to 
maintain order at the neighbourhood level (Silver & Miller 2004). This resonates 
with the community cohesion agenda, which emerged in the aftermath of the 
2001 disturbances (see Chapter 1). Community cohesion is defined as a common 
vision and sense of belonging for all communities; diversity being positively valued; 
those from different backgrounds having similar life opportunities; and strong and 
positive relationships between people of different backgrounds in the workplace, 
schools and neighbourhoods (LGA et al. 2002). This definition, which derives from 
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the work of the Community Cohesion Independent Review Team (Cantle 2001), is 
based on Kearns and Forrest’s (2000) model of social cohesion. However, while 
Kearns and Forrest emphasised the interconnectedness of social cohesion across 
different spatial scales – national/interurban, city/city-region and neighbourhood – 
the Review Team focused almost entirely on the neighbourhood as the context for 
the production and maintenance of community cohesion. In doing so, it failed to  
acknowledge that high cohesion at one scale can undermine cohesion at another 
(Robinson 2005). For example, a city may consist of socially cohesive but 
increasingly divided neighbourhoods, which, paradoxically, was the situation in the 
northern mill towns in 2011. Equally, a society in which citizens have a strong 
sense of loyalty to their respective cities might be in conflict with any sense of 
common national purpose (Forrest & Kearns 2001). 
This study largely focused on cohesion at the neighbourhood level, as per the 
official definition of community cohesion, because the neighbourhood represents 
the small-scale domesticity of most people’s lives – a narrow gemeinschaflict 
world of neighbourhood and kin (Pahl & Wallace 1988). By comparison, normative 
relations with the wider public can be ‘extremely tenuous’ (Mann 1970, p.435).  
‘Social cohesion is about getting by and getting on at the mundane level of 
everyday life’ (Forrest & Kearns 2001, p.2127). Localised daily routines and 
interactions at the neighbourhood level can also constitute ‘repair work’ and 
‘normalisation’ (Forrest & Kearns 2001), which protects individuals and social 
groups from macro processes of disorder, dislocation and social and economic 
social change (Turner 1991). This was one reason for considering the nature of 
community as a local protective factor against the spread of urban unrest in 2011. 
The study additionally sought to explore relationships between the study 
neighbourhoods’ and other groups in each of the case studies, accepting the 
interconnectedness of spatial scales, as posited by Kearns and Forest, and also that 
a ‘common vision and sense of belonging’, one of the four components of 
community cohesion, may be affected by inter-group dynamics (Oakes 2001; Tajfel 
& Turner 2001). The extent to which groups form normative barriers is said to vary 
greatly, being influenced by such factors as cross-group contacts and how far 
membership of multiple groups enables contact with a wide range of individuals 
and bridges between different identity groups (Brown 2008; Dryzek & Braithwaite 
2000). 
The study also considered variables that have previously correlated with social 
cohesion, such as deprivation (Lawrence & Heath 2008), ethnic diversity (Morales 
2013; Meer & Tolsma 2014) and population transience (Wells 2006). Addressing 
disparities in wealth was emphasised in Kearn and Forrest’s model of social 
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cohesion, but replaced in the ‘official’ definition with reference to the provision of 
equality in life-opportunities (Robinson 2005). However, equality of opportunity 
only specifies a fair way of distributing unequal outcomes and has been linked to 
an even firmer dismissal of equal outcomes (Phillips 2004), which can adversely 
affect individual (Tajfel & Turner 2001),  group (Oakes 2001; Newton 2006) and 
national identity (Wilkinson & Pickett 2009). Of specific relevance to this study, 
commentators (Tester 2012; Jeffery & Jackson 2012; Angel 2012; Stenson 2012; 
Lagrange 2012; Clement 2012) referred to the close proximity of wealth 
inequalities as a contributing factor to the 2011 English Riots (see Chapter 1). A 
community practitioner in Nottingham specifically referred to the lack of status 
frustration at the neighbourhood level as a protective factor, which explained why 
rioters did not attack their own neighbourhoods or loot local shops in the way that 
rioters did elsewhere in the country. 
7.4.1 Neighbourhood Level Cohesion 
This section looks at social cohesion within the study neighbourhoods, examining 
relationships between different social groups. The ability to pull together depends 
on a sense of shared identity, common interests and experiences. Neighbourhood 
attachment is theorised as being beneficial for social order via its capacity to foster 
collective efficacy. However, in the case of urban unrest, a distinct form of 
disorder, the role of community cohesion may be less straightforward. Contrary to 
theory, respondents felt that neighbourhood ‘in-fighting’ was protective because it 
prevented people from organising themselves, which was thought to be precursor 
to unrest. Referring to a Sheffield neighbourhood, which was not included in the 
study, a community practitioner claimed that recent population change had 
resulted in such a mix of different ethnic groups that young people there were not 
well placed to riot: 
If you’re gonna have a go at the biggest gang in the world, the police, you 
need to be organised, because they are. … In [the non-study 
neighbourhood]… the change in ethnicity, 10 years ago, 20 years ago, 10 
years ago, 5 years ago, from predominantly Black Afro-Caribbean, you’ve 
got Somali guys and Eastern Europeans in there now. There’s a lot of 
tensions, and I don’t think they’d come together to fight the old bill, to fight 
the enemy as they see ‘em. [Sheffield Practitioner 1] 
These comments imply that cohesion at the neighbourhood level is associated 
with the increased likelihood of urban unrest, because urban unrest, seen as a 
challenge against authority, relies on a degree of organisation. Of course, this 
presumes neighbourhood residents have a grievance in the first place. Moreover, 
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the comments only refer to relationships between young men and, drawing on 
social capital theory, if the neighbourhood is cohesive across other age groups, 
there remains the possibility that social order will controlled by the parental 
generation, either via direct or indirect controls. 
In the Sheffield neighbourhood predominated by Somali people, respondents 
reported tensions between Somali and African-Caribbean young men, which 
sometimes manifested as territorial behaviour. Some young Somalis felt that parts 
of the neighbourhood were ‘occupied’ by African-Caribbean young people and 
meaning they were ‘no-go’ areas for them [Sheffield NPO 2]. It was reported that 
these inter-group tensions had made it difficult in the past for community 
practitioners belonging to one of these ethnic groups to work in the 
neighbourhood. There had been a situation where a practitioner perceived to be 
defending the interests of the other ethnic group rather than his own was 
regarded as a ‘traitor’ and even physically threatened. Consequently, the 
practitioner saw no other option but to request redeployment to another part of 
the city [Sheffield Practitioner 4].  The tensions between Somalis and African-
Caribbeans were not, however, uniformly experienced across age groups. It was 
reported that it was mainly the cohort of men currently in their thirties, who ‘did 
not necessarily mix so well together’. Younger age groups, such as the 14-15 year 
olds got along much better, evidenced by their social interaction at the local youth 
club, as this NPO reported: 
The biggest group that I see at the youth club and what have you, there’s a 
couple of White British lads in there, there’s Afro-Caribbean, there’s some 
Yemeni lads that are in that group. There’s a really mixture, which is really 
good that they’ll come together. [Sheffield NPO 2] 
It was explained that the tensions among thirty-somethings stemmed back to the 
1990s when the ethnic composition of the study neighbourhood transformed 
rapidly from being predominately African-Caribbean to being predominately 
Somali residents.  As a relatively poor and less desirable part of the city, the study 
neighbourhood offered cheap housing options, which were used to accommodate 
asylum seekers arriving after the civil war in Somalia.  Other Somalis were 
attracted to the neighbourhood because it had become a place they felt they 
‘fitted in’ and had over time developed specialist facilities and social and cultural 
networks, perceived to be crucial to their well-being, sense of belonging and 
security (Aden et al. 2007). 
The parental generation in the neighbourhood were aware of the inter-group 
tensions and were reported to be involved in efforts to reduce them. 
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Representatives from each ethnic community would come together regularly 
under the auspices of a local umbrella group, called the Group of Groups, which 
was referred to in the previous chapter. It seems the Group of Groups was not only 
valuable in resolving tensions between third sector organisations over issues like 
funding, but also in resolving inter-community tensions, as this respondent 
suggested:  
Under the umbrella in [the study neighbourhood] you had what you call the 
Group of Groups and within that you had [agency name], which was the 
African Caribbean community representation coming together. So you had 
a number of different Somali community groups, but the elders working 
together, so I think that facilitated some of the, removing some of that 
misunderstanding, friction between the young people. [Sheffield NPO 2] 
The Group of Groups was an important community structure for facilitating inter-
community relationships, by providing a safe space to share and debate views. It 
was implied, however, that it was a pre-existing commitment of group members to 
harmonious relations that made conciliatory outcomes possible.  
The second Sheffield study neighbourhood was similarly reported to experience 
inter-ethnic tensions, but, again, these were not insurmountable. Tensions 
between the dominant Asian and minority Somali populations primarily surfaced 
between young men, but sometimes involved other members of the family too. 
Moreover, these tensions were affected by relationships with other 
neighbourhoods. It was reported how ‘turf wars’ [Sheffield Manager 7] between 
local Asians and Somali young men living elsewhere in the city affected 
relationships within the neighbourhood. For example, tensions were inflamed 
following the murder of a young Somali male. The Somali teenager was killed by 
local Asian men after he travelled to the neighbourhood with friends ‘armed with 
sticks and metal bars’ to find a local an Asian youth, who had previously fought a 
member of their group (The Star 2011b). Somali and Asian teenagers clashed in 
the study neighbourhood, however, the Somali boy was killed by older Asians, who 
arrived at the fracas in their car and drove into them. He died when a road sign fell 
on his head. Somalis living in the study neighbourhood were not immediately 
involved, but became ‘very angry and very scared’ as a result of the incident 
[Sheffield Manager 7]. In this case, it seems their ethnic identity was stronger than 
their neighbourhood identity. Local agencies reported having to actively manage 
relationships in the neighbourhood for some time afterwards. One respondent 
wondered whether this community engagement work might have been a 
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protective factor for the neighbourhood when disorder began elsewhere in the 
country a few months later: 
A lot of prevention work and a lot of engagement work went into – making 
sure all sections of the community were talking. I wonder how much that 
did have to play in it, because we'd done all that during that period.  
[Sheffield Manager 7] 
However, the tensions between the Asian and Somali communities in the study 
neighbourhood did not run so deep that they were unable to pull together and 
provide mutual support in times of perceived crisis. For example, following an 
alleged sexual assault on a Somali boy by a teaching assistant at a local school, 
both the Somali and Asian communities reacted. It was reported that the reaction 
of the Asian community extended beyond the neighbourhood. Asians travelled 
from elsewhere in the city and other parts of the country, notably from Bradford, 
to add their support to local protests. A demonstration staged outside the school 
was so large that the head teacher decided to close due to the disruption (The Star 
2011d). The perception of a shared threat to local children might be enough to 
explain why neighbours pulled together across ethnic lines, but it was perhaps the 
religious and cultural bonds of Asian people on a national scale that can explain 
the involvement of people from Bradford. Ethnographic research (Wardak 2000) 
has found that Pakistanis see themselves as members of the broader ‘Pakistani 
Community of Britain’, whichever town or city they live in. Moreover, this sense of 
belonging can sometimes go beyond ethnic boundaries to involve all Muslims in 
Britain, which seems relevant in this case. The homosexual nature of the alleged 
assault was reported to have been a particular concern, which might be explained 
by the general, although not homogenous, views of the Muslim community on 
homosexuality (see ICM 2016). 
Ethnic diversity in the second Sheffield study neighbourhood had been recently 
affected by the in-migration of Roma people, following the accession of new 
countries to the European Union in 2004 and 2007.  The term ‘Roma’ is a generic 
name used to describe a group of people with similar cultural characteristics, who 
originated from India and migrated to Europe around thousand years ago (Roma 
Source 2012). They constitute Europe’s largest and poorest minority ethnic group  
(Gill 2009).  The Roma generally migrate to Sheffield as whole families, contrasting 
with other migrants from central Europe who tend to be young, single men (Gill 
2009). In 2012, it was estimated that 1,500 Roma people had settled in and around 
the study neighbourhood (Sheffield City Council 2015). Respondents spoke of 
tensions and even ‘hatred’ of this new group by the longer- established 
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community [Sheffield Manager 7]. Despite inter-racial tensions, already described, 
between Asian and Somali and White young men, there was evidence that all 
three of these groups were united in their dislike of the new arrivals.  This had 
been demonstrated in local responses to a number of criminal incidents, which the 
Roma were wrongly accused of. For example, respondents described how a 
meeting was arranged by residents, who ‘summoned’ police and other agencies to 
attend, to discuss the rape of a White British woman by a Roma man. The meeting 
was well-attended with ‘200 and odd people baying for blood’ [Sheffield NPO 3]. It 
turned out that the allegation of rape was false and the man was not even Roma. 
Agencies recounted their frustration at the poorly attended follow-up meeting 
when this information was disseminated. They argued that residents did not 'want 
to hear that bit because it doesn’t feed their thought processes’ [Sheffield NPO 3]. 
Thus, demonstrating the real aim of this ‘community activism’, which was to have 
‘all the Roma rounded up and deported somewhere or sent somewhere, but either 
way not standing on the streets of [the study neighbourhood]’ [Sheffield NPO 3].  
As detailed in Chapter 5, the disturbances in Nottingham largely constituted 
attacks on the police, with the main damage to community property being 
associated with ‘collateral damage’ resulting from cat and mouse games with 
officers. However, given the theories about population change it seems significant 
that the bulk of the collateral damage occurred on Pym Street, where the homes 
were newly built. Although not a single respondent felt these residents had been 
‘targeted’, there remains the possibility that informal social controls were less 
effective here because rioters did not consider them to be part of the community.  
This is not to say, that they would not be over the longer term. Therein lies the 
catch with transience. It both undermines cohesion and undermines opportunities 
for agencies to develop socially cohesive relations between residents (Wells 2006). 
One community practitioner in Sheffield referred to the challenge of just keeping 
up with who's who since the recent arrival of Roma people to the neighbourhood. 
Some examples of how agencies can positively impact on cohesion have already 
been discussed; the role of community provision more generally will be addressed 
in a later section. 
7.4.2 City Level Cohesion 
This section considers the extent and nature of cohesion at the city level, which 
means looking at relationships between neighbourhoods. Poor relationships 
between neighbourhoods may be a factor promoting social unrest. In fact, a police 
officer in this study suggested the attack on a police station in one part of the city 
occurred because they were 'competing' with a rival gang in another part of the 
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city. As detailed in Chapter 6, Nottinghamshire Police were enthusiastic in their 
accounts of local gangs, despite other local agencies refuting their existence, at 
least in the form associated with U.S. style gangs. Nevertheless, territoriality is 
relevant to debates around local identity and conflict, being previously described 
as a cohesive behaviour in the context of deprivation (Kintrea & Suzuki 2008; 
Atkinson & Kintrea 2004). Territoriality offered a way of securing some of the few 
things that young people living in deprived areas could call their own – place and 
friendships. Thus, territoriality can be an expression of bonding social capital for 
young people. Additionally, for South Asian communities living in the UK, it has 
been viewed as a form of  self-defence in the case of racial violence (Webster 
1996). The two Nottingham study neighbourhoods were associated both with 
territoriality and high levels of deprivation. 
Some respondents in Nottingham suggested that territoriality in the study 
neighbourhoods was not as problematic as many assumed or suggested. They 
suggested some families had members in both neighbourhoods and, in fact, what 
was often viewed by outsiders as gang-related conflict was more ‘to do with 
familial tensions than anything else’ [Nottingham Manager 5]. Moreover, these 
familial relations could be a source of positive interaction between the two 
neighbourhoods. It was recounted how groups of young men from each of the 
study neighbourhoods were taken together on a visit to London as part of an 
Ending Gangs and Youth Violence initiative shortly after the 2011 Riots. A police 
officer, who accompanied the young men, had been shocked over the way 
individuals from the two groups greeted each other as they boarded the bus. Far 
from being a tense encounter, they were ‘high fiving each other’. This is when it 
began to dawn on some statutory agencies tasked with working with gang 
members that many of the young men thought to be in rival gangs were related to 
each, even if this was ‘several steps removed’, and were acknowledged as ‘part of 
each other’s families’ [Nottingham Manager 5]. This situation started to put 
previous conflicts into perspective. Like community practitioners, people in more 
strategic roles were starting to realise possibly not every crime in the study 
neighbourhoods was gang-related nor every fight, which may not even be related 
to group rivalries. A conflict between the two neighbourhoods may simply be ‘one 
individual who’s gone off and done something on his own batt’ [Nottingham 
Manager 5]. 
The predominant Asian community in one of the Sheffield study neighbourhoods 
sometimes had strained relations with Somalis in another neighbourhood, as 
detailed above, but tensions were ‘predominantly between young Asian men and 
young White men’, who lived in adjacent areas [Sheffield Practitioner 1]. Youths 
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from both ethnic communities attended the same schools, demonstrating the 
importance of schools working in partnership to identify and resolve tensions.  The 
local schools in this instance were reported to work closely with youth workers for 
this reason. Racism was not a term ever used by respondents in describing the 
tensions between Whites and Asians in this study. However, there was a history of 
racism, which had been responsible for local disturbances in the mid-1990s 
(Goodey 2001; Wiles 1995).  Theories of racism (Balibar & Wallerstein 1991; Cohen 
1988; Jackson & Penrose 1993; Goldberg 1993) suggest that all xenophobia is 
underpinned by a hostility to strangers, who are invariably seen  as the enemy. 
This has previously helped to explain racism in and around the study 
neighbourhood at times when discrimination and violence were directed against 
Asians by the longer established White community (Goodey 2001). More recently, 
however, the manifestation of a two-way victimisation may be explained by Asian 
young men developing strategies of resistance over time, which include the 
creation of defensible space. Webster (2003), has described how this occurred 
elsewhere in the North of England, with Whites attributing ‘victim status’ to 
themselves after encroaching into Asian territories (p.15). 
Alternatively, Webster warns about the simplistic understanding of violence 
between Asians and Whites as being racially motivated. Another of his study’s 
(1994) found that Asian and White young people routinely differentiated their 
violence as either racial targeting or proving oneself through fighting; and these 
two explanations sometimes co-existed in the same situation. Thus, he concluded 
that racial harassment may be part of a continuum of anti-social aggression with 
‘race’ merely providing a vocabulary of motive for fighting between adolescents. 
He also found that White young people who targeted and attacked Asians also 
tended to be involved in fighting and victimising White young people too. Thus, 
the issue is one of how to separate ‘racially motivated behaviours’ from ‘just 
fighting’ or incidental abuse. One factor associated with a decline in Asian 
victimisation by Whites in Webster’s study (2003) was their participation in local 
youth clubs exclusively used by their own ethnic group. Not only did this take 
Asians off the streets, thus reducing their availability as victims, but provided a 
situation in which they could bond, creating and sense of ethnic solidarity, which 
has been key to their strength in containing and ultimately resisting White racism. 
The youth clubs in the study neighbourhood may have been fulfilling the same 
need. Respondents spoke of a local youth club that ‘was 101 per cent a Pakistani 
boys club. No girls went to it. No White kids from across the divide’ [Sheffield 
Practitioner 1]; essentially it was ‘their own youth centre’ [Sheffield NPO 4]. 
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To further evidence that territoriality was not the sole preserve of gangs, 
respondents claimed referred to whole communities that did not like outsiders.  
One respondent reported concerns about starting work in one of the study 
neighbourhoods on this basis, although their actual experience was quite different 
from their expectation: 
I was told early on how people in [the study neighbourhood] don't like 
newcomers but actually I was really welcomed and I found, you know, it 
was a very kind of, very warm and great community to work in although 
obviously there were kind of issues and pressures and all that kind of thing. 
But it was a very kind of satisfying community to work in. [Sheffield 
Manager 9] 
Some predominantly White neighbourhoods were reported to be ‘far more insular’ 
and consequently far less tolerant of new people. One respondent claimed that 
their territoriality was sometimes perceived as racism if new arrivals were from a 
BME community, but their hostility much more to do with them being outsiders: 
 [The White neighbourhood] is quite an insular community. The community 
cohesions issues in [the neighbourhood] are not race-based, they’re based 
on if you are from [the neighbourhood] you are alright, if you're not from 
[neighbourhood], you're not alright. You can have, you could have a Black 
person living on [neighbourhood] for ages and everyone thinks its fine, but 
then you'd get a Black or Asian family move into [the neighbourhood], who 
aren't from [the neighbourhood], and they would be targeted, not because 
of their colour, but actually because they’re not from [the neighbourhood]. 
[Sheffield Manager 6] 
The Review Team diagnosed the bonding of ethnic communities as a ‘problem’ for 
community cohesion, but did not consider the range of factors that help explain 
why distinct groups cluster together. For example, Webster (2003) documented 
how racism against Keighley’s Asian population gradually created the boundaries 
of a ‘closed’ community in which they were able to find inclusion, acceptance and 
safety. Other commentators have pointed to the discriminatory policies and 
practices of housing agencies (Robinson 2002) or the mere affordability and 
accessibility of accommodation in certain areas (Johnston et al. 2002). However, as 
this and other studies have shown, communities living ‘parallel lives’ need not be 
ethnically homogenous. Poverty can be the shared experience that bonds people 
across ethnic lines and simultaneously excludes them from mainstream society. 
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7.4.3 Overview 
Neighbourhood attachment was evident in both cases studies. There were some 
inter-ethnic tensions within the Sheffield study neighbourhoods, but these were 
not insurmountable. Territoriality between neighbourhoods was reported, which 
more likely an expression of neighbourhood attachment within the context of 
poverty than criminality. Concomitantly, this territoriality demonstrated lack of 
cohesion at the city-level. However, the conflict associated with this territoriality 
was not seen to be a cause of the unrest in Nottingham nor a significant risk factor 
in Sheffield.  
7.5 Informal Social Controls 
Despite evidence suggesting that the study neighbourhoods were cohesive at the 
neighbourhood level, all were identified as having higher than average offending 
rates (see Chapter 4), which may indicate relatively ineffective informal social 
controls, raising the possibility that collective efficacy was being undermined not 
by low levels of social capital, but instead by residents’ strong ties with criminal 
types. However, Foster (1995) claims that there is a degree of complexity in high 
crime areas that many theories of informal social control fail to take into account. 
Her ethnographic research in a high crime location, not dissimilar to the study 
neighbourhoods, found that crime did not necessarily result from residents’ 
inability to implement informal social controls. Crime existed alongside a number 
of social and economic problems, often beyond the scope of residents to resolve, 
and so they learned to tolerate it. She found that residents did not expect to live in 
a crime-free environment, but the type and level needed to be such that it did not 
intrude too significantly on their everyday lives and residents had to feel able to 
confront it. This section goes onto describe the ways in which residents in the 
current study were reported to manage criminality and maintain order in their 
neighbourhoods using informal social controls. The risks of self-policing will also be 
considered. 
7.5.1 Family controls 
Unsurprisingly, given their role in the transmission of norms and values, families 
were reported to play a significant role in policing the behaviour of young people; 
and larger and stronger family networks, such as the Asian Biraderi, seemed to 
widen the scope of these controls. It was reported how Asian elders would play a 
role in patrolling the streets to discourage young people from engaging in criminal 
and anti-social behaviour at times of concern, such as Bonfire Night; and they 
would make specific reference to the family links as leverage: 
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A couple of times, what we did do was try to get the community people to 
walk, leaders or so, to walk with them on the street and say ‘oi, come on 
what you doing here? Come on inside, you’re too young. I’ll tell your dad’ 
[Sheffield Practitioner 2] 
It was not only community practitioners who were aware of these informal 
controls, police and other agencies also spoke of them, as this agency manager 
did: 
The community tends to sort issues out themselves. Police will sometimes 
get called, sometimes they just sort it out themselves. So sort of, a family 
fall-out, family feuds, you hear about it on the street. It's dealt with, end of. 
[Sheffield Manager 7] 
In western societies this scenario harks back to 1950s and 1960s when it was more 
the norm for adults to take responsibility for looking after other people’s children; 
for disputes and disturbances to be resolved by informal means; and harmful 
behaviours limited and dealt with outside the formal criminal justice system 
(Bazemore 2001). In more recent decades, these functions have been increasingly 
performed by state institutions. This development has ‘widened the net’ by 
bringing more young people into what is perceived to be a harmful system from 
which it is difficult to exit (Polk 1984); and one they perhaps never should have 
entered because youth crime is ‘episodic’ and most young people ‘grow out of 
crime’ as they transition to adulthood (Maruna 1999; Graham & Bowling 1995).  
However, some respondents reported concern that the strength of family and 
parochial networks within the Asian community, both as a source of social support 
and social control, were being undermined by the increasing size of the local 
population. The sheer number of people made it less likely that older members of 
the community would know all the young people they saw on the streets, thus, 
diminishing their regulatory controls: 
But generations have changed now. I for one, as much as I think I might 
know everyone, I won’t know children who they are. So it will be just a 
youngster from somebody, so I might have to do a lot of homework to see 
who it is, out of 20 I might be able to recognise four or five of them, but the 
rest of the 15 I won’t know, I won’t know who’s their father, their parents is. 
They might be respecting and say ‘hi uncle’, you know, you might get that, 
but I won’t really know because there’s a lot more people here, the families 
have grown. [Sheffield Practitioner 2] 
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As already detailed above, the local population had also changed in this study 
neighbourhood with the recent arrival of Roma migrants. It was reported that 
elders did not feel able to engage with this new cohort of young people in the 
same way as Asians because they did not share the same family and friendship 
networks. 
The Somali community in Sheffield were reported to be active in monitoring and 
regulating the behaviour of its members, especially young people, which was 
referred to by some as ‘inner policing’. Social controls were said to involve all 
members of the community, but especially ‘informal community leaders that 
young people and community groups that live in that community, respect and hold 
highly’ [Sheffield Practitioner 4]. As detailed in Chapter 4, the Somali community 
lived alongside students in the study neighbourhood, due to its proximity to the 
city’s universities. Victimisation of students, typically viewed as easy crime targets 
(Deakin et al. 2007), was not tolerated by the Somali community even though it 
was felt that students did little to cultivate social interaction with local people. 
Direct social controls were used by the community to deal with any Somali found 
offending against them. For example: 
If a young person has wronged a student and it gets picked up by us as 
neighbours we would literally take the young person to the student’s door 
to apologise because that is the right of that individual who is living 
amongst our community. So even though they just sleep there and go to 
their classes and come back – they are not really inclusive within the wider 
things that happen in the community – we still put an onus on ourselves to 
make sure that people are not wronged and justice is served; not in an 
extreme element, but it is done in a harmonious way and a learning way 
because also there is a need to educate young people. [Sheffield 
Practitioner 4] 
This type of intervention fits with the principles of restorative justice, which 
increasingly inform schemes aimed at preventing youth reoffending in the UK and 
elsewhere (Robinson & Shapland 2007). These schemes involve young offenders 
meeting with their victims to discuss the effect their crimes or other harmful 
behaviours have had on others and, in some cases, how they can make amends. 
These processes expose offenders to ‘shaming’ by others, but also provide 
opportunities for offenders to express or discharge feelings of 
shame/guilt/remorse, which may support their responsivity to other sources of 
rehabilitative and generate human capital (Robinson & Shapland 2007). Some 
commentators suggest that restorative practices also provide the potential for 
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‘community building’ where they focus on relationship building by engaging 
parents of troubled youth and other local people, who constitute their ‘natural 
communities of care’ (Bazemore 2001, p.221). Arguably, some of the study 
neighbourhoods were already benefiting from this approach. 
State agencies recounted times when they explicitly called on the support of 
Somali elders to challenge anti-social youths rather than invoking formal 
interventions. For example, one year, a group of Somali young people from the 
study neighbourhood were captured on CCTV behaving badly at a town centre 
Halloween event called ‘Fright Night’. An agency manager reported showing the 
footage to community members to demonstrate what ‘elements’ of their 
community had ‘been up to’, which ‘shocked’ them and, thus, invoked a local 
intervention [Sheffield Manager 5]. Similarly, a Neighbourhood Police Officer 
reported driving Somali parents to ‘a stand-off’ between local Somali and African-
Caribbean youths. Whereupon, seeing the parents arrive, the young people 
‘starburst’, meaning they quickly dispersed, which apparently ‘eased all the 
tension’ [Sheffield NPO 1], or at least temporarily. It was suggested that the 
informal social controls of the small African-Caribbean community residing in the 
same neighbourhood were not quite as strong. Respondents opined that this was 
due to two inter-related factors: the length of time the two migrant groups had 
resided in the country and family structure. They suggested that the traditional 
structure of the African-Caribbean family had changed over time and many now 
constituted single parent households, which concomitantly reduced parental 
influence. Nonetheless, African-Caribbean parents, especially mothers, did still 
play a role in managing their children’s behaviour, which was evident in August 
2011, alongside other influential members of the African-Caribbean community, 
which in this case was a youth worker: 
We have an African Caribbean youth worker … they were instrumental in 
engaging. And family members, despite my previous comment, they still 
had a degree, because the particular families were single parents, but the 
mother, the matriarch of the house was still you know calling the shots and 
to a degree she might not have a hundred percent, compared vis-à-vis her 
Somali counterpart, she may not have that same leverage, but she still had 
a degree of leverage and traction over the young people. [Sheffield NPO 1] 
 
7.5.2 The role of community practitioners 
Familial networks were also a source of informal social controls in the Nottingham 
study area, although not to the same degree as in the Asian and Somali 
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communities in Sheffield. A NPO reported how they regularly dropped into one of 
the local bars, where an older group of men from the Black community would 
typically strike up a conversation and ask about the behaviour of their 
grandchildren, offering to ‘sort them out’ if they were being problematic in any 
way [Nottingham NPO 3]. Otherwise, greater emphasis was placed on key 
members of the Black community who carried influence, especially with young 
people. Some of these people fitted into the category of ‘community 
practitioners’, at least for the purposes of this study, but they may have been 
musicians, who had fallen into community work because of their ability to engage 
and support young people, who might otherwise be led into criminal activity. 
These community practitioners were a valuable source of external control in the 
Nottingham study areas. Chapter 5 documented their role in calling for calm in 
August 2011. 
Practitioners reported appealing to residents’ sense of community to prevent 
them from rioting in 2011. For example, these comments show how one 
practitioner sought to remind residents of their social ties to each other by 
explaining that damage to local property and shops was actually damage to their 
own community, which would have implications for everyone and themselves 
personally: 
Because that work was done, saying to people ‘you’ve not got much 
already, so why do you want to damage the little that you’ve got? Because 
at the end of the fall-out from it, well what you gonna lose? Your shops 
gonna be closed for six months, your local shop. You don’t walk to town ‘cos 
you can’t afford to buy things in town. This is your local shop. This is your 
local area, and when you’ve damaged it, what are you gonna be left with?’ 
So they’d already got the message. [Nottingham Practitioner 2] 
These comments make explicit how social bonding provides the foundations of 
social control. They also provide an example of Kornhouser's external indirect 
social controls, which are only effective if individuals have a sense of being 
connected and, therefore, obligated to a social group. Although the practitioner's 
actions were aimed specifically at preventing deviance, this was done by referring 
to the relationships between residents at the neighbourhood level. It was helpful 
that the local shops were not faceless organisations, but part of the community, 
being owned and run by local people. Because they were known and knew people 
in their community, it was reported that shopkeepers were not in the slightest bit 
worried about looting. When approached at the time about any concerns they 
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might have about looting, one shopkeeper responded with by saying ‘what you 
asking me these silly questions for?’ [Nottingham Practitioner 2]. 
The actions of the police and the local authority in August 2011 explicitly 
acknowledged the existence of informal social controls when they threatened the 
Black community with the cancellation of their ‘much loved’ Caribbean Carnival if 
the disorder did not quickly end. It was described how the Caribbean Carnival was 
‘a real highlight of the city’, but meant most to the Black community, which 
included residents in both study neighbourhoods. As already referred to above, 
festivals can be important events for cohesion, and they also offer an opportunity 
to showcase and celebrate the positive aspects of a community’s heritage and 
identity, which can be especially important for groups that feel marginalised 
(Finkel 2010). It was described how ‘the good people' had ‘put months and months 
of work’ into the preparations for the carnival and consequently there was a real 
impetus to ensuring it went ahead, which meant directly engaging with rioters and 
potential rioters to stop the disorder: 
So part of this psyche was to say ‘we want our carnival, we want our 
carnival to happen’. So those people have a vested interest in making sure 
that the kids that normally would be away brought in to toe and told 
behave yourselves stay in this night, don't go out, I don't want you involved 
in the trouble. So families got involved in influencing others. And we ended 
up being able to celebrate it. [Nottingham Practitioner 1] 
These comments suggest that informal social controls did have a role to play in 
containing the unrest in Nottingham, families, but mainly other influential 
members of the community successfully managing the behaviour of people, who, 
despite their ‘bad behaviour’, were not completely beyond reach of their 
community. The with contrast Sheffield was the extent to which youth workers, as 
opposed to familial networks, were a source of control. 
7.5.3 Controlling marginalised young yen 
Respondents in Sheffield referred to the social controls of criminal types in some 
communities, which were effective with some groups of young people who could 
not be reached by family and community practitioners. It was described how 
criminal types who did not want the ‘heat’ of the police in their neighbourhood 
might prevent young people from engaging in deviance that might attract the 
attention. Mindful of this, community practitioners said they might sometimes 
reluctantly remind young people of this to encourage better behaviour:   
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We’re saying to them ‘you need to be careful. You’re bringing a lot of heat 
into the area. There’s going to be people who don’t like that, people who 
are making lot and lots of money.’ And they know what you’re talking 
about. They know who you’re talking about: the drug pushers, who they 
might aspire to be. ‘you’ll end up with a little clip. Thrown in the back of a 
range rover, and took to the other side of Sheffield and warned. Don’t bring 
this heat to your community!’ And we’re having to say that to young 
people, and you’re kind of thinking some of those undesirable community 
leaders, people who are pulling all the strings, there needs to be informal 
conversations with them, as sad as that sounds. They can stop things like 
that [clicks fingers]. [Sheffield Practitioner 1] 
Foster’s research (1995) highlights the importance of building upon existing 
mechanisms of informal social control in high crime areas  because it seems likely 
that a combination of informal and formal mechanisms, together with wider social 
and economic programmes, hold the key to long-term crime prevention (p581). 
This recommendation seems particularly appropriate to all the neighbourhoods in 
this study, which seemed to have functioning informal social controls that were 
both protective of their communities and prevented problems that might 
otherwise incur the resources of police and partners. On the other hand, it was 
reported that at times these communities required external support and 
sometimes formal sanctions to keep certain groups in check. 
Both the Asian and Somali communities were concerned about some groups of 
young men that were becoming increasingly harder to reach. They attributed their 
loss of influence down to processes of westernisation, which they viewed as being 
responsible for the disengagement of these young men from the mosque and 
increasingly their families. A Neighbourhood Police Officer in one of the study 
neighbourhoods recounted being approached by a mother, who felt she had lost 
control of her son and needed external support:  
I had a phone call this morning - a mother who is frustrated as to why the 
police keep coming to the door. ‘We are coming to the door because your 
son’s a criminal. He’s going to court and we’re looking for him’. ‘What do I 
do? He’s nothing to do with me anymore. I don’t see him. How do I control 
him?’ [Sheffield NPO 3] 
This respondent concluded that the loss of control over some young people, which 
had historically been so strong, had left the Asian community feel somewhat 
‘disorientated’ and nostalgic for a perceived time when Asian children did as they 
were told by their parents.  
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Paradoxically, respondents referred to the ‘disillusionment’ [Sheffield Practitioner 
1] of these same young men with key aspects of western life. Those who did not 
attend mosque typically did not attend school either. Respondents reported that 
this group were ‘NEETs’, meaning there were not in education, employment or 
training [Sheffield NPO 4]. The term NEET is officially reserved for young people 
aged 16-24 who have left compulsory education  (Chandler & Barrett 2013). This 
group started to attract attention soon after New Labour came to power in 1997 
and established the Social Exclusion Unit. This Unit drew attention to a growing 
body of evidence about the experiences and barriers that some groups of young 
people faced and concluded that ‘the best defence against social exclusion is 
having a job, and the best way to get a job is to have a good education, with the 
right training and experience’  (Social Exclusion Unit 1999, p.6). Subsequent NEET 
agendas have been criticised for stigmatising and marginalising young people, who 
are perceived as feckless and lacking both aspiration and employment-related 
skills compared to their more successful peers  (Lawy et al. 2009) and for 
distracting attention from substantial and entrenched inequalities in both 
education and employment (R. Thompson 2011). On the positive side, the NEET 
category has maintained vulnerable young people in the policy foreground and 
some initiatives, such as the Educational Maintenance Allowance14, have been 
redistributive (Maguire & Rennison 2005).   
There were also specific events that made communities worry about how effective 
their informal controls might be, even with their ‘decent young men’. As already 
detailed above, the Asian community were particularly worried about their 
younger members clashing with EDL demonstrators, who had come to the city on a 
number of occasions. So far there had been no serious incidents. Officers were 
supportive of the community, but due to the rights of protesters reported being 
unable to ban the demonstrations. Instead police focused on ensuring procession 
routes did not take EDL members close to any residential areas and they 
encouraged the community to disseminate preventative messages: 
With the EDL scenario, the first time they were coming, we had all the 
debate of – ‘we should ban them. They’re racist’. ‘We can’t ban them, this 
that and the other’. … ‘We don’t want our young men arrested’. ‘Right, go 
                                                     
14 Education Maintenance Allowance was introduced by the Labour Government and paid 
to young people between the ages of 16 and 19 from lower-income families. It was 
replaced with a bursary scheme by the Liberal Democrat / Conservative coalition 
government. Payments go to the educational establishment rather than the student 
and money provided is less overall than was paid by the Education Maintenance 
Allowance. 
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and tell, order your young men to stay at home. At Friday prayers tell them. 
Send out messages, text messages. You will tell people that they are not to 
go there. The only way to deal with the EDL is to ignore them’. ‘Our young 
men are not going there. We’re not having our decent young men getting 
embroiled by these racists because some of them will get involved and 
some of them will get hurt and some of them will end up getting arrested, 
and we’re not having it’. [Sheffield NPO 3] 
The disorder that occurred on an annual basis in the Asian neighbourhood each 
Bonfire Night perhaps called into question the functioning of informal social 
controls. As a minimum, young people set on fire to black wheelie bins and rolled 
them onto the main road [Sheffield Manager 7]. The disorder had become 
predictable and the community and local agencies 'expected' and even planned for 
it. It had practically become part of the local Bonfire Night festivities and there was 
'almost something of a reluctant acceptance' [Sheffield NPO 3] about it. But, this 
did not mean the community stopped trying to prevent it. The Asian ward 
Councillor was reported to walk around the streets telling young people to 'get in' 
and reminding them that he knew their fathers; thus appealing to family ties, 
values and obligations. Some respondents described how for young people it was 
just 'a good laugh' or an opportunity 'to get back at the police' for previously 
stopping them [Sheffield Practitioner 2]. As others have highlighted, delinquency is 
'complicated, contradictory or ambiguous' and usually requires more than one 
explanation  (Cohen 1987, p.ix), including that it may be pleasurable (Matza 1964) 
and a way for young men to contest ownership of the streets (Parker 1974; 
Campbell 1993). It is worth noting that the disorder involved a relatively small 
group of men, who were viewed as some of the most marginalised in the study 
neighbourhood. Nonetheless, even they did not repeat this behaviour at other 
times of the year, perhaps demonstrating that informal social controls were still 
functioning outside this ‘liminal space’. 
7.5.4 Overview 
This section has drawn on the interview data to demonstrate the functioning of 
informal social controls across the case studies. It provides examples of how 
families proactively prevented conflict and promoted positive behaviour in the 
Sheffield study neighbourhoods. Police and partners were reported to tap into 
informal controls, recognising them to be frequently more effective than formal 
controls in managing young people. Informal social controls were also 
acknowledged by police and partners in Nottingham when they threatened that 
the annual Caribbean carnival would be cancelled in the rioting did not stop in 
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August 2011. Community practitioners were seen to play a greater role than 
familial relations in regulating the behaviour of young men. However, communities 
in both case studies were concerned about an increasing group of young men who 
had nothing to do and nothing to lose and in the context of austerity presented a 
risk for future disorder. 
7.6 Community Provision 
So far it has been described how the study neighbourhoods in both Nottingham 
and Sheffield were cohesive and had functioning informal social controls that were 
able to prevent and contain criminality and disorder in most cases. However, there 
was a group of young people, especially males, who were felt marginalised from 
society and concomitantly undermined their attachment to family and community. 
This highlights the importance of socio-structural factors and external support to 
build human and social capital within neighbourhoods.  Respondents across the 
case studies lamented cuts to community and youth provision, which they felt was 
responsible for pushing many people to the margins of society. On the magnitude 
of these cuts, respondents said that ‘people are not as active as they were because 
there's no funding’ and that youth provision had been ‘stripped back to the bare 
bone’ [Nottingham Manager 5] or ‘diminished to the point it’s zero’. Some 
specifically lamented the loss of resources that had played an important role in 
diverting young people away from crime and anti-social behaviour: 
So there are gaps but still I'm saying that, I mean like the drugs problem, it 
is there, despite the fact that we are doing quite a lot, the reason is and I 
will say it again and again and again that we do not have a strong youth 
work system. We lost that youth work system where whenever young 
people used to be free there used to go and meet in the youth club, they 
used to. [Sheffield Practitioner 5] 
It was not only community practitioners who identified the loss of youth provision 
as an issue. In Sheffield, police officers also reported concern about the loss of 
initiatives that targeted youth crime: 
Equally with the cuts, from our partners, it’s a difficulty, but I’m not seeing 
the same level of resources from partners prior to the cuts taking place, in 
terms of youth work, detached youth work … we had a tackling knife 
programme. [Sheffield NPO 3] 
Respondents recognised that the local picture was not unique and that austerity 
measures had undermined youth services nationally:  
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It's gone. It's gone. We have no youth work in [the study neighbourhood]. 
Not that I know of. There is no funding and it's not just unique to us, it is a 
national problem. [Sheffield Practitioner 4]. 
There were comments made about the type of provision that remained after the 
cuts and how this was did not meet the particular needs of people in the study 
neighbourhoods. On the one hand, respondents were disparaging about the focus 
on big youth clubs because this was mainly about containing young people: – 
‘stack ‘em in high, keep as many kids occupied s you possibly can to reduce the 
anti-social behaviour’ [Nottingham Manager 5]. They felt youth clubs offered little 
in terms of promoting better life outcomes and were not even attractive to the 
most marginalised groups, for example, ‘cos those lads are just not interested’ 
[Nottingham Manager 5]. It was suggested that some young people needed 
courses and apprenticeships that might lead to a job, which, locally, they had 
shown interest in: 
I wouldn’t say we’ve quite reached the tipping point or anything but we’ve 
got a lot of lads going down to [the community practitioner’s] and saying 
well I want a piece of that, I want to get on an apprenticeship , I want to get 
a job. I don’t want to be doing this for the rest of my life. I want to do 
something different. I don’t want to have to look over my shoulder all the 
time. [Nottingham Manager 5] 
However, the argument for this type of provision had older age groups in mind and 
specifically those considered NEET, as discussed above. With greater reference to 
younger people, other respondents, in Nottingham and Sheffield, were highly 
critical about the loss of universal youth provision, including youth clubs. The cuts 
had prioritised targeted, or detached, youth for individuals with high needs. While 
no-one argued against the importance of the targeted work, they felt the loss of 
open access provision simply meant more people than ever were reaching the 
threshold for targeted work: 
I’m not saying that a kid in social care doesn’t need help or support but 
what I am saying is, I know now  that I need to make more referrals to 
social care than I did five years ago ‘cos some of the work I would have 
done myself. You get what I’m saying? Yeah, a lot earlier on. And even 
when it got bigger, I would still do it. [Nottingham Practitioner 1] 
On the importance of preventative work, it was argued that by the time young 
people get referred for targeted interventions it’s usually ‘too late’ to help them 
[Nottingham Practitioner 2]. Another argument was that universal provision 
ensured ‘good’ kids benefited too [Sheffield Practitioner 2], which they felt was 
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especially important in disadvantaged areas in sending the right message about 
the kind of behaviour that gets rewarded. 
Respondents in Nottingham were especially vociferous about how the cuts had 
favoured short-term ad hoc youth initiatives over long term provision, which was 
essential for addressing the kind of ‘entrenched’ problems that existed in the study 
neighbourhoods. This sentiment can be read in the exasperated comment of this 
respondent: ‘how are you supposed to stop a gaping wound with a little plaster?  
It’s like come on its just unrealistic’ [Nottingham Practitioner 3]. Ultimately, it 
seems not to be an argument about whether youth provision should constitute 
universal or detached youth work. Both were sorely needed in the study areas and, 
in any case, all provision in the study areas can probably be classed as ‘targeted’ 
given the socio-demographic characteristics of people living there.  
7.6.1 Provision for BME Communities 
Despite being under-resourced, it was suggested that existing services were 
sometimes underused in the study neighbourhoods because they were 
‘insensitive’ to local people. For example, family services that generally appealed 
to affluent educated middle class mothers, such as ‘wiggly toes’ baby classes, 
didn’t ‘cut it’ with young mums in the Nottingham neighbourhoods; with their 
mixed race children and fathers who were likely to be involved or on the fringed of 
criminal activities [Nottingham Manager 5]. In fact there was reported to be a lack 
of understanding across statutory services in Nottingham about the needs of BME 
communities: 
So we always knew that the gap in service provision was really about 
something that was attractive, met the needs of the lads and some of the 
girls that we would say are out most at risk, and meets their needs in a 
different way. I think that because most of our case load are predominantly 
from BME community, and what you haven’ t got is a good understanding I 
think, from a statutory perspective, in terms of how you work with the BME 
community, and how you make services attractive; and that’s been a really 
big issue.[Nottingham Manager 5] 
On the basis of needing tailored provision, members of the Somali community 
were reported to have lobbied local government hard for their own services and 
community buildings. One reason was that they felt they had specialist needs, 
even compared to other ethnic groups in the city: 
What works for the Somali community doesn't work for the Yemenis and 
Pakistanis. Every community have their own way. So they need a lot of 
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young Somalis to actually work with the community. That is the key. 
[Sheffield Practitioner 3] 
However, some of the Somali community’s greatest concerns – about the potential 
radicalisation or westernisation of their children – evidently were shared with 
other BME communities, including the Asian community. On the other hand, a 
shared concern does not necessarily mean a shared solution, for example, if causal 
factors were found to differ between ethnic groups.  The language needs of older 
Somalis, who did not speak fluent English, was another reason the community 
claimed to need distinct provision. Alternatively, some respondents suggested that 
the real concern was youth provision provided by English-speakers. There had 
been a particular anxiety about a youth club called the ‘Midnight Club’, which 
actually ran from 6-9pm, but sounded like ‘young people were out at doing stuff 
that they shouldn’t be at midnight’ [Sheffield Manager 9]. Additionally it played 
English music, which the elders felt was ‘culturally appropriate’. Thus, the ‘desire’ 
of some community members for single group provision was a way of protecting 
young people from westernisation. 
Some members of the Somali community were mindful that single group provision 
could be a barrier to bridging social capital and to boot leave people from other 
communities unsupported. One practitioner recounted a time when someone 
from another BME community visited the Somali Community Centre. This 
encounter made them conscious of the inequitable consequences of it not being 
more transparently available to the whole neighbourhood, despite the building 
being funded by the City Council: 
I remember a Turkish lady coming in saying ‘oh I've got a problem’ and she 
just asked me a question and I said ‘I can help you with what do you need’, 
and she said ‘oh I'm sorry I did not know I could come in here’. So I was 
shocked. I said ‘why would you think that?’ and she said well I just see 
Somali people coming here, so I just assumed it is their place’. You think 
about it, that is a Council building, it is a community structure, it is part of 
the community make up, but yet somebody felt that. … Those community 
buildings that we do have, whilst also serving a particular need, need to 
serve the wider need as well [or] how do you create natural cohesion? 
[Sheffield Practitioner 4] 
These comments resonate with the views of the Community Cohesion 
Independent Review Team, which concluded that one factor generating 
community tensions was a perception that some social groups had secured scarce 
funding resources in preference to others. On this basis, they recommended that 
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'funding bodies should presume against separate funding for distinct communities, 
and require collaborative working, save for those circumstances where the need 
for funding is genuinely only evident in one section of the community and can only 
be provided separately' (Cantle 2001, p.50). In short, the Review Team advised 
against single group funding, which means funding that is awarded on the basis of 
a particular identity, such as ethnic, religious or cultural. The Commission on 
Integration and Cohesion (2007), however, provided a more reasoned case for 
single group funding (Wells 2006). It supported single group funding where there 
was a clear need for capacity building within a particular group, such as a new 
migrant group. What was important, to prevent 'damaging myths [being] 
perpetuated around preferential treatment', was for all funding decisions to be 
transparent and open to scrutiny and communicated clearly to all communities 
(CIC 2007, p.162). The Commission's rationale drew explicitly on the social capital 
literature, acknowledging that cohesion is primarily generated through bridging 
social capital, but that groups with bonding social capital are more likely to bridge, 
meaning that 'the balance of emphasis on bonging or bridging activities will vary 
between local areas depending on the needs and make-up of the local 
communities' (ibid).  
There was evidence that although the Somali Community Centre may not have 
been directly generating bridging social capital, it may have been doing so 
indirectly by promoting bonding social capital. As a community that did not feel 
wholly included, due to their migrant and BME status, the centre provided a space 
where Somali people could re-group and gather strength, encapsulated in the 
views of this community practitioner: 
Well you ask the question, what is your stake in the City, where do you 
belong you know. [The Somali Community Centre], you belong there yes 
because there's people that look like you and you have got a breather for a 
minute to speak your own language, be amongst your own culture, to let 
your hair down, but as soon as you walk out, you are having to, you know, 
think ‘Well where am I? Who am I? Where do I belong?’ – Constantly. 
[Sheffield Practitioner 4] 
The opening of the centre was also reported to have promoted intergenerational 
relationships between older and younger Somalis and increased the participation 
of women in formal community structures, which supports the generation of 
bonding social capital. 
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7.6.2 Role Models and Advocates 
In all four study neighbourhoods there were reported to be community 
practitioners, who were invaluable as positive role models for young people and 
who worked tirelessly to engage and support people locally. The respect young 
people had for these practitioners gave them influence, which was a valuable 
source of social control at the neighbourhood level. They were not directly 
involved in promoting community safety and cannot be considered part of the 
‘extended policing family’ (Crawford & Lister 2004) , but these practitioners 
offered the capacity for informal policing, generally and specifically in August 2011. 
These community practitioners were an important source of social capital, 
promoting bonding by reinforcing norms and values and bridging, as per the 
example above when practitioners brought young people together to from the two 
Nottingham neighbourhoods for a visit to London. There were also reported to be 
advocates for local people and, therefore, an important source of 'linking social 
capital', which Putnam has described as people's ties to individuals and institutions 
with relative power over them. Linking social capital is the result of the weakest 
relationship but offers the most valuable outcome. Studies have found that linking 
social capital offers pathways for the long term survival and revitalisation of 
communities and neighbourhoods (Hawkins & Maurer 2009; Jochum et al. 2005). 
However, bonding, bridging and linking are not compartmentalised experiences. 
They rely on, build upon and interact with each other and it is this interaction that 
offers the greatest opportunities for communities (ibid).  
The importance of some community practitioners as role models and guides for 
young people was emphasised even in communities where family and religious 
networks were especially strong, such as in the two Sheffield study 
neighbourhoods. As this respondent indicated, faith leaders and adults in the 
community were able to offer guidance to Asian young men, but generally they did 
not have the same influence over young people: 
The youth workers actually are role models as well as guides for young 
people to tell them not to do this, do this, but if people from the community, 
adults, imams and others, if they say to the youth they have no means, no 
training and they don't link up psychologically, to provide that assurance. 
[Sheffield Practitioner 2] 
However, it was suggested that some younger imams with ‘the means and the 
ability’ to work with young people were more recently ‘coming forward and 
working with youths’, with the added advantage that they were ‘born and bred’ in 
the study neighbourhood [Sheffield Practitioner 5]. The most influential 
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practitioners tended to be part of the community. This contributed to their status 
as role models for young people, both in the eyes of young people themselves and 
other members; partly explained by the study neighbourhoods’ suspicion of 
outsiders and also by the fact that people within the community were more likely 
to understand the needs of local people. It was also suggested that outsiders were 
often ‘scared of the kids’ locally [Nottingham Manager 5]. In Nottingham, they 
were scared because the reputation of the study areas, as being crime ridden and 
violent, preceded them. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, community practitioners who felt themselves 
to be part of the community were also the strongest advocates because they 
empathised more easily with local problems and grievances. It was recounted how 
a young Somali man in the Sheffield study neighbourhood predominated by Asian 
people had regularly attended public meetings 'vocal and angry' about how the 
needs of Somali young men were overlooked by local provision [Sheffield Manager 
7].  This individual's value as a 'spokesperson' was recognised by statutory 
agencies, who eventually decided to ‘work with him, rather than ignore him’ and 
he was encouraged to take up a position in a local community-based organisation 
where he could continue to perform this role within a more formal structure and 
with support. Essentially he was 'connected to a stronger voice', generating linking 
social capital for local Somali people and being described has having an ‘inclusive’ 
approach, meant his efforts were likely to be advantageous for the neighbourhood 
more widely [Sheffield Manager 7]. Both Nottingham study areas were also 
reported to have key practitioners, who advocated for the community and young 
people in particular. The comments of this Neighbourhood Police Officer highlight 
that these practitioners ‘knew’ who to speak to about particular issues, thus, 
making explicit their ‘links’ to people in power: 
I mean I don't live there but when I was going to public meetings I would be 
amazed as to how many, you know, people felt so strongly about things and 
there are always if you like a community advocate but they always knew 
young people for example, they knew who to come and talk to, to tell them 
the Police were giving them a lot of crap about X, Y and Z. [Nottingham 
NPO 1] 
It was repeated across the case studies that another key characteristic of these 
few prized practitioners was their passion for supporting the local community, 
which meant they would work ‘above and beyond’ even when the funding had run 
out, as this respondent from Nottingham recounted: 
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A lot of goodwill and a lot of communities spirit and you know that was off 
the back of, you know me, a lot of us, I know me at the time we set up 
voluntary projects luckily running at the time because there’d been no 
funding so I set things up off my own back at the time when St Ann’s was 
getting a bad reputation with a lot of young people who we never had 
contact with because of cuts. [Nottingham Practitioner 3]. 
Respondents in both case reported how many of the community activities that 
were critical in preventing and containing unrest in August 2011 ‘ran on goodwill’ 
and possibly would again should there be another critical event: 
If it kicks off on Sharrow, people like [practitioner name], people like 
[practitioner name], who’ve worked in them communities for 20 years will 
work a forty hour week for nowt. It’s their community. They’re passionate 
about it. So a lot of it will be run on good will. [Sheffield Practitioner 1] 
However, some respondents also claimed that goodwill was running out in some 
places due to the perceived poor treatment of community-based provision by 
state agencies, particularly in relation to funding, and this meant that key partners 
in protecting and supporting communities may not be there when needed in the 
future. 
7.6.3 Overview 
Young men are the most likely to riot and, consequently, provision targeted at 
their needs is likely to be effective in preventing riots. This spotlights the role of 
education and employment as institutions with the potential to re-engage 
individuals, but only where these offer the potential for enjoyment and status. 
Community provision can rarely affect structural issues, but if resourced 
adequately can help mitigate their worst effects. Across the case studies, local 
youth workers with the experience and expertise to engage with marginalised 
young men were valuable as guides and role models, and thereby a source of 
informal social control. 
7.7 Conclusion 
This chapter finds support for the importance of social ties in promoting social 
cohesion, which is a mechanism for informal social controls. These social ties have 
been previously typologised as bonding, bridging and linking. Bonding social capital 
represents the stronger social ties with similar people. Whilst acknowledging the 
benefits of this in terms of social support, the community cohesion agenda, which 
was a response to the 2001 disturbances in north England, was cautious about ‘too 
- 258 - 
much bonding’ because of its potentially damaging effect on inter-ethnic relations. 
Single group funding was viewed as undermining inter-group relations, except 
where there was an immediate and urgent need for capacity building within a 
group. Hence, there was some acknowledgement of the role of bonding in 
promoting bridging, but barely any support for it. This study found that bonding 
and bridging were not inversely related, but mutually reinforcing, especially where 
bonding promoted group level structures that facilitated the process of bridging 
for a greater number of people. 
As suggested within systemic theory, bridging did seem to be beneficial in 
promoting neighbourhood attachment within the Sheffield communities that were 
characterised by some low level inter-group conflict. Neighbourhood attachment 
was demonstrated by inter-group activities for leisure and to address local 
problems. Neighbourhood attachment also ensured community controls had 
greater reach. There was no evidence for ‘too much bonding’. Even the 
territoriality observed in both case studies, but especially in Nottingham, cannot 
be viewed in this way. Rather it represents a lack of opportunities for some 
communities to develop meaningful relationships with others elsewhere in the 
city. In Nottingham, the main barrier to wider social networks was the stigma 
conferred up people due to where they live, associated with issues of poverty and 
race. This seemed to be factor explaining why disorder in 2011 was largely 
prevented within neighbourhoods, but not against people and places that 
represented social injustice, especially the police. 
In both cases studies there were groups of young men that were increasingly 
marginalised, due to changing social structures that perceptually and tangibly 
reduced their opportunities in the labour market; and this had impacted 
detrimentally on their engagement with education and training. Familial and 
religious networks were strong in the Sheffield study neighbourhoods and 
routinely played a role in regulating young people’s behaviour, but parents were 
concerned that their relations, and consequently their controls, were being 
increasingly challenged by young people’s sense of having nothing to do and 
nothing to lose. Familial networks were less extensive in Nottingham, prioritising 
trusted community practitioners and youth workers as a source of social control.  
Recognising this, practitioners in both case studies were pessimistic about the 
impact of austerity measures on youth provision, which were already visible by the 
increasing number of young people requiring acute interventions. Previously, 
these young people would have been dealt with upstream through universal 
provision. In the current context of worsening social conditions, at least for poor 
communities, and de-investment in youth and community provision, respondents 
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felt that capability to prevent and contain urban unrest would be severely 
compromised in the future.  
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Chapter 8 – Conclusion 
Urban unrest happens infrequently, but has serious financial and social 
consequences, linked to reputational damage through stigmatising discourses 
about riots. The rationale for this study was to understand why urban unrest 
affects some communities and not others. In particular, the research sought to 
challenge superficial narratives, claiming the 2011 English Riots were 'criminality, 
pure and simple', which detracted from the political and socio-historical context, 
both nationally and locally. These explanations have tended to problematise 
affected communities, suggesting rioters were senselessly 'trashing their own 
neighbourhoods' (Briggs 2012a). However, this study argues that rather than 
communities being to blame for the unrest, they were let down in a number of 
ways: by social structures, which had forced some social groups to the margins of 
society, making them less responsive to formal and informal social controls; and by 
agencies that did not understand them or treated them unfairly. In particular, 
Nottinghamshire police, under pressure to deal with violent crime, had used 
repressive tactics against entire neighbourhoods. Moreover, agencies in 
Nottingham were not a cohesive 'extended policing family' and, consequently, 
were unable to provide a partnership response, which offered the best chance of 
preventing and containing unrest in 2011. They failed to apply a key principle of 
community policing, to engage local people in finding solutions to local problems. 
Communities in both case studies played an important role in inhibiting disorder. 
These informal controls might have been more effective in Nottingham if they had 
been integrated into the main public order response and supported by formal 
controls. The sections below expand on this summary, beginning with an overview 
of what the study set out to achieve, challenges and limitations; followed by a 
discussion of key findings; and, finally, the theoretical and policy implications. 
8.1 The Study 
The main aim of the study was to understand 'where' disturbances occurred during 
the 2011 English Riots, with a focus on the role of the police and other partners in 
preventing and containing unrest. Explanations emerging shortly after the riots 
were mainly theoretical and empirical research focused on rioters' self-reported 
motivations and was London-centric to a degree. The spread of the violence across 
66 locations towns and cities was primarily explained as ‘copycat’ behaviour, 
linked either to emotional contagion or opportunistic criminality. However, this 
failed to explain why disorder did not occur everywhere. Ahead of this study, only 
two brief articles by Clifton (2012a; 2012b) considered factors inhibiting disorder, 
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including the specific efforts of  community workers in Leeds and lessons learned 
in Bristol about taking a fair but firm policing approach following other recent 
disorders (Clifton 2012b). Arguments for why some locales had been particularly 
susceptible included the severity of cuts to youth provision (Higgs 2011; Wain & 
Joyce 2012) and poor police-community relations (Jeffery & Jackson 2012). Thus, 
key objectives for this study involved exploring the role of police and partners in 
preventing and containing unrest; and, recognising that policing does not take 
place in a vacuum, identifying other contextual factors undermining and 
promoting social order at local levels. 
The importance placed on context informed the selection of the case study 
method, which offered the potential to utilise a range of data types and analytical 
tools to explore phenomena and context together. The two cases included 
Nottingham, as a riot-affected city, and Sheffield as a non-riot affected city 
deemed to have been ‘at risk’ of rioting. The two cities were characteristically 
similar in terms of socio-demographics to facilitate a compare and contrast 
approach. Neighbourhood subcases were also used as a methodological tool for 
accessing data on community-level variables. In Nottingham, these included two 
neighbourhoods affected by disorder in 2011; and, in Sheffield, two 
neighbourhoods considered to be 'at risk' by local stakeholders. The disturbances 
in Nottingham involved little looting. Violence was targeted mainly at the police 
and police property. There were attacks on five police stations, including one that 
was attacked twice and two that were petrol-bombed. An incident incurring 
damage to 40 cars and some properties on a single residential street was 
described by respondents as 'collateral damage' linked to policing tactics that 
involved chasing and corralling young people into a restrictive space. Sheffield did 
not experience large-scale disturbances, but there were some 'pre-disorder' 
events, including planned and actual gatherings of young people and some missiles 
thrown at police vehicles. 
The study provides in-depth understanding of events in the two cases studies, but 
the research also has wider relevance for the understanding of urban unrest and 
how it can be prevented and contained in other locales. This was made possible by 
the depth of detail on key variables and contextual factors, which helps to 
illustrate 'how' and 'why' particular findings might apply elsewhere. However, as 
some commentators have suggested, the 2011 English Riots may constitute a 
series of riots with different causes (Gorringe & Rosie 2011) requiring each to have 
their own inquiry. Research in other cities might also help confirm some of the 
more tentative findings from the current study. For example, there was a distinct 
lack of looting in Nottingham, which some respondents attributed to the police 
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perimeter around the city centre. Thus, it might be useful to examine the police 
tactics used in other locations where looting was more prevalent. Another 
reflective point relates to the authenticity of the data, which was mainly derived 
from interviews. Accounts rarely but sometimes conflicted, likely due to political 
motivations or the sheer passage of time, making accurate recall an issue for 
respondents. Any variance has been acknowledged and methods of triangulation 
used to help identify the most probable scenario. However, there remains the 
possibility that some will contest these findings or, at least, the importance of 
particular conclusions. 
The passage of time presented some challenges, but was also of value to the 
study.  The timing of the research, several years after the Riots, provided the 
distance that some individuals and organisations needed to reflect. In the 
immediate aftermath, agencies involved in the events were likely to be focused on 
limiting reputational damage, especially in Nottingham where disorder did occur. 
For example, a local report (One Nottingham 2011) written shortly after these 
disturbances was reported to be less about lesson-learning than deflecting blame 
from policing partners and, as one respondent noted, there was a concern local 
actors would begin to believe their own hype. The time-lapse meant respondents 
were less likely to be thinking about any repercussions of what they said because 
the public scrutiny had died down and this might have given them the confidence 
to challenge any official version of events. Some were perhaps also less self-
conscious about their own role in events as a consequence of reflective distance. 
Respondents made comments directly to this effect, even suggesting that the 
opportunity to remember was helpful for their own understanding of what 
occurred: 'I’ve not really spoke about it since. With this job you just get on. You 
just do it and there’s always the next thing, so the reflection time …  but thinking 
about it now, it was that…' [Nottingham Practitioner 1].   
It was the intention that local understandings about ‘what worked’, supplemented 
by the findings of this study, might inform local decisions about public sectors cuts 
being made as part of the national programme of austerity, ensuring the 
protection of roles and services key to inhibiting unrest. However, cuts had fallen 
fast and hard since the 2011 Riots, leaving minimal scope to influence them. 
Nevertheless, the research has been able to gain information about the specific 
outcomes of cost saving measures in the two case studies, as well as perceptions 
about how they might affect the likelihood of future unrest and the capability of 
local agencies to respond. In Sheffield, respondents were pessimistic about the 
impacts on local partnerships. They felt the loss of inter-agency structures and 
dedicated partnerships roles had undermined relations, already impeding local 
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ability to repeat the type of public order response successfully used before.  The 
virtual loss of neighbourhood policing was a particular issue for Sheffield, for which 
South Yorkshire Police has received recent criticism via a peer-review (College of 
Policing 2016a). By contrast, Nottingham stakeholders reported a positive 
trajectory since 2011 in terms of partnership approaches for dealing with young 
people suspected of gang involvement. Consequently, Sheffield and Nottingham 
may now be in a similar situation in terms of local capability to prevent and 
contain future threats of urban unrest, but without greater investment in local 
policing and partnerships, neither city is likely to be entirely successful. 
8.2 Key Findings 
This thesis highlights the importance of analysing riots from an extended temporal 
perspective because, as Corfield (2007, p.251) notes, ‘the long term is always 
detectable in the immediate moment'. Why the 2011 English Riots occurred in 
some places and not in others can largely be explained by the nature of the local 
response when unrest seemed imminent, but the nature of this response was 
informed by socio-historical events and pre-existing relationships. Young men 
living in deprived areas and marginalised from mainstream education and 
employment were most at risk of rioting and so the involvement of local people 
and practitioners able to influence this group provided the best chance of 
preventing and containing unrest. However, willingness and capability to involve 
them in the public order response was determined by inter-agency relations in the 
preceding years and decades, which had deleterious consequences for the social 
order outcome in Nottingham.  
The national context to events was the media and political commentary, which 
stirred concern about mindless criminality on the one hand and organised 
predatory gangs on the other. The latter, in particular, played to the anxieties of 
Nottingham's policing partners in Nottingham, including some who had witnessed 
local riots in their own professional lifetime. Other high profile incidents, such as 
the shooting of teenage girl in 2004, had put pressure on the city to be seen to 
deal with violence. Research has found that when police expect ‘mad mobs’ they 
tend to focus on tactics of control, such as containment, arrest or dispersal 
(Gorringe & Rosie 2008). However, South Yorkshire Police were less susceptible to 
the media reporting due to their recent success using dialogue policing at the 
Liberal Democrat party conference. Dialogue is a communication-based approach 
to managing crowds. Relationship building and mediation are used to deter 
violence, tied to philosophies of democratic policing (see Stott et al. 2013). 
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Directives contained in the HMIC's Adapting to Protest reports (2009a; 2009b) and 
the Keeping the Peace manual (ACPO 2004) meant that dialogue policing was 
routinely used by Nottinghamshire police to manage large events, such as football 
matches, but officers responding to this study did not see its relevance to 
community disorders. 
Both cities had several days to consider the spread of rioting from its original 
source in Tottenham, London, providing offering the potential for a proactive 
response. However, stakeholders in both case studies reported that critical 
incident protocols were not designed for urban unrest, meaning they had to act 
quickly and on the hoof. This possibly put Sheffield at an advantage, due to recent 
experience of policing the Liberal Democrat party conference and also due to 
annual partnership planning for disorder occurring in certain parts of the city 
around Bonfire Night. The earliest actions in both case studies were taken by 
communities and practitioners at the neighbourhood level. Their continued 
involvement in Sheffield's main response ensured a less antagonistic approach.  
Conversely, Nottingham’s was described as a ‘pure police response’ mainly 
involving officers in full riot gear instructed to engage to disperse those deemed 
intent on disorder and to make arrests on a limitless scale.  These tactics were 
targeted in poor Black neighbourhoods, where ‘intent’ was pre-determined by 
police perceptions of resident ‘gangs’. It is highly likely that this response 
promoted unrest.  
Residents in both the Nottingham and Sheffield study neighbourhoods possessed a 
strong sense of identity and belonging, which meant that 'at risk' groups were 
responsive to informal social controls. This helps explain why rioters in Nottingham 
did not 'trash' their own communities (e.g. Briggs 2012a). Instead, violence was 
mainly targeted at the police, due to repressive community policing that left young 
people feeling harassed and unfairly treated, often for little more than being 
present on the street. Arguably, there was a racial dimension to the police 
preoccupation with ‘gangs’ in these predominantly Black neighbourhoods. 
Consequently, the police killing of a Black man in London was reported to resonate 
with local people, who were monitoring the Mark Duggan case closely.  It was also 
suggested that Mark had family ties in Nottingham. Poor police-community 
relations were most likely the tinder for the disturbances in Nottingham and the 
public order approach was the spark. There was little looting, or  evidence of the 
intention of to loot, contradicting commentators who argued that the riots outside 
Tottenham were an expression of materialist greed and overwhelming 
consumerism (Moxon 2011; Treadwell et al. 2012). This may have been the 
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context explaining particular manifestations of disorder in other towns and cities, 
but it was not a significant variable in Nottingham. 
8.3 Conceptual Implications 
8.3.1 Theorising Riots 
There are various theoretical models to aid our understanding of riots. The most 
influential is Waddington et al.’s ‘flashpoints’ model (e.g. Waddington et al. 1987; 
1989; King & Waddington 2005) , which has been used to facilitate understanding 
of various disorders since it was developed (e.g. Waddington 1992; Waddington 
2010). The model offers six levels of analysis, including: structural, as the material 
circumstances of different social groups, their relationship with the state and how 
such factors relate to conflict; political/ideological, as the relationship between 
dissenting groups to political and ideological institutions and how dissenting 
groups are treated by those institutions; cultural, as the ways in which different 
social groups understand the social world and their place in it); contextual, as the 
long-term and more immediate backdrop to relationships—for example between 
particular groups and the police—within which disorder occurs; situational, as the 
spatial and social determinants of disorder, for example, that might influence the 
organisational and tactical dispositions of the police and civilians; and 
interactional, as the face-to-face interactions between police and civilians. 
Some commentators have criticised this model for its focus on events that trigger 
disorder because in some cases ‘tense stand-offs’ may not be the result of a 
‘flashpoint’ so much as a police tactic’ (Gorringe & Rosie 2008, p.201). 
Consequently, it is claimed the model lacks sufficient nuance for explaining all 
types of disorder. For example, global protest events involve numerous police 
encounters, which might become flashpoints, but many rarely do. Moreover, 
viewing ‘levels of structuration’ as concentric circles within which an event takes 
shape (Waddington et al. 1989, p.22) privileges the point of interaction (Gorringe 
& Rosie 2008). However, interactions may be determined primarily by political and 
historical factors. Findings from the current study support this argument. For 
example, street-level interactions between officers and civilians in Nottingham 
were dictated by command level policing strategies developed in response to 
media warnings of ‘mad mobs’ (e.g. Metro 2011; The Telegraph 2011) and 
historical concerns about local ‘gangs’ and levels of violence, which had been 
damaging for the city's reputation and for historical relations between Black 
communities and the police. 
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Towards the end of this study, two papers were published by Newburn (2015; 
2016) that seemed to overlap with this research, and, therefore, warrant some 
brief discussion here. The first (Newburn (2015; 2016) uses the flashpoints model 
to explicate how rioting was avoided in two English cities. Drawing on Clifton’s 
work (2012a; 2012b), Newburn argues there were elements at the contextual, 
political and situational levels that mitigated risk, but it was primarily matters at 
the interactional level that explained the absence of riots in both Bristol and Leeds. 
The elaborated social identity model (Reicher 1984) was additionally used to 
explain how police-citizen interactions are less likely to trigger violence when 
perceived as proportionate and fair by the policed. However, it is disputable that 
residents in Leeds perceived the actions of police to be 'fair' because after tense 
interactions with officers early on, community representatives requested police 
leave the area while they calmed the situation. Consequently, Newburn refers to 
police 'willingness' to trust community representatives to be mediators and 
peacemakers as a success factor locally. However, he falls short of acknowledging 
the importance of including other agencies in policing the threat of urban unrest. 
Public order policing must no longer be viewed as a distinct area of police activity, 
but instead viewed as an extension of community policing, albeit with a more 
challenging timeline and more extreme consequences.  
Newburn’s (2016) subsequent article introduces his ‘life-cycle’ model, which 
purports to move beyond antecedents and aetiology to focus on how riots unfold 
and what follows in their wake to facilitate historical and comparative analysis. The 
framework has four sets of features, including the context, within which disorder 
occurs. This captures the structural, political/ideological and cultural levels 
featured in the flashpoints model, as well as the relationships and attitudes that 
facilitate or inhibit collective violence. The second set of features relate to the 
dynamics of disorder to understand how disorder begins, matures and how long it 
lasts. The third set covers the nature of participation and motivation, how police 
and other agencies respond and the form of the disorder. Finally, there is the 
response when violence has ceased, which includes popular opinions, informed by 
the media and political response, the penal response and the public policy 
response, nationally and locally. The added value of the life-cycle model is meant 
to be its consideration of events in the aftermath of riots. However, this type of 
analysis has not necessarily been overlooked before. For example, Campbell (1993) 
reflected on the various responses to widespread disturbances in the early 1990s. 
The life-cycle model is also meant to offer greater potential for historical and 
comparative analysis, although it is not immediately clear how the flashpoints 
model is less amenable to this. The life-cycle model is perhaps more 
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comprehensive, but what it gains in scope, it seems likely to lose in depth. 
Newburn admits that it was not ‘possible in a short article to do more than sketch 
out some of the similarity and difference between the riots in France, England and 
Sweden’ (p.550) and so he incorporates a summary table. However, in doing so, he 
perhaps overlooks the differences within countries. This is a typical criticism of 
comparative national research, but, as this study shows, local differences are key 
to understanding riots and preventing them. The over-arching issues may be 
similar, but the nuance of how they play out locally is critical. So, for example, 
partnerships relations may inform willingness and capability to work together in a 
crisis, but how partnerships are supported and undermined may differ from place 
to place. 
In the present study, the flashpoints model was considered as a possible tool for 
interpreting events in the two case studies, but as the key findings emerged it 
became clear that the task of separating them out into the six levels was merely an 
academic exercise, which may be of little use to local stakeholders and actually 
detrimental to understanding by separately categorising factors that were critically 
related. For example, the ‘context’ of socio-historical incidents and relationships 
were central to community bonding and bridging processes as observed in Chapter 
7, but these would have been separated into the ‘cultural’ level of the model. 
Moreover, the category headings are not immediately accessible to public 
agencies wanting to make use of the findings. The police might naturally pick up 
'Interactional' findings, but other institutions may less readily see their role in 
addressing findings captured by and of the levels because they do not mirror the 
day to day priorities or practices of public service. Similarly, it is not clear within 
the life-cycle which agencies might respond to ‘nature’, which covers a vast range 
of issues including motivations and the policing of the unrest; and ‘context’ 
includes everything from poverty, to community belonging, to national political 
systems.  
This study does not dispute the usefulness of the flashpoints and life-cycle models 
for particular types of academic analysis, but prefers to summarise the findings 
under four different themes, which emerged inductively from the research and 
seem more accessible to public agencies wanting to inhibit unrest at local levels. 
The four themes include structural factors, as appear in other two models, 
including material and social inequalities, diversity and population change. 
Community factors include intra- and inter-community relations, socio-historical 
events that define and influence communities and, uniquely, compared to the 
other two models, informal social controls. This study finds that urban unrest is 
not only ‘caused’ by communities, but can be prevented and contained by them 
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too. Despite community being a contested term, this is used above ‘cultural’ 
factors, which can have negative connotations associated with ‘sub-cultures’ of 
crime and disorder. Local policing and partnerships constitute police-community 
relations and intra- and inter-agency relationships, which may be supported by 
particular structures, practices and roles. The public order response is the collective 
activities of all local stakeholders, including communities, when unrest seems 
imminent, focusing on timeliness, joint-working, communication and decision-
making and the style and tactics of community engagement/policing. There is a 
temporal dimension to these four themes, with the first three representing the 
longer to medium context and the public order response representing the 
immediate context to urban unrest.  
Drawing together the above, the diagram below (Figure 8.1) illustrates the 
direction and strength of relationships between the four themes and social order 
outcomes. Even though these were not explicitly examined in this thesis, the 
model acknowledges the relevance of global and national context, for example, 
global events promoting migratory movement and austerity and national media 
and political commentary when rioting erupted in London, which affected policing 
in Nottingham and possibly other riot-affected locales too. Primarily, however, the 
model focuses on local factors. It shows how structural factors influence the 
nature of community, which has a dynamic relationship with local policing and 
partnerships. This is because local policing is responsive to the socio-demographic 
characteristics of communities, particularly linked to prejudice, which in turn can 
affect community identity and grievance and the functioning of informal social 
controls. Poor police-community relations can provide the tinder for riots and limit 
the willingness and capability of communities to control at risk groups. Willingness 
and capability of public agencies to work together to prevent unrest are similarly 
affected by pre-existing relationships. Thus, the nature of the public order 
response most strongly determines social order outcomes, but is also dependent 
upon other factors, most importantly local policing and partnerships. 
8.3.2 Policing Partnerships 
Previous explanations have spotlighted the role of the police in precipitating riots, 
linked to poor police-community relations and actions that have 'sparked' a violent 
response. The novelty of this research is its wider emphasis on the role of other 
policing agencies, which include the local authority and other statutory and 
voluntary sector organisations since the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. This Act 
gave additional impetus to inter-agency working, which provides the potential for 
different perspectives on a given crime problem (Young 1991). Some of these 
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other agencies may also be better placed to engage with communities due to their 
relationships with particular social groups that the police, even Neighbourhood 
Policing Teams, struggle to engage with. Community-based organisations in the 
two case studies were especially well placed to understand the needs of local 
people, with respondents in both case studies referring to the value of 
practitioners, who were also members of the community. They were perceived to 
be more empathetic and, therefore, better advocates in helping to resolve local 
grievances.  
 
Figure 8.1: Aetiology of Riots at Local Levels 
 
 
However, a consequence of policing partnerships is that it is no longer just the 
police that offer the potential to antagonise communities. There was evidence in 
Nottingham that people were angry about 'poverty pimps', meaning organisations 
gaining funding for community safety initiatives and other community provision, 
but which were perceived to have little genuine concern for the community. 
Arguably, this supports a rationale for debates about democratic policing (e.g. 
Dryzek & Braithwaite 2000; Stone & Ward 2000) to be extended beyond the police 
to the full range of agencies comprising the extended police family. It perhaps also 
shows how the recent introduction of Police and Crime Commissioners intended to 
make the police more accountable to the public (Reiner 2013) may be less 
impactful as a consequence of policing partnerships. Local authorities may be 
democratically governed, but the views of the electorate do not necessarily trickle 
down to the local level. Policing partners may also reside within the voluntary 
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sector, which has variable governance structures. This study underpins the need 
for local people to have greater involvement in selecting and informing local 
provision, whether it is policing or other social provision. 
Grievance between partners, however, was a more important factor influencing 
disorder outcomes in the two case studies. Responding to critical incidents can be 
the springboard for better partnership relationships, but the immediate response 
fares better where these are already in place. This is because such relationships 
are built on trust, which requires long-term investment. It is important to note the 
distinction between ‘multi-agency’ relations, which merely involves the coming 
together of a number of agencies around a particular problem, and ‘inter-agency’ 
relations, ‘which entail some degree of fusion and melding of relations between 
agencies’ (Crawford & Jones 1995, pp.30–1). There was evidence of multi-agency 
working in both case studies, but inter-agency was better evidenced in the 
approach to public order in Sheffield, where day-to-day partnership working 
facilitated communication, decision-making and joint interventions at both 
strategic and operational levels. Blockages in Sheffield were more likely to emerge 
within a single organisation, associated with the ambiguity of roles and the pace of 
events, but these were not insurmountable. This study supports existing literature, 
which suggests there has been widespread acceptance of partnership working 
across police forces in England and Wales, but also some cultural and practical 
barriers (O’Neill & McCarthy 2012; Loftus et al. 2014). A key barrier to partnership 
relations in Nottingham was the way funding was allocated for community 
provision, which did not always prioritise the specific needs of local people. 
Competing understandings about the meaning of crime and its solutions had also 
hindered local relations between policing partners and with communities. It was 
primarily the police view of who was likely to riot and why that prevented their 
cooperation with agencies, which were well-placed to engage with local people to 
avert and contain unrest. 
8.3.3 Public Order Policing 
The research also makes a novel contribution to understandings of public order 
policing by showing how dialogue policing can be revised for use in the context of 
urban unrest. A key development in the trend towards negotiated management of 
crowd events, now used to prevent and contain disorder at public demonstrations 
and football matches, has been the introduction of Police liaison Teams (PLTs). 
These comprise Police Liaison Officers (PLOs), which are meant to add a low-level 
problem-solving capability to a public order policing operation by mixing with the 
crowd and mediating situations of emergent tensions (see Gorringe et al. 2012). 
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They do this on the back of pre-established rapport, which they continue to build 
and maintain during and after crowd events. In turn, these relationships and the 
contextualised knowledge that flows from them helps to improve police decision-
making by correcting inaccurate assumptions about risks and this mitigates police 
tendency to use force. Additionally, in the context of perceived police legitimacy, 
fans begin to police themselves. Although the PLO role has been associated with 
intrusive surveillance by some police forces (Netpol 2012; Parkinson & Evans 
2012), there is empirical support for their ability to promote peaceful outcomes 
(Gorringe et al. 2012; Waddington 2013). 
It is a finding of this research that the same liaison principles can be usefully 
applied to inhibit disorder in communities. Unlike football matches or 
demonstrations, however, this type of disorder is relatively spontaneous and PLTs 
would not have time to pre-establish rapport. Hence, in the place of PLTs it is 
sensible to deploy people already in positions of trust. This was the approach used 
within Sheffield, whereby commanders explicitly used Neighbourhood Policing 
Teams, especially PCSOs, who worked closely with other trusted individuals, such 
as local youth workers and community practitioners. In some cases, PCSOs and 
local practitioners patrolled the streets together, engaging with groups of young 
people about events in London and the consequences of becoming involved in 
similar activities. They were also able to gauge risk more accurately via their 
knowledge of what is normal for the neighbourhood and being able to read the 
behaviour of groups that may appear threatening to others. Conversely, 
parachuting 'experts' into socially marginalised neighbourhoods that tend to be 
suspicious of outsiders can transform a tense situation into a violent one. It was 
even reported that introducing additional youth workers into the study 
neighbourhoods could have been detrimental to social order outcomes. 
The mind-set of partners at senior levels, but especially the police, was critical in 
shaping the approach and tactics of the main public order response in both study 
areas. The mind-set of commanders in Sheffield was informed by the recent 
success of their force in using dialogue at the Liberal Democrat Party conference 
(referred to earlier in this chapter), especially as some commanders were involved 
in both operations. Public order commanders are noted to distrust the tactic, 
particularly when the results of dialogue are not immediately apparent 
(Wahlström 2007). However, in the case of Sheffield, positive results had been 
demonstrated, which provided the confidence to work with the tactic again. 
Previous experience also meant that commanders understood the principles of the 
tactic well enough to revise it in the context of a community threat. However, it 
was the pre-existing rapport of partners and communities in at risk 
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neighbourhoods that made the tactic possible. Thus, demonstrating the fortuitous 
coming together of multiple protective factors in 2011 and how the ‘interactions’ 
were key to preventing unrest, but these were heavily dependent on socio-
historical context. 
8.3.4 Community Policing 
Although the study did not set out to look at the motivations of rioters, the various 
accounts from Nottingham converged on a view that the disturbances were 
essentially an outburst of anger by young Blacks against the police, resonating with 
the Scarman (1981) and Hytner (1981) reports that sought to explain riots in the 
early 1980s. Stakeholders in Nottingham spoke of repressive policing of young 
Black men suspected of being in gangs, some for merely being present on the 
streets in particular neighbourhoods. This confirms the findings of other studies, 
which argue that 'gang' intelligence is based on societal prejudice against Black 
people and this has seeped into policing (Williams 2014). A recent mapping 
exercise, more closely adhering to the official definitions (Home Office 2011), 
provided some evidence that the Nottinghamshire Police had unrealistic 
perceptions of gangs, by more than halving their original estimate of gang 
members. Interviews with officers also revealed a level of prejudice, which was not 
distinctly racist, but did reveal negative attitudes towards places predominated by 
Black people. 
As in the 1980s, stop and search was an issue, which the introduction of the Police 
and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) had clearly not resolved. It was reported 
that individuals were repeatedly targeted and searches involved degrading 
treatment. Moreover, changes to the PACE in 2005 meant that stop and accounts 
no longer had to be recorded, which was a particular issue in Nottingham because 
individuals felt they had little opportunity for redress. These findings confirm the 
importance of police accountability and procedurally fair interactions with the 
public. Procedural justice theory is associated with the work of Tom Tyler (e.g. 
1990; 2002; 2003; 2007), who argues that where the police adequately 
demonstrate 'fair' procedures has the consequence of increased police legitimacy, 
which is associated with increased cooperation and compliance from the public 
and general commitment to the rule of law. In fact, Tyler’s findings suggest that 
people regard the process of policing as more important than the objective 
outcome.  
Neighbourhood Policing Teams were able to mitigate some of the damage done by 
police operational teams, reported to be the most repressive in both case studies. 
This remedial work was largely carried out by Police Community Support Officers 
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(PCSOs). It has been argued (Crawford 2007b; Innes 2004) that the introduction of 
PCSOs under the Police Reform Act 2002 provided an opportunity to ‘open out’ the 
police mandate beyond crime-fighting to deliver a visible and accessible 
community-focused policing style that could encourage familiarity with the public 
and respond to local priorities. This study found that the value of PCSOs as 
'professional natterers' was recognised by officers and communities alike. Their 
regular interactions with local people were able to generate community rapport 
and insight. These were important resources for public order commanders in 
Sheffield. In Nottingham, these were available, but not drawn upon to the same 
extent as Sheffield; although good community relations with the Neighbourhood 
Policing Team in one of the Nottingham study areas most likely protected the local 
police station from attack. This supports Harkin's (2015, p.604) findings that 
legitimacy is not granted in blanket terms to the police, but is granted variably to 
individuals and groups within the police and that community policing officers 
generally carry more legitimacy than response officers. 
8.3.5 Community Controls 
This study makes a novel contribution to previous understandings of urban unrest 
by considering the role of informal social controls. Campbell (1993) made implicit 
links to community controls in her explanations of the widespread disturbances in 
peripheral urban neighbourhoods in the early 1990s, but stopped short of linking 
these with theory. More generally across explanations of urban unrest, the nature 
of community has been identified as a risk factor linked to criminality, poverty and 
ethnicity (see Chapter 1). These explanations resonate with social disorganisation 
theory, which emanates from the Chicago-school research of Shaw and McKay 
(1942; 1969), who argued that low economic status, ethnic heterogeneity and 
residential mobility disrupted the social organisation of communities; and, in turn, 
these accounted for variations in crime and delinquency. This theory has, more 
recently, been developed by the systemic model of community attachment. This 
includes Bursik's (1999) work which articulated a connection between social 
disorganisation and social capital, claiming that neighbourhoods bereft of social 
capital, indicated by depleted social networks, are less able to realise common 
values and maintain social control. However, social networks only serve as a 
source of control if members can expect sanctions for behaviours that contravene 
community norms and values; and the norms and values of one community may 
differ to those of another.  
Although the riot-affected neighbourhoods in Nottingham did present as high 
crime areas, this study challenges the popular discourse that the 2011 Riots were 
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about 'criminality, pure and simple'. High crime was not the main risk factor for 
urban unrest, but rather the marginalised status of young men in deprived areas, 
which is a challenge for informal social controls. Crime is partly the consequence of 
structural factors beyond the control of communities and so they learn to tolerate 
a certain level, as long as it does not intrude too significantly on their everyday 
lives (Foster 1995).  It is suggested that community-based initiatives tend to hold 
unrealistic expectations of what communities can do to reduce crime (Crawford 
2007a). However, communities need to feel able to confront crime and often do 
using informal social controls to prevent particular types, such as violent crime 
(Foster 1995).  In keeping with other research (ibid), this study found that informal 
controls work best when supported by formal controls. Police in Sheffield seemed 
to recognise the value of informal controls more than in Nottingham. For example, 
Neighbourhood Policing Officers routinely involved parents in responding to youth 
disorder and conflict and did so again in 2011. So although communities in both 
case studies were actively involved in preventing and containing unrest in 2011, 
they were not fully integrated into the public order response in Nottingham, 
undermining the effectiveness of informal social controls. Additionally, young men 
in Nottingham harboured stronger grievances against the police, due to repressive 
policing over the longer term, which increased their motivation to riot and posed a 
greater challenge for community controls. 
Informal social controls are strongest where communities are socially connected 
through social ties to family and friends, referred to as 'bonding' social capital 
(Putnam 2002). These ties increase the ability of residents to monitor and socialise 
young people and to work together to solve local problems (Sampson & Groves 
1989).  Social ties were especially strong in Sheffield due to the familial and 
religious networks of the Somali and South Asian communities predominating in 
each of the study neighbourhoods, respectively. However, these neighbourhoods 
were also characterised by a degree of ethnic heterogeneity, which is associated 
with poor relational networks due to the mutual mistrust that often exists 
between distinct groups (Merry 1981). On this basis, the systemic model predicts 
that regulatory capacity is adversely affected in heterogeneous areas, leading to 
higher levels of crime. However, this study found that social 'bridging' between 
different ethnic groups can mediate the correlation between diversity and 
disorder, by providing a sense of neighbourhood attachment that fosters a greater 
sense of responsibility to maintain local order (Silver & Miller 2004). Despite some 
ethnic conflict in the Sheffield neighbourhoods, mainly between young men, the 
various groups were able to overcome perceived differences to be a place-based 
community. Neighbourhood attachment was evidenced by a range of inter-group 
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activities, including community meetings, festivals and actions to address local 
grievances; and parental interventions to prevent youth conflict evidenced 
collective efficacy. 
The protective role of bridging provides some support for the community cohesion 
agenda which emerged in the aftermath of the 2001 disturbances in northern 
England.  The Cohesion Review Team (Cantle 2001) identified bridging as a 
mechanism to prevent inter-group conflict, which was as a key feature of these 
disturbances. On this basis, it advised against single group funding, which it was 
likely to be divisive. However, in doing so it overlooked the role of bonding in 
promoting bridging. This study found that bonding and bridging were not inversely 
related, but can be mutually reinforcing because bonding can promote group level 
structures that can facilitate the process of bridging. For example, in Sheffield, 
single group provision was reported to provide solace for BME individuals, who did 
not feel wholly accepted by mainstream society. Single group provision constituted 
'safe space', which conferred emotional strength and this supported the 
development of intra-group ties, which conferred community strength. Social 
groups with high levels of social bonding are typically in a better position to make 
their voice heard and secure resources. They are also in a stronger position to 
forge links with other social groups (ibid). Hence, this study supports the view of 
the Commission on Integration and Cohesion (2007), which advocates single group 
funding where there is a demonstrable need for capacity building. 
The study also questions the Cohesion Review Team's  (Cantle 2001) focus on self-
segregation as the main barrier to social bridging. As others have spotlighted, this 
ignores the role of structural factors (Robinson 2002). The insularity of the two 
Nottingham study areas, which were predominated by Black people, was much 
less a consequence of self-segregation than socio-economic exclusion. A key 
barrier to mixing was how residents felt they were perceived and treated by 
people living in other parts of the city and by public agencies, due to the stigma of 
poverty and related issues. Territorial behaviour sometimes manifested in the 
study neighbourhoods, which signified to the police gang-related criminality and 
attracted repressive policing. Yet, this territoriality can be better understood as a 
form of neighbourhood attachment, developed in the context of deprivation and 
social exclusion (Kintrea & Suzuki 2008), which actually increases local capability to 
regulate behaviour. Although disorder did occur in Nottingham, this was restricted 
to violence against the police and did not involve people trashing their 
neighbourhoods, which was reported to be a feature of the Hyson Riots in 
Nottingham in the early 1980s. Community practitioners reported specifically 
appealing to neighbourhood attachment in their communications with at risk 
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groups, reminding them of inter-connectedness with other local people, including 
shop owners, as an 'external direct' form of control (Kornhouser 1978) (see 
Chapter 7). 
A further reflection on the role of ethnic diversity within the context of urban 
disorder is that it might be a protective factor because of its association with poor 
relational networks. As one respondent commented 'if you’re gonna have a go at 
the biggest gang in the world, the police, you need to be organised' [Sheffield 
Practitioner 1]; and being organised requires a degree of cohesiveness. 
Neighbourhoods containing a greater ethnic mix, and particularly a high 
proportion of new migrants, were considered less likely to riot than other 
neighbourhoods, regardless of crime levels. It has been argued that social 
networks can impede the development of social control if criminal types are 
embedded within them (Browning et al. 2004; Sampson 2006; Pattillo 1998). 
However, the applicability of this argument to urban unrest depends whether it is 
viewed primarily as 'criminal'.  Rioting is a lawful offence, but there is usually a 
political context, being typically foregrounded by social inequality and injustice 
(see Chapter 1).  A sense of grievance was a self-reported motivation for some 
rioters (Prasad 2011; Lewis 2011). There was also the ‘generalised’ anger of 
marginalised groups, who knew not what to blame (Lea & Hallsworth 2012). A lack 
of understanding amongst those involved in riotous behaviour about the structural 
and processual causes of their suffering did not make their response any less 
'political’ if they were rioting because something was definitely not right. Thus, 
social disorganisation theory may be less relevant for understanding urban unrest, 
which may be inversely related to neighbourhood attachment. 
This leads onto the role of linking social capital in preventing unrest. Linking social 
capital is described as people's ties to individuals and institutions with relative 
power over them and offers pathways for the long term survival and revitalisation 
of communities and neighbourhoods (Hawkins & Maurer 2009; Jochum et al. 
2005). This study, similarly found that links between community-based 
practitioners and formal agencies, such as the police and the local authority, can 
help secure resources and resolutions to address community issues. Faith in local 
resolution processes was a protective factor for Sheffield in 2011. A recent policing 
operation had antagonised one of the study neighbourhoods, but community 
practitioners had helped mediate with the police, triggering police efforts to seek a 
remedy and rebuild relationships. In Nottingham, where familial and religious 
networks were less strong, community practitioners were particularly important in 
generating bonding, bridging and linking social capital. However, despite their 
links, practitioners reported frustration at the police, who had not been responsive 
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to calls to change stop and search practices despite many meetings. Additionally, 
police did not seek to involve them in the main public order response in 2011, as 
they did in Sheffield. Had police stepped back to let community workers calm 
tensions, as they did in Leeds, another characteristically similar area that avoided 
riots, this may have inhibited violence at the city level in Nottingham. If urban 
unrest is political, linking social capital offers the potential for a more peaceful 
politics via the relationships community practitioners have with local people 
combined with their expertise and willingness to advocate on their behalf.  
8.4 Policy Implications 
8.4.1 Policing Partnerships 
The study concludes that urban unrest is more likely to be prevented by police and 
partners working together. This gives public order commanders and other key 
decision-makers access to the full range of knowledge and expertise. Involving 
local practitioners is particularly important where they have pre-established 
rapport with communities and especially with at risk groups. However, 
partnerships cannot be established in the moment. Relationships between policing 
partners and communities require long-term investment, which is overlooked by 
recent austerity measures. A recommendation of this research is for cities to 
consider how partnership relations, at managerial and practitioner levels, can be 
prioritised. Formal structures, dedicated partnership roles and co-location have 
been supported these before, and might be considered for re-investment in the 
future. Relationships with the voluntary sector can be adversely or positively 
affected by funding allocation processes and, as important partners in 
understanding and addressing the needs of communities, these processes must be 
perceived as transparent and fair.  
8.4.2 Public Order Policing 
Functioning partnerships ensure there is capability to respond to the threat of 
urban unrest, but partners may still lack the necessary expertise. Sheffield had 
prior experience of responding to similar threats, providing a template for action in 
2011. More generic critical incident protocols and public order policing manuals 
were less helpful, suggesting the need for partners in every city to have a clear 
plan of how to respond to community tensions to prevent them escalating. 
National policing guidance might be revised to highlight the relevance of dialogue 
policing and how neighbourhood officers might perform the current role of Police 
Liaison Teams, due to their local knowledge and rapport. Where riots are a risk, 
local plans might recommend additional roles that have the ability to engage with 
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marginalised groups and protocols for communication and decision-making within 
and between agencies. 
8.4.3 Community Policing 
Repressive policing of communities has been associated with previous riots and 
was identified as a predisposing factor again in 2011. In the two case studies, poor 
police-community relations were primarily linked to interactions with special 
operations and response teams. Residents had much better relations with 
Neighbourhood Policing Teams, particularly via the engagement of PCSOs, who 
worked with other local partners to address complex issues, such as anti-social 
behaviour. These local relationships were key to the success of Sheffield’s public 
order response. However, as a consequence of cost-cutting, PCSOs were reporting 
to be doing increasingly less community engagement and a dramatic re-structure 
near the end of the project virtually abandoned community policing. This study 
supports the view that community engagement is a valuable tool for the police, 
offering greater potential for crime reduction and order maintenance at local 
levels through officers’ relationships with communities. Hence, it supports the 
recent recommendation that South Yorkshire Police re-develop neighbourhood 
policing structures in ways that better support community engagement than they 
do at present (College of Policing 2016a). In the interests of sustainability and 
recognising the national focus on cost-cutting, there is perhaps the possibility for 
geographical variation within future structures, determined by the level and 
nature of support required by different communities in accordance with existing 
informal social controls. Communities have the ability to self-regulate, but there is 
still a role for the police as 'facilitators… rather than creators' of social order (Innes 
& Roberts 2008, p.257). 
The policing of communities in Nottingham was heavily influenced by the police 
perception of a ‘gang’ problem. Interventions succeeding the riots have engaged 
other partners in gang and youth violence initiatives, which, consequently, are 
more informed by understandings of structural and other causal factors. This is 
positive development. Other developments might focus on educating police 
officers, including response teams, about the challenges and needs of the 
communities they work in. Respondents felt that generic diversity training was 
inadequate. Response officers might additionally need to liaise with 
Neighbourhood Policing Teams to ensure sensitivity to local context, to help 
understand what is ‘normal’ in certain areas and the difference between a gang 
and a group.  
  
- 279 - 
8.4.4 Structural factors 
Both case studies referred to the challenges of increasing diversity in 
neighbourhoods, which had implications for social cohesion and the delivery of 
services where some groups did not speak English fluently.  During the riots, local 
ethnic shops helped disseminate protective messages, but this may not be a 
sustainable solution. Social disorganisation theory, and the more recent systemic 
theory, sees diversity as a challenge for social order. Hence, there may be a need 
for localities to monitor the effects of diversity and provide additional support for 
bridging, which can help promote neighbourhood attachment. New migrants can 
be a particular concern if longer-term residents perceive them to be in direct 
competition for resources, which spotlights the role of other structural factors that 
can predispose particular groups to participation in riots. Young men who were not 
in education, employment or training (NEET) were perceived to be at greatest risk 
across the case studies. However, it seems not simply to be a case of forcing them 
into any. Respondents acknowledged that young people need to see that 
education, employment and training opportunities would provide longer term 
reward, both financially and in terms of feelings of personal worth. Hence, a 
recommendation of the study would be that all of these structural factors, though 
difficult to address, should not ignored.  
8.4.5 Community Provision  
Supporting communities own informal social controls seems a way of getting 
'more for less', but in the context of social inequality and population change, 
communities still require external support, in terms of formal policing, as discussed 
above, and social provision. Social ties within and between communities at the 
neighbourhood level confer practical support for individuals and facilitate 
attachment to place, which promotes informal controls. Hence, community 
provision that supports bridging and bonding can help with maintaining social 
order at local levels. School-based initiatives were reported to be beneficial in 
Sheffield. Younger children were found to be less affected by inter-ethnic conflict 
and, thus, could be a conduit for addressing tensions between parents. 
Relationships with local media channels, newspapers and radio stations, might 
promote more responsible reporting. Negative headlines about neighbourhoods 
not only influence how outsiders perceive the area and the people who live there, 
but also how local residents perceive the area and their fellow residents, with a 
potentially damaging impact on the sense of community within the area. (Platts-
Fowler & Robinson 2013, p.24). Conversely, positive stories have the potential to 
reverse these effects. 
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Cuts to youth provision were a strong theme in the research. Unlike adult social 
care and looked after children, there is no statutory requirement to fund youth 
provision and given the scale of the savings recently being sought by local 
authorities, it is unsurprising that young people have lost out. However, young 
people, men in deprived circumstances in particular, are the greatest threat to 
social order. The rapport that youth workers and other community-based 
practitioners have with marginalised young men is key to preventing and 
containing unrest, demonstrated by this study and the empirical research in Leeds 
(Clifton 2012a; Newburn 2015). Yet, practitioners reported how the loss of funding 
had already compromised their rapport. They were generally passionate about 
supporting young people and a number reported working without pay. However, 
as one respondent noted 'riots cannot be stopped on goodwill alone'. Cuts to 
youth provision may be storing up problems for the future, at a time when there 
will also be few people left with an ability to do anything about it. Government 
agencies, at the national and local level, must decide whether the short-term 
savings are worth it.  
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Appendix B – Participant Information Sheet 
 
                                                                                               
Participant Information Sheet 
Study: Beyond the Riots - Policing Social Disorder and Urban Unrest 
You are being invited to take part in a research project. Before you decide it is 
important for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will 
involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully and discuss it 
with others if you wish. Ask us if there is anything that is not clear or if you would 
like more information. Take time to decide whether or not you wish to take part. 
What is the purpose of the research? 
Research has previously found that riots are linked to poverty, inequality, injustice, 
and austerity. This study will consider how the police, other local agencies and 
communities can work together to help prevent and limit social disorder even 
where these conditions exist. To identify useful approaches and practices, which 
take local factors into account, the research will explore how disorder developed 
and was prevented in two cities –Nottingham and Sheffield – during the 2011 
English riots. 
Why have I been chosen? 
Approximately 60 individual or group interviews are planned across the cities of 
Nottingham and Sheffield. People and organisations are being approached to 
participate if they: 
 have an understanding of the places or communities worst affected, or 
threatened by, the 2011 riots; 
 observed or were involved in actions to prevent and manage disorder 
at the time of the 2011 riots; 
 have been involved in understanding and/or responding to the events 
of 2011. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
It is your decision whether or not to take part. No-one else, not even your 
employer, can make this decision for you. If you do decide to take part you will be 
given this information sheet to keep (and be asked to sign a consent form) and you 
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can still withdraw at any time without any consequences, and you do not have to 
give a reason. 
What will I have to do? 
The research will last for approximately 1-2 years. Participants will usually be asked 
to just one interview. In a few cases it may be necessary to contact participants a 
second time, to seek clarification on something they or another participant may 
have said. Interviews will be relatively informal. The interviewer may want to talk 
about some specific topics, but participants will be able to respond to questions in 
their own way. 
Confidentiality and anonymity 
Anything that you say during the course of the research will be kept strictly 
confidential. Any notes and audio-recordings of conversations will kept safe by the 
research team, and will not be shared with anyone else. You will not be able to be 
identified in any reports or publications. Any quotations and descriptions of roles 
and situations will be anonymised. 
This commitment to confidentiality will only be broken where a participant reveals 
plans to cause physical harm to themselves or another person. In this case, the 
interviewer will stop the interview, check they have understood correctly, and tell 
the participant which information they intend to report, and to which agency (such 
as the police).  
Who is organising/ funding the research? 
This study is funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) and 
supported by a group of Universities, including Leeds, York and Sheffield, which 
together are known as the White Rose Doctoral Training Centre.  
Contact for further information 
Deborah Platts-Fowler (PGR) 
University of Sheffield 
School of Law 
Bartolome House 
Winter Street 
Sheffield S3 7ND 
Tel: 07904 526934 
E-mail: lwdpf@leeds.ac.uk / lw4dp@sheffield.ac.uk 
 
Finally … 
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Participants will be given a copy of this information sheet and a signed consent 
form to keep. The researcher will contact you via your preferred method of 
contact to arrange an interview. 
 
Thank you for taking the time to read through this information. 
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Appendix D – Interview Topic Guides 
Nottinghamshire Police – Senior/ Public Order Officer 
 
1. What was your role during the August 2011 disorders? 
 
2. How do you think the disturbances in Nottingham were different to those 
elsewhere in the country? 
 nature of the disturbances? 
 how did they begin? 
 
3. Where did the disturbances mainly take place, and why here? 
 nature of the place / residents? 
 historical events? 
 nature of the relationships between residents and statutory agencies? 
 
4. Any particular groups over-represented, and why 
 
5. Any forewarning of the violence? 
 
6. Can you tell me about the police response? 
 any specific strategies or processes put in place?  
 proactive or reactive? 
 
7. Did the location of the threat affect the response in any way? 
 Different approaches for dealing with commercial areas and residential 
areas? 
 
8. How was the response staffed? 
 enough capacity / trained in public order? 
 specialist roles involved? – liaison officers? 
 how were neighbourhood policing teams involved? 
 
9. To what extent were statutory and voluntary sector partners involved? 
 which partners, and at what level? 
 how were the relationships between partners? 
 
10. To what extent were members of the public involved? 
 
11. What information / intelligence was used to inform the response? 
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 from where/who? 
 what information was / would have been most useful ? 
 
12. Was there a specific communication strategy, and how well did this work? 
 within the force? (with neighbourhood officers) 
 with partner agencies and communities 
 what media channels were used? 
 
13. What do you think were the main successes of Nottingham's overall response? 
 
14. What could have worked better, and why? 
 
15. How have police relationships with the public been affected by the events in 
2011? 
 generally / in areas worst affected? 
 
16. How has August 2011 informed approaches for dealing with any future 
threats to public order? 
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Nottinghamshire Police – Neighbourhood Policing Team 
 
1. Can you tell me about your role in the neighbourhood team 
 number of officers, and roles, in the team 
 
2. How is the area to police? 
 Nature of community 
 what are the main crime and disorder issues 
 do people cooperate with the police - attend meetings, provide 
information 
 
3. Why do you think the disturbances occurred in this neighbourhood? 
 how did they begin – spontaneous violence or gradual build-up of 
conflict? 
 any particular groups over-represented in the violence, why? 
 
4. Any forewarning of the violence? 
 past public order incidents in these areas / with these groups (12 
months previous)? 
 
5. What was your role in responding to the disorders? 
 
6. What can you tell me about the wider response to the disturbances? 
 proactive / reactive 
 national models / local approaches 
 who involved - police roles, and other agencies, local groups and 
members of the public 
 
7. Did the location of the threat affect the response in any way? 
 Different approaches for dealing with commercial areas and residential 
areas? 
 
8. How well was the local policing team integrated into this response? 
 
9. How were key decisions made? 
 Locally or centrally 
 which roles / partners involved? 
 what information/intelligence informed decisions? 
 
10. Was there a communication strategy, and how well did this work? 
 locally, city-wide? 
 what media channels were used? 
 
11. What do you think were the main successes of Nottingham's response? 
 what specifically helped to contain the disturbances? 
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 policing vs. other stakeholders 
 
12. What could have worked better, and why? 
 locally and centrally 
 
13. How have police-community relationships been affected by the agency 
response in 2011? 
 any subsequent changes to local policing? 
 
14. Do you think there is an ongoing threat to social order in this neighbourhood? 
 
15. How has August 2011 informed approaches for dealing with any future 
threats to public order? 
 
16. How well placed to response now, given cuts and re-organisation of police and 
other services? 
  
- 328 - 
Nottingham Agency – Manager / Strategic 
 
1. Can you tell me a bit about your role now and during the August 2011 
disorders? 
 
2. How do you think the disturbances in Nottingham were different to those 
elsewhere in the country? 
 
3. Where did the disturbances mainly take place, and why here? 
 anything about the physical environment? 
 history of public disorder? 
 nature of the relationships between residents, other communities, and 
agencies? 
 any local grievances? 
 
4. Any forewarning of the violence? 
 
5. Can you tell me about the council response? 
 were any specific strategies or processes put in place? 
 when put in place? 
 proactive or reactive? 
 
6. Did the location of the disturbances affect the response in any way? 
 
7. What do you know about the staffing? 
 no. of officers and specialist roles involved? 
 trained in dealing with public order issues? 
 
8. To what extent were other stakeholders involved? 
 which agencies, and at what level? 
 how were the relationships between partners? 
 To what extent were members of the public involved? 
 
9. What information / intelligence was used to inform the response? 
 from where/who? 
 what information was / would have been most useful ? 
 
10. How were key decisions made? 
 how was level of risk assessed? (ask about ‘National Decision Model’) 
 which roles / partners involved? 
 
11. Was there a specific communication strategy, and how well did this work? 
 Internally 
 with partner agencies and communities 
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 what media channels were used? 
 
12. What do you think were the main successes of Nottingham's overall response? 
 what specifically helped to contain the disturbances? 
 
13. What could have worked better, and why? 
 
14. How have been the outcomes of the events 2011? 
 Affected relationships with community /agencies 
 Funding 
 informed approaches for dealing with any future threats to public 
order? 
 
15. How well placed to respond to future threats? 
 Re. cuts and re-organisation of police and other services? 
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South Yorkshire Police – Senior/ Public Order Officer 
1. What was your role during the August 2011 disorders? 
 
2. How real was the threat? 
 where was the threat thought to be greatest, and why? 
 which groups thought to present the greatest threat, and why? 
 Did any significant incidents occur anywhere? 
 
3. Can you tell me about the police response? 
 when was this put in place (following 1st outbreak of violence in London 
on Sat 6 Aug)? 
 specialist roles / public order police involved? 
 level of involvement by neighbourhood police officers - trained in 
public order policing? 
 
4. Did the location of the threat affect the response in any way? 
 Different approaches for dealing with commercial areas and residential 
areas? 
 
5. How was the response staffed? 
 enough capacity / trained in public order? 
 specialist roles involved? – liaison officers? 
 how were neighbourhood policing teams involved? 
 
6. To what extent were statutory and voluntary sector partners involved? 
 which partners, and at what level? 
 how were the relationships between partners? 
 
7. To what extent were members of the public involved? 
 community leaders  / established groups / or wider involvement of the 
public? 
 
8. What information and intelligence was used to inform the response? 
 from where/who? (local?) 
 what information was / would have been most useful ? 
 
9. How were key decisions made? 
 which roles / partners involved? 
 how was level of risk assessed? (ask about ‘National Decision Model’) 
 who made the final call? 
 
10. Was there a specific communication strategy, and how well did this work? 
 within the force? (with neighbourhood officers) 
 with partner agencies and communities 
 what media channels were used? 
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11. What do you think were the main successes of Sheffield's response? 
 specific policing factors 
 
12. What could have worked better, and why? 
 
13. How have relationships with the public been affected by the agency response 
in 2011? 
generally / in areas worst affected? 
 
14. How has August 2011 informed approaches for dealing with any future threats 
to public order? 
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Sheffield Agency – Manager / Strategic 
 
1. Can you tell me a bit about your role during the August 2011 disorders? 
 
2. Why do you think Sheffield avoided large scale disorder? 
 
3. How real was the threat? - any significant incidents occur anywhere? 
 
4. Where was the threat thought to be greatest, and why? 
 nature of the place / people? 
 historical events / grievances? 
 nature of the relationships between residents and statutory agencies? 
 
5. Can you tell me about the council response? 
 were any specific strategies or processes put in place? 
 when put in place? 
 proactive or reactive? 
 
6. Did the location of the threat affect the response in any way? 
 
7. What do you know about the staffing? 
 no. of officers and specialist roles involved? 
 trained in dealing with public order issues? 
 
8. To what extent were other stakeholders involved? 
 which agencies, and at what level? 
a. how were the relationships between partners? 
b. To what extent were members of the public involved? 
 
9. What information / intelligence was used to inform the response? 
 from where/who? 
 what information was / would have been most useful ? 
 
10. How were key decisions made? 
 how was level of risk assessed? (ask about ‘National Decision Model’) 
 which roles / partners involved? 
 
11. Was there a specific communication strategy, and how well did this work? 
 Internally  
 with partner agencies and communities 
 what media channels were used? 
 
12. What do you think were the main successes of Sheffield's response? 
 
13. What could have worked better, and why? 
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14. How have been the outcomes of the events 2011? 
 Affected relationships with community /agencies 
 Funding 
 informed approaches for dealing with any future threats to public 
order? 
 
15. How well placed to respond to future threats? 
 Re. cuts and re-organisation of police and other services? 
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Sheffield Agency – Community Practitioner 
1. Can you tell me about your role in the community 
 
2. Can you tell me about how you felt when you became aware of the riots in 
London? 
 
3. Did you think there was a real threat that your community would experience 
similar disorder, and why? 
 
4. Where was the threat thought to be greatest, and why? 
 
5. Which groups were thought to present the greatest threat, and why? 
 
6. Did any significant incidents occur in the local area? 
 
7. What did you do when you became aware of the riots in London and 
elsewhere? 
 
8. Were you aware of what others were doing in the area during that time? 
 Police 
 Youth services 
 Council officers and ward councillors 
 Community organisations  
 Residents? 
 
9. Were these various organisations/groups working together? 
 Police and youth workers 
 Agencies and residents 
 
10. Was there a communication strategy, to let you and others know what was 
happening and what was being done by police and partners? 
 locally, city-wide? 
 what media channels were used? 
 
11. What do you think were the main successes of Sheffield's response? 
 what specifically helped to contain the disturbances? 
 policing vs. other stakeholders 
 
12. What could have worked better, and why? 
 locally and centrally 
 
13. How have community relationships with the police and other agencies been 
affected by the response in 2011? 
 how were relations then and now? 
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 any subsequent changes to policing practice? 
 
14. How well do you think police and other organisations would be able to cope 
with a future threat? 
 Lessons learnt from responding to the threat in 2011? 
 Organisational changes that might affect future response (i.e. cuts)? 
  
- 336 - 
Abbreviated Topic Guide – Community Practitioner 
 
1. Your role- what do you do? 
 
2. What started to happen in your community/organisation when disorders 
occurring in London and elsewhere? 
 
3. How were local people feeling/ what doing? 
 
4. Aware of what other agencies (police / council) were doing 
(before/during)? 
 
5. Joined-up response with other agencies? 
 
6. What occurred locally? (any significant incidents / could have been 
prevented) 
 
7. What did police and agencies do well? 
 
8. What could police and agencies have done better? 
 
9. How agency response affected relationships with local people (inc. police)?  
a. How were relations with before? 
b. Relations influenced local events? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
